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# THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1883.

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NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1883.

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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

## JANUARY, 1883.


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THE

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

*EDITED BY ALLEN THORNDIKE RICE.*

VOL. CXXXVI.

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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1883.

NOV 10 1964

August 1901.
3/21/12

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1883.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXIV.

JANUARY, 1883.

# THE REVISION OF CREEDS.

PART I.

REV. DR. SMYTH.

RESTATEMENT of creeds has always been only a question of time. From the beginning the church has always at least held its creeds subject to renewals and adaptations to the times. In the ante-Nicene period several formulas of faith appeared. The so-called Apostles' Creed was a gradual growth. An ancient baptismal formula was expanded into the Nicene Creed, and a century had not passed before that first ecumenical symbol was in turn enlarged. Its closing anathema disappeared from later reaffirmations of it. The solemn decree of the fathers at Ephesus did not protect it from additions by the Council of Chalcedon, nor did their prohibition of any new creed prevent their own from receiving further definition by a still later council. This most unchangeable of creeds, as it still stands in the liturgy of the Church, shows upon more than one of its ancient expressions marks of time and change. Rome has repeatedly restated or defined its infallible teachings. The Protestant Confessions disclose the same tendency, and in still greater force, toward multiplication and periodic renewals. Confession followed confession in Lutheran and Reformed churches; the first Scotch Confession was followed by the second Scotch Confession; the thirty-nine articles of the Church of England were buttressed in twenty-

four years by the Lambeth articles. Neither Episcopacy nor Presbyterianism altogether escaped change in passing to America.

A brief glance at the history of creeds is sufficient to indicate the working of some law of growth, and, to some extent, of revision, in Christian theology, and to justify the inference that further statements and restatements of faith must follow in their own time. The significant fact should not be overlooked, that this process of renewal and rejuvenescence of creeds is no accidental matter; it is the first law of Christian creeds, for they contain within themselves the principle of their own revision. The Protestant Confessions, in particular, distinctly assume the possibility of their own improvement, for they uniformly subject themselves to the Word of God as their supreme law. Whoever subscribes to these creeds is bound in honor to hold them always in subordination to his study of the Scriptures. He violates, not merely their letter, but their life, if he does not so hold them. This principle of the supremacy of Scripture is a formative principle of Protestant creeds, and it involves in it the admission, and at times the obligation, of their revision. Consequently, honesty in subscription may require more than a stalwart adherence to their terms; it may sometimes lay upon such as are able to bear it, the duty of criticism, and the burden of restating their truths; as fidelity to a trust may sometimes require careful reinvestment of funds, while refusal or negligence to save a property by timely reinvestment might satisfy the letter, and break the intention, of a deed. It needs to be insisted that loyalty to the real mission of historic creeds, as well as obedience to their higher law of the Scriptures, which is acknowledged in the very act of subscription, may bring to honest men the duty of their preservation by their revision.

The practical question, then, is not whether creeds may be reinvested in better forms of statement by theologians who hold them in trust, but whether the work of revision is timely; whether, in any particular age, the time is fully come, and the necessity apparent, for a fresh readaptation of Christian doctrine to the thoughts and lives of men. Does this work lie now before the door of the Protestant Church?

Certain general principles of the formation of creeds should be considered before we can gain a broad judgment concerning the present timeliness of their revision. Creeds are growths; they follow laws of development. No great creed can be made;

it must be born. Any confession of faith which has vitality enough to live in the thoughts of men, is a birth of the spirit of an age; not the manufacture of a convocation of ecclesiastics. Living creeds are never made to order; they come forth from the struggles and throes of thought; they are born of the truest and best life of an age. Those solid stratifications of belief, the historic creeds of the Church, were not upheaved by theological catastrophes; — intense fires may have burned beneath them; forces which had been gathering strength for years may have broken out with apparent suddenness upon the surface, and in some one great soul the new era may have begun; but the law of progress in the moral world, as in the natural, is a law of growth and age-long development. We can trace a process of development of doctrine in the New Testament itself. The epochs of Christian history have proved no exceptions to this law of all progress. Thus the roots of the Reformation run far back, and deep down, into the richest Christian life and the most fertile thought of the preceding era. We may depend upon it, then, that we cannot manufacture by ecclesiastical contrivance, or produce by theological forcing, a creed that will live and be a power among men; the only question is whether, by the grace of God, any new creed for the Church is coming to the birth in these days; and if providence is about to send into the churches a creed, born anew of the spirit of truth, which shall inherit the past, and also be the heir of modern knowledge, and prove equal to present responsibilities of thought, then, surely, the Church of the living God should be ready to receive it, and to ordain it with its authority for the work to which it shall be called of God.

Our limits will permit only the brief mention of signs of the times which may betoken the opportunity for a revised creed.

*First.* An important and well-established development of philosophy and science may bring a new crisis to creeds. The ancient and solid masonry of systems once held impregnable, may not answer at all the necessities of modern warfare. Christian faith may be called to meet the alternative of marching out from some ecclesiastical fortifications, or else being buried beneath their ruins. Thus, at the Reformation, faith abandoned the protection of sacerdotalism, and defended itself with the sword of the Spirit in the open field of the new learning. There is, and must always be going on, a process of adaptation, or correlation, between the environment of thought in an age and the vitality

of its faith. Creeds must be subject to a certain process of acclimatization; and that, not because they are dead, but because they are things of life. A dead creed may need watchers, but not physicians. It may require eulogies and epitaphs, but not reclothing and improvement. The fears of some should be relieved by the reflection that revision is a vitalizing process, not a work of destruction.

*Second.* Some continued and pronounced movement of religious life may renew the creed of a church. Some fresh influx of spiritual power, as in Wesleyanism, may overflow traditional forms of belief, and require larger statement of belief. The Spirit of God through the revived life of the people may compel the theology of the schools to cast off its worthless branches, and to put forth fresh leaves in their season. Or before some gigantic form of error belief may be forced to divest itself of encumbrances, to choose again perhaps the simpler shepherd's sling, and to leave unused the carefully jointed arguments and iron-clad logic in which great defenders of the faith have thought themselves invincible, in order that it may overcome with its simpler faith the proud unbelief of the hour.

These two factors, the inward growth of faith, and the stimulus of some new form of error, may work together in producing greater works of faith. Thus the creed of Nicæa was the result of these concurrent forces, a growing appreciation in the thought of the Church of the essential deity of Christ, and the threatening Arian heresy. So in the Reformation, under the powerful excitement of the danger from Papal indulgences, the truth of justification by faith, which had been long latent in the heart of pietism, came to the light in Luther's theses, and ripened in the Augsburg Confession.

*Third.* Any deep-seated popular distrust of the belief supposed to be held in the churches, or a growing separation between the common Christian sense of Christian people and the standards of a denomination, may prove a providential necessity for restatement, and, possibly, simplification of the doctrines of faith. A plain man, accustomed to judge things by their appearance, may be at a loss to understand the liberties which theologians seem to take with ancient creeds. The trained theologian possesses the historic sense, is familiar with the controversies in which words have received their technical stamp, perceives at a

glance the self-limitations of creeds, can follow down into present issues the trend and true purpose of the successive confessions of the Church; and he therefore may be able with honorable intention to subscribe to forms of words which to the plain man seem to bristle and strive against any attempt to force them into conformity with present ways of speech. The churches seem to him, in their seminaries and their pulpits, to put in honor standards under which believers are not marching in their real conflict in the world; and a suspicion of theological casuistry, if not of Jesuitical evasion, falls upon the ministry who are required to profess conformity to such standards. This distrust may spring partly from an impracticable idea of creed-subscription. An elaborate theological or denominational creed is not, as sometimes seems to be supposed, a contract to be signed and kept to the letter; it is a platform for organization and united action. Plain men do not understand, when they assent to a political platform by the most positive subscription of a vote, that they are thereby bound in honor to believe in every identical word of it, and to give up altogether the right of criticising their party and even of differing from it upon particular points of its faith. Whatever crudeness and misconceptions, however, there may be in the popular idea of subscription to creeds,—a misunderstanding, be it observed, often fed by theological partisans in their anxiety to bind others to their particular construction of orthodoxy,—certainly the existence of a widespread uneasiness and distrust in the popular mind upon this subject must be regarded as an evil, and an evil, too, which the governing powers of a church can ignore only at the cost of their own influence among the people. It will not do if the theologians are satisfied with their "rights in ancient creeds," and the people are not. There is a sound apostolic principle which possibly may have application in some churches to their creeds as well as to their charities, that the strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak. Even conservators of orthodoxy might find in the application of this higher law of love to some creeds a reason for their simplification, although they may be satisfied with the Westminster Confession, and in consenting to its revision do not please themselves. "The Church," we may need frequently to be reminded, "was not made for theology, but theology was made for the church." I do not mean that we should be ready to trim our creeds to the fashion of the hour; a good creed like a strong

oak, does not bend to the passing breeze. The great problems of theology are not to be resettled by the newspapers. But I do mean that one of the providential signs of new work for the guardians of the faith to bestir themselves about, is the prevalence among the people, and in some churches, of a feeling that the theology of the creeds and the theology of the pulpit, the philosophy of the confessions and the working philosophy of the church, do not correspond. Among the laity of some churches, as the Presbyterian, this conviction prevails more generally than seems to be recognized among the clergy. I remarked that our theology cannot be remade for us in the newspapers; but the columns of the secular press may be good witnesses to the popular sense of need that our theologies should bring their standards up to the questions of the times.

Those, however, who are most keenly alive to this state of things among the people, may not be clear that the hour has struck for active effort in this direction. Some have deemed it wisest to spend their energy in helping their particular churches out and up to higher and broader views of revelation. They recognize the immense amount of preliminary work to be done before revision of a time-honored confession, like the Westminster, can be brought about quietly and beneficently; they wish for reformation rather than revolution; they wait for the fears and oppositions of good men to subside. They concern themselves mostly with the work of the real improvement of theology, leaving the ecclesiastical ratification of it to follow in due time. Such men must expect to be exposed to a double misunderstanding; on the one hand they will be regarded as bringers in of divisions, brethren whose own sense of honor should lead them to take themselves out of the communions in which they too were born, and which to them also are a sacred heritage from the fathers. On the other hand, they will be suspected of not knowing their own "drift," or of concealing their real opinions, and neighborly hands will be stretched out to them, and they will be claimed by bodies with whom they would observe only that general fellowship which all who are called Christian should be careful to maintain toward one another. But if their loyalty forbids them voluntarily to forsake their own birthright for other folds, their honor, also, will not permit them to be read out of their own churches; they will stay upon their own ancestral ground and finish upon it whatever work for the renewal of the

received theology may be given them to do. In this determination they will be strengthened by the reflection that they follow the highest example: for Jesus of Nazareth did not find himself constrained in honor to depart from the synagogue while he was training his disciples to build up his church, and he conformed to the customs of the Temple whose law he knew was to be fulfilled in his Gospel. The greatest of the Apostles was loyal to the Old Testament even while writing the epistles of Christian liberty for the New; and he would not be forced into the leadership of a party at Corinth, but was anxious to return to Jerusalem at Pentecost. He was making the first great revision of the creed of Christendom even while he could in good conscience take upon himself a Jewish vow. Those, therefore, who are consciously and really working for theological reform may stay where they are, and refer their inquisitors to the chief of the Apostles, and even to the great Example. It is never dishonest, it is always Christian, to seek to find the fulfillment of the old truth in the new knowledge. Such is true Apostolic conservatism.

The specific question is now in order, how far are these principles and conditions met in any present demand for revision or restatement of creeds? I have room to mention only the more important tendencies of our times, which are bringing this work to the attention of our churches.

No intelligent observer can deny that a powerful movement in theology has reached our shores. Many, however, mistake mere incidental turns, or momentary effects of it, for the sweep of the current, or the character of the whole movement. This "new theology,"—as it is called by those who do not realize how largely it is a return to a theology older than our Latin creeds,—may be generally described by the following characteristics.

(1) It is ethical rather than legal. Luther went back for his theology to the Bible, and Augustine, and Tauler. Calvin went back for his theology to the Bible, and Augustine, and the Roman law. The new theology goes back to the Bible and the Christian consciousness for its authority and its light; to the Bible with a more scientific principle of interpretation than Calvin could gain from Augustine, and to Christian consciousness with a more historical method than Luther could gain from the mysticism of the "German Theology." The "new theology" recognizes the fact that a chilling rationalism, or an unhealthy

pietism, has been the nemesis of much that was one-sided and imperfect in the theological revival which came to a pause in the seventeenth century. The present theological renaissance seeks to take up again and to carry forward to larger fulfillment the theology of the Reformation, which has been arrested in legalism and confessionalism. It will work out in their unity, on the field of modern criticism, Luther's two principles of the Reformation — the Bible and faith. It will think his mysticism out into a spiritual philosophy of the validity of faith. It will put Calvin's Institutes into a more comprehensive philosophy of history, and take his Latin principle of sovereignty up into a glowing Christian conception of the supremacy of love. The "new theology" is the oldest theology: it has its origin not in Holland, nor in the pulpit of Dr. Emmons; but it follows the ways of the Spirit through history, listening to all the prophets, and sitting at the feet of all true scholars, growing more simple and child-like of spirit as it learns from many masters, and comes through many lands, to open the Scriptures afresh for our wants, and to keep our faith untouched by the evil of our world.

The new ethical theology goes back, behind the principles of the Roman law, and the deductions of legalism, to primary and essential relations of moral persons for its analogies and the alphabet of its reasonings concerning God and his relations, historical and governmental, to man. It claims to fulfill the lower theologies in its ethical and spiritual comprehension.

(2) The method of this ethical theology is characteristic. Its style is Gothic rather than classic. It can be pointed and definitive; it can run clear lines high up; but it is impatient of rounded and closed systems; it leads up along all its lines to the thought of something greater than can be inclosed in circles of logical definition, and it is always suggestive of the infinite. Its method is to look abroad, and endeavor to see things as they are—the near object in its distinctness, and the truth left by revelation on the far horizons of knowledge in its indistinctness. It seeks for clear ideas, and among the first of these some clear idea of our own ignorance and the limits of revelation.

(3) It is distinguished by its inductive study of the Scriptures. This is its most generally accepted characteristic. The new epoch is marked by the advent of biblical theology. Its scientific method of discovering the meaning of different Scriptures will put away forever scholastic circumventions, verbal artifices, and systematic casuistries, in the study of God's word.

Another tendency of significance in this connection is the present movement from all sides toward Christian unity. Protestantism has apparently turned the goal of its age of separations, and is already moving on toward catholicity. The age of individualism was first necessary in Christian history; and it has had its day in Puritanism and the atomic Calvinism of New England theology. The truth of the individual right and responsibility before God has done its work—a great work—both for the church and the nation; its fruit shall remain in the coming age of rounder biblical faith and Christian catholicity. He who does not discern the undercurrent of life which is carrying all sects out toward one broad communion—who does not heed the demands upon the best thought and devotion which this movement brings with it to every living church—who would strengthen the barriers of sectarianism or provincial theologies against it—he must be blind to one of the most glorious providences of our generation, and dull of hearing to one of the clearest calls to go forward which has come in any century to the people of God.

One more fact of the times must be gathered into the conclusion of this matter. The error of our day is not any of the heresies against which the historic creeds were built up. Faith finds now its antagonism, not in denial of some particular doctrine of grace, nor in some faulty theory of some essential truth; but rather in the twofold opposition of materialism in science and materialism in life. Obviously the creeds erected to protect the church from this last and comprehensive denial must be different constructions from those which faced Unitarianism, or were made strong on the side opposing deism. Creeds, if they are to be worth anything for defensive warfare, must be made to face present issues, and be brought within range of modern denials. The paramount question now does not lie between different interpretations of Christianity in as many different sects; it is, whether there is any divine revelation, whether we have any religion at all. It is one of the services which science has rendered religion that its progress has compelled believers to go up higher, and to come out from their traditional controversies, to stand together and confidently upon the first principles of their faith.

Of one large and influential denomination, the Presbyterian —whose tolerance I have never had occasion to question—the call for revision would seem, at least, to require some plain,

official declaration of what is not now involved in subscription to their historic theology.

It has been the boast of Congregationalists that for them the Word of God is not bound. Their councils have repeatedly reaffirmed the principles of evangelical liberty. Of their leading seminaries, one is bound to orthodoxy by the loyal spirit of its custodians and faculty, more than by any form of subscription; and the other, in the judgment of those most responsible for its management, is not fettered to any past or passing form of orthodoxy. A commission, moreover, is now at work in formulating a new creed, not as another bond, but as a better confession of the faith commonly held in their churches. To the Congregationalists the demand comes, then, not for ecclesiastical liberation, but for honest, hopeful work in furthering Biblical studies and in meeting the thoughts of men's hearts by more spiritual teaching and preaching, emptied of the dregs and bitterness of past controversies, and full of the Spirit of Christ.

One practical question should be touched upon in conclusion. Two ways of revision of creeds seem possible. The one would be the short way of return to the Apostles' Creed. This solution of the question would be in harmony with one of the main tendencies of the new theology, which, as we have seen, has already worked its way back, around and behind the rugged Latin theology, to find a broad place and fresh life in the faith of primitive Christianity. Possibly the so-called Apostles' Creed might prove that "large thing in the midst of all the churches," which shall be the comprehensive formula for Christianity. But the theological renaissance in our age is more than a revival of ante-Nicene theology. Another way of meeting these providential demands upon Christian belief may be possible: not so easy a way, nor so short, yet one promising in the end larger results. That course, and to us it seems the more excellent way, is for each church to strive to work its own inherited creeds out from scholastic confessionalism into catholicity; for every honest scholar, in every church in earnest enough with truth to leave room for honest thought, to revise its beliefs in his own mind, seeking studiously to conserve in his growing thought and knowledge whatever truth he may find at the root of his own early training, whatever word of the Spirit has been the vitality of any dogma which now may seem to him overgrown with error. In this method of working, which is both loyal, honest, and brave, we

may hope to grow into a rich simplicity of faith which shall possess the child-like spirit of the early Apostles' Creed, together with the wisdom of the ripe age of the Church.

NEWMAN SMYTH.

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REV. DR. ABBOTT.

IN theological science, as in all other sciences, a clear distinction exists, though it is not always recognized, between facts and theories, between phenomena and the explanations afforded of the phenomena. Thus, for example, there is no question in any mind that great varieties are observable in the forms of animal life—great varieties, that is, of species. This is an unquestionable fact. The disputes which have taken place in the scientific world relate to the question how this fact is to be accounted for; in other words, what is the origin of these varieties of species. The great facts of the religious life are as absolutely certain, as entirely unquestionable, as the facts of material science. It is true that a larger and broader experience accompanying the development of the race renders more various and more complex the facts of the religious life. But it is equally true that a more patient and painstaking observation, a more careful study of the forms of life of the past, and a wider generalization and more careful classification, have also brought, either actually to our knowledge or to our wise comprehension, a much larger range of facts in material science than was formerly recognized. But in both domains the facts are not matters of dispute. In the religious life, as in every phase of life, belief in the facts remains substantially unchanged from generation to generation. There is no material change of opinion respecting them. The belief of man in them is as certain as it ever was, and is much clearer and more intelligent. The changes which have taken place in theology are of two kinds: they are either changes in the form of expression of the facts of the religious life, or they are changes of opinion respecting the proper philosophical explanation of those experiences.

Our church creeds are, for the most part, statements not of religious facts, but of religious theories; and our theological controversies are almost entirely about, not the facts, but the theories. To illustrate: there is no doubt, in any thoughtful mind, respecting the fact of sin and its universality. The expression,

in the prayer of confession, in the Episcopal Prayer-Book, utters the universal experience of all spiritually-minded men: "We have done the things we ought not to have done, and we have left undone the things that we ought to have done, and there is no health in us." The existence of this fact is recognized practically in every family, in the administration of parental government; in every community, by the institution of police systems, the erection of prisons, and the establishment of punitive systems; in every religion, in the language of confession and the petition for pardon; and in every individual soul, in its own consciousness of shame, disgrace, or remorse, in the view of its own sins and shortcomings. This is the fact; belief in this fact is both broader and profounder than it ever was before, and it will grow broader and profounder as the race progresses in moral and spiritual development.

How are we to account for this fact; how reconcile it with the all but universal belief that the world is the product of, and subject to, a wise and beneficent Divine Ruler? To this question two antagonistic systems of philosophy make two antagonistic answers. The traditional philosophy of the Church replies, "God made man perfect. The first man fell into sin, and all his descendants have inherited from him sinful proclivities." The modern philosophy of evolution replies, "God is gradually developing higher forms of life out of lower forms; the intellectual and the spiritual out of the animal and the sensuous, and it is in this process of gradual development that the supremacy of the lower over the higher, *i.e.*, sin, shows itself."

To illustrate again: the fact of the forgiveness of sins is unquestionable. That there is an experience of succor from remorse, and of peace in a sense of pardon, is not doubted by any one who has given any thoughtful consideration to the history of humanity. This is the fact which the oldest of our church symbols, the Apostles' Creed, represents by the declaration: "I believe in the forgiveness of sins." How this forgiveness of sins is brought about, how this peace is afforded, how the soul that has separated from God, and from all that is good, and pure, and holy, by its lapse into selfishness, animalism, sensuality, is brought into fellowship with God; in other words, what is the nature and operation of the atonement, is a question upon which conflicting schools of theology have contended from the earliest ages, and will probably go on contending to the end. Again:

that there is a Divine Spirit, that he influences the spirits of men, that he comforts us in our trouble, strengthens us in our weakness, helps us in our temptations, and guides us in our perplexity, redeeming and uplifting men, and changing, by his beatific influence, the whole course and current of their lives, is as certain as any fact of history. What this mystic influence is, how it is related to the Divine Father of us all, whether we are to call it an influence, or a person, what explanation, in other words, we are to give of this phenomenon, by what theory we are to account for it,—these are questions on which philosophers and theologians have disputed from the beginning, and probably will continue to dispute to the end.

When the question is asked whether the opinions of men do not differ widely from the creeds they profess to hold, the true answer must take account of this very simple distinction between fact and theory. In so far as these creeds embody a statement of the facts of religious experience, there has been no departure from them; there has only been a deepening conviction of their truth. But from the philosophic explanations of those facts, afforded by the creeds of the sixteenth century, there is going on a rapid departure. Old methods of explaining the facts of sin, and pardon, and divine inspiring and redeeming influences, are not satisfactory to men who endeavor to bring them into harmony with modern thought and modern knowledge. Some religious teachers, following, unconsciously, the lead of Pope Pius IX., declare emphatically that it is a heresy to attempt to bring theology into harmony with modern thought. Some are content to hold both the modern theories of science and the ancient theories of religion, incongruous though they may be, without attempting to reconcile them. Some endeavor to frame new theories of religion to conform to the better knowledge and new scientific theories of our own times. Some are content to hold fast to the great facts of the religious life as witnessed in human consciousness and testified to by wide observation, and leave the scientific explanation of them to the future. These four classes represent the four classes of theological thinkers of to-day. The progress of the Church is from the first two toward the latter two.

This analysis, if it be correct, answers the question whether a restatement of creed is desirable, and if so, what kind of restatement should be made?

Three methods of reconstruction are possible. *First.* We may undertake to construct a new science of religion, to find, that is, new philosophical explanations for the great facts of religious experience. The time has not yet come for this; I doubt if it ever will come. Individuals may write theologies; the Church never should have undertaken to write a theology, and probably never will undertake it again. There is no more reason why the theologians should come together in a great assembly and combine in a common explanation of the philosophy of religious phenomena, than why the scientific teachers should meet in convention and oracularly declare what are the true explanations of physical phenomena.

*Second.* We may restate the facts of religious life, with brief, comprehensive, and generic explanation of their causes. We may thus, perhaps with profit, disinthrall ourselves from the intellectual bondage which the traditions of the past impose upon us. The Congregationalists have recently appointed a Commission to restate Congregational faith; and if they are to succeed at all in this somewhat difficult task, it is in this direction they must look for success. But any restatement of the theories of religion, however simple it may be, can hardly prove more than temporary; and its chief value will be in a breaking loose from old theories rather than in a formulation of new ones, and, perhaps, still more, in the reaffirmation involved of those great facts of spiritual consciousness which give the chief, if not the sole, value to all creeds.

*Third.* Or, finally, we may abandon all attempt to make dogmatic and authoritative statements of the explanation of religious experience, and content ourselves with simply affirming the great facts of the religious life: sin, redemption, God, immortality, and judgment. Man is not only an immature and imperfect being yet to be developed into the blossom and fruit; he is sinful and guilty, knowingly doing and being that which is wrong, and requiring, before he is fitted for relationship with the pure and the holy, a radical transformation of character. The burden of the past and the fear of the future which sin involves can be, and is, lifted off from the human heart by the assurance of divine forgiveness hinted at in nature, more clearly declared in Scripture, and receiving its supreme attestation in the consciousness of peace and pardon experienced by the soul. There is a power out of ourselves which makes for righteousness; we cannot lift

ourselves out of our own condition, undo our own undoing, nor make ourselves worthy to be called sons of God. This comes of a higher and a divine influence wrought on us and in us by the invisible spirit and presence of God. There is a truth and a beauty in goodness and love; there is a falseness and a deformity in selfishness and hate. The life lived for one's self is a mean life; the life of self-denial for others' sake is a noble and a divine life. As there is a God above us, and about us, and within us, a God best interpreted to our imagination by the words "Our Father," best brought within the horizon of our vision by the incomparable life and character of Jesus of Nazareth, best brought to our consciousness by the indwelling presence of his Spirit in the heart, so there is a future before us for which it is worth every man's while to live—a future that holds out to us possibilities of spiritual ruin, the more awful that they are undefined, and possibilities of spiritual life, the more inspiring that they transcend definition, or even our most ecstatic imagination.

Of course, I do not attempt in a paragraph to embody a Christian creed; I only attempt to illustrate what I mean by the great facts of Christian consciousness, universally believed in all ages and in all branches of the Christian Church, in contrast with those theological theories which have been, in all ages and all Church organizations, so fruitful a theme of fruitless controversies.

Any new statement of theological doctrine at this time will be more likely to provoke controversy than to allay it. A statement of Christian faith might be made, in the fullness of time will, perhaps, be made, which would ignore intellectual divisions and emphasize spiritual agreement. Such a statement would leave religious teachers to differ in their religious philosophies and would be valuable because it would show their essential agreement as witnesses to the great religious facts. This was the method of the New Testament writers. They abound in testimony, they are chary of philosophy. They express their convictions, not their opinions. Of this method, the Apostles' Creed is the most conspicuous and illustrious example in ecclesiastical history. This is the method to which, in time, though it may be yet a long time, the Church of Christ will eventually return.

In all this discussion Christian men ought not to forget that

the chief object of the Church of Christ is not to propound, develop, or defend theology, but to make men. That "the man of God may be thoroughly furnished unto all good works" is declared by Scripture itself to be the final object of Scripture. That we may all come unto the stature of a perfect manhood in Christ Jesus, is declared by the chiefest apostle to be the final object of the work of all apostles and teachers in the Church of Christ. There is always a danger when the energy of Christians is diverted from spiritual work to intellectual pastime. The business of preachers is not to afford new definitions of sin, or new explanations of its existence, but to develop in men's consciousness a profounder sense of their own guilt and need; not to afford a new psychology of Christ, or a new explanation of his transcendent character, but to inspire in men a deeper reverence and a warmer affection for him; not to perfect a more satisfactory explanation of the methods by which God and the human soul are brought into spiritual harmony with one another, but to bring the souls of men out of their wretchedness, their falseness, and their unspirituality, into the warmth and the light of the love and the fellowship of God.

LYMAN ABBOTT.

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REV. MR. BEECHER.

IT is not to be denied that in every community where the intellect has been aroused, good men have become dissatisfied with the old and prevalent creeds. That creeds should be rejected by men who have abandoned all faith in revealed religion, or by scientists who have gone into the twilight of agnosticism, can excite no surprise. But, in a different way, and for different reasons, discontent prevails among the most thoughtful men and the most devout. It may be seen in the gradual disuse in the pulpit of venerable symbols of doctrine; in the attempt, by construction, to bring them into sympathy with modern religious ideas,—a signal illustration of putting new patches on old garments, new wine into old bottles,—in the demand in various quarters for an amendment of creeds; in a spasmodic attempt on the part of good but not wise men to bring back neglected creeds to the family, the school, and the church service; which is as if one in November should gather the leaves that have finished their work and attempt

to glue them again to their old places and make them perform again their past and finished functions; and, above all, this discontent with ancient doctrinal formulas is shown by an organized attempt to frame a creed that shall be suitable to the divinely appointed fruit of modern thought.*

This open or latent discontent with creeds does not spring from the decline of religious sensibility, but partly from the existence of other and better instruments for instruction, and partly from a conviction that creeds, as they now exist, are not helps, but positive obstructions in the way of the sacred Scriptures, demanding subtle ingenuity, a waste of time, and often the sacrifice of honesty itself, in explaining and defending them. To one not reared in the charmed circle of metaphysical theology of the mediæval type, it may well seem strange that a revelation from God to teach men their duty should be obliged to help itself by an explanatory creed, and that such creed again should require another creed for its explanation, as if each creed were a lens in a telescope, increasing its power to bring near the remote universe.

It may easily be admitted that in an early and ignorant age, before printing was known, when manuscripts were more precious than rubies, and when the common people, for these reasons, had little or no access to the Old Testament, and before portions of the New Testament were generally circulated, or even written—a brief capitulary of the contents of the Bible might be useful. It was under such conditions that the Apostles' Creed appeared. It is the only creed that ever united all Christendom, and has come down through the ages without rent or waste, voicing the heart of orthodox and heterodox alike, simple, transparent, catholic, sublime. It deserves to be studied by all who would build another creed. It is a brief statement of facts, touching the life, death, and resurrection of the Christ. It has no theories, no deductions of principles, no hint of a system of moral truth. Yet, like a golden cincture, it clasps and binds together the whole world of Christian believers!

Next came the Nicene Creed, slightly stepping away from the simplicity of facts, and beginning to evolve a philosophy of the Divine Nature. Slight as was the variation, it constituted a line

* The Triennial Council of Congregational Churches of America, held in St. Louis, 1880, appointed a Commission to prepare, if possible, a capitulary of doctrine.

of division. It separated men. The Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed came to its aid, weaving more threads for more intricate patterns; but dissent and division grew with equal speed, and to meet these was set forth that masterpiece of film embroidery, which no Jacquard loom could ever equal in silk or gossamer, the Athanasian Creed,—to read which would make even a metaphysician dizzy. And this amazing help to the understanding of Scripture was imposed upon the faith of mankind as the only alternative of eternal damnation!

When once the Latins took up the religious thinking of the Christian world, creeds were made to include ordinances, church organizations, theories of the sacraments, orders of the priesthood, worship, fact and dogma, correlation of scheme with scheme of deduced principles,—in short, an interpretation of the moral government of God, of the philosophy of the Divine mind, statements of the origin of all moral evil, a history of the past eternity, and a chart of the eternity to come.

In proportion as creeds augmented their volume and reduced supernal themes to crystalline definiteness dissent increased, new statements of doctrine fought with old ones, sects were split off here and there, until the Great Reformation came in. But, when learning revived, and a new impulse was given to thought, and vast changes for the better were effected, it was still believed that men had learned enough of God's nature and of human nature, to construct a perfect system of truth. The fatal march toward disunion continued, and the reformed churches had no omnipotent church authority with which to hide dissension within a vast corporation, or to suffocate it, or to govern it by the roaring bulls of discipline.

The venerable Roman sect was a vast tenement-house; the Protestant Church was an open street—each sect keeping house by itself—and quarreling with its neighbors for not keeping house in the same way. Protestant divisions and quarrels were all out of doors; the Roman Catholics' were all in the tenement-house; but they quarreled all the same, and both Catholic and Protestant stand before the world to show that complicated metaphysical creeds do not draw Christians together, but separate them; that they do not promote union, but dissent; and that the more they reduce moral truths to sharp definition the less possible is it to hold large bodies of active-minded men in unity—and all this results not from the impossi-

bility of framing a creed, but from the conceit of knowledge which God alone possesses.

Creeds are statements of belief. They may express the belief of an individual, or of a school, or of a sect. Every science has a substantial creed. Encyclopedias are voluminous creeds. Bills of rights, constitutions, are at the bottom political creeds. The evanescent "platforms" of political parties are creeds. There can be no well-founded objection to a statement of personal religious belief, nor of the joint beliefs of a brotherhood of men, churches, sects, etc. They may be useful in the instruction of the young—in giving to the community the sum of teaching to be expected in any sect, serving as religious advertisements. Valid objections may exist as to the contents of a creed, as to its scope and pretensions, or the uses to which it is put, but none to an attempt to reduce one's beliefs to a philosophical or systematic statement. Religion, being intrinsically an emotion, a disposition, out of which is to spring conduct, is liable to all the ills which betide mere emotion,—fluctuations, enthusiasms, evaporations, imaginative phantasies. An organized center of facts and principles will tend to equilibrate emotion, to give symmetry and stability both to feeling and to conduct. Catechisms for the instruction of the young, all doctrinal sermons, and all ethical discourse are either overt or implied creeds. The pulpit is a vocal creed. All institutes, or systems of theology, are expanded creeds. Christian churches are organized around a philosophical center, and differ essentially from pagan assemblies, not so much in external worship, as in the fact that they have an intellectual center. If creeds, in the largest sense, were withdrawn from the Church, it would collapse, and become a mere puff-ball of sentiment.

But the historic creeds have, in the main, been children of war and instruments of battle. The heaviest clouds, the heart of the storms, through ages, lie along the line of creeds. Protestants have railed at the Pope for unwarranted pretensions and usurped authority, but Protestants and Catholics are just alike, in that that they have given supreme authority to their ignorance, and have given to it the sanctity and authority of God. By and by *knowledge* will be revealed, creeds will be simpler and will require no terrors to hold men to them. Humility will rectify what pride has well-nigh destroyed. For the most part, old creeds are the tombstones of dead beliefs. When the Church

shall realize how little it knows, or has ever known; how unfit it has been, by reason of its worldliness, its passions, its sordid and worldly ambitions, its strifes and cruel quarrels, to give to the world the revelation of love, there will spring up a living creed — the creed of regenerated human life, which no one can dispute, which no one will wish to dispute. Since there is among good men a strong desire to perfect a creed which shall unite men, it may be well to consider past creeds, and to show that the very genius and method of them and their arbitrary and audacious assumptions of authority in the hands of sectarians have been the reason of failure, and will continue to be so as long as creeds shall be constructed after the manner of primitive and mediæval theologists.

The characteristic of the whole Bible is, that truths of the head are expressed in the language of the heart. Creeds have attempted to express the emotion of the heart in the language of the head. The reduction of an emotion to an idea is not a translation, but a destruction. A flower analyzed is a flower destroyed. Fables, parables, idyls, songs, and psalms, the thunder of prophets against iniquity, the simple narrative, the love-converse of the Saviour, the sad requiem of sorrow are, and are meant to be, powers. To obtain an intellectual equivalent may give another sort of power; but not the original, scriptural, divine, power. A musical score has its uses, but it is not music. That cannot be written in ink. It lives only in the air. A hard metaphysical proposition in a confession of faith, propped up by proof texts drawn from imaginative passages, from lyric descants, or heart throbs, can never represent the Bible whatever else it may represent. Creed-makers have treated the Bible as men do their sheep, shearing the wool to make thread, dyeing the thread for the shuttle, and working the shuttle in the loom to create every fabric that invention can conceive, all the while declaring that these fabrics and patterns all grew on the sheep's back!

The process of missing the spirit and genius of the Bible in creeds is carried on yet further by expressing truth, not in the colloquial and vernacular language that all men everywhere employ, but in words that are sorted and appropriated to religious ideas, as if religion must have a language of its own. consecrated phrases, understood only or chiefly by the initiated. In this way the creed is foreign to the Bible; not of its genius

SOUTH END



or method, or substance, but a poor substitute, of use only to men of peculiar education, perplexing to simple minds, even when in substance it speaks truth; but how much more when the substance of it is borrowed from exploded religions, from barbaric periods, from crude civil governments, from obsolete philosophies, dead but unburied.

But, far beyond these, as it were superficial, faults, the mediæval creeds, Catholic and Protestant alike, have utterly failed to understand the latent philosophy of Sacred Scripture. By emphasis it has been made to appear that intellectual believing was more important than being. Righteousness is the end and aim of both Old and New Testaments. Right-mindedness, right character, and conduct, is the whole meaning of the Bible. How to develop that is the problem of divine Providence. The morality prescribed by Sacred Scripture runs through its pages without a crook or change. Morality is obedience to the laws of our being. Obedience to physical laws is physical morality. Social morality includes our relation and duties to our fellowmen. Civil morality includes our duties to the state and nation. Spiritual morality includes the right ordering of life with reference to the great invisible world, the unseen God, the future companionship of purified and developed souls. Upon this line the Bible is an inspired Book. Its ethical teaching is undoubtedly progressive; but the progress, from its rudiments in patriarchal times to its perfection in Christ, is in one direction; and fundamentally its morality is one. Its word upon all things which injure manhood is clear, consistent from end to end, and has scarcely ever been in dispute, or well can be. Its teaching of the elements demanded for a true manhood — positive, affirmative — is continuous, consistent, ample. It places its ten commandments between man spiritual and man animal, saying, in pointed repetition: "Thou shalt not," "Thou shalt not!" It places its Sermon on the Mount with an affirmative voice, calling man, now somewhat released from the animal, up to the full blossom of manhood, saying, in effect, "Thou shalt!" "Thou shalt!" But, grander than Mount Sinai or the Mount of Benediction, stands Calvary, on which the Son of God manifests the inward disposition of God, and gives a new meaning to that life in man toward which slowly the ages had been traveling. And when the record was finished, the Bible was held forth, neither as an encyclopedia, nor as a revelation of the whole science of

humanity, or of Divinity, but, with clear and clean definition gave its own view of the aim and function of inspiration. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine (teaching), for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17.)

Thus Paul spoke of the book. Looking upon the whole apparition of church work, there pass before him apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers, "for the perfecting of the saints, unto the work of ministering, unto the building up of the body of Christ: till we all attain unto the unity of the faith, and of knowledge of the Son of God, unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ." (Eph. iv. 12, 13.) A well-developed manhood after the ideal of God, as manifested in the Christ, is the end which the Gospel seeks.

But, what is the power by which this education is to be accomplished? A gradual unfolding under physical laws, says one; the influence of society and the duties of citizenship, says another; a divine providence, says another; the Church and its ordinances, says another; the promulgation of truth and sound teaching, say still others. All these theories convey some truth, but not the truth. The distinctive force disclosed in the New Testament is the direct action of the soul of God upon the human soul, and the reflection of it from the human soul to its fellows.

All mediæval creeds, and the whole church economy, spring from material and mechanical notions: God is a remote inventor and manager, standing outside and afar off, approachable only or chiefly through mediators, priests, and ministers, and answering through ordinances. The church answered as a kind of general post-office, men sending their petitions to Heaven through it, and receiving replies through its officers and organized channels.

The Scriptural view of God brings him into intimate relations with every part of the universe. All life is inspired by Him and constantly ministered by Him. He is the invisible effluence, which moves all things according to their nature: "In Him, we live and move and have our being." He is near to every one of us; is the inspiration of every thought that seeks him; is approachable by every soul that would be lifted higher, with

symbols if they aid, without them if one choose. He is the one great fountain of influence, filling human life and the ages with power of development. No mountain, no Mecca, or Jerusalem, no shrine, or cathedral, can inclose or possess Him; no priest has any privilege in Him; no bishop or archbishop stands as a favored courtier before Him distributing his favors. "For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy; I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones." (Isaiah lvii. 15.)

There are two great churches,—the church mechanical and the church spiritual. The one is materialized, has forms, order, regulations like a kingdom; the other is living, lambent, invisible, of no shape, with no creed but holiness, with no ordinances; with the real, personal ministry of the Holy Spirit always present, and the light, the life, and the power of God. The church mechanical has no right of existence except as a servant of the church spiritual, but it has usurped the authority of its superior. It demands obedience of all men; it prescribes their beliefs; it organizes their worship; it determines their merit; it stands at the end of the way with the radiant key of heaven and the flaming key of hell, making the whole world crouch at its golden promises or lurid threatenings. To this earthly and mechanical conception of the church belong all mediæval creeds, which have turned the goodness of God into a dry herbarium, which have left out of account the one chief element of power in religion,—the power of a living soul on a living soul. The only orthodoxy on earth is the beauty of holiness. Above all creeds is the creed of right living. God and the human soul are the only forces that the world knows. All others are derivative, subservient, auxiliary.

These views are struggling for such recognition as they had in the primitive church, before philosophy had obscured them, or ecclesiastical ambition had imprisoned them in the vast machinery of the mediæval church. They will throw light upon the movements made to frame new creeds; upon the spasmodic orthodoxy which is attempting to conserve old creeds; upon the condemnation of men who are full of the Holy Spirit, and whose souls are giving forth the light of holiness, because they will not worship the formulas of the past,—because they listen

more to the voice of God than to the authority of the mechanical church.

All that in the Church to-day is lifting and purifying man and infusing into society the redemptive spirit of Christ, is from the soul power of men illumined by the soul of God; and the zealous and jealous disciples of the letter,—the sentinels watching the dead creeds, the mechanical defenders of a mechanical creed,—are the chief adversaries which the Gospel meets.

HENRY WARD BEECHER.

# UNIVERSITY EDUCATION FOR WOMEN.

THE organization of effort to secure to women opportunities for the highest intellectual development of which they are capable is a special outcome of the spirit of rational progress that distinguishes the present century in so marked a degree from those that preceded it. Cultivated women, fit for the companionship rather than the mere service of men, have made themselves famous in history; but their attainments were the result of genius, of personal activity and native force of character, operating without encouragement, despite the influences that tended to keep them within a prescribed sphere to which they refused to confine themselves. In bursting unnatural bonds they were compelled to trample upon the exacting but unwritten laws embodied in the etiquette of their time. To be "unfeminine" is to violate a conception of womanly propriety that is in some particulars conventional; and since popular conception is a variable, whose value at any given moment is determined by the total combination of existing conditions to which we assign the name of civilization, strict propriety is not necessarily or even generally the same in two successive generations.

We pride ourselves in this nineteenth century on the position that woman holds among us. We contrast it with that which was accorded her in ancient times, when intellectual women could exist, it is true, but only under sore difficulties. We compare our modern Mary Somerville, whose honored life and happy memory inspire the young women of Girton College, with Hypatia, who was beset on the highway by a rabble of monks and murdered at the doors of the church, with all the ferocity of ignorance, because she violated the social statutes of her time in daring to comprehend the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, and Apollonius, though herself "only a woman," and for fasci-

nating the best intellect of Alexandria, disseminating doctrines that were too refined for the directors of superstition.

In our parlors on Fifth avenue are women whose powers of thought challenge the respect of those who have borne off the honors of our universities; but their culture has been self-acquired, and in many cases delayed, because the customs of society have forbidden them to resort to universities for secular knowledge, though the freedom of churches is granted them for the acquisition of spiritual lore. They have been forbidden to sit beside their own brothers, for the purpose of listening to lectures on linguistic, moral, or physical science, during the week days, but readily permitted to accept the company of young men who are not their brothers in hearing Sunday lectures on theological or metaphysical science. It is proper to associate with the opposite sex in the parlor, in the church-pew, in the theater, in the park, but not in the university lecture-room. It is proper to compete with them in music, in archery, in croquet, or lawn-tennis, but not in literature or science, if this involves systematic work to be concluded with a test of proficiency and a certificate of results accomplished.

The culture exhibited by these women, moreover, despite the limitations imposed by etiquette, is much in advance of what can be conferred by even the best of the fashionable finishing schools; for from these, however meritorious they may be, an inexorable unwritten law requires each student to emerge by the time she has completed her eighteenth summer, immediately after reaching the degree of maturity requisite for beginning to grapple with the severer studies. Her choice then is between devotion to fashion and devotion to the intellectual culture that she must henceforth continue at a disadvantage. The two are, indeed, not mutually exclusive, if each be moderate in degree; but, when combined, they not infrequently mutually interfere, and the result is the production of but inconspicuous success in either domain.

Our treatment of young women is indeed far better in every particular than that which was customary a few centuries ago, despite the dictum of society that their preparation for life, so far as this depends upon scholastic training, must cease several years before the time at which their brothers are expected to give up similar work. The age of graduation at Harvard or Columbia is now several years greater than it was two or three

decades ago, having advanced in proportion as these institutions have developed from mere colleges into universities. The same may be observed in regard to all our best institutions of learning for young men. The existence of such colleges, even in America, dates back more than two centuries. Colleges for women existed nowhere a half-century ago. They owe their existence exclusively to ideas that received little encouragement until half of the nineteenth century had passed away; and even now, during its fourth quarter, there are few of them that even claim to offer to young women opportunities equal to those given by the best universities for young men.

Granting that the rise of women's colleges is an index of healthy reaction against the mediæval idea of the sex, and that etiquette in society may be trampled under foot if it interferes with woman's true advancement, the question of coëducation of the two sexes may be deemed still open, by those who would defend to the last every educational right that they believe really due to woman. By far the strongest arguments used against coëducation are those which are based, not on social or moral grounds, but on the physiology of sex. They have been canvassed with much vigor, and a debt of gratitude is due to the memory of the late Dr. Clarke, of Boston, for eliciting so much discussion on topics upon which the public needed instruction. There can be no question as to the existence of the evils he portrayed, but the evidence has shown that he referred to a single source what may be traced to a great variety of causes; and these may either coëxist or operate singly. The fact, to which testimony is abundantly rendered by both the advocates and opponents of higher education for women, is that the laws of life are not properly observed, in the rearing of large numbers of girls in our great cities. Through ignorance or deliberate disregard of physiology, and in obedience to the dictates of fashion, they are subjected to multitudinous sources of ill-development; and the effects are those which Dr. Clarke ascribed to the methods used in their education. It is not denied that injurious influences may be superadded in connection with study; but thoughtless mothers must share the blame with too exacting teachers. The cultivation of the body is even more important than that of the brain, for no education is valuable that involves the sacrifice of health. So great is the number of delicate girls, whose physical weakness is due, not

to sex, but to the lack of physical training in childhood, and so incompetent are they to find out when they are beginning to suffer injury from mental application, that no young woman should enter upon a course of severe higher study without the best assurance that she is not only physically mature, but also in perfect health. There is no reason why such healthy women should be refused opportunities to cultivate their minds in universities, while they may continue the culture of their bodies elsewhere. The mere possibility of self-injury by these students obviously imposes no responsibility upon the governing board of the university which admits them.

Experience has amply demonstrated that no institution of learning can preserve a high standard of scholarship and present an extensive course of studies for selection, unless possessed of a permanent endowment, so as to be wholly or partly independent of the fluctuations of patronage. Without this, it is like an engine without a fly-wheel. Up to 1820, no one seems to have entertained the thought that female education was of sufficient consequence to make it in any way desirable that an institution should be endowed for the purpose of making the education of women commensurate in thoroughness with that of men. In 1821, a donation of $1000 was granted by the State of New York to the Albany Female Academy. Between 1820 and 1830, repeated efforts were made, but in vain, to secure the aid of the State to an institution which afterward grew independently into eminence, the Troy Female Seminary. In Massachussetts, the first successful pioneer was a woman, whose remains now sleep within a few rods of Mount Holyoke Female Seminary, and who has commemorated in this noble monument her just appreciation of the capacities of her sex, after devoting the best years of her life to the work of demonstrating that woman is, intellectually as well as morally, worthy of the best education that can be given. The story of Mary Lyon's devotion to this cause is that of indomitable faith and perseverance, against apathy, ridicule, and hope deferred. Though eminently successful in elevating the tone of a private seminary with which she was connected, she perceived the great necessity for endowment, if a permanent high character was to be established for an institution in which collegiate education was to be given her sex. During the seven years of effort expended in changing an idea into a reality, she found

that it was not the wealthy and fashionable on whom dependence was to be placed for the accomplishment of her reform, but the intelligent middle class. Her seminary was endowed, chartered in 1836, and opened in 1837. Satisfied with the opportunity to do work of a high order, she did not have included in her charter the authority to confer baccalaureate degrees.

While Miss Lyon was struggling in Massachusetts, a few men in Georgia, led by Rev. Lovick Pierce, D. D., conceived a similar idea; and a charter for the Georgia Female College was granted, in 1836, by the Legislature of that State, to a board of twenty-two trustees. The institution was opened in 1839; it is, probably, the first of its kind intended exclusively for women, and crowning its course of study with a baccalaureate degree. The struggles of its founders were scarcely less than those of Miss Lyon. The men to whom application was made for support could not see what was the possible use of such an institution. The question has been wittily asked: "What is the precise degree of ignorance required for a proper female character?" This puzzling enigma, though but recently presented, was solved in 1837, in Georgia, by "a gentleman of large means and liberal views as to the education of his sons." In response to an appeal in behalf of the contemplated college for women, he replied: "All that a woman needs to know is how to read the New Testament and to spin and weave clothing for her family." The conservatives of to-day would doubtless grant her wider latitude than this, but what limit they would assign is still indeterminate. For them, therefore, the question is still open. The writer has lately heard in New York an answer closely comparable to that of the Georgia wiseacre. Georgia has advanced a number of steps in education since 1837.

If it be difficult to state the degree of ignorance to be displayed by a modest and delightfully charming woman, it becomes equally difficult and certainly unjust to mark out a limit of knowledge beyond which she must be forbidden to pass. It is mere arbitrary prescription to declare that she can have no use for Greek or Calculus, and therefore must not be admitted to places where she can study these subjects to advantage, if they present attractions to her. Whether they will aid her in getting married, or in housekeeping, or in presiding at receptions, must be left to herself to determine; no one else can do so for her. They certainly constitute no barrier. We may be quite sure

that all feminine minds will not enthusiastically crave these two special topics; but experience has shown that some masculine minds also, perhaps a majority of them, do not take kindly to Greek particles and triple integrals, if there be a chance to avoid such intellectual food. No one should be compelled to study either of these subjects, nor should a prohibition be imposed upon either sex, if there be reasonable ground on which any individual chooses to master the difficulties, and thereby to enjoy the pleasures they unquestionably afford. The opponents of higher education for women may quite unconsciously, yet benevolently, strive to offer protection that is not needed, and endeavor to determine on artificial grounds for others what these are quite capable of determining on natural grounds for themselves. In every case, personal organization is a better guide than any code of social statutes in settling the question as to what branches any person of either sex ought to study thoroughly.

The demonstrated success of Miss Lyon at Mount Holyoke suggested the establishment of other female seminaries of high grade. Several of these are chartered colleges that have acquired wide reputation, and continue to do excellent work. Contemporaneous with the movement in Massachusetts and Georgia was the founding of a college for both sexes at Oberlin, in Ohio. This was an innovation that would scarcely have been possible, except in a new country where social prescription had no existence, where manual labor was almost a necessary adjunct to study, and where economy made it advisable to forego any inconveniences that might be expected to spring from the intermingling of both sexes in the same class-room. It was from Oberlin that came the first experimental demonstration of the feasibility of coëducation for the two sexes, continued throughout the curriculum ordinarily prescribed in colleges. Opinions may still vary as to the advisability of carrying out such a plan where it can be avoided, but there are many theoretic objections, which indeed are continually repeated to-day by those who have no practical experience in the work of coëducation, that were fully answered in the light of experience at Oberlin. It was natural that the example thus set should be followed, first in the great West, amid a population that was remarkable for its freshness and physical vigor, its passion for progress, and consequently its disregard for conventionality. The experiment began at Oberlin with its first

college class in 1834. It has been repeated now by about two hundred of the chartered institutions in the United States, or more than half the number that claim the name of college, exclusive of those under the care of the Roman Catholic Church. Many, indeed, are colleges in little else than name, but among those which are best known are the Universities of Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Indiana, California, Mississippi, and Vermont; Cornell and Syracuse Universities in New York, Washington University in Missouri, Wesleyan University in Connecticut, and Boston University. In all of these, students are admitted without distinction on account of sex, into any courses of study for which they may show themselves properly qualified; both sexes together listening to the same lectures at the same hours, standing the same examinations, and taking the same degrees after their fitness for these has been demonstrated by successful mastery of the courses leading to them.

Aside from the conservatism that incases itself in custom, in sentiment, in moral intuition, in foregone conclusions, in the agreement that what is locally established shall be cherished because change is inconvenient, the only basis on which the impropriety of any deliberate action can be fixed is its proven tendency to result in evil to the individual or to the community. Were there any real and deep-seated vice implied in the coëducation of the sexes under suitable conditions, it is most extraordinary that this should not at some time have sent a shock throughout the country from some one of these two hundred imaginary abodes of organized conspiracy against propriety, feminine delicacy, and true refinement; these seminaries of strong-mindedness and masculinity; these poisoners of the future domestic happiness of those who are to be mothers, but whose capacity for the successful performance of maternal duties is supposed to be diminished by their substitution of systematic mental training for social dissipation, miscellaneous amusement, or the aimless routine that so often fills up the interval between graduation and marriage. They are expected to make home attractive, to administer domestic economy with system and accuracy, to preserve the health of their children, and train these up with intelligence, utilizing the stores of doubtful information gathered in novel-reading; but it is assumed that they will be made coarse and unfit for home life by learning more than the traditional school-girl's allowance about

the chemistry of food and air, the physiology of the human body, the laws of mental and physical health, the philosophy of ethics, the mathematics that underlies all exact science, the philology that coördinates all the higher languages, the principles of sociology in contrast with the mere details of history, the structure and history of the earth as well as that of its inhabitants. Disagreeable women indeed there are, women whom no man would marry, even if they have mastered some of the higher branches; but their coarseness is natural, and in no way traceable to the topics they have selected for study, or the culture, though imperfect, which they have acquired, or the fact that they have sat beside men in university class-rooms. The coarsest of viragoes are always found among the most ignorant. If a woman of vigorous mind finds herself debarred by prescription from exercising the powers for whose existence she is not responsible, and if it be deemed unfeminine for her to exhibit less than lamb-like meekness under the restriction, her sin in becoming impatient is the natural outcome of human nature, and not of feminine depravity. This statement does not in the least commit the writer to the vagaries that have so often been sheltered under the protecting name of "women's rights." The physiology of sex may be safely trusted to determine the limitations to women's natural rights, political as well as educational; limitations that no amount of declamation or abstract reasoning can ever remove. Nevertheless, irrational limitations may still remain, that have no excuse in physiology, but are due to the human tendency to hold on to whatever has been already established by our predecessors, instead of giving impartial consideration to conditions as they exist to-day. Despite the political transgressions of the present generation, there are some subjects left in which it is hopefully possible to improve on the results left by our forefathers.

To those who are practically familiar with the work of co-education, the present discussion may seem quite superfluous, the question having been settled in connection with the admission of women into the Michigan and Cornell universities. But the writer has lately found that in New York there is noticeable opposition to the higher education of women, expressed by sincere persons who are governed by theory, sentiment, etiquette, and in some cases violent prejudice. In no case has he been able to find such an objector among those who have had any experi-

ence in the practical work of education, where both sexes were rationally taught together. Such experienced opponents may perhaps exist; but, if so, they are few and far between. To form definite conclusions against coëducation without careful study of the subject, as exemplified in the best universities where it has been practiced for years, or without direct and thorough personal observation of it in the class-room, is no more logical than to conclude from one's inner consciousness that the Atlantic cannot be crossed by a steam-vessel, or its bed spanned with a cable; the impossibility of this having been established a number of years ago to the entire satisfaction of theorists. Were the present article to be of unlimited length, it would be easy to quote page after page, from the presidents of the universities already named and from scores of the most distinguished practical educators in the land, who unite in testifying that the evils apprehended by theorists are mainly imaginary; that not only have no bad results followed the admission of women into universities, but both young men and young women are elevated to a higher plane as regards deportment and healthy emulation in study, that some women have exhibited both mental and physical powers equal to the severest demands made upon the young men with whom they had to compete, bearing off the highest prizes in such severe branches as mathematics and Greek; that no tendency to coarseness or "strong-mindedness" has been developed, but that the effect has been to make "the young men more manly and the young women more womanly."

A few months ago, an "Association for Promoting the Higher Education of Women in New York" was organized in this city, including many public-spirited ladies and prominent gentlemen. A petition was addressed to the trustees of Columbia College, praying them "to consider how best to extend with as little delay as possible to such properly qualified women as may desire it the many and great benefits of education in Columbia College, by admitting them to lectures and examinations." This, it will be seen, is not a specific plea for coëducation; it is only a request to abolish the discrimination against women on account of their sex, a discrimination that has been in force ever since the founding of the college in 1754. It is left to the trustees to decide whether this can best be done by opening the doors of existing lecture-rooms to women, as at the universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, and the rest of the two hundred colleges that

have preceded Columbia, or by establishing an "annex," as has been done, though unofficially, at Harvard. It was well known that in the annual reports for 1879, 1880, and 1881, presented by the distinguished president of the college, Dr. Barnard, the admission of women had been fully discussed and strongly recommended. Dr. Barnard's conclusions had been reached, not only as the result of his own long personal experience, but from the most careful study of the experience of many institutions in America and Europe, and in view of the fact that in the lecture-rooms of the large new building there is greater seating capacity than is demanded by the size of the present academic classes. There is hence ample room for as many women as can reasonably be expected during the next few years, if the prejudice against coëducation be laid aside. In case an "annex" be established, much voluntary additional work on the part of the professors would be necessary, and perhaps further expenditure of money to an extent much beyond any probable receipts from the fees of such few women as may be enrolled. The productive endowment of the college is estimated to be not less than $5,000,000; but large expenditures are now incurred from the erection of more extensive new buildings.

The petition of the association was not formally presented, but its nature was soon made public, and the opinions of the trustees were sought by the daily press. Thirteen members, from a board of twenty-three trustees, were consulted, five of whom were non-committal. Of the remaining eight one expressed himself in favor of the liberal movement, but regarded it questionable whether the plan was feasible in the college just at present. Another was opposed to coëducation in the college, but favored the plan of an "annex," saying, "School-life in Ithaca or Ann Arbor is entirely different from what it would be in New York. What may be entirely practicable in a small town would not be at all feasible in a city like this. Coëducation in a large city is only an experiment yet, and there is no room in the Columbia College buildings to try such an experiment." Substantially the same view was expressed by a third. In regard to the unqualified opposition manifested by the remaining five, it is simply justice to these gentlemen to assume that in brief interviews with a reporter it was impossible to put their opinions into such form as would be suggested by an exhaustive and unprejudiced investigation of what experience has already

taught, and that the conclusions reached by them are subject to modification.

The argument that "coëducation in a large city is only an experiment yet," and hence that what may be advisable in small Western towns would be hurtful in New York, is worthy of consideration. The Boston University has been in successful operation for several years, in the midst of a city of more than three hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants. It is hence important for objectors to determine a limit of population at which the benefits of coëducation are counterbalanced by the specific evils resulting from numbers, and to give a clear idea as to the peculiar nature of these evils. But even in New York City there is one large institution in which coëducation has been practiced for twenty-three years. At the Evening School of Science in Cooper Institute, women are regular attendants, being seated in the same class-rooms with men, and subjected to the same examinations. The writer has had excellent opportunities for observing the operation of coëducation in this as well as in many other institutions which he has visited. The standard of scholarship at Cooper Institute is necessarily not so high as that of Columbia College, although the writer has there seen a woman acquit herself creditably in Differential Calculus. If coëducation, with two thousand students of all ages, from fifteen to fifty years, has long been conducted successfully in an evening school in one part of this city, it becomes difficult to understand why it should be looked upon as an innovation, or mere experiment, that would be unwarranted, in another institution of the same city, where teaching is done only during daylight hours.

The conditions which tend to establish fixity in the social customs of large and old communities operate even more forcibly upon educational institutions that are old, and in which, therefore, traditions have acquired a certain degree of dignity and sacredness. With no traditions to violate, and with industrial rather than wealthy classes of society from which its students were to be drawn, Cooper Institute easily and naturally adopted the system of coëducation; while Columbia College, with the traditions of one hundred and twenty-eight years to displace, naturally but unnecessarily hesitates to follow an example that has been presented, with all the success that could reasonably be demanded for a dozen years, by one or more of the best universities in America.

But it is not in America alone that the example has been set. In discussing the academical establishments of some parts of Europe, it was once remarked by the Scotch metaphysician, Dugald Stewart, that they were "not without their use to the historian of the human mind. Immovably moored to the same station by the strength of their cables and the weight of their anchors, they enable him to measure the rapidity of the current by which the rest of the world is borne along." The cables have been lately strained and the anchors rudely dragged. The history of the development of higher education for women in England has been so succinctly and clearly detailed by President Barnard in his annual reports for 1880 and 1881 that there can be no necessity for its full repetition here. The London University since 1878 has made no distinction of sex in giving either its examinations or its degrees. Durham University, England, last year adopted a rule admitting women to the public examinations and the degree of Bachelor of Arts. Girton College was established in 1867 near Cambridge, and Newnham College in 1879, within the city, to secure to women the benefits of instruction under the university professors, who had opened their lecture-rooms to them. In some courses the lectures were repeated to women after having been delivered to men; in others, they were delivered to women and men, seated together in the same audience. Up to 1881, university degrees were not there accorded to women, even though fairly won by examination; but, in response to a petition signed by many leading citizens, the proposition to grant these degrees to women was carried in the Senate of the University of Cambridge by a vote of four hundred and forty to thirty-nine. Even old Oxford, the venerable home of classics and the synonym for conservatism, has been compelled by popular opinion to drag its deep-buried anchors and open its doors to women. The Royal University of Ireland has recently announced that "all prizes, honors, and degrees which it can confer are open to female as well as male students." The University of Copenhagen in Denmark, of Upsala in Sweden, of Zurich, Berne, and Geneva in Switzerland, and all the universities in Italy, are open to women. The writer has been unable yet to gather statistics from France and Germany, but reads that "one of the last acts of the Minister of Public Instruction in France, under the Empire, was to provide courses of superior instruction for women at the Sorbonne";

and that "not a few of the German universities admit women without question, and several have conferred upon them the highest academic degrees."

If Columbia College responds favorably to the application of the New York Association for Promoting the Higher Education of Women, it will be not without good precedent and eminently respectable company. Its trustees control its doors; they have abundant legal power to keep these closed. But it may be fair to assume that their independence in law is equaled by their magnanimity in spirit, and that their counsels will be controlled by reason.

Mount Holyoke, Vassar, Smith, and Wellesley colleges are doing excellent work, and will continue this, even if all our universities are opened to women. It is not desirable that they should be supplanted by the universities, and they are in no danger. But if there be in New York qualified women who prefer to live at home, and take at Columbia College such special courses as they may elect, it is a hardship that they should be uncompromisingly driven away, and forced to assume the extra expense and inconvenience of residence elsewhere, in order to get what is abundantly provided at their own doors. By special courtesy of some of the professors, a few women have already attended courses of lectures, with benefit to themselves and no harm to the students in whose presence they sat. All that is now asked is to extend this, as a right, to others of the same sex, whose fitness is demonstrated, but who have no personal claims on the professors. There is no request that the institution shall modify its courses or lower its standard of scholarship to please women. Were it an inferior college, with cast-iron curriculum, grinding out unfortunate graduates from the three-cornered mill of Greek, Latin, and mathematics, nothing more and nothing less, there would be little demand for the extension of such privileges to the sisters of those who are already its students. No plea is offered for the admission of girls to the close curricula of antiquated boys' colleges. It would indeed be bad for the girls, if any could be caught for such trituration. But the call is for the admission of young women to the elective courses of our universities.

Nor is there any plea for coëducation in the preparatory schools of New York city, or for competition with these on the part of the college. Our fashionable female schools must con-

tinue to give to the majority of young ladies of the wealthier classes all the instruction that is desired for them, at least for many years to come. Although some of these schools may be much improved by the reactive influence of the college, the quality of the education they afford, whether solid or superficial, must continue to be controlled, as it is now in most cases, by popular demand. This they can meet, but cannot control. Their tone must accord with that of the society with which they vibrate in sympathy. Like resonators, they must reënforce the best elements that combine to make up the *timbre* of polite society, each school singling out its own harmonic, expressing its own individuality, and thus helping to analyze the whole.

The question of admitting women will soon press upon all the higher institutions of the Atlantic slope. Harvard has informally answered it in part by the organization of its "Annex." Yale has opened its Art department to women. The University of Pennsylvania makes no distinction of sex in admitting to its Medical department, its department of Music, and its laboratory of Analytical Chemistry. Johns Hopkins University has by courtesy granted a scholarship to at least one female student in higher mathematics. The summons will doubtless be heard within a few years at Princeton and the Universities of Virginia and Georgia; indeed, the call may be expected along the entire line. The position of Columbia College, in the midst of two millions of inhabitants forming one great community, makes the situation in this city one of unusual interest; and there is no reason to expect that the knocking at its doors will cease, even if the present effort in behalf of women be crushed. It is simply an index of a movement that is steadily becoming world-wide, and if success is not attained here during the present generation it will be during the next. The present discussion is not intended as a piece of special pleading in behalf of the association lately organized in New York, but as an imperfect exposition of what has to be taken into view by all the older institutions of higher instruction in our country, except, perhaps, the technical schools. Experience in the universities where coëducation is already in full operation has shown what may be expected from the majority of women who gain admittance. Literary, historical, æsthetic, and biological topics will doubtless continue to be more popular among them than such abstract and technical subjects as occupy attention in our schools of applied science. In no case is

there any probability that the ratio of women to men among the students will be large, or that the presence of women will produce any inconvenience.

From what has just been said it is readily seen that the writer is no advocate of the identical coëducation of the sexes, any more than of the identical education of all members of the same sex. If there is one truth more thoroughly established than all others in modern education, it is that of the diversity among young human minds and the consequent necessity for adaptation to this by presenting variety in courses of study. The time is not far distant when this necessity will be generally recognized in determining the requisites for admission to the lowest as well as graduation from the highest classes in our universities. Such elasticity implies no evil to the traditional courses, like Greek; it only keeps out those who are naturally unfit for such study, with manifest advantage to themselves and equal gain to the students of Greek, who otherwise would be burdened with unappreciative associates. The same great institution may be capable of furnishing variety enough for all who prove themselves fit to enter, without distinction of sex. Columbia College, like Michigan University, has been steadily approaching this condition. Liberty to take advantage of it is needful to young men as well as young women; and with it the general characteristics of each sex, as well as of each individual, will be preserved and marked by the courses of study which they freely elect. It is fully possible to heed the truth that sex pervades mind as well as body, and yet to furnish to both sexes in the same institution the highest intellectual culture that is suited to each.

But the intellect is not all of humanity; and the university can neither identify the sexes nor furnish to either of them all the physical, moral, religious, and social culture that must be united in the highest type of man or woman. It is only a highly organized part of the great world, and this in the end is the universal educator for weal or woe.

W. Le Conte Stevens.

# A DEFINITION OF LIBERTY.

THE conclusions arising from the history of the development of civil liberty in England, may, I contend, be summed up in two propositions: *First.* Civil liberty is the result of the restraint of the legally acknowledged and vested private rights of the more powerful individuals and classes of the community, provided, *Second,* That this restraint be exercised by the sovereign people.

*First.* Civil liberty as the result of the restraint of private rights.

That civil liberty is not generally supposed to be incompatible with the restraint of personal freedom, our penal statutes and prisons amply prove. It may, however, appear somewhat paradoxical to assert that it is also dependent on the restraint of rights of private property and private contracts. Nevertheless, the history of civil liberty in England conclusively shows that the right to convert all manner of relations into private property and the right to the unrestricted use of private property, are incompatible with the security of private property, and consequently incompatible with liberty itself; for such unrestricted rights are nothing less than instruments of oppression in the hands of the more powerful individuals and classes.

By the conquest of 1066 one individual became so powerful that, compared with him, all the other individuals and all classes of the community taken together, sink into insignificance. This was owing to the fact that at that period the idea of public relations was unknown, and that of unlimited private rights was recognized. And so William of Normandy, conquering England, acquired it as his private property in unrestricted ownership, with the incidental right of converting all relations springing out of the land into appurtenances of it. And thus, as owner, not only did he have a paramount title to the soil, so that all who

occupied it held it by his good-will and pleasure, and subject to the conditions which, by contract, he chose to impose upon it; but likewise all the proceeds issuing out of land and constituting the movable property of the tenants became mere appurtenances of the land, and were held by others only to the extent permitted by him. Consequently, whenever he required the possession of these movables, he was justified in seizing them by taxation or purveyance, as he merely took back his own. Since it was impossible to fully enjoy his property unless peace were kept in his domains, peace became an appurtenance of them, and there was an implied contract imposed upon all who were suffered by him to dwell upon them, not to commit an injury on the King's peace. Whoever broke the peace, therefore, committed a breach of the contract, under which alone he held anything whatever, and consequently forfeited all he held. If the King, in his mercy, allowed the offender to retain a portion when the offense was not too heinous, it was a matter of mercy, and called an amercement. And as it was difficult, or perhaps impossible, to maintain peace intact unless the tenants of his great manor dealt justly with each other, the dominion of the relations of justice as appendant to that of peace was one of the necessary appurtenances to the land. But, of course, this did not give a right to any one to compel the King to protect him against the injustice of his neighbor. This protection was always a favor which the King might grant, but for the granting of which he was justified in exacting a compensation. Just as necessary to the maintenance of peace was the control of the relations arising out of the commerce of his tenants among themselves, and with foreigners. Therefore, the dominion of markets, fairs, coinage, exchange, weights and measures, and many other things of this nature, became, likewise, a private right appurtenant to the land. It need hardly be said that the owner of this vast property might defend it against all enemies within and without, and that it was part of the contract of all his tenants to assist him in this defense, and that, in consequence the dominion of war was also a necessary appurtenance of his ownership. These services he could exact either in the shape of men or money, or in necessaries, and could, of course, as owner, commute these one with another.

And this complete ownership had, by the time of King John, become, through the continued enjoyment of a century and a

half, as thoroughly vested a right as it is possible to conceive. A complete proof of this is found in the fact that this King performed the extreme act of ownership — that of alienation. In 1213 he conveyed England with all its appurtenances to Pope Innocent, who reconveyed it to him in fee-farm subject to a rent of 1000 marks; and that this conveyance and reconveyance were considered strictly within right is evidenced by the fact that the rent was paid throughout the reigns of Henry III., Edward I., and Edward II., and part of that of Edward III., for nearly a century and a quarter. And among the numberless other evidences of the King's vested rights of private property in the kingdom of England, I shall only advance that as late as 1271, Edward I., while yet heir-apparent, devised the kingdom with all its appurtenances to his executors, to administer the same for the benefit of his heirs.

And this vast estate with its immense revenues, in the shape of reliefs, wardships, marriages, aids, and escheats, its direct issues of the land; and in the shape of taxation and purveyance, forfeiture and amercement, purchase money of judicial writs, tolls, customs, coinage, — its indirect issues; this vast estate, I repeat was managed entirely on business principles — that is, on the basis of the self-interest of its owner.

His great officers and council, therefore, were nothing more nor less than his private servants, and any interference on the part of his tenants in regard to the appointment or removal of these was always resented as an unwarrantable impertinence. When Richard II. was petitioned by Parliament to remove his chancellor, he replied indignantly that he would not remove the meanest scullion of his kitchen at their request. The answer shows that for the king the difference between a lord chancellor and a scullion was one in degree — not in kind — the one as the other being only his servant, and no one else's servant.

It was for the better collection of his revenues that he divided England into the bailiwicks of counties and hundreds, over which he set his sheriffs, escheators, and others, as his stewards or his farmers, responsible only to him, and holding their offices as tenements from the king, in fee, for life, or for a less estate by the various tenures in which land itself was held. And for the reason that the relation of the king to subjects was the private one of landlord and tenant, the Court of Exchequer, the guardian of his treasury, into which court all payments of what-

ever nature were collected, and all disbursement of whatever nature—whether for building of castles, manning of ships, or settling of butchers' and grocers' bills for the household—were indiscriminately rendered, was the highest court of the realm; where the capital justiciary presided, where the chancellor sold his writs, and whence the justices itinerant were sent all over England, to judge and to oversee the collection of taxes and rents, and secure faithful returns of the king's various revenues.

But such private rights and revenues, such ownership and management of an entire kingdom for the benefit of a single individual, were incompatible with civil liberty; for where one has absolute freedom, there all others can have none whatever. So, be the rights of their lord ever so vested, be the interference with them ever so greatly to be reprehended, the tenants of the manor of England no sooner felt themselves strong enough, than they began the struggle to restrain these rights, in order that they might not be exercised to their ruin. By main force they extorted the Great Charter which restricted royal liberty, and diminished the royal revenue in every particular; and they clung to it, although it was quashed and cursed by the Pope as subversive of every principle of private property and vested rights. Yet the victory at Runnymede was only the first round in the struggle. It continued for nearly five hundred years thereafter, until, step by step, the king was not only restrained in the exercise of his private sovereign rights, but actually deprived of every vestige of them, and from an absolute owner of all England, was converted into a mere trustee, with the duty of executing for the public good, and in a regulated manner, the functions prescribed to him. I need hardly urge that each of these deprivations and conversions, though interfering with rights vested for centuries, is universally conceded to have been a step forward in the development of civil liberty.

The restraint of the king, however, was only one phase of this development; other elements of society required restriction no less than he. The most important of these was the church—owner of the domain of conscience. For, absolute as the king might have been, his power only extended to temporalities—to matters of the body and this world: affairs of the soul, and concerning the Kingdom of Heaven, were sacred, and as the middle ages knew of no relations which might not be turned into property, were held by the church in ownership. This ownership

was moreover exceedingly profitable, and brought in large revenues in the form of tithes, payments for indulgences, dispensations, the control of probates of testaments, marriages, penalties for infringement of ceremonial laws and justice. And besides these general revenues of the national church, the Pope, as Supreme Lord of the Church, had a vested right in many special revenues arising from provisions, translations, appeals, Peter's-pence, and other sources. And all these rights were again and again acknowledged and guaranteed by solemn charters, and designated collectively as the liberties of the church.

But these liberties and rights proved tyrannical. A long struggle ensued, and after they had first been restrained, and then seized by the king, they were finally either abolished, or converted into the public rights and liberties of the nation.

And yet the restraint of both the sovereigns, spiritual and temporal, was not sufficient to secure civil liberty. It required restraint of subjects as well. In the first rank of these we may consider the king's officers, great and inferior, who had vested rights in their offices as tenements, held either in fee, or for life, or for a term of years, and generally for a valuable and legally valid consideration. Civil liberty was not reconcilable, however, with such vested private rights, and they were converted into public trusts, just as the king's had been. Akin to these were the rights of private persons to the various municipal offices in fee and for a less estate, and the rights of members of close corporations; also those of boroughs in Parliament. All of these were ruthlessly swept away in the progress of liberty.

But the rights of those whose station was altogether private, were just as unceremoniously interfered with. The great tenants held of their landlord not only the land with its incidents of relief, wardship, marriage, escheats, aids, and its villein population,—they also had let out to them the domains of peace, of justice, of commerce, with all the revenues (exceedingly important) attached to these tenements. As lords of their manors with respect to their own tenants and villeins, they, of course, held in their persons the right of defense of the same, and thus they became lords of the domain of war with respect to their neighbors; and their tenants were compelled to follow them in their expeditions, and assist them in their defense, or pay a commutation exactly as they themselves were bound to do toward their lord paramount, the king. So they could close up

their possessions against strangers, and take toll for passage through them, on highways and on rivers. They were also possessed of the right of enlisting others besides their tenants under their banners by private contract, the right of liveries as it was called, which though occasioning considerable outlay was yet exceedingly beneficial to them, in enabling them to reimburse themselves with profit by disseizing their poorer neighbors or putting them under tribute.

All these valuable vested rights, no less than those of king, church, officers, corporations, and boroughs, were incompatible with civil liberty, and were abolished after long and bitter struggles.

In the midst of the struggles of crown, church, and nobles for the purpose of restraining one another, and of each to secure unrestrained mastery for itself, there arose another element—capital; which, in the measure that the others were mutually weakening each other, gained such power that the capitalistic class became the dominant one of the community. By means of its dominancy it secured to itself what may be termed freedom of commerce, a freedom which, like that of crown, church, and nobles, redounding to the advantage of a part of the community merely, proved incompatible with civil liberty. It brought in its train, not only the right of extreme exploitation of labor by capital, but also a general crowding downward and oppression of the less wealthy by the wealthiest. It became necessary, therefore, to limit its freedom and abolish some of the private rights that had been acquired, and had become vested through it; and the restraining process, begun about fifty years ago, has not as yet reached its final stage. Among the numerous acts of Parliament signalizing the progress in liberty by means of the limitation referred to, I shall only instance a few:

The right of contracting between masters and children and their guardians, and master and women generally, was restrained by a succession of factory and workshop laws, accompanied by a strict factory inspection, throwing private management open to public scrutiny under the sanction of public penalties; reducing the factory or workshop from being the castle of its lord to a quasi-public institution, and putting an end to his right of conducting his business according to strict "business principles" alone. The agricultural and mining interests and establishments of various other kinds were put under similar restraints. So the vested

right of the employer to be free from responsibility for accidents to his workmen was abolished by the "Employers' Liabilities" act, and all acknowledgment of such supreme property in rotten hulks, as would permit the owner to send them to sea laden with human freight, was put an end to. The proprietors of animals were put under limitations of their property rights by various "Contagious Diseases" acts, and landlords were no less restricted by a complete sanitary code. In Ireland even the amount of rent which a landlord could charge was no longer left to his free arbitrament, and the remittal of all arrears beyond a certain term of years, decreed.* As it was thought oppressive that private individuals should operate telegraphs they were converted into public property; and railway corporations, though not yet so converted, have been much restrained. Moreover, as indirect means of restricting capital, trades-unions have been expressly sanctioned by statutes; and land-owners have been deprived of the vested right to improvements made by their tenants. All in all, we may say that the people of England have awakened to the fact that the acquired rights of capitalists are no more sacred than had been those of king, church, officers, and landlords, and as these were abolished so must those be, whenever the exercise of them becomes oppressive.

*Second.* Liberty requires a popular sovereignty.

By the conquest, as we have seen, the absolute sovereignty of England became vested in a single individual. One hundred and fifty years later, the tyrannies of this individual's successors had been heaped up to such a degree that the principal subjects revolted, extorted a charter by virtue of which the sovereign submitted to many restraints, and placed the means of enforcing these restraints in the hands of a committee. An individual sovereign, restrained by fear of the most powerful subjects, might seem to constitute a more liberal form of government than an unrestrained one. In reality, however, it does not. The unsettling of the sovereignty only increases the number of tyrants, and proves to be a step backward rather than forward. And thus the committees charged with carrying out

* This portion of the land act has been assailed as depriving landlords of their property, and as being extreme socialism; strangely enough, I think, when we remember that bankruptcy laws do a very similar thing, and yet no one dreams of calling them socialistic.

the Magna Charta under Henry III. and Edward II., as well as all subsequent ones, were short-lived, and a restoration of the absolute sway of the king was always hailed as a diminution of tyranny. After the constitution had vibrated for over a hundred years between the unrestrained individual sovereign and the sovereign restrained by individuals, each party sought to draw over to itself the wealthier portions of the community, and thus was engendered the power of Parliament. When this body had become strong enough to exercise an important influence—that is, in the reign of Edward III.—the third phase of our history is entered upon. It is characterized by the restraint of the sovereign through the influence of barons and knights in Parliament. This form of government was essayed for nearly one hundred and fifty years, and, like the preceding ones, was unable to bring about civil liberty. The oppression, indeed, which it exercised became unbearable, and again the absolute sovereignty was gladly permitted to reside with an individual; whom, it was hoped, the lessons of the past might have taught the necessity of restraining himself for the sake of his own safety. But Edward IV. died without having secured the crown for his heir, and after a brief season, bordering on anarchy with its attendant horrors, the kingdom was conquered by Henry Tudor.

But the second conqueror was animated by motives different from those of the first. Instead of relying on the great and powerful nobles for his support—and to that end, still further enriching and exalting them—he schemed to overthrow and ruin them. This brought about a fifth phase in our history, in which the absolute sovereign, though still an individual, uses his own unrestrained powers to restrain the great and wealthy oppressors of the people.

Many historians, too much engrossed with the idea that oppression can come only from the king, consider the period of the Tudors a retrograde movement in liberty, and are at loss to understand how absolutism could be tamely submitted to by a people already experienced in parliamentary government. They forget that the sovereign is not necessarily the sole oppressor—and that he may even himself permit many oppressions, and yet relieve the people, if the oppressions are directed against those who are themselves oppressors. Fortunately, too, for the Tudors, the Reformation took place during their reign, and they fully availed themselves of it.

Until that event, the sovereignty of the kings, however absolute at times it might have been, was constantly hampered by the fact that it did not extend to spiritual matters, over which another lord, the Pope, had full control. This duality of the sovereignty, though it might have been beneficial for a time, was finally seen to be incompatible with progress in liberty, and so the assumption of church supremacy — of the headship in the domain of conscience, as well as in that of material things — proved of the most momentous advantage to the cause of liberty. The assumption, moreover, brought a new relation to the kingship itself — it involved a responsibility to an acknowledged Supreme Being, whose vicegerent on earth the king had become. It gave something peculiarly sacred to the character of sovereignty, which raised the sovereign from the condition of a private individual into the holder of a great public trust. It bore with it also another incident: the care of the poor, hitherto the wards of the monasteries. This care was a duty that could not be shirked, which was enforced by the irresistible pressure of circumstances, and which, therefore, required neither a committee nor a parliament to compel the king to give it his attention. And thus the absolute sovereignty of the Tudors was of a nature entirely different from that of the Norman and the Plantagenet kings; and contained within itself something of a public character in which germs of liberty reside.

Yet the *jure divino* kingship, in spite of its high sense of duty, after a lengthy trial proved itself to be as incapable of actually securing civil liberty as the previous forms of sovereignty had been. Fortunately, by destroying the overweening power of the great Lords, it had proportionately raised the condition of the Commons; these, comprising a far greater portion of the people than the Lords, could, in a measure, be said to represent them, and were, therefore, better instruments for the advancement of liberty than the Lords had been. And so these very Commons, after having been the most subservient tool of absolutism; after having almost done away with themselves by giving the King's proclamations a force superior even to enacted statutes; after having empowered the King to devise his crown by will; after having changed even their creed again and again at the nod and beck of their master, gradually recover both their power and their sense of it, and, examining into the bases of the sovereignty of one by divine right and freely criticising them, totally deny

their validity, and send the sovereign to the scaffold. The Restoration shows us the anomaly of a sovereign by divine right restrained by a Parliament — a condition too illogical to last. And when, finally, this sovereign goes so far as to attempt to again divest himself of his supremacy in the domain of conscience, in favor of a foreign lord, the whole people rise as one man, and, thoroughly satisfied that individual sovereignty in any form is incompatible with full liberty, abolish individual sovereignty, and replace it by that of the Parliament.

But was this transfer of the sovereignty from an individual to the wealthier classes of the community in their corporate capacity sufficient to insure liberty? Certainly not. The reign of Parliament is signalized by the oppression of the unrepresented classes. The whole machinery of government was strained to enable capital to increase its profits by a proportionate increase of the miseries of labor. Parliamentary liberty became synonymous with unrestrained exploitation of the weaker by the stronger, of the employed by the employer, of wives by husbands, of children by parents.

All attempts on the part of the unrepresented to protect themselves against the encroachments of their rulers were checked by Draconic laws. Combinations of workmen for the purpose of bettering their conditions were forbidden by numerous and ever-recurring enactments. Not only were all contracts to combine for the purpose of lessening the hours of labor, or advancing wages, declared void, but they were put in the category of misdemeanors, and severe penalties were attached to them; indeed, the mere making of a request to assist such movements by money subscriptions was punished by imprisonment.

If a workman quitted his service before his time expired, he was guilty of a penal offense, and thus the employer was able to put on the screw at his pleasure, using for his guide nothing higher than his enlightened self-interest. And if workmen, under these conditions, sought to flee from their inhuman surroundings by emigrating into more favorable countries, they were stopped by a most stringent law against enticing artificers out of the kingdom, and against exporting their tools. This kept a full supply of labor on hand, and made it cheap. On the other hand, manufacturers were expressly authorized to meet and elect inspectors of work; these inspectors were empowered to enter the dwellings of workmen at all reasonable

hours and examine their work, and if the work was not in compliance with the manifold statutes regulating the various kinds of work, enacted since the time of the Edwards, it was their duty to prosecute the workmen, and their unsupported oath was sufficient to convict. The laws of apprenticeship of Elizabeth were abolished, and the journeymen who had entered and completed their apprenticeship in obedience to, and in reliance upon these laws, were deprived of their valuable rights without one penny of compensation. The rights of the poorer classes to the soil were even less regarded than their rights to a fair return for their outlay of labor. Over four millions of acres of the common land of the kingdom were inclosed, that is, wrested from the poor and bestowed on the wealthy. While these freed themselves from all burdens on their land in regard to their lord, the king, they retained these burdens on copy-hold tenures on the land held of them, although their rights to those dues were less defensible than those of the king to dues from their tenures. For the loss of most of his rights they compensated the king, not by a tax on their lands, which gained everything, but by an excise, which they knew would chiefly fall on the poor, who gained nothing by their abolition.

All these tyrannical laws were supplemented by others, which made the want of visible means of subsistence a penal offense, and the workman who might refuse to work on inhuman terms was sent to the house of correction and publicly whipped.

The ruling classes, moreover, possessed a machinery for executing these laws to the utmost degree of exactness and rigidity. The justice of the peace, capitalist and landlord himself, and united by all family and social ties, and all the promptings of self-interest with the legislature, was, to the poor man, a far more terrible tribunal than the Star Chamber had ever been to the rich. In the latter the accused was at least judged by men of his own rank and station, by his peers; but the poor man, like the king, had no peers, and his judges were instigated, not only by their duty to the sovereign, but also by an inborn antipathy and class hatred. Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights were empty names, and of no avail to the victim of the petty justice's summary jurisdiction. And besides his capacity as criminal judge, he was also empowered to interfere in all conflicts of a civil nature between employer and employés; and in

all disputes between workman and master, he—himself frequently a master, and connected by all interests and ties with the master—was the arbiter. Even the finding of the rates of wages was intrusted to him; a precautionary measure, to shut out the oppressed from the last avenue of escape from their sad fate.

And now if we add to these sins of commission by parliamentary government, only the single one of omission, which permitted the barbarous clearing of estate—that is, the eviction of tenants from lands held and tilled by them in order to convert these into sheep walks and deer forests, and thus caused the destitution and starvation of thousands upon thousands of industrious citizens of the state for the purpose of increasing the already bloated wealth of the titular land-owner, and of making labor still cheaper in the cities, we have a picture of tyranny in the England of the House of Hanover to which that of the Tudor and the Plantagenet periods might seem preferable.

But the people did not seek to go back to the sovereignty of the barons or of the king, to feudalism, or absolutism (by again narrowing the basis of the sovereignty) in order to find alleviation from oppression; on the contrary, profiting by the lessons of history, they widened the basis, and converted the sovereignty of individuals or classes into that of the people at large.

And this sovereignty carries within it all the potentialities required for the final consummation of a perfectly free condition of society; for, comprising in itself all the elements of society, it is logically not incapable of bringing about a complete harmony among them. That in the fifty years of its existence it has not entirely undone all the evils resulting from the oppressions of many hundred years of feudalism, of two hundred years of absolute monarchy, and of one hundred and fifty years of the sovereignty of capital, is natural. If it had done so it would have proceeded indeed, too rapidly, and worked, itself, an oppression which might have led to a reaction. But that it has made an undoubted and substantial advance, the statute books testify; these indeed have completely altered their tone and have taken on the color of humanity as previously they had the color of barbarism. While formerly all combinations among workmen to better their conditions were treated as crimes, now they are expressly legalized and encouraged. While formerly the employers appointed their own creatures as inspectors, in

order to oppress the workmen, now the government salaries a respectable class of agents in order to bring about an alleviation of their condition. While formerly the hours of labor were fixed so as to punish the laborer who worked less, they are now fixed so as to punish the capitalist who exacts more. While formerly land acts were for the purpose of evicting human beings in order to hasten the accumulation of capital in the hands of the favored classes, now the land acts are for the purpose of restraining eviction and protecting the interests of human beings against the selfishness of accumulators. While, in short, formerly, constitution and law had a care only for the property of the rich, now they deem the property of all classes worthy of protection. And since the year 1832, hardly a session of parliament has passed which has not contributed something toward the development of humanitarian principles, and which has not been a step forward in civilization.

This advance, too, has been peaceful, conservative, with due regard for all reasonable acquired rights, and is at the same time not only a proof that popular sovereignty is a requisite of civil liberty, but also an earnest of what may be expected of it, as it becomes daily better understood and better trusted.

*Third.* The definition of civil liberty.

As the result of our investigation we are now able to formulate a definition of civil liberty; a definition embodying a principle that may serve as a guide in the enactment of laws and furnish a canon of criticism for laws already enacted. It is this:

Civil liberty is the result of the restraint exercised by the sovereign people on the more powerful individuals and classes of the community, preventing them from availing themselves of the excess of their power to the detriment of the other classes.

It may be necessary to call attention to the fact that in this definition the word classes is not used in the sense of caste, so that each person is not considered as confined to a single class; on the contrary it is assumed that every person actually belongs to several classes, in one of which indeed he may act as oppressor, while in the other he may be himself oppressed. It is also to be remarked that the same class may be at the same time oppressor and oppressed; thus the manufacturing classes may suffer from the encroachment of monopolies, and as such be

oppressed, while at the same time they themselves may be oppressors of their workmen.

In the second place I must call attention to the fact that the principle contained in the definition, far from being in conflict with the rights of private property is, on the contrary, their very safeguard and maintenance.

A person has no more right to use his property for the purpose of encroaching on others, than he has to commit a nuisance by means of it. And just as he is restrained from the latter in the very interests of private property, so he may be in the former case. In fact, the encroachment of monopolies, such as railway corporations, on the rights of others, are nothing else than purprestures,— nuisances, by encroachment on public rights,— and their restraint is absolutely necessary to liberty. For we must ever remember that liberty is not characterized by absence of restraint, that, indeed, restraint is its very life and being; but by absence of oppression.

Nor does any danger arise from carrying out this principle to its extreme consequence, as it carries its own limitation within it. So far as the government interferes in private concerns in order to prevent encroachments of the more powerful classes— so far, and only so far, the interference is justifiable and necessary to liberty. But the moment it steps beyond this limit, it becomes itself oppressive, for then its action will be in itself a wrongful encroachment and subversive of liberty.

In the third place, the principle we have reached furnishes a conclusive answer to those who decry all governmental interferences for the purpose of counteracting oppression as "paternal," and unfit for a free people, who should rely on self-help; for this principle points to governmental interference as the essential feature of civil liberty. Moreover, a government by the people can in no case become a paternal government, since its law-makers are its mandatories and servants, carrying out its will, and not its fathers or its masters. I admit that the self-protecting organization of classes in arms against each other, culminating in lock-outs on the one side and strikes on the other, with selfishness, hatred, discord, oppression, brutality, attended by general demoralization and harrowing suffering, may be considered self-help, but it is the self-help of feudalism, and savors strongly of barbarism.

I contend, however, at the same time, that the action of a people through its elected agents, organized as a government, is equally entitled to be called self-help, and that it is a self-help just as manly, nay, far more manly, if we use this word in its highest sense; for it is productive of regard for law, of deference to the common weal, and of an harmonious and peaceful development of the resources of individuals and the state.

And this I consider to be the self-help of liberty, progress, and civilization, the ideal of democratic institutions.

ISAAC L. RICE.

# AMERICAN ENGLISH.

THE time-honored jokes about the "American language" are generally supposed to be antiquated as well as venerable; and serious references, like that of Dean Alford, to "the process of deterioration which our Queen's English has undergone at the hands of the Americans," are not often found in British publications of very recent date, except when accompanied (as was the dean's) by some display of insular prejudice or crass ignorance in regard to the history, geography or politics of the United States, such as would naturally disqualify the writer, in the mind of an impartial judge, as a critic of anything pertaining to this country. Yet the pages of so important a periodical as the London "Nineteenth Century" gave place, not long ago, to an article by Mr. Fitzedward Hall, in which it is gravely (as well as elegantly) stated that William Cullen Bryant lived "among a people among whom our language is daily becoming more and more depraved," and that whoever compares the diction of "Edgar Huntly,"—a forgotten novel, published in 1799,—with Mr. Bryant's letters, "the English of which is not much worse than that of ninety-nine out of every hundred of his college-bred compatriots, will very soon become aware to what degree the art of writing our language has declined among educated" people in the United States!

That such rubbish should be written by a recognized authority in philology ceases to be surprising, when it is understood that the author is—not a Briton, as might be supposed, but one of those extraordinary Americans of the Henry James, Jr., stripe, who seem to regard it rather as matter of regret than otherwise that they were not born in Europe. But that the editor of such a magazine as that in which this effusion appeared should think it worth while to print, and presumably to pay for it, is a phenomenon which suggests two interesting reflections.

The first, of comparatively minor importance, is merely that our English cousins have a good deal yet to learn about our common language as used in the two countries. The second is, that where there is so much smoke there must be some flame. That is, making all allowances, there must really exist certain noticeable variations between the styles of writing and speaking that are current on the opposite sides of the Atlantic; for if no differences at all could be found, it is hardly probable than an intelligent man, however strongly British his prepossessions, would care to publish a dissertation in which our practice is deliberately set down as distinctly inferior to that of his own nation. In what these differences consist, and in what particulars the mother tongue may be thought to have become especially "depraved" in this country, are questions deserving attention.

In the first place, it will hardly be denied in any quarter that the speech of the United States is quite unlike that of Great Britain, in the important particular that here we have no dialects. Trifling variations in pronunciation, and in the use of a few particular words, certainly exist. The Yankee "expects" or "calculates," while the Virginian "reckons"; the illiterate Northerner "claims," and the Southerner of similar class, by a very curious reversal of the blunder, "allows," what better educated people merely assert. The pails and pans of the world at large become "buckets" when taken to Kentucky. It is "evening" in Richmond while afternoon still lingers a hundred miles due north at Washington. Vessels go into "docks" on their arrival at Philadelphia, but into "slips" at Mobile; they are tied up to "wharves" at Boston, but to "piers" at Chicago. Distances are measured by "squares" in Baltimore, by "blocks" in Providence. The "shilling" of New York is the "levy" of Pennsylvania, the "bit" of San Francisco, the "ninepence" of old New England, and the "escalan" of New Orleans. But put all these variations together, with such others as more careful examination might reveal, and how far short they fall of representing anything like the real dialectic differences of speech that obtain, and always have obtained, not only between the three kingdoms, but even between contiguous sections of England itself!

It ought to be remembered also that the ordinary language of the United States includes not greatly more of what may be

called caste variations than of those that are attributable to differences of locality. The speech of the lower orders of our people, whether examined in regard to its vocabulary, its construction, or its pronunciation, differs from what all admit to be standard correctness by a much smaller degree than is the case in England. A comparison of slang dictionaries will reveal a far longer list of unauthorized words as current among British "cadgers" than among their congeners in the United States. Grammatical rules are violated badly enough by the ignorant of our own cities every day, no doubt; but how often, after all, will you hear from intelligent and respectable working people of American descent quite such a solecism as the "I were" and "he were" that one so frequently notices in the mouths of lower middle-class Britons, accustomed all their lives to conversation with speakers of the purest English? And as for pronunciation, we have our faults of course, in abundance, and ought to amend them with all diligence; but where, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, will you discover any such utter disability of hearing or discernment as can permit men to drop or multiply their *h's* or transpose their *w's* and *v's*?

Speaking of pronunciation and with regard to orthoepy proper, the deliberate sounding of single words, it will be found that in almost every case the difference between the British practice and ours is due to the American's following more closely than does the Briton the spelling of the word, a habit which can hardly result in depraving the language, but seems rather to suggest that the American is the greater reader of the two, and therefore likely to be the safer guide in questions of verbal correctness. Thus the now thoroughly anglicized French word *trait*, in which no American ever thinks of dropping the final *t*, is still commonly called *tray* in England, and that pronunciation is given the place of honor in the best British authority, Stormonth's excellent dictionary. *Sliver*, which very many Americans call *slĭver*, following the obvious analogy of the more common word *liver*, and following, too, the example of the poet Chaucer—is *slīver* and *slīver* only, at present in Great Britain; and *schedule*, which we invariably pronounce *skedule*, constitutes in England almost the only exception to the rule that *ch* is hard after the initial *s*, being there called *shedule*.

And in respect to geographical names, the closer adherence of our countrymen to the guidance of the orthography is, of

course, notorious and manifest. Except the dropping, in imitation of the French, of the final *s* of *Illinois*, the words *Connecticut* and *Arkansas* (the latter a very doubtful exception), and a few terms like *Sioux*, derived from corruptions of Indian names, there is hardly an important geographical appellation indigenous to our soil which is not pronounced very nearly as it is spelled. And when names are imported with a well-marked divergence between the sound and the spelling, a strong tendency toward the obliteration of this divergence is sure to become manifest. *Warwick* is about as often *Warwick* as *War'ick* when spoken of in America; *Norwich* is more commonly *Norwich* than *Noridge; St. Louis* and *Louisville* are often called *St. Lewis* and *Lewisville;* a resident of Delaware County, N. Y., would not know what place was meant if the county seat were spoken of as "Daily," so perfectly settled is "Delhī" as the pronunciation no less than as the spelling of the name. So long as *Chautauqua* was spelled with a final *e*, people persisted in saying *Chautauk*, notwithstanding that the local practice was always otherwise; but an immediate reformation was effected, some twenty years ago, by the simple expedient of substituting an *a*. It is probably quite safe to say that no mispronunciation of a geographical name growing out of an attempt to follow too closely the sound of its letters has ever become so prevalent in Great Britain as even to suggest the idea of making the spelling conform to the orthoepy; and furthermore that, if such a difficulty occurred, the attempted remedy in question would be found in that country quite unproductive of any change in the popular usage.

Passing from orthoepy to orthography, it hardly need be said that in every instance where a change in spelling has originated in the United States, the change has been in the direction of simplicity, and in the interest, therefore, of the "reform" which the Philological Society of Great Britain so warmly favors. The dropping of the second *g* in *waggon*, the *u* in *parlour* and similar words, the *e* in *storey* (of a house), and the final *e* in *pease* (plural of pea),* are all changes in this direction, and so is the substitution of *w* for *ugh* in *plough*, and *f* for *ugh* in *draught*, and the abandonment of the spellings *shew, cyder, tyre*, and especially *gaol*, the universal adoption of *jail* bringing the word into harmony with the rest of the language, as there is no

* Of course, *pease* was not originally a plural word, but nobody thinks of it otherwise now.

other instance in English of a soft *g* before *a*—notwithstanding that some absurd people, who do not call Margaret *Marjaret*, or Garfield *Jarfield*, will persist in saying *oleomarjarine*.

In respect to at least one American spelling, that of *plow*, and probably others, it should not be forgotten that the prevalent practice in this country is in accordance with the custom of an earlier time, from which divergence without good reason had gradually grown up in England. And this brings us to another strongly marked characteristic of our American speech—its greater permanence and steadiness, so to speak, as compared with that of the mother country. This peculiarity will appear very clearly, on close examination of any list of words supposed to have been greatly distorted in their meaning or even manufactured out of whole cloth by erring Yankees, a very large proportion of which will almost always be found to be good old English, grown obsolescent or obsolete at home, but preserved in the New World in their pristine vitality and force; and conversely, on examining such a book as Halliwell's Dictionary of Archaisms and Provincialisms, which contains, presumably, no word now in good use in Great Britain in the meaning given, the American reader will discover a great number of terms—nearly three hundred, I should say—with which he is perfectly familiar. Here are a few examples, not including any that are marked as provincial, the inference being that all these words were once good English, but are no longer in common use in the mother country: Adze, affectation, amerce, andirons, angry (said of a wound), bay-window, bearers (at a funeral), burly, cesspool, clodhopper, clutter, copious, counterfeit money, cross-purposes, deft, din, greenhorn, hasp, lintel, loop-hole, newel, ornate, perforce, ragamuffin, riffraff, rigmarole, scant, shingles, sutler, thill, toady, trash, underpinning.

It would not be difficult, on the other hand, to compile quite a list of Briticisms, including words recently invented in Great Britain, like "totalling," or "totting," for adding up; "hipped," for out of spirits; "navvy," for laborer; "fad," for pastime; "randomly," for at random; "outing," for pleasure excursion; "tund," for beat; and a larger class of old words now used in that country in a comparatively new and in some respects objectionable signification not generally recognized in the United States.

I remember hearing with astonishment, a dozen years ago, from an English gentleman of culture and high social standing, that it was necessary to remove the gates of Quebec, "to give more room for *traffic*." I asked no questions, but wondered inwardly whether the people of the American Gibraltar were in the habit, like the ancient Orientals, of resorting to the gates of the town to exchange commodities with each other. On our arrival next morning, the mystery was solved; it was travel, not barter, that my friend meant by traffic. The word is continually thus misused in England, and it must be sorrowfully admitted that the bad habit is now slowly invading this country as well. Other examples—as yet, happily, not naturalized in American usage—are: *Famous*, for excellent; *bargain*, for haggle; *tiresome*, for disagreeable; *rot*, for nonsense; *jug*, for pitcher; *good form*, for in good taste; *trap*, for light wagon; *tub*, for bathe; *stop*, for remain; *assist*, for be present; *plant*, for fixtures; *intimate*, for announce, and *tidy* for almost anything complimentary. A London paper made mention, the other day, of "a very tidy bull," the writer meaning a valuable animal, and by no means intending to refer to any particular neatness in the beast's habits. English hostlers also,—to get pretty well down in the social scale, though by no means going as low as do the compilers of what are termed Americanisms in their search for blunders,—English hostlers sometimes speak of *chilling* cold water, meaning warming it slightly,—an extraordinary perversion of a very common and elementary word.

It is not only, however, in their recent coinages and anomalous assigning of new meanings to old terms that the English have made reckless changes in the body of our speech where the American practice adheres to the former standard. They have swung off in the opposite direction also, curtailing to no good purpose the significance of several words. A "young person" is always a girl in England. An invalid is "ill," not sick, unless he happens to be nauseated, though it is regarded as perfectly proper to describe him as confined to a sick-room or stretched upon a sick-bed. A Briton is horrified at the idea of *riding* in a carriage; although he makes no scruple of riding in an omnibus or a street car When you enter the vehicle at the side, you drive; when at the end, you ride. And if the author of "Macleod of Dare" is a trustworthy guide, the word *up*, used in reference to a journey in Great Britain, indicates, not that the traveler is seeking a more

elevated region or moving northwardly, but solely that he is going toward the capital; "up to London" and "down to the Highlands" are, it appears, the correct formulæ.

A third kind of variation that seems to have grown up in Great Britain to a greater extent than in this country, is the habit of turning active and especially reflexive verbs into neuters, as "Don't trouble," for "Don't trouble yourself." As long ago as 1854, Miss Yonge wrote (in "Heart's-ease"): "Theodora flung away and was rushing off." Charles Reade, whom the astute Fitzedward Hall ranks among "the choicest of living English writers," is guilty of such phrases as "Wardlaw whipped before him," [Little] "flung out of the room," and various others. These and similarly incomplete sentences certainly strike the American ear as decided innovations, and constitute a peculiarity of diction very rarely to be observed on this side of the water.

The English have also a practice, more pronounced by far than our own, of abbreviating a good many words in their common talk. They never call their consolidated government bonds anything but "consols." The Zoological Gardens in London are the "Zoo," and a series of popular concerts given every season in the same city are euphoniously denominated the "Monday Pops." Hampshire is "Hants"; Buckinghamshire, "Bucks"; Hertfordshire, "Herts." A similar liberty is taken with the names of firms; "Smith & Co." is made to do duty, even in formal business letters, for the established title, "Smith, Brown & Robinson."

In the construction of many sentences, however, an opposite plan is frequently followed: the insertion of utterly superfluous words. Thus one occasionally hear English ladies ask, "What*ever* are you doing?"—meaning, "What are you doing?" In Herbert Spencer on Education, we read that "in Russia, the infant mortality is *something* enormous"; few Americans would have put in the "something." And who has not been disgusted by the innumerable *got's* with which so many English pages fairly bristle?—in places, I mean, where the author does not intend to convey the slightest idea of getting, but only that of present possession. The general American dislike of this word, and our practice, where the past participle of *get* must be used, of adopting the old and softer form *gotten* (now scarcely ever heard in England), are not exactly what would be expected of a people who are ruining the language.

There seems, moreover, to be some ground for the opinion that good English authors in general are less particular about many points of grammar than are Americans of the same class. Dean Alford is authority for the statement that "our best writers (meaning the best British writers) have the popular expressions, *these kind*, *those sort*," where *this kind* or *that sort* is intended. In a story called "The Ladies Lindores," published serially in "Blackwood," we find the following: "There are some happy writers whose mission it is to expound the manners and customs of the great. . . . And yet, alas! to these writers, when they have done all, yet must we add that they fail to satisfy their models. . . . 'As if *these sort* of people knew anything about society!' Lady Adeliza says." Lady Adeliza, or her reporter, would do well to study a certain very elementary rule of grammar.

Worse than this, perhaps, is Charles Reade's occasional blundering with the nominative and objective cases, as when he makes the high-born and elegant Edward Fountain, Esq., of Font-Abbey, inform his niece that "there will be only *us* two at dinner." Worse still is the confusing of the verbs *lie* and *lay*, an error very rarely to be observed in respectable American society, but one to which Dean Alford says Eton graduates are especially prone, and of which a striking instance may be observed in an extraordinary place for a grammatical error—Stormonth's English Word-Book—where *laid* is actually given as the participle of *lie!* After noting this, one need hardly be surprised to find the same writer defining *Alborak* (in the supplement to his dictionary) as "the white mule on which Mohammed is said *to have rode* from Jerusalem to heaven"! And there are certain highly incorrect constructions, like "different to," for *different from*, and "immediately" or "directly," for *as soon as*, which are notoriously British, and of which it is almost safe to say that no American is ever guilty.

Mr. Fitzedward Hall, as already quoted, is of opinion that educated people in this country have lost the ability to write our language as did the author of "Edgar Huntly," eighty years ago. What must he think of the improvement that has been made on the other side of the sea, when he turns the pages of "Endymion" and notices the following, among other phrases of similar correctness and beauty? "*Everybody* says what *they* like"; "I would never leave him for a moment, *only* I know he

would get wearied of me"; "I have never *been* back *to* the old place." Speaking in all seriousness, were it not on the whole preferable that the art of writing English should decline everywhere even faster than it has declined in this country since the close of the last century, rather than that it should develop into such perfection as is illustrated by the last literary production of an ex-prime-minister of Great Britain?

Of course nobody thinks of denying, nevertheless, that a number of new, and in many cases uncalled for, words and expressions have been invented and now pass current in the United States, or that the meaning of some others has been gradually warped, to the injury of the language, just as has occurred in England. This part of the subject has been laboriously investigated by several diligent students. Not to speak of articles in periodicals, brief essays, and single chapters, no less than four books devoted entirely to so-called Americanisms have from time to time appeared: Pickering's Vocabulary, in 1816; Elwyn's Glossary, in 1859; Schele de Vere's Americanisms, in 1872; and Bartlett's Dictionary, of which successive editions were published in 1848, 1859, 1860, and 1877. The student of language will find much to interest, and not a little to amuse him, in each of these compilations of monstrosities.

John Pickering's "Vocabulary, or Collection of Words and Phrases which have been supposed to be peculiar to the United States," originated in the author's practice, while living in London during the first two years of this century, of noting down, for the purpose of avoiding them, such of his own verbal expressions as were condemned for American errors by his British friends. After returning to this country, he communicated a paper on the subject, consisting of an essay and a list of words, to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and shortly after, having largely amplified the vocabulary, he submitted the whole to the judgment of his countrymen for their instruction and admonition. As finally published, the list contains over five hundred words, of which not more than about seventy are really of American origin and now in respectable use. As examples, may be cited *backwoodsman*, *barbecue*, *belittle*, *bookstore*, *breadstuff*, *caucus*, *clapboard*, *dutiable*, *gubernatorial*, *hominy*, *intervale*, *salt-lick*, *offset*, *portage*, *rapids*, *samp*, and *sleigh*. The other six-sevenths of the book consists of mere vulgarisms and blunders; unauthorized expressions in-

vented by eccentric writers and never generally adopted; and words really British in their origin, though not current in good London society: to which last class, by the way, it is probable that some of the terms above mentioned as genuine Americanisms might be transferred, were their full history known.

Dr. Elwyn's "Glossary of Supposed Americanisms" was undertaken "to show how much there yet remains in this country of language and customs directly brought from our remotest ancestry," a purpose quite different from that of Mr. Pickering; but the chief value of the book consists in the contribution it makes to our knowledge of Pennsylvania provincialisms, of which the author is evidently a careful observer. About four hundred and sixty words are included, a clear majority of which would be quite as little understood in decent American as in decent British society; but it seems that we have been accused of manufacturing the whole list, while the fact is that they are one and all of British origin.

Schele de Vere's "Americanisms," a small octavo of something less than seven hundred pages, differs from the other works mentioned, in not adopting the dictionary form, but presenting our verbal peculiarities arranged in various classes. The author has been accused of plagiarizing from Bartlett, and doubtless did avail himself freely of the labors of that diligent lexicographer; but he added a good deal of original matter, and his book possesses an interest of its own, being indeed the only one of the four that is likely to be read entirely through. About four thousand words and phrases appear in the index.

Bartlett's "Dictionary of Americanisms" is, in its latest edition, a bulky octavo of over eight hundred pages, containing something above five thousand six hundred entries, but hardly representing more than about five hundred genuine and distinct Americanisms now in decent use, less than one-tenth of the whole number of articles. Of the remainder, nearly four hundred words and phrases are set down by the author himself as of British origin. Perhaps the most surprising word in this class is *immediately* for "as soon as." This wretched expression, Mr. Bartlett writes, "is creeping into use from England." What possible sense there can be in counting as an Americanism a villanously ungrammatical construction which is creeping into use in this country from England, it would puzzle Fitzedward

Hall himself to explain. At least one hundred and seventy-five more, and probably a much larger number, are also certainly British, though the author seems not to be aware of it. Many of these have already been pointed out by various reviewers, but I believe the following have escaped notice:

*Ampersand*, *beef* (an ox), *blaze* (a mark on a tree), *clever* (good-natured), *cradle* (scythe), *hulking* (unwieldy), *Jack-at-a-pinch*, *pitch in*, *sauce* (impudence), *shinny*, *stand* (a platform), *stock* (cattle), and *tramp* (a strolling vagabond)—are all in Halliwell. *Cookey*, a little cake; in Prof. J. F. W. Johnston's "Notes on North America," chap. 23, vol. 2, we read that this word is familiar to a Scotchman's ears. *Firedogs*, andirons; this is found in Brockett's "Glossary of North Country Words." *Right*, for *very;* fancy setting this down as an Americanism! Did Mr. Bartlett ever read the 139th Psalm, "Marvelous are thy works, and that my soul knoweth right well?" To *set to rights*, and *safe*, a place of security, are both in Elwyn, the former credited to Essex, and the latter to Suffolk. *Span* for *perfectly;* the expression "Span new" is as old as Chaucer. *Stop* for *stay*, as "I am stopping at a hotel." The insertion of this detestable Briticism in a dictionary of Americanisms, of all places in the world, is one of the curiosities of the book. *Too thin;* Smollett wrote, in "Peregrine Pickle" (published 1751): "This pretext was too thin to impose upon her lover." And Shakspere, in Henry VIII., Act 5, Scene 2, makes the king say: "You were ever good at sudden commendations, Bishop of Winchester. But know I come not to hear such flattery now, and in my presence; they are too thin and bare to hide offenses." *Tophet*, the place of torment; this is of course just as much an Americanism as is *Eden*, or *Babylon*, or *Jerusalem*. *Touch-and-go;* who does not remember the "touch-and-go young Barnacle" of the circumlocution office in Charles Dickens's "Little Dorrit"? *"Well,"* a meaningless preface to a sentence; the word is twice used in this way by highly aristocratic speakers in the first chapter of "Endymion." Lord Beaconsfield would have been slightly amused if Mr. Bartlett had informed him that he represented Sidney Wilton and William Ferrars as conversing in the American dialect.

The rest of the dictionary, say four-fifths, is made up, partly of expressions never in general use or long since antiquated; partly of mispronunciations, grammatical errors and unauthorized contractions; partly of vulgar and disgusting slang; and partly of wearisome repetitions. It is a great pity that the diligent compiler, in his anxiety to make a big book, buried his grains of wheat under so appalling a mountain of chaff.

In regard to genuine Americanisms—words and phrases really peculiar to this country, or used here in a sense never recognized in England—it is needless to take note of any that are correctly defined by Bartlett, his book being, with all its faults, indisputably the standard work of reference on this subject.

Among those that he has either omitted, or about which his statements invite remark, are the following:

*Blizzard.* This remarkable word Mr. Bartlett defines as a "poser," having noticed, apparently, only a single instance of its use, and jumped at the conclusion that this is the meaning intended. He adds the comment, "not known in the Eastern States," which was generally true no doubt until the sharp winter of 1880–81 familiarized the term (as well as the thing itself, in a greatly modified form) to the people of the East. It is hardly necessary to say that a real blizzard, as the word is now understood, is a terrific storm, with low barometer, light clouds or none at all, "and the air full of particles of snow, in the form of dry, sharp crystals, which, driven before the wind, bite and sting like fire." The term is said to have made its first appearance in print about the year 1860, in a newspaper called the "Northern Vindicator," published at Estherville, Minn. Its etymology can only be guessed at, but there has been no lack of guesses. The English word *blister;* the French *bouillard;* the German *blitz;* the Spanish *brisa;* the surname *Blizzard* (said to be common around Baltimore); an unpronounceable Sioux term, and the Scotch verb *blizzen*—all these and other words have been suggested with various degrees of improbability as the origin of the term. My own conjecture is that it is simply an onomatopœia: an attempt, not wholly unsuccessful, to represent the whistling and "driving" noise of a terrible storm. It should be added that the word seems to have been occasionally used in various places in the Eastern States for a long time past, in significations quite different from its present meaning. *Boom*—a semi-slang expression, though it appears in the 1881 supplement to Worcester, descriptive of a sudden advance in popularity or in price. Perhaps borrowed from the mining phraseology of the Far West, where a process called booming is sometimes adopted to clear off surface soil and reveal supposed mineral veins. An artificial reservoir is constructed near the summit of a mountain, which is first allowed to fill with water, and is then suddenly opened, whereupon a mighty torrent rushes down the slope, carrying rocks, trees, earth and all, with resistless force. *To buck against*—to oppose violently. *Canaille*—shorts, or low grades of flour. *Casket*—a kind of coffin. This first appears in the Webster Supplement of 1879. *Coal*—Bartlett blunders fearfully in attempting to give the names of the different sizes of coal: His list is: 1. Broken, or furnace coal, being the largest lumps; 2. Stove or range; 3. Pea or nut; 4. Egg; 5. Coal dust. The correct nomenclature is: 1. Furnace; 2. Egg; 3. Stove; 4. Chestnut; 5. Pea; 6. Coal dust. *Coral* of lobster—Unimpregnated eggs. Not in the dictionaries except the Webster Supplement, and incorrectly defined there. *Dodger*—a small handbill; not in the dictionaries. *Escalan*—twelve and a half cents. A New Orleans term, not in the dictionaries. *Fair*—an exhibition, not primarily for the purpose of sale. This very common American use of the word is not recognized by any dictionary in ordinary use, though the authority of a recent writer in the "Westminster Review" may be cited in its support. *French*—a term used in Maryland and Virginia for anything that is greatly disliked. *Furore*—an excitement, not in any English dictionary, so far as I know, although it is found in one of Bartlett's citations. *Gripsack*—a vulgar term for a satchel, chiefly heard at the West. *Highwines*—this may not be an

American coinage, but I believe it appears in no diction
cester Supplement. *Institute* — a convention. Farmers' In
lasting two or three days, with lectures and discussions
at the West. *Liable* for *likely* — a vulgar error that sometim
company. *Mung* news. A writer in Blackwood, for Octob
*mung* is the preterite of the old English verb *ming*, to mix
and means, not false (as Bartlett has it), but confused. *You must not*, instea
of *you may not*, as the reverse of *you may*. Closely allied to this is the incorrect use of *can* for *may*, when there is no question of ability. A line on the face of our postal cards makes the absurd statement that "nothing but the address *can* be placed on this side." The English newspaper wrappers have a similar notice, correctly worded: "This wrapper *may* only be used for newspapers." *Ninepence*. Twelve and a half cents. Formerly used in New England and Virginia. *Railroad nomenclature*. Bartlett gives a list of eighteen objects pertaining to railroads, which have different names in the two countries, but fails to note that the American "buffer" is the English "bumper," and the American "grade" the English "gradient." *Solid-colored*. All of the same color. This expression, common among cattle-breeders and drygoods dealers, may not be an Americanism, perhaps, but no dictionary defines it. *Spilth* — in the sense of street mud. This occurs at page 259 of a story called "Alice Brand," by A. G. Riddle, published in New York, in 1875. *Super*. Bartlett says this is a contraction of *superintendent*. The "super," or, as he is commonly called, the "supe" at a theater, is certainly by no means a superintendent, but a supernumerary. *Tenderfoot* — a new arrival from civilization in the wild regions of the Far West. There is a post-office called "Tenderfoot," in Custer County, Dak. *Whisky*. It is, perhaps, to Mr. Bartlett's credit that he does not seem to be very well "up" in the varieties of this popular beverage, as he remarks that "Bourbon whisky is the best, being made of rye." As to the question of the best kind of whisky, there may be differences of opinion, but as to Bourbon's being made of rye, the fact is that Bourbon never contains more than one-third of rye, and seldom as much as that.

GILBERT M. TUCKER.

# THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROGRESSIVE THINKERS.

For our present purpose we may divide the world of thinkers into two classes: the progressive and the non-progressive. The latter class may include all those who either cannot or dare not pass beyond certain narrow and well-defined limits. If the limitations arise from want of strength to grasp a subject in its larger bearings, and to follow out lines of reasoning to their logical conclusions, or if the mental vision be dark and prejudiced from want of a sufficiently broad culture, such persons deserve sympathy rather than censure, and may be dropped out of the discussions that involve close and serious thought.

But there is another and a very large class of thinkers of whom it cannot be said that they are wanting either in ability or training, and yet, like a picket upon guard, they come and go along the same path: there is a boundary line beyond which they dare not pass. The territory beyond is held by an enemy, or belongs to some other tribe, and the most that is permitted them is to stand on the border and look over, or perhaps in the night-time, or under safe cover, make a hasty reconnaissance and then retreat within the range of their own guns.

Now, were these limitations the boundary lines of thought and fact, the position of such thinkers would call for no criticism, for all thought, as thought, is necessarily conditioned within the laws of thought, and hedged about by the world of fact. And hence there is not, and in the nature of things there never can be, any such thing as free thought. To these natural and necessary limitations all rational minds cheerfully submit. Not to do this is to cease to think, and to abandon one's self to a lawless way that is worse than idle—it is positively hurtful. It is to drift and not to make headway. But whilst free thought is something in

itself unthinkable, there is such a thing as freedom to think. The true thinker is and must be free within the laws of thinking and the world of things. His ships may sail every sea and his forces march across every continent. He acknowledges no right of preëmption or pre-occupation by which any school or sect or party can lift up a flag and say, "This territory is ours, and you dare not come and dwell within our lines." Truth is too boundless and divine to admit of any monopoly: like the air and the light of the sun it should be free to all. But very unfortunately for our world, truth is a territory that has been long in dispute, and in hostile hands; its fields have been fought over by many contending armies, and each one has conquered or captured some portion of the wide domain and thrown up fortifications, and with trained gunners guards the way against the approach of all invaders. And somehow this right of occupation has been generally conceded so far as to make one liable to the suspicion of deserting his own standard if he attempts to pass beyond the line covered by his own flag.

Were it possible to draw the lines so as to define accurately the boundary between good and evil, the false and the true, and to station the armies accordingly, then the warfare might be a just one; but the sad thing is that too often, and generally, it is a division, not of those who should be enemies, but of those whose common interests should make them friends, and in this way it happens that we have parties in politics and science and philosophy and religion. And becoming partisans, men almost necessarily become something less and something more than seekers and defenders of the true; for it will hardly be claimed by any party that it holds all truth and carries along nothing that is false.

Looking at the field in this light we find thinkers generally committed to the defense of some system, and in so far as that is the case they have lost their liberty. They may think, but they must think in one way, and along one line, and with the depressing feeling all the time hanging over them, that, after all their thinking, the party, or the creed, has settled the matter in advance as to what they must at last believe.

One by birth or education, or by both, finds himself in some one of the sects; or he may in his earlier years have sought its membership. All this occurs in the learning or acquisition period, and long before it has been possible for the mind to reach that breadth of view that can come only as the result of culture and

reflection. He chose for himself, or others chose for him, and he is now committed to a certain faith; he is planted as it were in a soil, grows up in the midst of certain surroundings and associations, and in these finds his home and his life; it is only fair to assume that this planting, whether by himself or his sponsors, was entirely sincere, and meant for the best.

He may have been raised as a Protestant or a Romanist, or among the differentiating sects, as a Calvinist or an Arminian, and to believe in total depravity and endless punishment, and for a time supposed that his sect held all truth, and that all beyond was largely false; but with reflection and a wider reading he comes first to question and then to doubt some of the things he once accepted, and looking into other fields of thought he discovers forms of truth where he once supposed all was error; and to some of these truths he is attracted, and, yielding to their influence, is won over into a larger life, and for the time, forgetting the lines that were long ago drawn about him so closely, he rejoices in the wealth of this larger world.

In touching this larger land he has come upon shores that are beset with trials and temptations. He is as yet true; that is, he has at heart the love of truth and right; and in this richer experience he would gladly rest and work. He has tasted the love of truth as truth and the love of man as man; but in this larger life and love he soon begins to feel the hard restraints of his sect, and in the fullness of his heart he transcends his narrow limitations and finds himself speaking in the language and feeling the thrill and breathing the air of the universal love and the broad brotherhood of the race. But now comes a new experience — a sad one; he hears the whispers of suspicion, and feels for the first time the cold sense of desertion, of being shunned by his old-time friends as one who is somehow not true, and the faith that had lifted him up like the great tides of the sea is denounced as false and dangerous.

What shall he do? He feels that he is not a deserter from truth and right; that he loves God and man — loves as never before; and longs to see all mankind lifted up and borne out into this great ocean of life. But the keen heresy hunters are on his track; their bloody yelp draws nearer, and the battle-cry of party is raised. Were it the battle of truth he would rejoice, for this he loves, and would see it vindicated at any cost to himself. But the issue is not truth, but what the party

or sect says is truth—something that was long ago settled, not by God or his word, but by the opinion of man; and being settled and accepted it became the basis of an organization, and he finds that the question is not truth. But what does the creed say? Much of this creed he believes, and to all that he deems essential, or to the truth in substance, he can fully assent. But the form, the cold letter, and not the warm life, is pressed down upon him, and the ultimatum presented is, "Say this or consent to a painful silence, or go hence—consent to be banished from early associations and those you love, and begin anew in the wide world; if you think there is truth over in those other fields, go where it is, but don't attempt to bring that kind of truth and think it can be permitted to grow in our soil."

Here the temptation may arise to compromise—to play double, to say one thing and believe another, or to conceal the new meaning under the old phraseology. Or the temptation may assume a more subtle form, and by a half unconscious tampering with the deeper sense of honesty and right he may persuade himself that, as society is, one cannot afford to be entirely honest; that a measure of mental jugglery is justifiable, and after all may be for the best; and he may help the case along by placing such thoughts as these on the side of the pleadings of rest and ease, and position and family, and party applause, and thus the scale may be turned against manhood and honor. Alas, how many thus fall; how many consent to become special pleaders and apologists for something less or more than truth, and to remain all their lives in bondage, who otherwise might be free and fill the high place of noble advocates.

Only the other day the writer was told, on what he deems good authority, that a certain able college professor and author and minister of a certain conference said, that he did not believe that there were a dozen thoughtful preachers in that conference who any longer held to the doctrine of endless punishment; and when asked how they manage to preach it and not believe it, he said, "Oh, they content themselves by using the old phraseology." Let a young man in trouble, on this or some other kindred question, go confidentially to some of the older men and ask advice, and he will be singularly fortunate if, instead of meeting a strong, honest belief, he does not hear some such remarks

as these: "Oh, yes, I have doubts; indeed, I no longer believe as I once did; but then it's no use to trouble myself or others, and so I say nothing about it, especially in public; and I am not alone, I know many others who think and feel the same way." On this same question of a broader hope for the future of our race, one of the ablest and most learned orthodox divines of our country said to me not long since: "Nearly all the great orthodox divines of Germany hold to that faith; and I believe it, brother—the Scriptures teach it; but I am getting old and I don't want any trouble, and I would rather you would not quote my name in public." It is sad, indeed, that the deepest and ripest convictions of able and devout men should be thus repressed and kept from the world in its doubts and struggle by a system of theological surveillance that is only less cruel than the old inquisition.

Nor does the evil stop with the pulpit; it permeates nearly all the denominational literature of the day. Authors and editors write from a lower stand-point than that of simple truth; and hence a large part of our books and papers are not free from the vice of special pleading, and one expects to find them devoted to the defense of the peculiar tenets of their particular sect; and it is only too common to find church editors carrying two heads: one is their official head, and with that they think and write for the church; the other is their own, and with that they do their own private thinking.

To avoid injustice, some qualifications or explanations of this apparent double-dealing should be made, and these may serve as a partial extenuation of what would otherwise be nothing less than downright hypocrisy.

It may be said of many preachers that they are simply learners and repeaters; they do not essay the task of independent thinkers, much less of original investigators, but content themselves with trying to master the common text-books of theology, which they accept as final, and hence may honestly believe what they say. And let it be confessed, also, that some, possibly not a few, able men really believe in the old ideas of a literally endless punishment and total depravity, and of a strictly penal atonement. When this is the case we should certainly respect the courage and the fidelity that persist in preaching doctrines so at war with the broader thoughts and feelings of the age. And then, of those who have come to hold these doctrines

in a more modified and less repulsive form, many may honestly think that the time has not come for such teachings; that the result would be to unsettle many minds, and to cast distrust over other doctrines that they really do believe, and that it may be best to let the church grow, or quietly slip away from the old views until, like neglected statutes, they will remain as a dead letter; that after a while the new truths will gain acceptance by a general consent, and that this will be better than to preach them at a time when such preaching would excite controversy and opposition. And still another fact that may be pleaded in extenuation of their course is, that all these men have long since come to draw a broad line between their professional and denominational theology and religion; and it is the theology and not the religion that they doubt. A wide and intimate acquaintance of more than a quarter of a century with the clergy of all denominations leaves not a doubt in my mind that almost without exception they honestly and devoutly believe in religion; not in morality alone, but in piety and the spiritual doctrines that relate to the soul and to experience. It is true that in their systems and their preaching their special theology and religion have gone along hand in hand, and the one has seemed to be essential to the other; and it is true, also, that they have not been careful to disabuse the public mind of this impression, but have, by a studied silence, if not by implication or positive statement, sought to strengthen rather than weaken this impression.

But whilst these cautious and hesitating preachers may quiet their consciences with the thought that they believe in religion, and in a theology, but not in the theology that they are required to uphold, have they sufficiently considered the fact that it is just this theology, or its special form and emphasis, that is standing in the way of thousands of sincere minds who would gladly be religious and enter the church and enjoy its means of grace, but are held back by these mental difficulties that to them are insuperable? Should not the way of faith be made easier and not harder? Is it just or noble for these isoteric thinkers to place burdens upon others that they themselves are no longer willing to bear? Whilst the church should be careful of the weak ones within its own fold, does it not owe a duty to those without? If all or one-half of the progressive thinkers in the Orthodox churches of the land would come to the front and openly say what they honestly believe, the battle would be ended

in a very short time; and the result would be seen in a more rational and not less scriptural theology; the pulpit, ceasing to be so poorly apologetic, would become open and honest and manly and strong; the burdens would be largely lifted from faith, and thousands of souls taken from the confusion and turmoil of trying to believe, and feeling that somehow they ought to believe, what, at the same time, in their deeper natures they feel is not true.

The truly progressive thinker can have but one end in view, and that is truth. He cannot serve two masters. Rising above all prejudice and time-serving and policy and cunning and deceptions, he must be true at any cost; and if he really have truth and the love of truth in "the inner parts," he will hardly pause to ask what the cost may be. This was preëminently the spirit of Jesus Christ. With a dignity that was divine and a calmness that was serene, he moved along in an age of bigotry and narrowness and hypocrisy, rebuking the false, criticising the old, casting aside traditions, and passing beneath the bitter and the cold forms in which truth had been well-nigh buried, he revealed its spirit, and hence his words were instinct with life and power. "He spake as one having authority;" the authority of truth; for truth will always compel a hearing; if not just at the time, or in the near future, yet after a while, for "the eternal years" are hers. And he is saying to those who would be his followers to-day, "Can ye be baptized with the baptism wherewith I am baptized?"

The responsibilities resting upon the progressive thinkers of to-day are not easily measured. We are living in a period of general unsettling: a kind of transition from the old to the new. The amazing progress of the physical sciences has opened the way to larger conceptions of the material universe and of the wide-extended reign of law. In the presence of stars so distant that the light reaching us now started on its long way before history began, our age is asked to formulate the thought of God. In the presence of universal law we are asked to define the supernatural. Before the full realizations of awakened thought the mighty questions of the future are being re-opened. Science and archæology are challenging the chronology of the Bible; and the doctrine of evolution is asking us to adopt new theories of the creation.

Now, in the midst of all this, what should the thinkers—thinkers who are not bound by assumed or imposed obligations

to defend any mere system, do? Simply this: be true; true to facts and to the laws of thought; and with a confidence in truth that can know no doubt, follow where truth leads; and if the way be dark and uncertain for a time, wait for the morning. In the baptism of truth that is yet to fall upon the minds of men they will cease to debate for the sake of debate, or to defend theories simply because they once supposed them true; they will lose the desire to tear down what others have builded unless it be found false; they will be as willing to follow the old as the new, or the new as the old. In the larger love of truth the thinkers will consent to take great questions out of the heat and passion of pride of debate, and to view them in the light of reason and as matters of common interest. The time should hasten when men will delight in agreements rather than disagreements. The love of truth is yet to be an enthusiasm—an "inner God," that will dominate all other feelings.

The great debates of our world are narrowing down to a few central and vital issues. Not many care any longer to argue about the meaning of *baptizo*, or the personality of Job. The weighty questions that press upon thinkers now are those that relate to God and the future life, and to righteousness.

Fortunately for the rising generation, the unsettling of our time is not so much over religion as theology. Men never believed more in religion than now, and never so little in theology; that is, in theology as commonly taught; and yet beneath all the misgivings and doubts as to the forms of theology there is an abiding faith in the substance of those doctrines in which the roots of religion must ever find their life. Mankind believe possibly more than ever before in an established order, an order or a power that "makes for righteousness"; and believing in the possibility and the fact of the right and the good and the true, though they may call it nature, or law, they are in substance believing in God. If not above nature or outside of nature and law, to them, God is in nature; and perceiving the soul's world of truth and love and right to be eternal, they will be slow to confess themselves as less than immortal. Much of the old theology may change in form and the substance remain. Many of the old theories may be dropped entirely, and religion remain and be the stronger because less encumbered. And some of the old theories must give place to the new, not because they are old, but for the deeper reason that, whilst urged as essential parts of faith, they are in

their very nature destructive of faith. Thus, it is useless to any longer ask most thoughtful men to believe in a God who is the best, and at the same time ask them to believe in a theory of his government that makes evil stronger than good, and punishes forever the souls he has brought into being. When we ask men to believe in God, we should show them the works worthy of a God. Evil may indeed, and does appear in the process, or in the evolution of morals toward the perfect; but that is a very different thing from evil appearing as permanent and ineradicable in the last result. It is more, and not less faith in God that is forcing open the long-closed doors to this brighter hope of the final triumph of the good. And so, also, mankind are asking for a new meaning in the atonement. They can no longer believe in the old doctrine that Christ died to reconcile God; for they naturally ask if God needed such reconciliation, why, if Christ were divine, did he not need to be reconciled? Is Christ less just than God? If God be the best, could Christ be better, or love the world more than God? And the moral judgment of the age is rising up against the injustice that could be propitiated by punishing the innocent instead of the guilty; and it shrinks equally from the sham of imputing the sins of one to another, and then making a show or pretense of punishing. But whilst the old forms of these doctrines must pass away, the substance will remain. Mankind will never cease to believe in law, and that all sin must receive its proper punishment; and they will believe that all love is vicarious, that it is in the nature of love to suffer, and if need be, to die to save; that God is love, and that "such a God in love could not be less than such a Christ in suffering." And it is for the thinkers who know this love and are willing to bear its cross to lift the hard and heavy burdens of the old faith that the new age and the rising generation be not hindered.

H. W. THOMAS.

# BIGOTRY IN THE MEDICAL PROFESSION.

One extreme of bigotry, whether as manifested in the massacre of St. Bartholomew's eve, or as in the action of the *Parlement de Toulouse* against the Calas family, is so cruel that it is universally condemned by civilized humanity; the other extreme has been cuffed by Rabelais, Molière, Tasso, Boileau, Swift, and the other satirists to such an extent as to make it needless to more than quote their names against it. The bigotry of the medical profession in America appears in no way related to either of these extremes; it actuates men who officiate on boards of health, who work in hospitals, who preach in all their deeds the gospel of humanity; they have dropped the robe and the doctor's hat; the cane and the black suit even have disappeared; these "tatters and rags of superannuated symbols," after various modifications to suit the spirit of the age, have vanished. When the regular physician refuses to consult with an irregular for the purpose of palliating suffering or saving life, he does so at the command of the medical society, which decides that such action is necessary to "establish distinctions in the public eye" between regularity and irregularity.

What, then, are the principles of medical regularity? Are they themselves beyond the comprehension of the public? The principles of medical regularity are founded upon the relation of the physician to science. History shows that the culture of science has greatly improved the healing art, and experience has taught us the necessity of organizations for caring for this culture; we have learned by experience that the more remote claims of science are apt to be sacrificed to the selfish individual ends which the struggle for existence forces upon us all; hence, as man has organized in society to protect

his higher interests from the dangers of individual selfishness, from barbarity, so the medical profession has formed associations for the purpose of protecting itself and humanity from the injury which neglect of the claims of science surely causes. Taught by the same experience, we have found that the culture of science is incompatible with the support of any dogma; we have found that if the dogma were true, making it an object of special care or reverence takes it out of democratic relations with other truths, and so injures it at the same time that it injures us by influencing us to unduly neglect or favor other truths. Here then are the simple principles upon which a claim to medical regularity is properly based, and in accordance with these principles, a regular physician is a member of an organization whose aim is the culture of science or truth as a whole. That these fundamental truths are not universally recognized is proved by a writer in a recent number of this review, who defines a regular physician as "a graduate of a regularly chartered medical college." Many diploma factories are regularly chartered, but the graduates of such institutions may have learned nothing of medicine. The same writer illustrates the influence which a dogma, true or false, may exert upon the relation of a physician to science. In speaking of the law "*similia similibus curantur*," the writer says: "Hahnemann believed, his followers believe, that the Almighty having given us medicinal substances, which, when taken into the system, produce in every instance each a distinct and separate action, he at the same time gave us a law for the application of those substances in the cure of disease." Most botanists, geologists, and zoölogists teach us that God gave us animal and vegetable life in a very primitive condition; that from this beginning he permitted life to evolve and specialize itself; that in this process there was a most complex action and reaction between life and its environment, which has been going on for uncounted ages. Saying nothing as to the truth of this hypothesis, it is obvious that one cannot be impartial in judging it if there exists in his mind an *a priori* belief in a God-given law of similars, for it is not possible to believe that the fauna and flora of successive geological ages have varied in every respect, in themselves and in their relation to each other, and still have maintained just this one relation expressed by the law of similars.

But to return to the consideration of medical regularity. It is obvious that professional organizations formed upon these principles have nothing to do with trade matters; in this relation the medical man would be governed by the laws which rule all other traders. Medical organizations have no right to interfere with honest trade laws, nor with matters of individual opinion; they can exact only such a loyalty as the State demands from Quakers and Jews. It is not good statesmanship to interfere with laws of trade, nor to foment bigotry by interfering with individual rights of opinion.

We claim, then, that the physician has a right to trade where, when, and with whom he pleases, subject only to the laws of trade; that in his relation to science he owes it allegiance as a whole. When this duty is confided to a regular medical organization he should loyally support that body in performing it; but if the organization, in violation of a compact with the public as expressed by its charter, or as based on the principles involved, neglects its proper functions or invades the individual rights of members, he should oppose it as earnestly as he should support it in doing its duty.

Our medical codes, as we shall see, furnish us, instead of these simple principles, a confused and meaningless system of laws embodying a certain amount of false sentiment, opinion, and tradition; before we examine the code, however, let us consider briefly the chief cause of this condition of things. We have said that the principles underlying the relation of the physician to humanity are established by experience — we mean, of course, established as truths. It takes a long while, as every student of history is aware, to establish such principles as rules of action. Great principles, as plain as facts can be, have always been obliged to undergo long and bitter contests with organized tradition and opinion before being recognized as laws of action. This contest is just beginning in the medical profession in America — principles, the results of the best experience of the profession, our earnings, so to speak, standing in direct opposition to the inheritance of traditions which we, with the other professions, have received from the clerics of the middle ages. The university has been the trustee of the educated guild with which we have shared the title of liberally educated men, and in support of which we have gained much of the habit of intellectual dishonesty that has influenced us in forming our codes.

It is a difficult position for the medical profession, this membership in the old intellectual aristocracy and this direct contact with modern science, as is seen by comparing the standards of liberalism of the systems of education peculiar to each. Fortunately for the purpose of this comparison we can quote an expert's testimony as to the nature of the liberality of our ancient educational chivalry:

"The English universities and the American colleges were also designed, from an early period, to educate gentlemen as well as scholars. But inasmuch as in the earlier, and, in that respect at least, better days, every gentleman was supposed to take some position in society as a legislator or magistrate, a diplomat or soldier, the same education was deemed suitable for all who aspired to what we have called a public position. These liberal studies were not thought unsuitable even for the duties and station of a merchant, especially of one who might be a prince among his fellow-merchants in generous tastes, wide information, courtly manners and refined accomplishments."

So much for the liberalism of the party headed by "Der kleine grosse Mann Hans Metaphysikus."

Contrast this idea of liberalism with that naturally resulting from the teachings of the "new education." Here there is no bigoted claim for any particular class of studies: all search for truth is recognized as liberalizing; here there is no effort to define or to form an aristocracy of culture, for the new education recognizes the teaching of experience, and prizes the "liberalizing" effect of the struggle of life, including, as it does, efforts for home, country, and society. Not books nor schools alone, but work, so far as it frees a man from the selfishness of his individual environment and teaches him to recognize the more generous aims of society, makes him liberal. All may be gentlemen by this code, which is not technical. It can treat privilege lightly, for it furnishes principles defining the rights of man and men, and points to experience, not tradition, as their source.

The principles underlying our relation to the public, as we have stated them, are direct results of the same teachings of science; the principles as stated by our codes are as directly the results of the traditions and opinions fostered by the university, and shared by us with the rest of the "liberal" guild. Misled by these traditions, the medical profession in England and America regards the culture of science as a sort of university function, and not a practical, daily duty. The profession has

lost sight of the fact that the practitioner needs to be scientific in practice as the artist needs to be artistic in the same relation. Without this quality, the doctor becomes the slave of conventionalities, routine and fashion, like the artist who ceases to act according to the principles of art. Thus influenced, the medical profession here and in England has allowed a wide chasm to form between the practitioner and the scientific worker. This fact is well illustrated by the nature of much of our effort at reform in medical education; for instance, the Johns Hopkins University agitated the subject of educating scientific professors for medical schools with the object of elevating the nature of professional work. It was chivalrous, this idea of renouncing its business and riding into the abyss; but the days of miracles are past, and it is probable that she would merely have broken her neck.

We must cut adrift from the system which has caused us so much damage, and adopt methods of instruction in accordance with the teachings of modern science,—methods more like those which in Germany have gone a long way toward making the members of the profession a body of scientific workers, capable of producing scientific professors, and supplying them with scientific support. Partial methods, whether like that of Johns Hopkins University, having the improvement of teachers in view, or like that of Harvard, affecting pupils only, are of doubtful value. Members of the medical profession should realize the dangers of pleasant palliation, and the need of a scientific diagnosis as a preliminary to scientific treatment. The professional organism is diseased, and our bigotry is but one of the symptoms of the disorder. In studying it, we find it connected with a constitutional vice, made strongly evident by the divorce between practice and scientific work. This condition, on the other hand, exerts a most pernicious influence upon medical education; it is a sort of vicious circle, where each individual symptom aggravates the others, and where all the conditions are to be met only by constitutional remedies. Thus purging our medical organizations of bigotry would naturally relieve them of the police duty which now occupies so much of their time and effort, and favor the performance of their proper function, the culture of science. A sound professional organism and a healthy professional spirit would favor active professional development, and this would, of necessity, soon lead to the emancipation of the

profession from a wardship under the university, which, more than any one cause, has dwarfed the medical profession in America. In this connection it is well to remember that we have a form of government which, more than any other, represents the public. Now, the public can understand and appreciate action based upon fair principle; it cannot and will not understand nor support actions based on technicalities, and resulting in manifest injustice and inhumanity. These considerations may well make us doubt those who seem to think that our profession suffers from popular misapprehension and indifference; we should remember that there is a charlatanry of savants.

An illustration of the violation of the principles underlying the relations of the physician to the community is afforded by any one of our State medical codes, with the exception of that of New York; the medical society of that State is the pioneer in the cause of medical liberalism. Most of the other States have adopted the code of the American Medical Association. The Massachusetts code contains much the same matter, but stripped of the verbose platitudes that luxuriate in the national code. This, together with the fact that the profession in that State has for more than eighty years been under the direct control of men thoroughly imbued with academic liberalism, leads us to select it in proof of the general statements as to the causes and effects of medical bigotry which we have made.

The Massachusetts code consists of ninety-nine lines, as printed by the society. These are divided into eight paragraphs, the first of which states in four lines the intention of the code. It is "intended to furnish certain principles and rules of action" for the "guidance and convenience" of the members of the Massachusetts Medical Society. The second paragraph, four lines, enters boldly upon the task, and defines the principles of our relation to science as follows:

"A physician should lend his influence to encourage sound medical education, and to uphold in the community correct views of the powers and the limitations of medical science and art."

I can find no principle in this paragraph, excepting this, that a physician should mind his own business,— a very good principle for an individual to act upon in personal matters, but a very poor principle for a trustee to act upon too literally. Now, the State has made us trustees in this relation to science, as our charter shows. Some physicians imagine that "to encourage

sound medical education" implies fulfilling our duties in relation to science; but medical education is unsound in an unsound medical community, as the local respect for Harvard Medical School proves. The fact that the school is impoverishing itself by constructing a costly new school-building, while it is suffering from the want of funds to procure a fairly competent faculty, is a sign of itself that the soundness of its instruction is rather conventional than real. Others imagine that "to uphold in the community correct views of the powers and limitations of medical science and art" is fulfilling our duty in relation to science. I can see in this no principle but that of the duty of advertising soundly and honestly,—a good thing, no doubt, but good for all traders as well as physicians. The principles underlying our duty to science obviously have many relations to the future of humanity. A scientific fact may be of no practical benefit, excepting to a future that cannot reward the discoverer of to-day. Is not this our real claim to special consideration in the present? But what relation have the "correct views in the community as to the powers and limitations of medical science and art" that is not essentially a relation of the present day? Further, the correct views may be conventionally correct — correct only in the community in question. But of the ninety-nine lines of the code these are the only ones devoted to our relation to science, excepting the preamble and fourteen lines devoted to the "relations of the physician to quackery." The remaining portion of the code is devoted to our relation to trade, or, more correctly speaking, to minute regulations of the etiquette to be observed in trade. Now, principles are not governed by conventionalities, but the statements of our relations to science contained in the code are so governed. Have we then no relations to humanity excepting those trade relations which the code seems to squint at in stating our relations to science? The next paragraph treats of the relation of the physician to medical business. Having found so much good trade matter in the former paragraph, we may find valuable statements of our relation to science here.

The essence of our trade relations as stated by the code is as follows: "The relation of practitioners of medicine to families and households is not like that of tradesmen to their customers. The kind of competition which might be considered honorable in business cannot exist between physicians without diminishing their usefulness and lowering the standing of the medical profession." It seems like another instance of strabismus. Our

relation, "not like that of tradesmen," reminds of that duty which medical organizations were instituted to care for, and which differs from ordinary trade duties. Perhaps the titles of the paragraphs were misplaced, or the paragraphs perhaps were changed by wicked nurses; but fair competition in science would not diminish our influence, it would not lower our standing, it would elevate it. No; evidently the paragraph belongs to the title; the trouble is caused by endeavoring to state our relation to business as no trade relation, as a relation of "sentiment"; that is, so far as families and households are concerned. With single ladies and gentlemen having no relations, no families, no households, the physician has a right, according to the code, of dropping all sentiment. Prof. Huxley, in speaking of more important matters, said: "In a matter of this kind there is no advice better than that of Dr. Johnson, 'Above all things, sir, clear your mind of cant.' And there is a good deal of cant about education, and I think a cant in respect to the medical profession is a notion vague and misty to the last degree—still powerful—that the medical profession ought to be a sort of liberal profession." One more paragraph from the code and we are done with it; it defines the "relations of the physician to quackery" (*relations* to quackery, *relation* to science and business), and reads as follows:

"In every community there are minds naturally inclined to quackery, which has flourished in every age. It grows by being noticed, and thrives best under opposition. It is commonly unwise to employ argument against it. But a physician should lend his influence to establish a distinct line between the regular practice of medicine and the practice of quackery, and should avoid any act which might tend to weaken such distinction either in the professional or in the public mind." The exegesis of this paragraph commences: "Thus, he should not consult with an irregular practitioner (see by-laws)." We claim to have discovered in the code ignorance of our relation to science, confused sentimentalities concerning our relation to trades. A quality worse than either is shown in this hypocritical assumption that regularity is a virtue opposed to quackery as a vice; that a line can be drawn between regularity and quackery which will not divide the regulars against themselves. We love regularity too well to enjoy seeing its would-be friends endeavor to support it by a false assumption. Is not quackery a personal quality, a vice to which all human nature is subject, and is not regularity

in this connection a technical quality that a pure and upright man may not possess, and still be fit to labor with the regular practitioner for the relief of humanity? Does medical bigotry ever appear more ridiculous than, when stripped of its modern respectable exterior, it is seen as it really is, too ignorant to understand its own aims? Professional training and culture do not enable us all to see this technical affair, regularity, in the same light, but the difference of opinion should not lead us to quarrel in a manner that does injury to that portion of the public which supports the views differing from our own. Such action would be paralleled by an attempt to punish every metaphysician, who does not regard the brain as the organ of the mind. If we cannot establish medical regularity without such means, we may conclude that it is no way worth establishing. But it is not the cause; it is the men who support it by bad methods who are at fault. The code as it is does not owe its nature to the quality of medical regularity, but to the folly of certain "stalwart" regulars who have made it. But let us leave the code to the scavenger.

It may be thought by some that our practice is better than our theory, that our by-laws are better than our code: we will glance briefly at a few proofs that this is not the case. Some of the by-laws relating to ethics and discipline are as follows:

"Any fellow may be punished by censure, disfranchisement, or expulsion, or be deprived of his privileges on conviction by a board of trial, upon charges of the following description, made to the President of the society in writing, and signed by three or more fellows, viz.:

. . . . . .

"For any attempt to disorganize or to destroy the society. For the breach of any by-law of the society, for which censure, disfranchisement, expulsion, or deprivation of privileges is made the penalty.

. . . . . .

"For any conduct unbecoming and unworthy an honorable physician and fellow of this Society.

"Any physician engaged in the practice of medicine or surgery in this commonwealth, who has not received such a medical education as is required by By-law I., and any one guilty of practices forbidden to fellows (I.) shall be deemed an irregular practitioner, and it shall be disreputable and unbecoming (VII.) for any fellow to advise or consult with any such irregular practitioner, or in any way to abet or assist him as a practitioner of medicine or surgery."

The public may find it difficult to understand the import of these remarkable statutes. In the sixteenth century the first would have been understood as a warning against free thought and free speech upon certain technical questions. Does it mean

anything else to-day? As for the second, it may be well to state that the society find it inexpedient in the present state of public opinion to connect too directly certain crimes as defined by our statute and the penalties which it is customary to visit upon those committing them. The nature of the conduct "unbecoming and unworthy an honorable physician and Fellow of the Massachusetts Medical Society" needs considerable explanation for lay apprehension. In one case that I am acquainted with, dining with an Eclectic Medical Society constituted such conduct; in another case it was associating in business with a homeopath, although both parties particularly stipulated that there should be no compromise in medical opinions; in a third case the expression of certain ideas by a physician, while acting as counsel for a fellow-member before the society's board of trial. Any of these offenses are liable, at present, to lead to expulsion from the society. Expulsion makes a man an irregular, and as such the fellows are forbidden to consult with him. In the act of expulsion his name is liable to be associated with those of members expelled for offenses criminal in the eyes of the civil law. When a man has been advertised to the public as dishonorable, and refused before the same public the privilege of meeting his acquaintances in consultation, of course the malice of the society has exhausted itself; it can only hope that its tricks will succeed, that the end so directly sought will be realized. But we are all honorable men; it was the stupid board of trial, the two or three bigots who preferred charges, the personal spite of the president or his toadies, that caused the resulting wrong,— all of which shows that poor human nature should not be tempted by such codes and by-laws.

Fortunately the law, itself a creature of technicalities, cannot interfere in the technicalities of a sister profession; so the abuses will operate until we learn by experience to dread their influence, and to care for those solid principles upon which only a consistent and honorable course of action can be based. Already many members despise the society by-laws and the clique which manages to administer them. Though some members are conservative by nature and training, and dread the fuss of tearing down and rebuilding, and others are young and dread giving offense to the politicians who run the machine,— for the politicians have influential positions in college, hospital, school, and community, and can injure in many ways a young man who makes himself obnoxious,—though these and other obstacles oppose the march

of reform, progress is inevitable. In the meanwhile the absence of all scientific work characterizes our society, chartered solely to care for our higher interests, to protect the interests of science from the daily incroachments of our individual selfishness. Read the preamble to the charter which the State granted the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1781.

"As health is essentially necessary to the happiness of society, and as its preservation or recovery is closely connected with the knowledge of the animal economy, and of the properties and effects of medicines; and as the benefit of medical institutions, formed on liberal principles, and encouraged by the patronage of the law, is universally acknowledged, the fellows and their successors shall be, and continue forever, a body politic and corporate, by the name of "The Massachusetts Medical Society."

Here are the principles stated by the men of 1781,—men who were accustomed to deal with principles,—men of the time of Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin. In the hundred years that have passed since their day the people have grown greater and freer; among them there has been a notable increase of intellectual freedom, a notable decrease of bigotry. Let any one compare the principles stated in the preamble of our charter, written in 1781, with the rules and regulations of our code written in 1880, and say if there has been anything like a parallel movement in our profession. Yet we, as members of the professional guild, have enjoyed a sort of monopoly of "liberalizing studies," while the people, illuminated only by a few great principles, have spent their time in daily works of peace and war. Verily, principles are better than traditions.

Finally, if it should be advanced, in opposition to our ideas as to the cause of this bigotry so evident in our codes and by-laws, that it is not the nature of the system of higher study which has dominated in America for the last century, but the lack of training and thorough education in general, we would not dispute the proposition very earnestly; we merely affirm that the men who have formed our codes and by-laws, and managed our society, have been good university men, fine specimens of their class. We see the results; as students of sociology we study into the causes. To us in this capacity, Fisher Ames and the writer of "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," are types of the same dyspeptic, hysterical conservatism which has influenced the good and highly respectable individuals who have substituted the senseless rules of our code for the generous principles of our charter.

DAVID HUNT.

# THE ADULTERATION OF INTELLIGENCE.

THE newspaper press, like less abstract personages of power apparently unlimited and frequently ill-regulated, is accustomed to assume that it "can do no wrong." Yet, so shrewd an observer as Mr. James Mill said, at a time when the character of newspapers by no means so strongly warranted the remark: "There is scarcely a right for the violation of which, scarcely an operation of government for the disturbance of which, the press may not be employed as an instrument. The offenses capable of being committed by the press are, indeed, nearly coëxtensive with the whole field of delinquency." The writer adds: "There can be no doubt that the press is an instrument peculiarly adapted for the commission of injuries against reputation and for effecting disturbance of the operations of government." To this it may now be added that the press is capable of disregarding material rights, of embarrassing legitimate financial operations, of promoting monopolies, of maintaining corporate usurpations, of provoking the violation of vested interests. Its responsibility to the whole body politic may be assumed, since it is recognized by every newspaper with constant protestations of high moral purpose. Its pretense is (if it be a pretense) that it is seeking rather the good of the whole people than the emolument of its own proprietors. Those who reiterate these claims, it is true, have seldom given any evidence of peculiar qualification, moral or intellectual, for the work so generously, if not so gratuitously, assumed; but they are usually taken at their word, at least by that portion of their readers which it is specially desired to affect. In this respect the public acts with its usual inconsistency. Its avowed position toward the press is one of indolent distrust; but men will believe anything which they wish to believe, and even what they do not wish to believe, acting

instantly upon rumor, as if it were confirmed by ample demonstration.

It would be simply impossible for newspapers to exercise anything like the influence which they unquestionably exert, if readers were in the habit of thinking accurately and of carefully weighing possibilities. The public journals partly exist upon the indifference, the indolence, and the overweening confidence of their patrons, who, having first paid for information, forget the rule of *caveat emptor*, and receive it as if it were beyond dispute. We must admit, as some extenuation of this folly, that if the public deserved a more trustworthy source of information, it is utterly without the means of securing it. The newspaper may not be always the best guide, but often it is the only one. It may well happen that while millions may be interested in the accuracy of intelligence, with our present machinery for its transmission and publication, only a few may be able to secure it, while, for their own purposes, they may suppress the true or suggest the opposite. It is needless to point out how nefariously exclusive intelligence may be employed, or what a power its possession may be, or how disastrously to the rights of others facts may be garbled and falsehoods invented. The enormous and yet delicately sensitive operations of the Stock Exchange offer the strongest illustration of the mischievous effects of exclusive or untrustworthy intelligence, because its operations, partaking of the nature of a game of chance, are conducted with peculiar rapidity, and leave little or no time for the correction of error. Moreover, values there being in many instances fictitious, and bargain and sale frequently having no solid basis of property, there may be insolvency without assets and little protection against tort, except the moral one, which is principally limited to the preservation of a seat in the Brokers' Board and the opportunity for speedy recuperation. How far the sales at the Board are *bona fide* in comparison with those outside, which notoriously are not so, we shall not pause to inquire. The whole business of buying and selling stocks is of such a character that the legal maxim, *qui facit per alium facit per se*, is too often ignored. If an important speculator desires work done of a dubious nature, there are agents to be secured all around him, without characters to lose or seats to be forfeited. In all this tangled and hazardous business it must be evident that the strongest or, at least, the safest position is that occupied by the

freebooter of the market. He cares for no reputation except that of audacious success. While failing himself to penetrate the privileged interior of the Board, he may be represented by one holding toward him a *quasi* partnership relation. Thus, being under none of the wholesome restraints provided by such honor and integrity as the Board may itself provide, he is at liberty to carry on his operations in such manner and in such quarters as he may deem most profitable to himself and most damaging to his enemies. He has at his service the whole intricate machinery of the market, without being amenable to its code or to its unwritten laws. If he has no conscience to torment him, no lingering regard for veracity to make him uneasy, no care for the ruin he may wreak, or the wretchedness he may occasion; admitting him to be selfish, greedy, and unscrupulous, utterly free from the restraining influence of self-respect, it requires no other evidence to prove that though he may be feared, he is not to be trusted, and that he is the last to whom extraordinary power is to be wisely confided.

The safety of the public from the tyranny of great corporations is in the number of corporators and in their individual responsibility; but this safety, by a singular paradox, diminishes as the number of corporators grows less, and disappears altogether when the corporation, or a majority of its stock, is under the control of an individual. There can be no fuller opportunity for absolute despotism over all others interested than that which is thus afforded. The rights of original investors are nothing to the man who comes into possession of fifty-one per cent. of the stock, while he may refuse with impunity to acknowledge the convenience or, as often happens, the safety of the public, reigning supreme, the king of the railway, of the telegraph, of the newspaper! Contemptuously disregarding every equitable feature of the situation, he may placidly indulge in dreams of yet more enormous wealth or less limited power. Such tyrants are neither petty nor insignificant.

There is an old distich which it was once the fashion to place at the heads of newspapers:

> "Here shall the press the people's rights maintain,
> Unawed by influence and unbribed by gain."

There may have been numerous examples of this more than Spartan virtue in times which are regarded as good, chiefly

because they are old. In these days of degeneracy, the newspaper is not necessarily a paragon of honesty, of veracity, or even of that simple sincerity which may mean well enough while making great mistakes. Journalists, it is true, are seldom given to self-depreciation. Modesty is not a characteristic of the leaded columns, and one may sometimes observe there a self-complacency a little comical. The air of indomitable and Rhadamanthine equity is no more wanting than the frequent intimation of omniscience. The everlasting "we" may lend to the crudest conclusion the dignity of a royal proclamation. The intention of impressing the public is always obtrusive, and often the public is impressed. Being in too much of a hurry, it hires a three-penny oracle. It may receive the truth or be put off with "words deceiving," for such is the chance of all who depend upon oracles.

The newspaper may either be following just behind advancing public opinion, or it may be endeavoring to create such opinion, but in either case its utterance is of no more value because it is printed than would be the oral opinion of the person who was employed at so much a column to put it in shape. *Prima facie* there can be no claim to judicial impartiality. A newspaper may be influenced by a variety of motives. It may aim, by the creation of a factitious excitement, to secure a sale large enough to be profitable, or at least to attract advertisers. It may be the instrument, literally bought and paid for, of a political party. It may be the mouth-piece of a financial clique, or of one financial adventurer. It may be used to gratify the personal resentment of its managers. It may lend itself, for a consideration, to feed the grudges of those rich enough to subsidize it. It may be arrogant to the weak and compliant to the strong.

Because a man has become the owner of a newspaper, it does not follow that he is fit to manage it, unless management is considered from the lowest and most material point of view. Strictly speaking, newspaper publication is a species of manufacture. Talk of patriotism, of love of the people, of devotion to justice, of honest politics, may really mean business, as the phrase is, and have no loftier purpose than that of making money. There may have been a time when the leading American newspapers were all of them free from this debasing passion for financial success; some of them may be so still. There have been, perhaps there may still be, editors like Mr. Greeley, quite careless

of acquiring wealth. There have been editors like Mr. Leggett, who, nearly fifty years ago, when left for a time in charge of "The Evening Post," nearly ruined it by his sturdy defiance of the money-changers of Wall street. But it cannot be denied that too many newspapers, particularly those printed near the great centers of business, are now no more than the instruments of the self-seeking, the ambitious, the lovers of pelf, and the lovers of power. Each of these is now more than ever the representative of an individual, meaning "I" always when it says "we." He uses his staff of writers as a general uses his mercenaries, or a great railway contractor his "navvies." He recognizes no right of independent thought in those who are employed by him. He generally acquires, especially as he grows richer, a contempt for the intellectual ability of his servants, and fancies that he can anywhere and at any time purchase it. He manages the internal affairs of his office as a pedagogue manages a district school. He grows daily more and more despotic as he grows richer and richer. He may at last be able to defy the public, partly because the public is not his best patron, and partly because it has fallen into a lazy habit of believing without any real faith, and has delegated to one who thinks only of himself its own liberty of thinking. And all this time this mock Jupiter, who is credited with the possession of real thunderbolts, may be ignorant and selfish, ill-bred and heartless, vain to silliness, and absolutely unscrupulous. The lamentable spectacle which such a man, whatever his material success, would present to the eyes of thinkers, of scholars, and of gentlemen, may be only the figment of a needless apprehension, and if so let us pray Providence that it may always be so.

Yet in this, as in all other human affairs, we must make allowance for the infirmities of human nature. To be sure, no New York editor writes over the door of his den, *Primum pecunia quærenda; virtus post nummos;* and nobody would believe him if he did. They would say that the good, honest man was only joking. There are legends, not numerous, but fairly authenticated, of editors who have exhibited a miraculous integrity and bid Satan get behind them. For this they have been rewarded, some fifty and some a hundred fold. Virtuous indignation may sometimes prove a good investment, bringing excellent interest in the public confidence and a proportionate increase of circulation. The Duke of Newcastle once gave to Mr. Gifford,

the editor of "The London Standard," the sum of £1200 as a reward for a single article against Roman Catholic Emancipation. The wily editor knew too much to appropriate this money personally; he gave it to some charity, but the facts being made public were worth a much larger sum to "The Standard." Grant, the historian of the London press, says that to his certain knowledge, Moran, the sub-editor of "The Globe," during the railway mania, in 1845, received a considerable number of allotments of shares, which he sold at a large premium. During the same period of mad speculation, "The London Times" fairly and squarely denounced it, and its weekly receipts for advertising fell off from £6687 to £2320. Still, nobody can suppose that "The Times" lost anything. Such stories are very impressive in print.

But turning from these pleasant examples of British virtue, how are we situated at home? We are not responsible for the truth of statements which are in the mouths of everybody, and really seem to be denied by nobody. There are certain newspapers which, it is asserted, are owned or controlled by Mr. Jay Gould. Who he is it is unnecessary for us to state. He is pretty well known, and mankind is not ignorant of his peculiar merits. It may be admitted that Mr. Gould might have obtained control of the Western Associated Press; might have pooled the journals which he owns or controls here, members of the Associated Press with the Western Association; might have succeeded in amalgamating the Associated Press and the Western Union Company. What Mr. Gould is not able to effect to-day he may accomplish to-morrow, for millions of money are a mighty power. Now, in his recent operations, we suppose that nobody will pretend that his purpose was to secure to the public the cheap and accurate dissemination of intelligence. It is conjectured that one of his desires was to benefit certain Western newspapers which he is said to own or control. He cared nothing for the interests of a portion of the New York, of the New England, the Philadelphia, or the Baltimore press; for when it was proposed to admit these to the Associated Press, the proposition was voted down by newspapers supposed to be owned or controlled by him. Men like Mr. Gould do not devise huge schemes like these for the sake of keeping the public well-informed. This eminent money-maker, whatever may be his skill, shrewdness, or valor in conducting a stock-jobbing campaign, is not credited with a heart

swollen with love for his fellow-creatures, or with spending his days in devising plans for the benefit of mankind. If he purchases newspapers, it is that he may use them in his business. If he contrives practically to monopolize the ocean cable, it is not that he may bring two continents together in love and amity, but that he may get good dividends and extend profitably his operations to the financial centers of the Old World. If he seeks to make the conveniences and the opportunities of the Associated Press his own, it is that he may cause newspapers to publish something or suppress something which it may be for his interest to have published or suppressed. If he really owns the newspapers which he is credited with owning — and there is nothing absolutely improbable in the story — it is idle to talk of the editorial responsibility of the persons nominally occupying the editorial stools in Mr. Jay Gould's printing-houses. In each instance, Mr. Gould himself is that august autocrat, the editor-in-chief.

Let us suppose, further, that there exists a Jay Gould cable monopoly; that this gentleman and his associates are in a position to establish rates, to suppress intelligence, to color that which may not be suppressed, and generally to use the cable, not for the public benefit, but for their own private emolument. Such being the circumstances, we will suppose that other capitalists, dissatisfied with this state of affairs, have projected another cable, of which Mr. Gould will not have control, and which will have the natural effect of competition in reducing rates. These premises being granted, it follows, as probable, that if Mr. Gould does really own or control certain newspapers, these journals will be the first to denounce the new enterprise as a stock-jobbing speculation. Something like this has really occurred. The newspapers which Mr. Gould is supposed to own or control are the very newspapers which have made haste to stigmatize the promoters of the new cable, as engaged in a foolish speculation which is sure to fail. The scheme is denounced as illusory, insincere, rash, and imprudent to the last degree. Now, the disapproval which is thus expressed of the enterprise is not one which any newspaper would be likely, apart from outside influences, to entertain. A reduction of rates would materially benefit all newspapers wishing to use the ocean telegraph for the legitimate purpose of obtaining general intelligence. There was no reason why the whole press of New York should not have

rejoiced exceedingly at the prospect of securing foreign dispatches at lower rates. That, to some of these newspapers, the plan should have appeared worthy only of opposition and obstructive criticism, was, to say the least of it, a most suspicious circumstance.

The simultaneous control of the telegraph, of long lines of railway, and of leading newspapers, by a few men acting in a corporate capacity, or by one man employing the advantages of a corporation, puts the whole public, so far as intelligence is concerned, at the mercy of unlimited power. The only question remaining is, what is intelligence, early and accurate, worth? The eagerness of mere money-makers to grasp a monopoly of the transmission of intelligence, proves that it is worth a great deal. That cannot be without inordinate advantages which such men are so anxious to possess. A broad generalization presents the matter as sufficiently as could the minutest and most varied particulars. The power to vitiate information, to misrepresent facts, to misreport money and other markets, as well as the probabilities of production, to overestimate or underestimate crops, or losses by fire or by railway casualties, in the chances of war or peace, or pending legislation, or the intentions of the treasury, is a power to control financial and commercial operations for private and personal benefit. If the lord of the lines above us or under our feet desires to inflate values, his are the means always at hand of doing so. If, on the other hand, it is for his interest to depress prices, his facilities are the same. He competes with all who are engaged in trade of any kind, in stock selling or buying, in production, in fetching and carrying, as the dexterous gambler, manipulating marked cards, competes with an honest or ignorant adversary. He adds to the advantages of an absolutely unlimited capital something like prescience, if not omniscience. He wagers upon a certainty. He may not only determine what shall be sent over the wires, or the form in which it shall be given to the public, but he may direct that it shall not be given to the public at all. He may even mislead the managers of newspapers not his own, who desire to tell the truth and all the truth, and thus make them the innocent agents of fraud. All this may vastly increase his personal fortune, but it is an increase which brings no compensating public benefit. On the contrary, it may work enormous injury, by enabling the modern Crœsus to fix prices, to increase

the costs of carriage, to monopolize markets, and to limit supply. It is precisely this which has led many commercial men to the conclusion that it would be better for the Government of the United States to purchase and officially manage the telegraphic lines of the whole country, rather than leave them in the hands of one man whose name (according to the opinion of the Board of Trade and Transportation) has "become a synonym for unscrupulousness and rapacity." These are not our words, but they have been deliberately used in the presence of a respectable mercantile body without protest or dispute of their accuracy. They indicate, at least, the fears of intelligent men of business.

In considering the question of the newspaper, it is necessary to look as intelligently as possible into the probable future. Notwithstanding our remarkable expansion, the real destiny, the ultimate historical experience of the United States, the fortunes of this continent to be covered in the next ages by an almost innumerable population, must be matters, to a considerable extent, of speculation. Like no previous nation, we have begun with an unreserved recognition of the democratic element, and with a suffrage well-nigh universal. But, while democracy implies absolute personal equality, and has been accurately defined as the supremacy of man over his accidents, we have not escaped the action of well-established natural laws. Wealth, in spite of all constitutional and legislative precautions, implies power, so long as it is protected by law, while, by its influence upon legislation, it also possesses the capacity for self-protection, as well as for self-aggrandizement. Through its control of the material necessities of the whole body-politic, and its ability to promote or restrain production, it may for a time exercise dominant sway, and have and hold those who are not wealthy at its mercy. But the aggregate amount of the real wealth of any nation being limited by its production, it follows that its absorption by a few must leave the great majority under the weight of comparative poverty. This always has awakened and always will awaken the most dangerous passions of our common nature—envy, class-hatred, covetousness. But it will do more, and, perhaps, worse than this. It will seduce the masses into the maze of irregular speculation, and leave the many, who have here the power of legislation, with no better guides than instincts, which may not be logical and may be dangerously sophistical. Possibly, it is absurd for a poor man to ask angrily why he is poor, even to

want, while his neighbor is rich, even to repletion; but he will sometimes ask the inconvenient question all the same. Finally, after asking, until he has become impatient, without receiving any satisfactory answer, the *ultima ratio* may vaguely present itself to his bewildered mind. It will not help matters much to tell him that he is a thief, a fool, and a rascal, as some newspapers do. Already, there are alarming signs of the tendency of the many to exercise the power which they undoubtedly possess. We gain nothing by shutting our eyes to inevitable tendencies, to the rapid, though still clumsy organization of the laboring classes. A riot will not always be their ready, but irrational resource. They will find out some time the fallacy of strikes, or they will conduct them after a surer and more effective fashion. Thus far it has been one of the worst features of the adulteration of intelligence that newspapers owned or controlled by capitalists almost invariably have taken the side of the employer against the employed. It would be remarkable if capital were always in the right and labor always in the wrong. Undoubtedly there are great faults and errors upon both sides, but, in a contest of the weak against the strong, there should be large and liberal allowance made for even the honest ignorance of the former, for blind zeal and mistaken passion. We gain nothing by telling a great body of working-men that they are stupid and wicked, or by sneering at them as ridiculously incapable of effecting their purposes. To misreport studiously the movements of the operative classes is merely to provoke them to the exercise of physical force which they do understand, and which in this republic is particularly to be dreaded. The newspapers which doggedly misrepresent the situation are losing large opportunities of doing a great deal of good. Unless sold and delivered, brains, presses, types, and all, to this millionaire or the other, they might act as umpires in this great dispute, and perhaps save the parties engaged in it from follies which must end, if persisted in, most disastrously. The responsibilities of the American newspaper, and particularly those of leading journals, are great. It may be well to have a giant's strength, but it may be shameful to use it like a giant. With ample capital, with such culture and intellectual ability as may drift into the offices, with such brains as can be purchased, with innumerable readers who are willing, and frequently too willing, to be convinced, what might not "the great dailies," as they are sometimes called,

do to avert the storm which is impending? Why should they be only money-making enterprises, thus naturally lapsing to the money-making side? Why should they be, on the part of their proprietors, only opportunities of vulgar ostentation? Provocative merely of foolish wonder at their low success, real or apparent? The supple agents of those who are richer than they are or can hope to be? Surely the most prosperous of modern editors might, in some unguarded moment of honest self-communing, remember how Mr. Garrison printed the first shabby sheets of "The Liberator" in a Boston garret; or how Mr. Greeley, as far as possible from being a Gorgius Midas, poor, unknown, and with no capital except his own dauntless determination, struggled to establish a newspaper which should be the friend of the poor, the suffering, and the oppressed.

The consequences of a journalism devoted mainly to the conservation of corporate and financial power are not confined to the gambling experiments of misinformation. The history of newspapers abundantly demonstrates that the dangerous and dissatisfied classes — dangerous we mean to vested rights and dissatisfied with existing social relations — have never found any difficulty in securing organs of their own. This, cheap printing now renders still less difficult. Any period of political excitement is sure to produce a brood of irresponsible sheets, badly edited and badly printed it is true, but still exercising an influence which may be most undesirable over the thoughts and actions of their readers. The despot may temporarily protect himself from such enemies by rigid censorship, but there can be no censorship of the press in a democracy. In France, in 1789, began that remarkable increase in the number of Parisian newspapers which did so much to forward the first French revolution. Marat sent forth *L'Ami du Peuple;* Mirabeau his *Courier de Provence;* Barère his *Journal des Débats;* Hébert his *Père Duchesne*, while Camille Desmoulins rushed through his short but brilliant career. The revolution which led to the establishment of the Second Empire was equally prolific of cheap newspapers which, after effecting no little mischief, disappeared with the circumstances which called them into existence. In England, in spite of occasional periods of rigid and vigorous war by the Government upon the liberties of the press, the demagogue has always found it a ready and useful instrument. It was the medium through

which the letters of the unprincipled Junius, that best of good haters, were given to the public. It has employed scores of dishonest and troublesome writers once notorious enough but now forgotten. Of how much value the voluminous writings of William Cobbett were to the world we need not stop to inquire, but of their great number and strong contemporary influence there can be no question. The contributions of this industrious man to periodical literature, with his other works, fill one hundred and six volumes. It may do no harm to ask ourselves, particularly at this time, what might be the disastrous power of such a writer in the United States,—of a man of indomitable will, of vigorous intellect, at once combative and careless of the weapons which he used, devoted to what are called the rights of the people, with a genius for making the poor dissatisfied and quarrelsome. A journalist thus endowed, master of a forcible style and of peculiar powers of sophistry, would make sharp and short work of the carpet-knights of the newspapers, and might soon create a school of journalism which would be astonishing and inconvenient not only to presidents and secretaries and members of congress, but to all dilettante votaries of the press. Cheap publications of the class which we have indicated might be frequently wrong and not seldom actually wicked, but they would only be copying, after their light, an example set them in much more pretentious quarters. But against such a plague of lice and of fleas we may well pray to be delivered. Unless, however, those who own or control newspapers take heed in time, unless they remember that money and political power and the opportunities of politicians (not statesmen) are not the loftiest objects of human energy, just so surely as cause follows effect will the day of an actually popular journalism come. We are going on madly in many things, but in nothing are we madder than in fancying that the giant democracy, which thus far has been kept under tolerable restraint, can always be made to believe what capitalists and the editorial agents of capitalists wish them to believe. The adulteration of intelligence may work in a quite unlooked-for way; the misstatement of social problems may end in explosions painful to apprehend; and a people left in ignorance may prove quite beyond the management even of the wisdom which, for a considerable portion of the year, irradiates the city of Washington.

CHARLES T. CONGDON.

THE

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

FEBRUARY, 1883.

**No. 315.**

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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1883.

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1883.

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

## FEBRUARY, 1883.


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SOUTH END.


# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXV.

FEBRUARY, 1883.


## THE REVISION OF CREEDS.

PART II.

REV. DR. POTTER.

*First.* Is it not a fact that creeds differ greatly from the opinions of a majority, or at least of many, of the people who hold them?

Undoubtedly; nor is it surprising. If by the term "creeds" is meant, as I suppose it is, all symbols and formularies which in any age have undertaken to define religious belief; then it is to be remembered that many of these, and conspicuously those of the sixteenth century, were the product of particular religious movements, were meant to be protests against prevailing doctrinal errors, and were reactions from previous doctrinal excesses. But reactions are rarely just. It is almost of the very nature of protest to be extravagant and one-sided. It is rare in denouncing error that its opposite truth is temperately stated, or that the underlying half-truth which gives to error its power is adequately stated also.

And here we have one of the most fruitful sources of the defects of many modern formularies of faith. They are essentially fragmentary and one-sided. They were doubtless profoundly true to the men or the ages that produced them. But later ages have seen the truth more broadly and more justly, and later

teachers have been unable to accept them *ex animo*, or teach them cordially.

And herein, too, we have the clew to the modern dissent between the pulpit and the pews. A Reformation symbol of the faith is lifted by the voice of a so-called ecclesiastical authority into the place of an infallible utterance. But time turns toward us its "seamy side." A new generation wins a clearer vision; a more profound scholarship reaches down to a truer exegesis; and then the teacher himself finds that he is a doubter. A great religious body, to which England owes a vast debt of gratitude, demands of its ministers that "before any minister is admitted into full connection, he shall give, in the presence of the Conference, a full and explicit declaration of his faith as to the doctrines taught by Mr. Wesley in his first four volumes of Sermons and his Notes on the New Testament."* I have the greatest respect for Mr. Wesley's Sermons and Notes, but I do not believe that the scholars of his communion to-day will care to pin their faith so implicitly as the above regulation demands, to the opinions and interpretations of a single individual; and one can at least sympathize with one of them who is said to have exclaimed, "If we must have a Pope, let us have a living and not a dead one!"

*Second.* Is it not a contradiction which is the cause of much disadvantage and injury?

Unquestionably. It is a grievous disadvantage to any teacher that he must seem to be affirming or holding dogmas which do not express his inmost belief, and it is inevitably injurious to any people to be bound by "Confessions of Faith" which they suspect their teachers of having outgrown, and which have no potential voice of authority to themselves. Any communion will gain enormously in power when it so re-adjusts its standards of faith that they shall eliminate things that have come to be recognized as of doubtful authority, and when, above all, it shall consent to distinguish between those things which "may be proven by most certain warrant of Holy Scriptures" and those others which are simply the echoes of theological controversies having no single point of contact with the profoundest convictions of the spiritual nature, nor any helpful or quickening relation to our common life.

* See Grindel's "Compendium of the Laws and Regulations of Wesleyan Methodism," pp. 14, 15 (5th edition).

*Third.* Should they not be revised?

It is doubtful whether such symbols of belief as I have referred to are susceptible of revision. You can not "revise" a preraphaelite picture of the Madonna. It was true to the hand and eye that drew it, but, however grotesque it may be to our vision, it will not be bettered by having a background painted in by Mr. Burne Jones, and a modern drapery introduced by Cabanel. We shall do better to hang it reverently in the picture-gallery of ecclesiastical history, where it will serve to show men what the ages that drew it believed, and where, underneath the quaint drawing and coloring, a reverent student may still see, shining through, a fore-gleam of some larger truth.

If creed-revision, as applied especially to the leading Reformation symbols, is virtually an impossible thing, it would seem to be an opportune question whether there may not be some earlier and simpler formulary to the use of which Christians of every name might wisely return? Is it asked, could there not be a convention of the various communions now existing in America, for the purpose of — what? putting their various symbols of faith in a hopper, and getting some residuum acceptable to all? To suggest such a scheme is effectually to dispose of it. But what is attainable, is:

*(a.)* A juster estimate of the purpose of a creed. It can not, from the very nature of things, be an exhaustive definition of the faith. If it attempt so much, it must inevitably run itself out into refinements of definition which make it unintelligible to the great majority, and, even when it is not unintelligible, "a burden too heavy to be borne." The (so-called) creed of St. Athanasius is a conspicuous illustration of this, concerning which it is sufficient to say that no such wide departures from primitive faith have ever discovered themselves in that daughter-Church which has discarded it, as are notorious in the mother-communion which has retained it. In all creeds which attempt much more than a simple *résumé* of facts fundamental to the faith and epitomized from the pages of the New Testament, there is a human element which must needs reflect the intellectual peculiarities, the degree of learning, and even it may easily be, the theological animosities of the age that produced it. And a creed will not serve its best uses if it includes these, for it becomes not a bond of union but a weapon of repulsion. It is not inclusive, but exclusive.

*(b.)* Again, it is not perhaps too much to affirm that what is to-day attainable is a more cordial, even if less formal assent to some simpler formulary. All Christians agree in accepting the New Testament, and there is a creed which is expressed in the very words of the New Testament, and of which its foremost Anglican expositor has affirmed (as expressing, it is to be presumed, something more than the mere opinion of a prelate of the Anglican Communion) that it is, "without controversy, a brief comprehension of the objects of our Christian faith, and is generally taken to contain all things necessary to be believed."* This creed is to-day accepted by every communion of Christians throughout the Christian world, and if it be objected that it is too vague and indeterminate to secure uniformity of doctrine and harmony of teaching among Christian ministers, and that more explicit and particular formularies are required to that end, then I ask, have they secured it? To speak only of my own communion, has the Church of England secured it, and are the names "Low Church" and "High Church" and "Advanced" and "Broad Church" only so many names for men who do not differ, and for schools which do not denounce each other as teaching deadly error or holding defective and unorthodox views of the truth? If any churchman is trying to comfort himself with this illusion let him read the "exchange of civilities" at the late English Church Congress, between Canons Hoare and Gregory.

But what is vagueness and indeterminateness in a creed? Greater and more helpful than any creed, it is to be presumed, is the personalty of Him in whom it is its office to affirm our belief; and a creed which concerns itself chiefly with the facts of his life and death and resurrection is certainly more likely to be serviceable than any other. For this, which is essential to this whole discussion, may not be forgotten; Christianity is supremely the words and life and spirit of Christ, and these may not be compressed or expressed within the compass of any creed or confession of faith whatever. But, while on the other hand it is true that what men call the Gospel is a statement of truths or doctrines that may be defined, as to their essentials, in words, and is essentially unchangeable truth, this unchangeable truth has been but slowly learned, even by its own disciples, and has been reached as men have advanced by degrees through the

* Pierson on the Creed, Int., p. 1.

mists of inherited superstition, "seeing through a glass darkly," to a better and fuller knowledge of its innermost meaning. What now will best keep them in this progress? A symbol which retreats from the person of the Founder of the Christian church to discuss the "hidden things" of God, or one which, leaving these till the dawn of a fuller light, affirms that simpler belief which binds the life of the church of to-day to the cradle and the cross of its Author?

It may be said that all this assumes the divine character of the founder of Christianity and the inspired character of those records from which the story of his life and death is drawn, and that these are among the very questions concerning which some Christian ministers and more Christian laymen are in doubt. For one, I do not believe it. Many a Christian minister may be transiently perplexed by the last skeptical book that he has read, and many more laymen may be loosened, now and then, out of an earlier and hereditary hold upon the substance of Christian truth. But such doubts concern, more often, the accidents of the Christian faith than its essence,—more often its modern or mediæval excrescences than its primary truths. The man who has power in the Christian pulpit to-day is the man who believes these firmly, and affirms them courageously, and such men had never so many attentive and sympathetic listeners as now. Doubt is a disease, of which there may seem to be many conspicuous indications in the air. But it is not an incurable, nor always a harmful disease, for out of it there is coming, for those who are to come after us, a simpler *Credo*, heartier and less intricate formularies of faith, and a more honest love and reverence for those masculine virtues, of which the longest creeds have often been the least prolific, but for which the world of to-day, weaker even in its morals than in its faith, is most of all waiting.

HENRY C. POTTER.

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REV. DR. CROSBY.

I KNOW of no creeds differing from the beliefs of those that hold them, excepting in very small and unimportant points. I can speak for my own creed—the formulas of the Presbyterian Church. I know of no Presbyterian minister, or person

who does not accept them as an entirety, although they think that some of the wording might be improved.

The United Presbyterian Church of Scotland has, within a few years, published an addition to the Confession, in which they bring out more clearly the side of man's free will, and thus more completely represent the whole truth of Scripture. That addition I consider a very wise one. It does not alter the creed, nor contradict it, but completes it; and I should be glad to have the Presbyterian Church in the United States adopt it.

As regards the great subjects that have agitated the public mind of late, namely, the atonement of Christ by a sacrificial death, and the eternity of future punishment, I know of no Presbyterian minister in our country who does not accept them both; and I think that all the talk about making new creeds because of the errors of the old ones, is the talk of men outside of the church, or of worldly-minded men inside the church, who seek a philosophical rather than a scriptural religion. If you take the formularies of all the evangelical denominations, the only great difference that exists among them is the difference between Arminianism and Calvinism, which is, after all, very largely a metaphysical difference, and, as the results show in Arminian and Calvinistic Churches, has very little to do with the piety and the growth of the church.

The talk of the opposition of science to the received views of religion appears to me to have no deep or extended source. That scientific discoveries have helped interpret the Scriptures there can be no doubt; but that scientific discoveries have, in the slightest degree, contradicted the Scriptures I deny *in toto.* And the trouble arising from scientific teachings is a trouble that never touches the hearts of religious people. That will only be found to be a subject of discussion among those who are on the outskirts. The theories of evolution are only theories, so far as any general application of them is to be considered, and, like many other scientific theories, will probably be forgotten in another generation. The Bible and the creeds have been assailed in the name of science by worldly men in every age, but they have never been harmed and never will be.

HOWARD CROSBY.

REV. DR. THOMAS.

THE notion of any recently developed, serious, and widely prevalent discrepancy between creed and opinion in Evangelical Christendom is, in my judgment, greatly exaggerated. The Evangelical Alliance, representing the various denominations, adopted in 1846 a succinct statement of doctrine, since confirmed by the American branch, and which, as I understand, still remains their unquestioned basis of agreement. This statement is explicit and unequivocal in its affirmance of the views recently assailed. It attributes the Scriptures to the inspiration of God, rather than the aspiration of man, recognizing them as a revelation, and not an "evolution." It affirms the "utter depravity of human nature, in consequence of the fall." It insists on our Lord's work of atonement as an actuality. It affirms the finality and hopelessness of the condition of those who die in their sins, etc.

Probably this statement would be unobjectionable to the great mass of Protestant Christians. That a contrary view should to any extent be entertained, is due, in part, at least, to explicable causes, involving more or less misapprehension or confusion of thought. In the first place, dissent is, through its very eccentricity, more conspicuous than conformity. The ring of the battle-ax on the castle-gate is noisier than the waiting of the defenders within.

Then the swarming issues of the periodical press, largely dependent on the piquancy of their contents for success in the "struggle for life," both invite the utterance of novel views and give them a broader hearing. By this means silent and timid sympathizers are rallied at once to responsive utterance. This seeming spontaneity of outburst from many quarters is accepted as evidencing a still more general sentiment as yet unexpressed. The receding echoes of their own voices are mistaken by the orators for murmurs of applause. Forthwith that tendency to hasty generalization, which is the peculiar infirmity of fertile and sanguine natures, tempts the confident assertion that the whole world has changed front. Assertions and reiterations seem, somehow, at last to be transmuted into, or at least to supersede the need of, proofs, both in the mind of him who utters and of those who hear them. But they are not proofs.

It ought to be added that the great bulk of so-called "scientific" speculation on theological problems, though sometimes reckoned as complicated with the question in hand, has in reality nothing to do with it. Atheism, Pantheism, and grossly materialistic "Pottheism" (to subsidize Carlyle's grim joke), are not neo-Christian, but distinctly anti-Christian. They are interested, not in re-adjusting creed and faith, but in abolishing both.

It is fair to infer, too, from occasional public utterances, a certain confusion of mind as to the use of the term "creed" itself, and therefore as to what constitutes defection therefrom.

More strictly, though not so used in current discussion, the term belongs to the early and simple formularies, such as the Apostles' Creed. Sometimes it is assumed that Protestant Christendom has adopted some one elaborated statement as a standard of doctrine, which is not true. Sometimes it is implied that the Westminster Confession, in its entirety, including even the detailed Catechism, has been accepted as such a standard, which is still more unwarranted. It is even at times insinuated that failure to assent to the very *obita dicta* of Calvin is somehow a lapse from "creed," which is, of course, grossly absurd.

John Calvin carried into theology a lawyer's instinct for right lines and right angles. He tried by logical supplement to bring his scriptural deductions as nearly as possible to the pattern of the New Jerusalem, which "lieth four-square." But he did not try to substitute his for the Apocalyptic vision; and there is no curse on those who "add to" or "take from" his words.

That there must always have been some denominational differences in creeds is implied in the very existence of denominational lines. The Methodists were Arminian, the Presbyterians Calvinistic from the beginning. They are probably far nearer in faith now than at first.

There has always been some latitude of interpretation of particular words in Church symbols. The Lutheran and High Churchman interpret the word "regenerate" as referring to effective grace in baptism; the Moderate Churchman regards it as equivalent to "incorporated into the Church"; the Low Churchman and most others refer it wholly to an independent spiritual change.

The churches have generally had (to use the language of one of the earlier Confessions) "no itch to clog religion with new

words," nor any superstitious attachments to old ones that have, through perversion or obsolescence, ceased to serve their original purpose. The abandonment of a term, which is, in fact (no matter how perversely), commonly misconstrued, is not abandonment of the doctrine once taught by it, but taught by it no longer. It is exceedingly unjustifiable and misleading, however, to direct an assault upon such terms, without any explanation of their origin and historic use. For this not only suggests a sweeping repudiation of the whole underlying idea, but, by attributing a gross caricature of their meaning to the original use of the words, it fixes the stigma of stupidity, if not of hypocrisy, upon men who were in fact remarkably clear-headed and heroically sincere, and who are no longer here to answer for themselves. It is one thing to refuse to accept or circulate defaced or mutilated coin; it is a far different thing to insinuate that it was originally issued in that form. Much of the genius devoted to showing the fallaciousness of the Fathers' opinion that three might be mathematically one, and one, three, might have served the world in some better way had it been recognized that the word "person," used by them in reference to the Trinity, was only the Latin *persona* transferred, and did not yet import, as now, the notion of concrete and isolated individuality. The term "total depravity," likewise, ought to be fairly interrogated before being ignominiously pilloried as an intruder. "Depravity" should be construed in connection with its antithesis "original righteousness." It is simply, as the word itself etymologically means, "perversion," and by contrast with righteousness perversion from the right line. In that sense any divergence, however slight, would be "total"; for it would involve that "missing of the mark" which is implied in the Greek equivalent for the word "sin." "Totality," however, was insisted on as the essential postulate on which rested the necessity of the "new birth." Only when a man was persuaded that he was "dead in sin," and that "in him, that is, in his flesh, dwelt no good thing," according to the Scripture, would he abandon the hope that he might somehow "evolve" into the new life. Death has not yet been found so to evolve.

Regard ought further to be had in the study of creeds to their occasion and purpose. They were frequently controversial in aim, and so drew out into minute detail, and with an emphasis which, though not false, seems to us now disproportionate,

definitions of specific sections of doctrine. Damnatory clauses, sticking their muzzles out of frequent port-holes, betrayed their bellicose intent. Sometimes the political animus protruded, as in the early English Articles, which scarcely differed from the Popish, except in transferring a Popedom to England. Sometimes, as in the case of the seven churches in London, who describe themselves as "commonly but unjustly called Anabaptists" (their Confession having been issued in 1643, before the Westminster), the avowed purpose was self-vindication against misrepresentations.

This last confession may serve to illustrate the principle generally recognized in the adoption of modern creeds, and constituting the very core of Protestantism — viz., the disclaimer of any rivalry with, or authority independent of, the Scriptures. Its authors expressly declare their work to be incomplete, and beg any one to do them "that friendly part" to show them "from the Word of God that they see not." Creeds have ordinarily been meant, like lamp-posts, to hold up a light and show people the way. Both are perverted if used to hang people for getting out of the way.

How far, and by what method creeds may and ought to be revised it is not easy to say. In England, where ecclesiasticism is wrought into the governmental fabric, it would doubtless require an Act of Parliament. Corporate action would be required in the case of the Episcopal and other analogous organizations in this country. But the Baptist Churches, which have never had an authoritative denominational formulary, and the Congregational Churches, which have been in like case, since the Unitarian defection, are at liberty to re-state their views as often as they find new ones, — subject, however, to the social ban of dis-fellowship imposed by other churches for apostasy. To the question, therefore, whether there exists in the Baptist denomination, to which I belong, any conflict between the creed and the belief of the people, I reply that, for the reason just stated, such conflict is impossible.

I am inclined to think that many who are dissatisfied with present doctrinal statements would be but little comforted by any re-statement fairly embodying the actual sentiments of to-day. Under its multiform phases of utterance the body of Christian doctrine has steadily matured and grown symmetrical. Its parts are so inextricably interdependent, that the wrenching out

of any one will inevitably and manifestly wreck the whole. Its form and permanence are due, not to the creeds, but to the inspired word of God, which has created it and them.

For myself I have never thought uninspired re-statements of inspired statements so essential or serviceable as many others do, to whose superior judgment I bow. So long as the "green pastures" are green they are better than baled hay, and quite as safe for flock and herd. Specific statements of belief being human, must, like all things human, wax old and perish; but the beliefs themselves will abide, and the "things most surely believed" will remain true. For "*verbum Dei manet in æternum.*"

JESSE B. THOMAS.

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REV. DR. PECK.

CREEDS are human, fallible, and uninspired statements concerning the doctrines and truths of an inspired Book. They are the record of the progress of human thought in apprehending and formulating the Divine thought. They can be, at best, only tentative and approximative declarations of the contents of the divine revelation. It is but natural that the human statements of the great truths of the Bible should be changed in their formulas, for these statements in any age are inevitably colored and clouded by the political, social, moral, and ecclesiastical conditions of the period. And hence the statements of any one age cannot presumably embody the maturer thought of a subsequent age. The largest value of creeds, except the Apostles' Creed, is in their historical record of the progress of human conception of the Divine truth. It is to be expected, therefore, that symbolic statements of the Divine doctrines will undergo modification, and many of them ought to be entirely recast.

As to the fact of an essential difference between the creeds and the opinions of a majority, or a large number of those who profess to hold them, there is no doubt considerable variation in some denominations, and the discord is creditable to both mind and heart. To our thinking, the larger part of whatever difference may exist between creeds and opinions will be found in the Calvinistic Churches.

In America for many years, and in England and Scotland for a shorter period, this revolt of opinions has been growing more

and more pronounced against many dogmas of Calvinistic creeds. In the churches just named are found the most complex and metaphysical creeds, attempting to interpret the Bible, only to make it sometimes harder to understand or to accept.

These creeds were formulated largely as apologies and defenses in a former state of the Church; also they were an attempt, by philosophy and metaphysics, to speak the unspeakable, to reduce the character, government, purposes, and mysteries of God to human terms, and then to compel men, under pains and penalties, to swear supreme allegiance to these man-made creeds. These long, minute, metaphysical creeds have had their day, and have gone, never to return. They are a galling yoke, that thinking men will wear no longer. An explosion has been avoided by permitting the believer to accept the creed "for substance of doctrine," in many churches.

That door will admit a mouse or an elephant. And the elephant has got in and is tramping around *ad libitum*. There is, doubtless, a loud demand for shorter, simpler creeds, for larger liberty to men loyal to Christ and godly in life, for less imposition of yokes, and for respecting the great Charter of Protestantism, "the right of private judgment." There is no warrant in the New Testament, in Christ and the Apostles, or in the primitive church, for imposing long creeds on men before allowing them to enter the church. In the case of clergymen, as denominations are constituted, if they accept authorization from a church, covenanting to preach her doctrines, they ought, when they cannot fulfill that contract, to be honest and manly enough to go out; and if they are not, the church ought to have self-respect enough to put them out. They made a contract to do certain work and no other. No man has the right to covenant to be a watchman in my house against burglars or fire, and then admit the burglars or set the house on fire.

But I assume that each writer in this symposium is expected to state the facts inquired about, as they exist in his own denomination more especially. Thus the field may be best covered. There never has been a schism in the Methodist Episcopal Church on the question of doctrines. Church polity and slavery have produced several divisions, but there has never been any marked divergence from unity of belief in the doctrines of the church. There never has been doctrinal divergence from our standards on the part of the laity, except in so far as that change has been

fomented and led by the preachers in local churches. This statement is probably largely true of other denominations as well. The laity in all churches are usually conservative and loyal, except in so far as they are inoculated with the heresy or liberalistic views of their religious teachers. For the people do not profoundly study or understand the differences and distinctions in creeds, but tacitly agree to accept the interpretations from their pastors. One reason for the absence of doctrinal heresies in the Methodist Episcopal Church (a reason more powerful, perhaps, than is found in most denominations) is that the creed of Methodism is in itself elastic and liberal. The laity are called upon to subscribe, upon baptism and reception into the church, to the Apostles' creed, and to answer this question: "Do you believe in the doctrines of Holy Scripture as set forth in the articles of religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church,"— which articles of religion are twenty-four. And while several of these articles are not of vital moment in the present age, and are practically obsolete, I know of nothing contained in them that any considerable number of persons in the Church would deny or question. The clergymen of the Methodist Episcopal Church, however, are amenable, not only to the articles of religion, but also to what are called the "standards" of the church, and they are to be judged in their orthodoxy or heterodoxy by their harmony or inharmony with the consensus of belief in the church. That there is any wide-spread heretical tendency among the clergy of our church is not believed. That there is more liberality and breadth in the statement of truth than formerly is not denied; but I am asked to speak more specifically concerning the three fundamental doctrines concerning which the public mind is chiefly interested at the present time, viz: the Inspiration of the Scriptures, the Atonement, and Future Punishment.

Concerning the inspiration of the Scriptures as a fact of inspiration, divorced from the method of inspiration, there is no decided doctrinal heresy in the church. The article in our creed concerning inspiration is so worded that any man who accepts the Bible as containing an authoritative and infallible revelation from God may hold the verbal, plenary, or any other theory of inspiration with perfect consistency. The article is as follows: "The Holy Scriptures contain all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should

be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." The elasticity of this article as to the theory of inspiration, combined with the fact of belief in the authoritative and infallible revelation of the truth from God, has preserved our laity and clergy from any marked heresy touching the inspiration of the Scriptures.

Then concerning the atonement. As to the fact of the atonement made by Christ for the sins of the whole world, there is no variance, so far as we know, between our doctrine and the belief of our people. As regards the theories or philosophies concerning the atonement, *i. e.*, man's conception of how Christ's death made atonement, there doubtless is some diversity among our clergymen. On the vicariousness of Christ's sufferings and death for the salvation of all men there is substantial unanimity. The governmental theory of the atonement most largely prevails among us. A few may be inoculated with the Bushnellian or "moral influence" theory, but this has not, we judge, spread far or deep. The doctrine of the atonement in its orthodox statement is preached from our pulpits with fervor, and believed by the laity with confidence.

As for future punishment, there is no word about it in our articles of religion. A layman could be admitted into the membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church, so far as our articles of religion go, or his subscription to creeds is required, who did not believe in future punishment. Nevertheless, as a fact, future punishment is distinctively an article of faith among our laity. But the relation of the clergy to this doctrine is different. Their orthodoxy is tested and measured, not only by the articles of religion but by the "standards" of the church, which standards do teach and declare the doctrine of endless future punishment. Hence, no clergyman who disbelieved, and preached his disbelief, in future punishment, or who preached a second probation, or restorationism, could maintain his footing among us. The case of the Rev. Dr. Thomas, of Chicago, is in point here. There are not so many sermons preached in the Methodist Episcopal Church specifically upon the doctrine of future punishment as in former years, but most decidedly the doctrine colors and tones the practical preaching of our pulpits. There is, however, more modification, or divergence of belief, on this point perhaps than concerning either of the others. Very few, if any, are known to hold tentatively, while not uttering it, the doctrine of a second

probation; while possibly some, in their recoil from the materialistic and literal teachings of earlier days concerning future punishment, may have accepted certain modifications of the doctrine, as, for instance, the conditional immortality of the soul, or the final extinction, after unknown time, of the wicked, as surmised by Archbishop Whately and Dr. Bushnell. There is no preaching, however, of the doctrine of restoration and second probation. The governing mind of the Church, both in the clergy and in the laity, is tolerant. Methodism has never preached that belief in a human creed was necessary to salvation, and yet the Methodist Episcopal Church is not a creedless, invertebrate church. The period of her greatest activity in doctrinal preaching was when she stood face to face with the Calvinism and Universalism of the earlier period, proving her right to exist by her distinctive teachings and by her emancipation of the people from the thralldom of dogmas offensive to reason and repugnant to the character of God. And it will be no assumption unwarranted by the facts to say that the doctrines of the Methodist Episcopal Church, distinctively proclaimed in its earlier days, largely tended to modify and liberalize the beliefs of men, and to emancipate them from the sterner doctrines of the older churches. And if there is less of distinctively doctrinal preaching among us to-day in the line of dogma and controversy, it is because the faith of Christians generally in this country has largely approximated unanimity on fundamental questions. This fact is demonstrated in the frequency with which Methodist preachers are called to the pulpits of other denominations, and are accepted as pastors without the modification of a single doctrine which they formerly held. There are many evidences of growing unity and approximating uniformity of belief in vital doctrines among Christians; and while "a universal church" in one organized body is chimerical, if not undesirable, at present, nevertheless, the substantial unity of Christendom on the great fundamental doctrines of Christianity is becoming more and more manifest. The people care less for dogmas and more for practical piety. But all practical piety is informed by doctrinal truth, so that, if Christianity is less a skeleton of doctrines to-day, it is because practical religion has covered those bones with the sinews and flesh of Christian life.

Another explanation of the absence of dogmatic preaching is found, not in the intellectual indifference of the people to the

doctrines, but in the fact that the activities of business life, the insane rush and whirl and strain upon nerve and brain of men cause them to covet on the Sabbath such preaching as will be restful and helpful rather than wearying and controversial.

It would be no benefit to the Church of Christ to attempt to modify her creeds in deference to outside clamor, or to revise her doctrines in the vain hope to harmonize them with newspaper theology.

J. O. PECK.

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REV. DR. KROTEL.

ASKED to answer the question whether there is any difference between the opinions commonly held by Lutherans and the creed they profess, I would say that such is not largely the case. There are differences in the Lutheran Church in regard to a closer or a looser adherence to the acknowledged creeds, although all parts of the Lutheran Church in this country profess to receive the fundamental creed of Lutheranism, the Augsburg Confession, *ex animo*. Luther's small catechism, which embodies the same principles, is the text-book for the instruction of the young, next to the Bible, in all our churches.

Of late years greater attention has been paid in the Lutheran Church to the creeds of the Church — the so-called symbolical books — than for many years before. The general tendency is to study them more thoroughly, and there is a general agreement all round as to the reception of the standards.

There is no discussion in our church on the subjects of the Atonement, the Inspiration of the Scriptures, and Future Punishment. All are agreed to adhere to the old orthodox position. I do not know of a solitary man of any standing who does not hold to the old views, or of a single article of an antagonistic character that has been written on those subjects in any of our reviews or periodicals. The scientific questions that have recently agitated many parts of the church — doubts in regard to the inspiration of the Bible, the relation of Science to Religion, the Atonement, Future Punishment, and so on — have not come up in our church at all. Such controversies have created no difficulty whatever among us.

About twenty-five years ago an attempt was made by several prominent men in our church to revise the Augsburg Confes-

sion by cutting out such parts as they thought belonged to a past age, and which the people were now no longer willing to receive. But the effort was a complete failure. It only led the ministers and the people to a united investigation of the old creed, and to a return to the old standard.

There is no necessity for the revision of the creed of the Lutherans. There has been published within the last year a new English translation of all the symbolical books of the Lutheran Church, by the Rev. Dr. Henry E. Jacobs, of Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg. I refer to this work because it has attracted very general attention, not only in our church, but in the theological world, and the fact that a book of that kind should be called for now in the church, and attract so much attention, is one of the strongest proofs that the Lutheran Church, instead of going away from her standards, is really coming back to them *con amore*,—the English branch particularly. This is all the more significant, because, if there has been any controversy at all in any direction, it has been largely among English-speaking people, owing to the fact that they had not access, in the English language, to the literature of the Church. That difficulty is being met, so that the English portion of the Church is rallying around the old standards just as much as the German or the Scandinavian.

G. F. KROTEL.

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REV. DR. CHAMBERS.

IN the Reformed (Dutch) Church the difference between the accepted creed and the actual belief of the present generation is hardly appreciable; that is to say, in a hundred ministers there may be found two or three whose opinions would differ from the standards, and among the laity there may be a small number.

Modern scientific theories have had no effect on the popular belief among us. The great body of the laity do not know anything about apologetics. My opinion is that the ignorant washerwoman who is a Christian knows that the Bible is the Word of God, because, as we state it theologically, the Holy Ghost bears witness to her in and by the truth, and satisfies her own mind, and that is independent of anything outside. I do not hold that the plain Christians get their convictions of the truth

of Scripture from learned men. If such were the case their faith would rest upon the testimony of men, while it really rests upon the testimony of God.

In regard to Future Punishment I do not know of a single minister in the Dutch Church that doubts it, and the same is true of the old fashioned, sacrificial theory of the Atonement.

As to the Inspiration of the Scriptures, that dogma has never been formulated in the larger creeds. The authorities say that the Bible is the Word of God, and that its authors were inspired; but none of the creeds define what inspiration is, with one single exception, and that is a creed which never came into very general use. While I hold that there is a substantial agreement on the matter of inspiration among all our ministers yet, perhaps, they might not be able to agree upon the way in which they would set forth the doctrine.

There is no need of any revision of creeds, so far as the Reformed Church is concerned. The only possible exception to this statement has respect to certain expressions in the Office for Infant Baptism, where it has been proposed to make some modifications or explanations, in order to meet the case of a very few individuals in different parts of the church who, while thoroughly orthodox in all other respects, have some doubts upon these points, and therefore decline to make the confession required. That matter is now before the Church and will be settled in the course of the next year or two. But it is not supposed by anybody that, if an alteration is made, it will, in any degree, affect the doctrinal position of the Church or of its ministers.

I think it would be well if there could be a revision of the creeds of the Reformation,—not in order to modify their doctrine in any degree, but simply so to change the phraseology that it will not mislead any one. The explanations which I heard from my professors in Princeton and in New Brunswick many years ago I should be glad to have in some way introduced into the body of the creed, or subjoined to it.

I do not know how a creed could be revised with safety. A creed must grow. It cannot be manufactured, and it would be best to leave the matter to tentative efforts in the course of years, through which, probably, a desirable result might be gained.

TALBOT W. CHAMBERS.

# THE EXPERIMENT OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE.

WHAT the average American citizen boasts as characteristically American is the "freedom" and "equality" of all men, and their "equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This common freedom he gives as large a definition as his interests, real or imaginary, may dictate. This common equality he understands to be absolute. These common rights he inclines to think inalienable, and there seems to be a growing belief that they absorb or extinguish some of the rights of his fellow-citizens. The American citizen to whom I refer is one of that great voting mass whose determinations shape our dearest interests and fix the fortunes of the nation.

A conviction, however, which is growing stronger, exists in the minds of the few who contemplate thoughtfully the tendencies of our later history, and I may add, the fallacies, which lurk in the political "axioms" on which our institutions are built, or rather in our interpretation and application of them, that serious defects must exist somewhere in the fundamental structure of our political system. That political evils exist is universally admitted, save by the political tradesmen who manage to turn public misfortunes to their own advantage. The daily press is a mirror of daily wrongs,—unscrupulous political self-seeking, incompetence in legislation, corruption in office, defeat of the popular will, extravagance in public expenditures, maladministration of law, and, finally, virtual dominance of the worst elements of the nation. But while these evils are seen and denounced, it is customary to charge them against the demagogues who have forced their way into public affairs, and who are supposed simply to have perverted the fundamental ideas of American freedom, and to have misrepresented sadly the constituencies which placed them in power. We shall see, however, that the American demagogue is the legitimate outcome of the

dogma of absolute equality, and the faithful representative of his constituency.

The discovery of the political evils under which we suffer requires only a very superficial observation. Nor does the discovery of their ultimate cause call for any experience in statesmanship. The cause, like any fundamental principle in political science, may be reached by a thoughtful analysis guided by fair common sense. It is certainly an ungracious, and perhaps opprobrious, venture to give expression to radical dissent from the fundamental conceptions that underlie the political fabric of one's own country. Perhaps no criticisms reaching the foundations of a government have ever led to any peaceful reconstitution. But the methods of men and of governments have grown more peaceful and just with the growth of civilization, and the future may always hope for consummations which the past has found impracticable. In any event, the discussion of the causes of our political evils is impending, and cannot be stayed by the prevailing adoration of the "American idea," or the satisfaction with the existing state of things felt by those who fatten on the corruption of American politics. Twelve years ago the present writer ventured to raise in public addresses the questions which he here again presents; and the warning words of the distinguished English philosopher who recently left our shores have sunk deep into the hearts of all thoughtful American patriots. The discussion, however, in the present instance, must be condensed into a presentation approaching the nature of a syllabus.

*First.* The Factors of National Welfare. The conditions of national well-being supplied by nature, while they are all-important and demand governmental recognition, do not enter into the fabric of government, and do not require mention in this place. But institutions, whatever they are, grow under human agency. Man supplies, therefore, another group of factors in national destiny. Human intelligence must plan, human effort must execute, and human integrity must conserve, the political and social organism under which the beneficence of nature becomes tributary to human happiness. If a people possess endowments enabling them to rise above barbarism, there must be some basal principles framed into a fundamental national organization. There must be enacted judicious laws to meet ever-arising emergencies, and give

expression to ever-progressing ideas. There must be a just enforcement of the laws, and some tribunal to administer equity between man and man. These consummations must grow out of the exercise of human powers. What man has to do in molding the destiny of his country, how man's agency in this work can best be brought into action, whether our system utilizes most efficiently the powers for usefulness possessed by our citizens,—these are questions which we wish to approach with patriotic fearlessness and candor.

*Second.* The Human Conditions of National Welfare are grounded in Intelligence and Virtue.

(1) What the exercise of political functions demands. The fundamental principles of the political fabric demand an acquaintance with history, or the past experience of nationalities, a knowledge of the political, industrial, and financial sciences, and a recognition of the principles of justice and equity among men. The enactment of useful laws demands an acquaintance with the history and results of legislation under analogous conditions; a knowledge of the political, industrial, and financial sciences; acquaintance with the nature and usefulness of the great public enterprises consummated or undertaken in the past; a comprehension of the public enterprises suited to the country and people concerned; courage and intelligence to project and promote beneficent public measures; virtue to seek justice between men and between nations, and to provide wise laws for the encouragement of virtue and the suppression of vice; patriotism to restrain from the sacrifice of the public welfare for the sake of personal ends. The administration of the laws demands an intelligent comprehension, interpretation, and application of them, according to their spirit, without perversion, or evasion based on sophistical technicalities, and an execution of them without evasion, without malice, and without fear.

(2) The origin and maintenance of modern civilization. The slightest acquainance with the history of civilization shows that its rise among any people is co-incident with the access of new ideas respecting the powers of nature and the modes of nature's activity. The advance of civilization has depended on increasing knowledge of the laws of the natural world, increasing activity of the intellectual powers of man, and progressive withdrawal from occupations exclusively physical; the invention of new and more expeditious methods of attaining the ends of sub-

sistence, comfort, and happiness, and the progressive strengthening of the sense of justice, and the sentiments of sympathy, philanthropy, and patriotism. Savage and barbarous people are ignorant and superstitious, and generally perpetrators of cruelties and injustice. The high civilization of modern times is the product of intense intellectual activity, and a noble development of the moral sentiments. The constituents and the agencies of modern civilization are largely the applications of conceptions which constitute the body of the sciences and arts. All those modern improvements and advances which signalize the culture of the Mediterranean race, which have facilitated so amazingly all the useful operations of industry, which have brought communities, cities, states, and nations into rapid inter-communication, almost annihilating space and time, which have made the experience of all the instruction of each, which have introduced all grades of organized and coöperative activity, which have permeated all nationalities with a common feeling of sympathy, and consolidated mankind into a brotherhood of love and coworking,—these achievements are intellectual and moral. This fact cannot be too deeply pondered. Nor are these intellectual results attributable to the utilization of scientific truth, but rather to the very study, acquisition, and diffusion of scientific truth *per se*. Invention is only the medium through which science transmits its benedictions to humanity. Thus it becomes intelligible that civilization has advanced in proportion as the interests of education, and especially of higher education, have been promoted; and civilization has receded where intellectual enterprise has waned. This correlation of intellectual activity and moral excellence with the existence of those civil, political, and social conditions, which we unite in pronouncing the supreme excellences of human culture, brings to view the important fact that society is deeply concerned in the promotion of intellectual activity, and the provision of all requisites for its successful achievement of new conceptions of truth, and new utilities toward society. Can any man fail to feel the force of the inference? Is there any member of civilized society who does not enjoy benefits earned for him by the strenuous exertion of intellect? Is there any one so obscure and feeble that he receives none of the blessings conferred by good roads, by railways, by cheap newspapers and cheap books, by the postal system, by trade and commerce, by labor-saving machines, by

good national organization and laws, by exalted conceptions of the natural world? Let it be noted, also, very carefully, that the intellectual work represented by such factors in our civilization is a work of a high and exceptional order. The human mind, to produce these beneficent results, the common possession of all, has had to grapple with the darkest problems of nature, has exercised patience, endurance, persistence, and penetration which, when understood, have commanded the admiration of the world. Sometimes these herculean labors have received the sympathy and aid of wealth; and in every case it is accumulated wealth which takes the thought of the scientist and inventor and builds it into the social fabric, making it an efficient and visible agent in working out the comfort and happiness of all.

If it is thus intelligence and virtue that have created our modern civilization, an inherent right to the control of civilization dwells in intelligence and virtue, and every citizen is personally interested in securing to intelligence and virtue the exercise of their rightful control. Civilization is the product of the highest wisdom and virtue among the people; the regulation and government of civilization ought to reflect the highest wisdom and virtue among the people, and when these factors of national prosperity are so reflected in the government, all the people, high and low, receive the greatest possible blessings from the best possible government. I "hold these truths to be self-evident." But where are lodged these high powers for creating and conserving civilization?

*Third.* Modern Civilization does not reflect the Intelligence and Virtue of the Masses of the People.

A glance backward over the course of history shows it illuminated chiefly by the luster of single great names—captains, lawgivers, philosophers, artists, historians, scientists, inventors, philanthropists, teachers, capitalists. These in their several fields have risen far above the common mass of humanity. Their lives have been spent in a different, mostly in a higher, range of activity. They have forsworn momentary and sensual pleasures, and have given themselves to the life-long pursuit of some distant end. Not less human; not less in sympathy with humanity, but more so; not less intelligent in the operation of the social and political machinery, but preoccupied in the development of the sources of human comfort and happiness, they have

generally been allowed to live in seclusion, if they have even escaped the neglect and the jeers of their fellow-men. But when we glance over the list of names that gleam as beacon-lights along the course of progress, we see that each stands the representative of some germinal idea,—some seed-thought which has grown and multiplied and expanded till it fills the world, and all men, rich and poor, great and small, partake of the fruitage thereof. We see the names of great poets,—the first blossoms of civilization; the names of great framers of states and of social institutions; of great leaders in the dire emergencies of war; great historians, who have gathered up the experiences of the receding ages; great artists, who have created and kept alive the highest conceptions of the beautiful; great orators, who have taken noble causes before the apathetic multitude and achieved for them the world's regard; great scientists, who have unlocked the secret truths of nature and given them over to the use of the world; great writers, who have gathered up the lofty thoughts in every field and inspired the common mind with unfamiliar conceptions; great jurists, who have followed the course of right through the bewildering mazes of casuistry, and have sought to maintain concrete justice among men; great teachers, who have saved the masses from barbarism by devising systems for enriching the minds of the many with the fertilizing ideas of the few. A brilliant array of names passes before us as we utter these sentences. As each personality has receded from the society of men, a halo has begun to gather about his name, and men have been moved to acknowledge the debt which civilization owes him. It is useful to reflect how limited is the number of those who have made important contributions to the forces of civilization. Yet the beneficent results of their labors permeate every department of civilized life. In the comforts of home, in the conveniences of travel, in the work of legislation, in the adjudications of courts, in the avocations of industry everywhere, we draw upon and depend upon the resources supplied to us by the high intelligence of the past and present. Blot from the past one thousand selected names among the thousand millions who have lived and died, and modern civilization would be a barbarism. To these names we are indebted for all which we most highly prize in modern life. These living thoughts, these vital forces which have come down to us from the few great souls that have starred the course of humanity, hold up

social condition at its present level, and hold up with it the meanest member of the social compact, and the thousands upon thousands who have never reflected on the sources of their social blessings, nor ever entertained a sentiment of respect for those whose devotions and sacrifices have purchased the common comforts of human populations. How soon, along the frontier, where the supports of higher intelligence and virtue are sometimes wanting, the condition of society relapses toward barbarism—that barbarism, alas, so congenial to the average intellect and native morality of the great mass of men. If the highest condition of civilization is best for all classes of society, then all classes are deeply interested in the conservation of the interests of high intelligence and exalted virtue; and no man is slighted, but all men are benefited, by the public measures which secure to intelligence and virtue the highest recognition, respect, and encouragement. I "hold these truths to be self-evident."

*Fourth.* Therefore, absolute Political Control should not be exercised by the Masses.

The converse of this proposition, in the light of the foregoing statement of principles, seems a preposterous absurdity. The conferring of equal political control upon every citizen implies that all citizens are equally prepared to counsel wisely and act patriotically, and have equal stakes in the civil compact. There are no other conditions under which the equal distribution of power would not be unphilosophical, inequitable, and impolitic.

Every member of society is personally interested, as the state at large is interested, in securing greatest influence to those most competent to serve the state usefully. Persons not possessing the highest qualifications of intelligence and virtue should, for their own sakes,—for the best protection of their own lives and property, and for producing the best conditions of individual prosperity and happiness,—seek to lodge political influence in the wisest and safest hands; as every passenger on the ocean steamer refrains from interposing his own counsel, and gladly relegates command to the best captain and the best engineer to be had. This is not injustice to those who surrender control; it is justice to those who have a right to best government; it is justice to those whom nature and education have fitted to administer best government. This is not oppression of the masses by a selected few; it is the best protection of the masses from all political evils; the best guidance of the masses

toward the blessings of higher national and individual prosperity. This is not the establishment of inequality among men; it is the equitable distribution of political power according to political capacity. It is best government for the masses; it is a just burden of responsibility for those capable of government, and a fit conferring of power on those designated by nature to receive it. It is absolute equality for equal wisdom, equal virtue, and equal usefulness. For a people to avail themselves of the wisest and the best political control is but fidelity to the beneficence which has created the capacity for political usefulness; to reject the best control and choose the worst is ingratitude, impiety, and self-destruction. I "hold these truths to be self-evident."

But the American system robs intelligence and virtue of a natural right. Intelligence and virtue are disfranchised. Ignorance and intelligence, vice and virtue, are clothed with equal power. All the nation's political incompetency is resolved into some millions of units which, like a flood, deluge and annihilate the few thousands of units fitted by nature and education to act most wisely and most beneficently for the millions.

The American system, as it exists in practice, misapprehends the meaning of "equality." Because nature has established a certain species of equality,—equal helplessness at birth, equal mortality, equal right to life and the pursuit of happiness,—it assumes that all men possess by nature an equal right to exercise political control. This absurdity could only be equaled by the assumption that all men possess the same right to exercise the functions of chief justice, or discharge the duties of railroad president, or turn a somersault from a high bridge. Every one has the right to aspire to these things, and to do them when qualified by nature, by training, and by the consent of others whose rights are involved. The exercise of political power can exist only as permitted by the state. Suffrage is a privilege conferred by the state under such limitations as its own welfare demands.

The evils which germinate in the American system of universal suffrage have become enormous, wide-spread, and alarming. Patriots and thinkers are lifting up their voices on every hand, sounding alarms, offering counsels, and deprecating the tendencies of our politics. Our political evils are generally ascribed to the administration of the laws and the usages of our system. The packed caucus, the "cut-and-dried" convention, the venal legislator, the

official defaulter, the spendthrift Congress, the bullying "bosses," the relentless "machine"—these and other agencies are commonly named as the causes of the evils under which the people are misrepresented, beguiled, overtaxed, and oppressed. But these are only the symptoms of an evil more deeply seated. Every political evil-doer has had conferred on him the power which he misuses. There is no malfeasance except in some function assumed by some authority. A man is not responsible for doing as he pleases except where some trust is concerned. These political evil-doers are all office-holders. Those who elected them to office are themselves the cause of all the evils which they suffer. The American voter is the incompetent and often unconscious author of the political burdens under which he groans. Ignorance has installed ignorance in places of power. Selfishness and passion have thrust cunning and unscrupulousness into places where they fatten on other men's earnings, and tyrannize over honesty and patriotism. It is our universal suffrage—simple "manhood suffrage"—which lies at the root of our most threatening political maladies. Let us specify some of the evils which we trace to universal suffrage.

(1) It establishes the sway of demagogism. The ignorant, uncultured, or dissipated voter most willingly yields to the social persuasions of one of his own class. The field is inviting for the unemployed and unprincipled to seek the suffrages of their fellows and make a trade of office-seeking, and office-holding, and office-fattening. The profession of political service is truly a useful adjustment in society; but it should be a profession, and not a trade; and the candidate for office is solemnly and patriotically bound to allow his constituents unrestricted freedom in their suffrages. The resort to tricks and jugglery in caucus and convention, not to mention the baser influences of money and whisky, intimidation and fraud, is only the expedient of a demagogical trade whose practice is criminal. The very liberty of equal suffrage—a principle prompted by the sense of human equality, and incorporated in our institutions for defence against monarchical oppression, is made the instrument for raising to rulership the worst and least competent elements of our population, and converting our "popular" government into a tyranny, all the more regrettable and galling because self-imposed and avoidable. The sense of patriotism in public service is disappearing. Voters and demagogues alike dispense office for base

personal gains; and one begins to think of the pretorian guard which, in the decline of the Roman Empire, used to sell the imperial succession at auction. The highest intelligence and virtue seldom rise to places of political responsibility and trust. Our government, sad to say, is sinking progressively to the condition of a kakistocracy. It needs more than a patriotic contradiction of the prophecy to render its non-fulfillment probable.

I have stated the fact that, under our system, the better and more competent class of citizens are generally excluded from office by the conspicuousness, urgency, and unscrupulousness of political tradesmen in the management of the ignorant voter. Let any man look about him in his own city or town, or county, or State, and inquire whether the population does not afford better and more competent persons for discharging the duties of the various offices. The very proposition excites a smile. Who ever supposed the best men were in office, save in occasional instances? But does not the public welfare demand that the public functions should be discharged by the most competent?

Why are not the best men in office? Why are not the popular suffrages turned in the direction of best elections and best government? Because the voters misjudge what is politically wise,—and that whether they trust their own intelligence or yield to the solicitations of their leaders. It is the fashion of the devotee of the American system to exclaim that every citizen is bound in duty to grapple with the demagogue and counteract his influence with the voters. The citizen is willing to attend the "primaries," but he finds the primaries already "fixed,"—the candidates already chosen. Now it is idle to say he ought to have acted beforehand and circumvented the tricky demagogues of his precinct. 1. He cannot afford to spend his time in doing it; he has great personal and public interests on his hands quite unlike the small political tradesman who has no material interests at stake beyond his daily bread or his personal ambition. No better, indeed, can he afford to make an even trade of his knowledge, material interests, and political competency for the stolidity, ignorance, and sensuality which neutralize his ballot at the caucus or the polls. It is a damning wrong that the political influence of a chief-justice, so far as provided by our system, can be annihilated by the ballot of a bloated sot; or, the convictions of the illustrious political scholar by the momentary caprice of a vacant-headed boor,—and that too, on questions of education, of

finance, of State organization, or any other high and dear interest of society. 2. Civilization cannot afford to have him do it. The public welfare requires the faithful discharge of the duties of private citizenship. All cannot become "political bummers" without disastrous consequences to public industry and public intelligence. 3. It is not possible to do it. Good and useful citizens have not the gifts of the political fugleman, nor can they practice the unscrupulous arts of caucus-packing, ballot-buying, and "ballot-box stuffing." 4. It is not necessary to do it. Destroy the occasion for doing it. Suppress demagogism by making demagogism impossible. Diminish the power of the worst classes or increase the power of the better classes. The demagogue says we have no classes in America—perverting the fact that no hereditary class-distinctions have been established by law. To deny the existence of classes among us is to dispute with the multiplication table. We have a class who exercise rights appointed by nature to be exercised by their betters. Modern "civil service reform" proposes to doctor the sores of the body politic; but the evil is in the blood; it needs a constitutional remedy.

(2) It paralyzes all grander public enterprises. It conditions the inauguration and maintenance of every great public undertaking on the comprehension and approval of all the ignorance and incapacity in the State or nation. All our great public enterprises are either extinct or decadent, except First, those which, like the Coast and Geodetic Survey, are maintained by authority beyond the immediate hazards of popular approval, and Secondly, those which, like "river and harbor improvement," can be turned into Mississippi streams of pap for political paupers.

(3) It discourages the higher efforts of intelligence. The interests of higher education are staked on the guardianship of those incapable of appreciating high education, and all unconscious of their own profound and complete indebtedness to higher education. It discourages professional preparation, by ignoring the interest and duty of the State in its promotion, making it necessary for high-minded citizens to assume the State's duty. It holds to the liberty of every man to practice every profession, without any adequate preparation, if he can secure his clients. It thus fosters quackery of every sort. In law, free play is given the pettifogger to foment disputes, mismanage causes, and squander estates. In medicine, the crude tyro saws our bones,

and drugs our vitals, and confesses his ignorance of our ailments. In theology, it tends to reduce the efforts of the pulpit to a fashion of weary platitudes and chronic snarling over the progress of ideas, thus bringing Christianity and all religion into disesteem. It discourages science, from which flow the most fertilizing streams of our civilization, by formulating charges of inutility, by withholding means for the prosecution of scientific investigations and surveys, by imposing onerous taxes on imported scientific books and works of art, holding (alas, that high officials should confess it!) that all higher intellectual efforts are "for personal adornment," and mere selfish advantage.

(4) It represses popular education. By giving free scope and supremacy to the avarice and false economy of the individual, by which the office of teacher is given to the lowest bidder, and the school-house plot is left to become the most desolate and comfortless square rood in the township. Experience has shown that our yeomanry, as a rule, do not sufficiently appreciate efficient primary schools to tax themselves adequately for their maintenance. Some of those sections of the country long famous for their "opportunities for universal education" have degenerated, under popular control, to a condition of startling illiteracy. One New England State, with increasing population, shows a diminishing school attendance. Even the more intelligent centers of population are continually studying to make their high schools less expensive,—by over-working their teachers, by dropping out languages and sciences, and even, in some cities, by the proposal to abolish all public education above the primary grade. The effects of diminished popular intelligence are seen in the growing disrelish for reading above the grade of fiction and story-telling, and in the trashy, sensational, and paragraphic fashion in journalism.

(5) It levels all gradations. As the State declares all men "equal," and emphasizes and interprets the declaration by making all men equal rulers, it is inevitable that ordinary intelligence should draw the inference that all men are equally good for any function exercised by the State. That is the inference which dominates the popular conviction. The "best fellow" is the preferred man for public duty. Every one is fit to practice any calling—to grind an ax or to frame a statute. The uneducated small grocer, who feels an itching for office, has but to be "one of the boys," and they will make him State Senator, or put him on the board to control the education of the

city, or send him all the way to Washington to vote on great international questions, while his superiors may remain at their business and nurse their disgust over the operation of the "glorious" principle of universal suffrage. Many other more or less serious evils flow from the popular conviction of universal equality. Emoluments must be equalized; the judge must stand on a level with the granger. Professional preparation, experience, and skill earn no special consideration; apprenticeship at trades is suppressed; every workman expects to-morrow to be a "boss," and every employer must stand the cost of unskillfulness and constant blunders. Respect for superior character or superior excellence is lost; reverence has not descended to us from colonial times. Even good clothes are sometimes a reproach, as a particular cut of the beard was recently quoted as an opprobrium to one of our national officials, whose character for intelligent public service has seldom been equaled. The principle fosters a feeling of freedom to offer manifestations of disrespect, and finally even to encroach on private rights. The insolence of petty officials is notorious; and the practice of trespass, theft, and robbery prevails throughout the country to an appalling extent. Private grounds cannot be safely improved; all movable property must be kept under lock, for a sort of community of possessions seems to be the central core of the "American idea." The outcry of honest people is heard on every hand. The execration of our political tyrants rises to heaven, but still the unthinking mob shouts, Equality! Glorious American freedom! America is indeed becoming a paradise for the worst classes. Communism and social chaos are the only possible finality of such a tendency.

*Fifth.* The Rational Bases of Political Power.

If the highest wisdom and virtue could be placed in supreme control, every citizen's welfare would be best conserved. It is immaterial whether these qualifications are found lodged in one person or more. Autocracy is not inherently evil; some of the best governments which ever existed have been autocracies. Infinite beneficence is exercised by the Divine autocrat; and the Divine ruler is recorded to have established monarchies secular and hierarchical on several occasions during the history of the world. It is human weakness and finiteness which render autocracies in human governments dangerous and commonly oppressive. It follows that the highest qualifications for political control must be sought in a body of counselors, or

a selection of the most competent citizens by the most competent electors.

But the best men are finite—imperfect in knowledge and justice; and even the most ignorant and dependent have some interest which they wish conserved by good government, and which it is the duty of government to protect. Every individual, then, should be allowed some voice in political control. This is as far as our system goes. But some possess more wisdom for control, and some hold a greater stake in the government; and these are grounds for discrimination. This axiom our constitution makers did not discover.

Let us try to develop the natural, and, therefore, the just and expedient, grounds of political suffrage. The exercise of suffrage being a personal act, all right to suffrage must ground in the individual. As there can be no conflict between the highest good of the state and the highest good of the individual, conceived in the general sense, all grounds of suffrage regard both the welfare of the state and the welfare of the individual. But some exist in relation to the state directly and the individual indirectly; others, in relation to the individual directly and the state indirectly. Let us enumerate them:

I. In relation to the state directly and the individual indirectly:

(1) Wisdom—good judgment supplemented by adequate knowledge.

(2) Virtue—rectitude, temperance, unselfishness, patriotism,

These represent the individual's qualifications to counsel wisely for the state, and these entitle him to exert influence in the government. The government which fails to utilize the best gifts of its citizens is derelict to every citizen.

II. In relation to the individual directly and the state indirectly:

(1) Personality—personal suffrage, including women. Every one is equally interested in his personal existence and happiness. Every one has the same right to personal security.

(2) Property. This has always commanded respect and protection at law. Much of our legislation relates to rights of property. Nations go to war over questions of property, and even of private property. It is inconceivable that property should have no natural right to a voice in the legislation which affects its welfare and ownership. That the rule of money is opprobrious; that a moneyed aristocracy is hateful, is not to the point. The

rule of money is not advocated, but only its rights. The augmentation of the influence of property reaches, however, a natural limit which government must define. It is even a serious question whether millionairism is useful to a state. Assuredly, as to its right to political influence, the stake of the millionaire is not felt to be more serious than that of the man whose all is measured by a decade of thousands. But these questions certainly admit of some equitable and advantageous adjustment.

(3) Family. The Romans were right in holding that family confers a claim upon the state. The children are so many personalities for whom the father acts. Each life is worth an adult life to the state. Both state and individual demand the influence of the children (through the father) in the framing of the laws.

These possessions represent the individual's stake in the government, and entitle him to exert an influence over it. Total disfranchisement, temporary or permanent, should be visited upon drunkards and persons convicted of crime.

Is such a basis of suffrage practicable? I hold it to be both practicable and best. It provides for manhood suffrage. It increases suffrage-power while elevating the standard of suffrage-competency. It secures greatest wisdom for the service of the state. It emancipates the citizen from the thraldom of ignorance, stolidity, and vice. It gives representation to every interest which contributes to the worth of the state. It tends, in short, to secure the survival of the fittest. Nor would greater difficulty be experienced in determining the relative qualifications of voters and the suffrage-competency of each, than in qualifying for signature to a bond, or for teaching, or medical or legal practice, or for tax-paying. A suffrage-commission in each precinct or township, under general—preferably national—enactments, would, after the first embarrassments, adjust all suffrage rights with the same ease and equity as a county board of supervisors acting in questions of equalization and apportionment.

*Sixth.* Can our Basis of Suffrage be changed without Bloodshed?

The change implies the consent of those who are to suffer relative disfranchisement. But as the change is for their betterment, and the masses of men are endowed with fair intellects, most classes ought to be approachable by fair arguments. But the demagogue, whose greed requires the defeat of good government, would interpose his nefarious influence adversely.

Perhaps the masses, trained to obedience to such masters, would in this question prefer their equal suffrage, with plunder and anarchy, to qualified suffrage, political order, and national perpetuity.

If the change is impracticable, we see alarming ground for anxiety. The signs of the times are ominous. More threatening than any present evils is the steady march from bad to worse which has characterized our national history. We shall not fall into chaos to-morrow, nor at the next presidential election. The counsels of the wise and patriotic, which they cannot embody in ballots, will avail to postpone the evil day. The conservative influence of wealth, which, though not put in ballots, often wins ballots from destructive proposals, may, if wisely employed, steady the decaying fabric for many years. The people will again and again change one set of masters for another, and at each shift the march to political perdition may halt. But American tendencies have been studied long enough to reveal their course and outcome, and the political student is entitled to utter his predictions with as much confidence as the astronomer, who, from a series of observations on the movements of a newly-discovered planet, is able to describe its entire course in the depths of space.

These truths will never lose their force by being ignored by our statesmen and students. It will be vain to compose ourselves in the complacent assurance that we live under "the best government the sun ever shone upon." Evil omens are not dispelled by closing our eyes. If these views are unsound, their unsoundness will not be demonstrated by unreasoning, illogical, or sentimental objections. It will be futile simply to pronounce them pessimistic, unpatriotic, impracticable, unsound in theory, a wholesale impeachment of American statesmanship, a proposition to dethrone the people, a plea for an aristocracy, a motion to revolutionize a political system which has witnessed results unparalleled in history for the blessings conferred on humanity. The case requires proof that our government is under the control of the best elements; that our political evils are not great; that they are not increasing from year to year, and are not probably destined to increase; and that these evils are not traceable logically to the communistic principle of universal and equal suffrage.

ALEXANDER WINCHELL.

# THE DECAY OF PROTESTANTISM.

UNBELIEF is spreading in the world, causing great unrest. The life to come and man's relation to it engage his thoughts and excite his hopes or his fears. The natural, the material, the present, are around him, and ever at hand; they arrest his attention and claim his time. The supernatural, the spiritual, the future, are far off, are not seen, and so are often relegated to another time—to the next world. Yet, the thought of a life to come, in eternity, with a possibility of endless pain or pleasure, compels reflection and begets uneasiness. Men do not care to make a mistake in what concerns eternity. God, the Redemption, Sin, Salvation, are questions of paramount importance to the whole human race. They cannot be ignored; they demand solution; the solving of these questions brings faith and hope, or unbelief and despair.

Men had definite beliefs with regard to these truths three centuries ago. They then believed in supernatural truths and in mysteries. They also believed in a divinely established authority to guide men in all questions of faith and morals.

Protestantism, taking its rise in the beginning of the sixteenth century, began by rejecting this teaching authority, and substituting therefor the right of each individual to judge and choose in all matters of religious faith and morals. Private interpretation of the Scriptures, without note or comment, without guide or limit, became the cardinal tenet of Protestantism—its very essence. By it Protestantism was to live or to die. In leaving the Catholic Church, it carried along many of the old points of doctrinal belief, and some of the familiar and cherished religious observances. But when it thus left the Catholic communion, it was much like a mariner going out to sea in a ship without a rudder, who, when the storm arises, casts out one bit of cargo after another, in the vain hope of sav-

ing the sea-tossed and foundering vessel. Protestantism went out to sea without Christ's appointed pilot, and has been discharging cargo ever since, to escape shipwreck. Now that there is little left to throw overboard, above all wrangling and contention the cry of distress is heard, that danger is imminent and disaster inevitable. In all its multitudinous forms Protestantism is decaying—is dying.

On all sides this confession is heard. It comes from the review and the newspaper; from the pulpit and the platform; from friend and foe alike.

So long ago as 1847, Brownson wrote in his "Review": "That Protestantism in most countries, especially in this country, is developing into infidelity, irreligion, *naturism*, rejecting and losing even all reminiscences of grace, is too obvious and too well known to be denied, or to demand any proof." The "Westminster Review," in its July number of this year, sweeps the whole body of believers in the supernatural away from the world of to-day, leaving only a few fossilized fanatics, succinctly cognizable as knaves or fools. It says:

> "The result is that intelligent men cannot accept as true the current forms of theology, nor yet can honest men day after day act the falsehood of apparently countenancing opinions which in their hearts they know to be false. Those who are thus left as the exponents of the popular faith are those so intellectually dull that they cannot master the logical effect of recent criticism, and are unable to realize the spirit of the age in which they live; or they are those whose moral susceptibilities are so blunt that they perceive no moral incongruity in the advocacy of opinions they do not hold in the ordinary and conventional sense. But a class which is intellectually dull or morally blunt cannot long retain ascendancy over the public mind; and that process of deterioration in the character and influence of the clergy, which during the three last centuries has materially compromised their position, seems likely to result in the total extinction of all respect for the office and services of the class."

These are, it may be alleged, unfriendly witnesses. Their testimony would avail little if it were not corroborated by mournful avowals within the fold.

The purport of this paper is to show by facts and figures, and by the admissions of sincere and sorrowing friends, that Protestantism as a religious organization is decaying. This decay is found in:

*First.* Church creeds.

*Second.* Church government and ministry.

*Third.* Church membership and attendance at church worship or services.

Some of the causes which have led to this decay will then be indicated.

*First.* There is decay in church creeds. At the outbreak of the sixteenth century schism, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, and their associates formulated creeds which they imposed on their followers, and sought to impose on others. Each new sect, as it broke away from its parent sect, announced its special creed, made up of what it brought away, headed by its peculiar and distinguishing doctrine justifying the separation and an independent organization. The multiplication of these sects was so rapid, and the dissensions among them so bitter, that all pretense of unity and Christian comity ceased. Before Protestantism had celebrated its first centennial, a refuge in Deism as a relief from unending disputes and uncertainties seemed the only alternative. This threatened lapse into Deism alarmed the ablest and most earnest of the leaders in the Protestant ranks. From Deism to Atheism was but a question of time. Grotius, Leibnitz, Bacon, drew back in dismay, and sought safety in a reunion with the Catholic Church. They asked concessions that involved dogmatic truth. But the Church cannot sacrifice truth to interest or expediency. It was within this first century that Protestantism made all its gains. Steadily since, in spite of state protection, the smiles of wealth and power, its easy facility in yielding to the whims, the demands, the social exigencies of its adherents, it has lost ground. From time to time the need of unity was felt. Lopping off of doctrines, modifications in church creeds and discipline, failed to bring it about. At last an agreement to disagree was offered distracted minds in the delusory hope of peace. The various sects have continued to disagree, to discard old points of belief, to cast away the substance of Christian doctrines, while still retaining phrases and forms, until now little remains of the original teachings of the fathers of Protestantism. Although Episcopalians still profess to stand by the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Prayer-book, the utmost latitude is allowed in interpreting their meaning. Nineteenth century Presbyterians of all schools combined could not produce a disciple acceptable to John Knox. The old Puritans of New England would never recognize as brethren the Congregationalists of to-day. It is becoming the fashion to eschew doctrine, and to philosophize rhetorically on

conduct. According to Rev. Mr. Pullman, as reported in the New York "Herald," even this minimized creed is not believed in. He says:

"Another great drawback to effective Christian work is in the clergy itself. This body, which was once so powerful for good, finds itself paralyzed, and the secret is that the ministers have nearly all lost belief in the religion they find it necessary to profess. They preach a creed openly, but secretly their souls are honeycombed with doubt, and thus they have to a great extent become mere reasoners, arguers, and platform lecturers."

Whatever else may be said of Henry Ward Beecher, it can be safely admitted that he interprets correctly the progress and aims of American religious thought as developed day by day. His career at Plymouth Church shows a gradual curtailment of doctrinal teachings, and an emasculating of others to harmonize with the notions of his hearers. He is something of a barometer in American Protestantism. Lately he withdrew from a Congregationalist organization, that its orthodoxy might not be disturbed by his advancement in religious teachings—this advancement consisting in a further pruning of his church creed. Whereupon the Rev. Dr. Edwards A. Park, a leading theologian among the Congregationalists, admitted, at a meeting of ministers of his denomination, according to the New York "Times" of Nov. 6th, "that Congregationalism is no longer what it once was, and that its ministers show a tendency to discard one doctrine after another." For his part, he would admit no candidate to the ministry who did not make profession of a belief in the atonement, in eternal punishment for the wicked, and in the Scriptures as a perfectly trustworthy religious guide. The last point of the Doctor's creed is somewhat hazy, inasmuch as that for three centuries Protestants have been taught by their ministers that the Scriptures were inspired, and were an infallible guide subject to each inquirer's private judgment.

Beecher, seemingly disgusted with all the schools of Protestant theology, in a letter to a friend writes: "But, wherever I may go, I am determined, before I die, to find a theology which will pass muster at Bangor, at Andover, at Cambridge, at New Haven, at Princeton, at Alleghany, at Oberlin, at Chicago, and at Park street—then I shall willingly die." In other words, a search after a theology in which all the schools of American Protestantism are in accord is a hopeless task.

The writer of "Certain Dangerous Tendencies in American Life," published by the Riverside Press, Cambridge, displays intimate knowledge of the American Protestant public, and of their present condition of religious thought. Of those who still retain belief in their church creed he speaks in high terms, "but," he remarks, "they are too few to regenerate the American Church, though their influence is highly valuable in resisting some of the evil tendencies of the age. Most of them are old, and they have few successors among the younger people, . . . and their number and strength diminish from year to year." Of another very large class, he says: "Church work is for them, in all its forms, a kind of sacred amusement. Public worship, with its pulpit oratory and modern church music, is an æsthetic entertainment. They have developed a religion which is not religious . . . they do not believe the creeds which they subscribe when they join the church, and generally make no secret afterward of their doubt or disbelief respecting various fundamental doctrines of Christianity." "Their ministers," he writes, "are men of intelligence and of considerable culture. They believe even less than their people of the doctrines of their creeds."

Here I might rest, but, as in so serious a question the authority of representatives of religious creeds should be adduced, as well as that of individuals, I cite the Pan-Presbyterian Congress that met in Edinburgh, Scotland, July 4, 1877. It was composed of over three hundred delegates from all the divisions and subdivisions of Presbyterianism in the world. To bring these discordant sects of a sect together at all, it was necessary to determine in advance that dogmatic questions should not be mooted. The official organizers of the council shut out doctrinal discussion by the following programme: "To consider questions of general interest to Presbyterians; to strengthen and protect weak and persecuted churches; to explain and extend the Presbyterian system; and to discuss subjects of church work—evangelization, use of the press, colportage, suppression of intemperance, observance of the Sabbath, systematic beneficence, and the suppression of Romanism and infidelity." The canny Scots must have enjoyed the bit of humor thrown in at the close of this bill of entertainment. The delegates to the convention carefully avoided doctrinal subjects and the condemnation of heresies. The zealous but inexperienced minister that introduced dogmatic topics was promptly quieted. Not even

in religious worship could these three hundred delegates come together as one. Only one hundred and thirty partook of the Lord's Supper, on the one day of the congress appointed for a general act of worship. When teachers abdicate their office, is it any wonder that pupils lose confidence in them and pass from under their influence? The transition to doubt and negation, to indifferentism and infidelity, to rationalism and atheism, becomes logical and certain.

*Second.* Protestantism is decaying in church government and ministry. It will be conceded that no society or corporate organization can live that has not the power and the will to enforce discipline and coerce refractory members — that cannot compel obedience to its rules on the part of all who choose to remain within its body. How is it with Protestant churches?

The Methodist denomination, once so strong in church government and discipline, is weakening under the influence of wealth and desire for the good things of the world. Its most effective power was found in ministerial itinerancy. A strong and active party is forming within the bosom of Methodism, to do away with the periodical removal of its ministers. This growing feeling is so far deferred to that popular ministers are assigned to the large towns, and when the round of rich churches has been run in one conference, they are transferred to another.

No Protestant denomination holds more tenaciously to the forms of authority than the Episcopal Church, and none fails more lamentably in its exercise. Its right to excommunicate those who withdraw from its body is exercised only when they have openly turned their backs on Episcopalianism and joined another church. While the name of fellowship is kept up, they may belong to the broad church, the high church, or the low church; their teachings may be in favor of baptismal regeneration, or against it; in favor of the Real Presence, or against it; in favor of auricular confession, or against it. The church governmental agency for self-protection seems powerless. When a congregation is largely composed of advanced thinkers, as they love to be called, their chosen minister preaches according to the views of his employers. Whatever authority is in the church to control the abuse is inoperative. Ritualist and cultured Rationalist are at home and in peace within the same fold. In the church of the former there may be altar, candles, and vest-

ments; there may be services closely copied after those of the Catholic Church, and most unlike those of recognized Episcopal forms. In other churches of the same denomination all forms, ceremonies, and aids to devotion are set on one side, while the minister labors to preach, not in the sense of the Gospel of Christ, but in that of the interests of science and progress in things material and earthly.

The Episcopal denomination also puts forward the loudest claims for the ministerial character and dignity of its clergymen. Yet, after three centuries, it is unable to state authoritatively, in precise and non-nebulous terms, the nature of the office and work of its ministers. In October of the year just past there assembled in Richmond, Va., a Congress of the Episcopal Church of the United States. On the second day of assembly the subject presented for discussion was, "The Priestly and Prophetic Functions of the Christian Ministry." The first speaker was the Rev. William R. Huntington, of Worcester, Mass., who eloquently maintained that the Episcopal minister held the priestly and the prophetic office. He was followed by the Rev. S. D. McConnell, of Philadelphia, who boldly denied that either of these functions belonged to this dispensation. The Rev. Dr. Courtenay, of Boston, disclaimed all pretension to exclusive privilege for their ministry; the whole people rather are the royal priesthood. By the way, this view of the subject may explain the absence of the laity from public worship on inconvenient Sundays. Bishop Peterkin, of Western Virginia, as comported with his official position, was exceedingly non-committal, but exhorted his hearers to aspire to the prophetic rather than to the sacerdotal function. Rev. D. H. Greer, of Providence, R. I., said: "After the expression of such widely varying views, he did not know if he was priest or prophet, or what he was. . . . The fundamental idea with him was worship. . . ." And he might have added that worship by a "royal priesthood" could be offered up as well in a private house as in a church—by the head of a family as by a minister.

At the same Congress they discussed "The Powers of Standing Committees." Judge Sheffey defined their powers and extolled the value to the church of these committees. He also lauded the late Rev. Dr. De Koven. The learned judge evidently had not read the eulogy of standing committees pronounced by this learned doctor. In the Episcopal Congress which met in

Boston in October, 1877, Dr. De Koven gave way to his pent-up feelings in this style:

"So far as the laity are concerned, anybody may be a lay member, if he 'merely goes to church a few times a year.' He need not be baptized; he need not be confirmed; he need not be a communicant. He may even be a Jew, Turk, or Infidel, if you please, provided he has the money qualification which makes up the franchise of the church." . . . "Underneath it all lies the money qualification. The parish elects the vestry, and the vestry need not be communicants. The vestry and parish elect the lay delegates to the Diocesan Convention, and they need not be communicants. The Diocesan Convention elects the lay members of the standing committees, and they need not be communicants."

When a church cannot tell what are the functions of its ministry, and when its government falls in a degree under the control of laymen who need not be communicants, it may be said to have abdicated all government and ministerial power and office. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that Protestant pulpits are often occupied by unordained women-preachers, boy-preachers, lay-preachers.

*Third.* Protestantism shows decay in church membership, and in attendance at religious services. Proof of this assertion flows in from many sources. These proofs are startling and conclusive. They are found in the admissions of Protestant clergymen, in official documents, and in the statistics gathered by impartial secular newspapers. Empty pews tell the tale Sunday after Sunday. Churches are lavishly furnished and made cozily snug, the music is fascinating and artistic, the social standing of the members is above reproach, but the favorite minister, who is most acceptable on every other score, fails to draw and fill the pews. The attendance is beggarly in spite of the opulent membership, except on a few special occasions when piety takes a start, or the religious inducements are unusually seductive.

Within a few years, statistics carefully collected amply confirm the statement that church membership and attendance are falling off. According to the "Christian Alliance," of the 1,100,000 inhabitants of Berlin, only 30,000 go to church. Deduct the Catholics from this number, and the remainder discloses a woful condition of religious life. Yet the State religion in Berlin has many aids to growth. It is well paid; it is the religion of the Court and of the aristocracy; it has no embarrassing load of dogma to carry, and conforms readily to the advanced

and progressive theories of the day; secret societies do not plot against it. When the government dispensed with the observance of religious rites on the part of its Protestant subjects, these dispensed with the services of ministers of religion at baptisms, marriages, and funerals. American clergymen visiting the centers of European Protestantism return with dismal accounts of its decay.

In England and Wales, statistics of church attendance have been gathered by secular newspapers in about 70 cities and towns. These statistics have been made in the interests of Nonconformists, as against the Established Church. They show that the latter is steadily decreasing, with all its advantages of wealth, an educated ministry, and the prestige of respectability. They also demonstrate that a majority of the people spend the Sunday elsewhere than in church.

The object of this paper is, however, chiefly with the condition of religion in this country. Here, also, secular papers have, at times of dearth of general news, busied themselves and interested their readers with accounts of the growth or decline of the churches in their respective localities. Some statistics have been based on church membership; others on church attendance. The Rev. Dr. Rylance, of the Episcopal Church, thinks the former very misleading, as he said to a New York "Times" reporter: "I am sorry to say that in nearly all church returns there is much dead wood. Often there are names on the books that can be duplicated from grave-stones, especially in large organizations. But this is nothing compared to the number who continue to figure on the roll, and who have dropped away through indifference or other causes."

On the 16th of April, 1882, the Boston "Advertiser" caused a census to be taken by its reporters of attendance on Divine worship at the churches in that city, obtaining the following result: In 160 Protestant churches, 75,572 worshipers were counted; and in 30 Catholic churches, 49,337. Catholics do not receive the credit to which they are entitled, as this count was made in some instances at only one mass. A stronger spirit of faith and piety is needed to attend service at six o'clock in the morning than at ten. Besides, Boston is only at the beginning of the good work of establishing Catholic church schools.

On a Sunday in January, 1881, canvassers counted in 131 non-Catholic churches of Philadelphia, 42,140 heads, and in 19

Catholic churches, 82,653. The accuracy of this count having been called in question, the Philadelphia "Times" sent its reporter on a Sunday of March in the same year, who found in 56 non-Catholic churches, 19,946 attendants, and in 9 Catholic churches, 38,019. Though but a partial report, it verified the first enumeration.

The 40 non-Catholic churches of New Haven showed a less number of worshipers on a Sunday in April, 1881, than its 5 Catholic churches.

St. Louis gave 34,109 at 104 non-Catholic churches, and 85,171 at 34 Catholic churches.

A count of church attendance made by the Rochester "Morning Herald," on Sunday morning, Nov. 26, 1882, gave these figures: At non-Catholic services, 10,784 were present; at the mass in 11 Catholic churches, 18,913 worshiped. The non-Catholic attendants were distributed as follows: 1,397 were in 8 Protestant Episcopal churches; 2,633 in 11 Presbyterian; 1,271 in 5 Baptist; 1,248 in 7 Methodist Episcopal; 3,311 in 11 German Protestant; 924 in 8 miscellaneous churches.

It is a noteworthy fact that the churches which maintained their own church-schools, the Catholic and German Protestant, had the largest attendance at church services.

In Baltimore, a secular paper adopted another plan on which to form an estimate of the religion or irreligion among its people. It gathered statistics of church membership. It consulted the latest official documents and submitted the figures to the inspection and correction of prominent clergymen. The totals gave 177,689 in a population of 340,000, distributed as follows: 110,000 Catholics; 28,642 Methodists, of 10 different sects; 11,474 Lutherans; 8,561 Episcopal Protestants; 6,887 Baptists; 4,995 Presbyterians, of three subdivisions; 4,109 of the Reformed church; 1,003 Friends; 2,010 scattered among seven other denominations. The editor remarks that religious indifference is chiefly found among the large Evangelical churches of the native Americans.

The most exhaustive study of this kind was made by the New York "Times" in the summer and autumn of last year. Its canvassers explored New York City, Brooklyn, and the surrounding country. It placed before its readers statistics of church membership, of church Sunday-schools, and of church charitable contributions. A mine of wealth in facts and figures

on these subjects is opened to interested seekers after this kind of knowledge. The reporters of the "Times," in continuance of their labors, interviewed prominent clergymen to learn what they thought of the figures thus displayed before the community. There was no getting around these figures; nor could an honest mind ignore their lesson. They demonstrated that growth in the Protestant sects kept no pace with increase of population in the cities of New York and Brooklyn. Want of space necessitates the briefest summary. The non-Catholic population of New York City in 1882 is estimated at 800,000. The total membership of all the non-Catholic churches, including Synagogues and miscellaneous, was 97,497. Brooklyn held its own much better, for out of an estimated non-Catholic population of 390,000, it had 69,000 church members. A comparison is made between 1845 and 1882, showing that while the population of New York has increased in that period over 300 per cent., the percentage of increase in church membership has been startlingly small. When the Rev. Dr. Curry, of the Methodists, was called on by a reporter of the New York "Star," he admitted the lesson of the figures, but acknowledged his inability to explain the falling off of Methodism. A brother Methodist preacher gave as his solution of the problem that "Education, culture, and refinement have killed them (Methodist preachers) as preachers of the gospel." Rev. Dr. Hall is hopeful, in spite of empty pews in other churches than his own, but does not believe in spasmodic efforts and revivals, and calls for organized congregational labor. Rev. Dr. MacArthur, Baptist, says: "While things are not so bad as some pastors think, they are bad enough." Rev. Dr. Newman, Methodist, thought that "the statistics of the 'Times' did injustice to Christianity by omitting Catholics." "The Roman Catholics," he urged, "belonged to the great aggregate of the Christian church. They represented the most venerable branch of the church of Jesus, and for ages the Roman Catholic Church has been a wall of brass against the encroachments of scientific infidelity. That church had also been the sturdy enemy of secret societies and the spirit of Communism. Furthermore, the Roman Catholics have steadily opposed frequency (?) of divorce, and have always recognized children as being part of their church." He might have completed the chapter by adding, And they educate their children in church-schools away from the malarious atmosphere of infidelity. Prof. A. E. Waffle, at a meeting of

Baptists in Pierrepont Street Church, Brooklyn, said that the proper training of children was the greatest work of the present generation, and that if this had been attended to in the past, it would not be possible to say to-day that in Brooklyn, nine out of ten of the young men do not belong to any religious denomination. Rev. Mr. Newton, Episcopalian, thinks that irreligion in New York City prevails among the very rich and the very poor, while the middle class are driven out of the city by costly living. Rev. Dr. Ferris, Methodist, is reported thus: "But it must be said that the native American Protestants are growing more and more indifferent. As a result of careful observation, it is my conviction that fully one-half of our native American people, with Protestant traditions, must now be classed as absentees; and it is getting more and more difficult every day to induce people to attend divine service." Many more admissions in the same sense might be quoted, but the above cumulative evidence proves incontestably that Protestantism is decaying in church membership and in attendance at divine service.

After the foregoing arraignment of Protestantism as an inefficient agency to hold and transmit faith in Christianity, it is but right that causes be assigned, if any there be, for this inefficiency.

There is one true and effective cause for this incapacity and consequent failure. There are, no doubt, many secondary causes which are rather results flowing from the primary and predominating one. Protestantism has failed to do Christ's work, and will continue to dwindle away until nothing is left of it but remnants and a name. Its failure lies in its rejection of Christ's divinely constituted teaching authority; in its doing away with the renewal of the unbloody sacrifice of the mass, and in its dispensing with the means to holiness and eternal salvation graciously vouchsafed to us in the sacraments. Christianity is a religion of supernatural truths needing supernatural helps. The religion of the future, the religion of nature, the scientific religion, into which all Protestantism is rapidly lapsing, having eliminated supernatural truths from its creeds, where it has not blotted out creeds altogether, has only polite phrases with which to designate a condition of religious life more correctly characterized as indifferentism, irreligion, infidelity, atheism. Into this avowed Atheism largely increasing numbers of Protestants are passing, because they have no divinely assured teacher to lead

them to a knowledge of the supernatural and help them by supernatural means to a supernatural end.

But it may be said that this is a begging of the question. Be it so. Other causes for the admitted decline of Protestantism can be stated. Of these secondary causes, or results necessarily consequent on the one named above, the following are worthy of consideration, and may be called common-sense explanations of religious phenomena:

(1) The dissensions among Protestants with regard to vital truths. These dissensions began with the founders of Protestantism and have not intermitted since. The more the various sects felt the want of unity, and the greater the efforts they put forth to bring it about, the wider were the breaches among them, and the more rancorous the bitterness they manifested one toward another, even while confessing the right of each sect and of each individual in the sect to hold opinions, persuasions, and choice of tenets of belief. It was this doctrine of private interpretation, conjoined with each man's self-sufficiency in matters of religion, that constituted the basis of separation from the Catholic Church. It has led to sects innumerable, to wranglings endless and bitter, to a search after peace by the casting away of all dogma. What has been for three centuries will continue to be until nothing is left of Protestantism.

(2) The malignant acerbity with which Protestantism assailed the Catholic Church and her doctrines. No language was too vile, no misrepresentation too gross, in describing to children and to women, the Pope, priests, and nuns. The result was, that when non-Catholic laymen became cognizant of falsehoods and exaggerations amounting to calumnious caricatures, the reaction that set in threw a doubt over other strong statements of their ministers. The encouragement lent in the past to wandering outcasts of the Catholic Church retailing scandals, true or false, in indecent and scurrilous lectures, in Protestant pulpits, helped the downward course of Protestantism. The tone of pulpit and press has changed in dealing with Catholics, but the wrong of the past has left its impress on Protestants rather than on Catholics. When non-Catholics began to read the Catholic chapter of history, and made the acquaintance of Catholics, lay or cleric, they learned to doubt much more than these false charges.

(3) The radical principle of Protestantism took away from

its ministers all authority. These ministers depended on their followers; they came at their call, and went at their command. They thus lost all courage to reprove popular sins. Morals in the pulpit, under such a constrained relationship, were colored by the sentiments of the pews. Questions of morals were decided by this sentiment, or were ignored altogether, as a convenient compromise. The marriage tie, as morals grew looser, broke under the operation of divorce laws. The Protestant churches acquiesced promptly in these laws, because the pews demanded the concession. With divorce laws the family lost its chief safeguard. Children were at the mercy of the new arrangement, with no certainty of a home having obligations and duties, and often found themselves in the way and a troublesome burden. On the heels of divorce laws followed lewder notions of the marriage state and its requirements. The religious education and nurture of children demanded by Christian denominational organizations were sacrificed by ministers who held office at the beck of men whose ideas of the training of children were regulated by the world around them, and not by the thought of responsibility to church or God. Hence in vain did the General Assembly of Presbyterians, in 1848, resolve: "Cordially to recommend their congregations to establish primary and other schools, as far as may be practicable, on the plans sanctioned by the last Assembly—of teaching the truths and duties of our holy religion in connection with the usual branches of secular learning." No such schools are established. The desire for them is dying.

An exception is noted in German Protestant congregations. These maintain, in connection with their churches, day-schools for the religious education of their children. These congregations show the most numerous attendance at church services of any of the Protestant denominations.

The full religious training of children is not cared for in families liable to be broken up, not by death, but by uncontrolled passion; by men and women whose principles with regard to marriage differ from those of the Mormons only in this: that these keep many wives at one time, and the others have many, one at a time, as has been said.

When passion rules in marriage, other evils follow. Children become an encumbrance. Hence, alarmed at the prevalence of child-murder, Bishop Coxe, of Western New York, directing

attention to matters treated of in a late pastoral of the House of Bishops, wrote:

"I have heretofore warned my flock against the blood-guiltiness of infanticide. If any doubt existed heretofore as to the propriety of my warnings on the subject, they must now disappear before the fact that the world itself is beginning to be terrified by the practical results of the sacrifices to Moloch which defile our land. There are scientific and statistical documents before the people which fully sustain my remonstrances."

But some may say, our numerously attended Sunday-schools in cities and towns disprove the theory that Protestantism is decaying through the want of children in the families of church members. Statistics with regard to the New England States demonstrate this theory of few children among church members as an undeniable fact. "Besides the strictly native New Englanders," says Dr. Allen, in the "Popular Science Monthly," "there is only one other people, or race, where there has been such a natural decrease in numbers—that is, the Sandwich Islanders." This assertion finds its strongest sustainment in the testimony of Mr. J. W. C. Leveridge, for forty years prominent in Sunday-school work, and now Secretary of the Sunday-school Association of New York County. He thus unburdened his mind to a reporter of the New York "Times":

"They (the churches) never report so many scholars for the church, and so many for chapels and missions, but so many in the lump. The reason for this is, in plain English, that they are ashamed of themselves. There are lots of these big churches on Broadway and Fifth Avenue, with from eight hundred to fifteen hundred members, who cannot show one hundred Sunday-school scholars. Why is this? you ask. Well, I guess rich people have about quit having children. And even middle-class Christians don't seem to do much better. When I was a younger man than I am now, our Sunday-schools were largely made up of the children of church members. Now the children of Christian parents are awfully few and far between." . . .

Rev. Mr. Eaton, of the Universalist denomination, said to the same reporter: "Our Sunday-school is in excellent condition, but it is largely composed of children whose parents have no connection with the church—chiefly the better class of Germans. The fact is, Universalists don't seem to have any children." The Superintendent of Rev. Mr. Collyer's Sunday-school made a similar remark with regard to Unitarians. It may be asked, after pondering on the significance of the above facts: Do culture and

sterility, natural or artificial, even in Protestant churches, go hand in hand?

(4) A common-sense view of the working of Protestant churches in our cities and towns notes that their members are highly respectable, their equipments costly, all the furnishing and upholstery parlor-like, pervaded and encompassed by an atmosphere of exclusiveness. In a word, these churches are not for the poor, and the poor do not go to them. For the poor, missions and chapels are built and supported by wealthy fellow-religionists, on side streets and in the suburbs. Poor people, not mendicants, resent the affront of sending them away from their brethren. For one or two months of the summer season, ministers and their wealthy parishioners adjourn to the sea-shore, or to the lake-side, for religion and health, leaving behind them closed churches and their spiritually uncared-for poor. Many forget to return when the churches re-open.

(5) Another hinderance to the growth of Protestantism is found in the impossibility of providing churches with ministers educated up to the standard required by Americans at the inadequate compensation offered. The advance of the American people in intellectual development, their habits of thought and study with regard to everything that comes before them, in their business or occupation, in politics and religion, make them fastidious in the choice of preacher or minister. They demand much of him. He must be as intelligent, at least, as themselves; be able to treat subjects of the day with readiness and skill, in language flowing, rich, and attractive, or their own minds, running ahead of his, may be on the alert to supply the missing word, or the apt argument. The minister who can come up to their demand can do better in some other walk of life, and he may not see the necessity of sacrificing himself and family for a flock unwilling to make sacrifices for him. Hence every day we hear of able ministers deserting the pulpit, and of congregations with church and pulpit but no preacher. Thus, Rev. Dr. Tyng, of New York, came down from his pulpit, and resigned what might be called a large salary to do better for his family in the insurance business. His case is not exceptional. While the statistics furnished by the secular press relate chiefly to cities, the losses to Protestantism in the rural districts come in no small degree from their inability to obtain suitable preachers at beggarly pay.

(6) Nothing has developed skepticism in the laity more

effectually than the minister's quickness in giving up a doctrinal point at the demand of secularists, on the plea of science. The theories of the scientific school have more weight than Bible, church creeds, or theological teachings. The belief loaned to a congregation one Sunday may be taken back the next. Science, in many of its false assumptions, domineers over theology. In a word, the laity have learned from their ministers to hold few or no dogmatic truths. Constant changes, vexatious uncertainties, doubts, negations, have led multitudes into the ranks of cultured Agnostics and polished Atheists.

(7) Of late years secret societies, with ministers as chaplains or high-priests, have engulfed many who find in the lodge a substitute for the church. The attractions for men, wanting in the latter, are found in the former; the restrictions are less; there is no troublesome creed; the coveted exclusiveness is obtained. Churches are left for women.

Much more might be said. Let this suffice. It may be asked, Do Catholics rejoice at the evident decline of Protestant sects? If Protestants drew nearer to the one true fold as they forsake their own pastures, Catholics would indeed be glad, and, with happy hearts, give thanks to God, through whom alone such a mercy can come, and welcome them to peace of mind and refreshment of soul. But as the decay of Protestantism is a transition from church organizations, that held some of the great truths of salvation and administered baptism, to the ranks of indifferentism and infidelity, Catholics grieve. The late Rev. Dr. Spring, of the Old Brick Church of New York City, publicly announced his preference for the Infidelity of Voltaire over the teachings of Catholicity. His co-religionists are heirs of his preference with a vengeance.

Yet Americans are not infidels of the stamp of the continental European infidels. These glory in their infidelity, and have no shame in blaspheming God, whom they seem to hate. When Americans doubt and deny, they do so with regret. Our "Bob Ingersolls" are not numerous, while the crowd of those willing to pay to hear his revilings of sacred truths is great.

Most commendable indeed are the earnestness, the zealous work, and the large generosity of many non-Catholic church people in the United States. Catholics believe that their efforts are misdirected, yet give them credit for well-intentioned sacrifices for religion, for charity, and the religious education of the

wealthier members of their churches. Catholics appreciate the many good words spoken in the past by able non-Catholics, in favor of the inspiration of the Scriptures, of a belief in God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; in the Incarnation and Redemption, in eternal rewards and punishments, and in other truths. They sincerely regret that, in the impending struggle between Infidelity and Catholicity, their aid shall be wanting; and regret yet more that so many who were once members of Evangelical church organizations shall be seen in the ranks, not of indifferentism, but of open and avowed Atheism.

It is not intended to present in this article a comparison with Catholicity.

Whatever falling-off in numbers there may be among members of the Catholic Church in some countries, it is accounted for by their neglect to listen to the Church when she condemns secret societies, by the evil influence of political state oppression, and by the sinking of religious truths when conflicting with national questions. For these losses there are compensating gains in other quarters. In her creed, government, and ministry, she is as strong to-day as ever in the past, though the helping hand of ruling powers is greatly weakened, or altogether withdrawn.

B. J. McQuaid.

# THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

MR. SEYMOUR.

THE results of this year's elections have excited much comment. At first view they seemed to be due to the dissensions in the Republican ranks, but on closer study their explanation is found to lie deeper : it is a "ground-swell," of which all surface disturbances are effects, not causes. To get an understanding of this subject, it is necessary that we dismiss from our minds all partisan prejudices, for it concerns the organic principles of our Government, and demands a thoughtful consideration.

The American people are divided into two parties; these grow out of the form of our Government; each is needed for its preservation. All agree that there is a division line between the powers of the General and the State Governments. To enlarge unduly the power of the States endangers our Union. To extend unduly the jurisdiction of Congress leads to corruption.

For a long time the Democratic party had the direction of affairs. The division of our country into free and slave States led the latter, out of fear of Federal interference, to carry the doctrine of State rights too far. Civil war was the result. After the contest was over there was a reaction against the doctrine of State rights. A feeling grew up that the stability of the General Government might be insured by giving to it larger powers. Jurisdiction was mistaken for strength. This sentiment was carried too far; for, while State rights have been unduly magnified, they still exist, and are as sacred as the rights of the General Government.

Herbert Spencer objected to our written Constitution, because it was the work of theorists and did not grow out of the character and condition of the people. In making this criticism of our Constitution, he did not understand its origin. There is no other instance where a government grew, as ours

did, out of the thoughts, habits, and customs of the people. Every one who reads the proceedings of the convention at Philadelphia will learn that the views of prominent members, whose learning tended to make them theorists, had not the influence which the opinions of such men usually exercise. On the other hand, the usages which had grown up on our soil and the opinions held by the body of the members governed the Convention.

Our oldest political organisms are those needed by local communities and which are designed for the preservation of the rights of the respective localities. These organizations have different names, but they are substantially what we now call towns. Notwithstanding the diversities of language and lineage in our country, the people gave like powers and forms to their local governments. These formed the ground-work of our political institutions. So strong was the pressure of common necessities on the colonies, that, when they were called upon to act together in forming our Union, there was no confusion or discord, although there had been little opportunity for the exchange of political thoughts and sentiments between them. It is easier now to traverse this continent from ocean to ocean than it was then to make the journey from New York to Boston; yet we find that the Germans in the Valley of the Mohawk, the Hollanders on the shores of the Hudson, the Scotch and the Huguenots in the Carolinas, and the English colonists in Virginia and New England, had reached common conclusions about the nature of the government they should form. Their delegates could meet in conventions and act in harmony. Our Union and constitution grew out of these facts. Their existence depends upon preserving the boundaries between the different governmental functions thus established. At the close of the civil war the public feeling was so excited that a prejudice grew up against the term "rights of states."

At the last presidential election the Republican party selected as its candidate one who went very far in favor of "centralization." He expressed his joy that power gravitated more and more toward the National Capital.

A member of the Cabinet in 1880, speaking of our government, in an address which was circulated by the Republican organization, said:

"It must not be forgotten that this Government is no longer the simple machinery it was in the early days of the Republic. The bucolic age of

America is over. . . . They are the interests of nearly fifty millions of people, spread over an immense surface, with occupations of endless variety and great magnitude, producing interests so pushing, powerful, and so constantly appealing to the Government, rightfully or wrongfully, that the requirements of statesmanship demanded in this age are far different from those which sufficed a century ago."

To show how far recent administrations have drifted from the positions held by the patriots who formed the Constitution, it will only be necessary to refer to the warnings uttered by Washington in his farewell address. It is remarkable not only for its wisdom and foresight, but from the fact that it aptly describes the condition into which we have been drawn by the influence of destructive currents:

"The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal, against invasion by the others, has been evinced by experiments, ancient and modern; some of them in our own country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them."

The words uttered by Washington and by General Garfield respectively show the difference between the policy now most favored by the Republican party and that advocated by the patriots of the Revolution.

I have no intention to impeach the patriotism of those who hold opinions which grew out of the excitements of civil war. But, in their eagerness to extend the jurisdiction of the General Government, they went too far, and exposed the country to unforeseen dangers. A review of the events of a few years past, as set forth by Republican journals, will make this clear.

The Capital of our country is on one side of this continent, at a great distance from most parts of the Union, without commerce or manufactures, and ordinarily no one has occasion to visit it except for business with officials. Lavish expenditures are as necessary for its citizens as good harvests are for the farmers. Every appropriation, in favor of points however remote, is in some degree a benefit to its citizens: it makes a clerkship or some employment for a resident. Hence Washington has rapidly grown from a small place to a city of one hundred and fifty

thousand inhabitants. It cannot be denied that the views of its people regarding expenditures are affected by their interests, and that they make the local atmosphere which members of the Government breathe when they reach the Capital. It is not necessary to repeat the history of the corruptions which have brought dishonor upon the American people, and which have occasioned demands for reform from all parts of the Union. Those who have lived under these baleful influences, when they return to their homes, find they have been misled by the local ideas at the Capital.

The increase in the revenues of the Government has given to Congressmen vast sums of money to vote away for various purposes. Much is used for the payment of the public debt, much is voted away for the benefit of those who have schemes which they wish to have executed at the public cost. This draws from all parts of the Union shrewd and unscrupulous men, who seek a share of the lands or money given away.

Within a few years our Government has assumed a new aspect. It is now made up of a President, who holds for four years, and whose energies are absorbed by the distribution of places; of Senators, whose terms are six years, and who are engrossed by legislation touching our domestic affairs or our relations to other countries — they, too, are pressed with the labor of attending to the personal interests of their constituents seeking place or legislation; of members of the House, who hold for two years, in which time they cannot attend to all the calls made upon them, and at the same time learn the details of our Government, or of the abuses which grow up. The fourth body is the "lobby," rapidly increasing in numbers, who hold their places for life. Many of them make their homes in Washington; they alone are familiar with affairs, and acquainted with the clerks and others who fill the departments. These are the men who, in the language of the late member of the Cabinet already quoted, are "producing aspirations and interests so powerful and complicated in their nature, and so constantly appealing to the Government, rightfully or wrongfully, that the requirements of statesmanship are far different from those which sufficed a century ago."

Republican journals have made it known throughout the land that this last-named organization is so potent that it defies the Government itself, in its own courts, by the aid of its own

agents. These facts have aroused the attention of patriotic Republicans, who find that they are the results of their own doctrines of centralization. The fruit of centralization is found to be a system of temptations, which will grow worse as our population increases in number and wealth. In less than thirty years this country will contain one hundred millions of souls. Its income will grow still more rapidly. The amount of money in the hands of Congress to be given away for all sorts of objects will, as past experience shows, increase in a fourfold ratio. Congress is now overburdened with duties, and it usually adjourns more in consequence of the weariness of members than because its task has been done. All thoughtful men in each party see that this state of things must be corrected, that we must go back to the teaching of the Constitution, and that a strict construction of the powers of Congress will leave less opportunity for corruption.

It is this feeling which has produced the political results of the year 1882. It has burst the strong bonds which held together the Republican organization. A party which has doubts about the correctness of its views loses the power to adjust its controversies. Should they be adjusted the tap of the drum will not call back citizens to its ranks. I say this, not because I would throw discredit upon the Republican party; on the contrary, the sentiments which govern large numbers of its members are patriotic and honorable, as are their efforts to check abuses which have grown out of mistaken views of policy. It would be an insult to say that they were governed by their passions or personal interests. No; the results of the election of 1882 were not due to local causes or controversies. They were the product of a general belief that the doctrines of centralization have fostered serpents' eggs, where they were expected to give strength to our Union. We have reports of corruptions not only in the post-office, in the signal service, and in the police force designed to protect the property of the public from wrongs and robberies; but also in the collection and use of political assessments, which Congressmen claim they have a right to make, while they punish as crimes such acts by other officials. Other departments, where there are greater temptations, are yet to be looked into.

The circumstances of the elections differed in the several States. The character of the nominations had the usual influ-

ence. Whatever difference there may have been as to harmony or strife in the ranks of parties, all were overborne by the feeling in the minds of thoughtful, calm, and patriotic Republicans, that they had drifted into errors under the influence of passions inflamed by civil war. And this has been confirmed by every day's reports of judicial proceedings, where the Government has been baffled in its effort to punish wrong-doers, in many instances by the corruption of its own agents. All feel that in the near future, when our population shall be a hundred millions, our Government cannot go on unless it returns to the constitutional policy of our fathers. In view of the evils growing out of vague constructions of the Constitution, and of usurpations of indefinite powers, the public is inclined to heed this warning of Washington:

"If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be, in any particular, wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance, in permanent evil, any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield."

HORATIO SEYMOUR.

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MR. BOUTWELL.

THE recent overthrow of the Republican party is not an exceptional event in political affairs, nor need we infer therefrom that its days of power are past.

It is useless to inquire whether the party deserved defeat, but it may not be superfluous to state some of the causes thereof, and to suggest some of the duties that are now incumbent upon the organization and upon its individual members.

The great error of the Republican party, an error whose fruits have not yet been gathered, was in its neglect to revise the tariff and revenue systems when the country was restored to prosperity; or, if it were not then possible, at the earliest moment after the restoration of the Republicans to power. This duty has not been performed, and we are now confronted with an alternative which offers no choice that is not fraught with peril. The enormous surplus of revenues available for the liquidation of the public debt portends the overthrow of the national

banking system, and the consequent re-adjustment of a thousand million dollars of credits now granted by national banks to the business men of the country. On the other hand, a considerable reduction of the revenues will lead to evils no less grave.

The returns indicate that the country has built nine thousand miles of railway in the year 1882. If these roads were built at a cost of twenty thousand dollars per mile, the consumption of capital was at the rate of half a million dollars a year. From what source has this capital been drawn? Very largely from the Treasury of the United States. The Government has been gathering from distant and unobserved sources ten or twelve million dollars per month in excess of its needs, and using it for the redemption of its outstanding bonds. The payees have been compelled to receive this money, and, receiving it, they have applied it to such undertakings as promised the best results.

When the revenues shall not exceed the current expenses of the Government the redemption of bonds will cease, the supply of free capital will diminish proportionately, new enterprises will not be undertaken, and many old ones will be brought to a disastrous conclusion.

But, whether the evils now suggested are real or imaginary, a revision of the revenue system is a necessity and a duty. Moreover, the party is responsible for the system of protection, and it is its duty in the few remaining days of its power to re-adjust that system to the new condition of things. Its duty is two-fold: It must reduce the revenues; and it will fail in its duty if it does not preserve that system by which we have demonstrated and made matter of history the apparent paradox in political economy, that it is possible, at the same time, to advance the wages of the laborer and to reduce the price of the products of his labor. The construction of railways has furnished support during the last year to a million or a million and a half of persons, either by direct or indirect employment. The sudden suspension of the business will diminish the means of subsistence of a body of our inhabitants equal to one-third or one-half of the population of New England. The loss of labor in so vast a body of people is a loss of means to buy the products of the labor of others, and thus the evil extends until every branch of industry is involved in a common catastrophe. A public debt is not a public blessing, but our national banking system is; and inasmuch as that system rests upon the public debt, and for

the moment can rest safely nowhere else, it is the part of wisdom to allow the debt to remain, that the banking system may continue.

The second of the two great errors of the Republican party has been its neglect to consider the subject of civil service reform.

Of all the efforts at reform, the civil service order of President Hayes received the most liberal approbation; and of all things done, or omitted to be done, it deserved the severest censure.

Among the sentiments which are the incidents or the products of our political system, the sentiment of respect for citizenship is, or should be, the highest. The chiefest political dignity of citizenship is in the right to elect and to be elected to office; hence, in some of our State constitutions, these rights are bound together and guaranteed by the fundamental law. Greed for office may be a political vice, but contempt for office is a political sin; and that sentiment or that literature that seeks to degrade office, and thus drives young men of capacity from the avenues that open to public service and public duty, is the enemy of republican institutions. The offices are the offices of the citizens, to be held by citizens, and for the benefit of the whole people. The degradation of office and of office-holding works the degradation of citizenship, and ultimately of the entire government. It is the necessity of our system that, in all the rights of citizenship, the office-holder should be as free as any other man; and any limitation of those rights or any form of guardianship is an offence to every citizen, inasmuch as the office is thus made the subject of contempt, when it should be the object of an honorable ambition.

Citizens lose none of their political rights when they accept office; and after meeting the requirements of the position, they are as free as other citizens to participate in political affairs, both local and general.

Attention has been directed to the means employed to obtain money for political purposes, and all the schemes and processes for levying assessments are under condemnation. The circumstance that a person holds office imposes upon him no obligation to contribute to any political organization, and a refusal to so contribute ought not to impair nor in any way affect the official standing of the person so refusing; but any organization formed

for the advancement of political opinions and principles may properly ask pecuniary aid of all citizens who sympathize with the purposes of the organization, and it may appeal to those who hold office as well as to private persons.

The fortunes of the country, however, can never be affected seriously and unfavorably when the ways of collecting money for political purposes are open and the objects for which it is expended are known. Our chief peril is not in the fact, reprehensible though it be, that per cent. assessments have been exacted of, if not levied upon, clerks and subordinates in the public service, but that vast sums are contributed not upon party grounds nor for patriotic reasons, and expended in ways that shun the light. The time is not long since past when candidates were nominated upon reputations gained in the public service, or for their abilities, known and recognized in the vicinity; and when nominated they were not expected to contribute money beyond a proportion of the amount needed to print and distribute the ballots. But now there is better evidence than can be had from the tongue of rumor that the use of considerable sums of money in Congressional and Presidential elections is the rule in every part of the country. Indeed, it is not uncommon in staid and moral communities for the managers of campaigns to consider the ability and disposition of candidates for nomination to contribute to the expenses of the canvass.

In every election there are legitimate uses for money, but those who contribute large sums may have pledges, or liens that may prove inconsistent with the public welfare. But more certainly true is the statement that the use of large sums of money works the exclusion from the public service of all honest men who are not also men of fortune. The time may not be far distant when the country will require every candidate and every committee of every political party to make a full and verified disclosure of the expenditures of every campaign.

And has not the time come already for the abolition of Congressional committees created to supervise or to manage the elections of the country? During the first quarter of this century Congressional caucuses assumed to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President of the United States. This assumption yielded to the demand of the people for direct representation in so important a business. As members of Congress are not elected to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President,

so neither are they chosen to superintend the political affairs of the country.

Originally the demands for the reform of the civil service were stated in three propositions, viz.: (1) Competitive examinations of candidates for office, and the appointment of those best qualified; (2) a tenure of office during good behavior; and (3) pensions for the old and infirm. The two latter demands have been abandoned, and it may be assumed that the country will not accept the policy implied by them until its attachment to republican ideas and institutions has disappeared absolutely. There are a small number of places, not a thousand in all, which require that qualification which we call statesmanship; but as to the ninety-and-nine thousand offices, more or less, a fair amount of business tact, the training of a high school or its equivalent, and industry and fidelity, are the qualifications needed. To get persons so equipped does not require a large share of wisdom in the appointing power, nor the aid of complicated machinery. For every person needed there are at least twenty qualified. The interest of the public is realized when the business in hand is well done, and therefore it is of no public consequence whether the first or the last of the twenty receives the appointment.

An analysis of the complaints made against the present civil service system shows that the main objection is against the alleged influence of members of Congress in demanding removals and in securing appointments. If any member of Congress has ever asserted a right to any appointment, except to the Military Academy and the Naval School, the evidence thereof has not been furnished to the public; but, if the offices are to be distributed to the States and districts with any reference to population, then those entrusted with the duty of making appointments must rely upon advice and information derived from the sources thought to be most trustworthy. Naturally, the Executive Department turns to the representatives of States and districts, and so it will always be. The remedy for any abuse of the trust is with the people. They may withdraw their confidence and support from a representative whenever he uses his influence for narrow, or personal, or pernicious purposes. But when they bestow their suffrages upon a representative, they cannot, in fairness, complain that he exerts influence in a government of which they have constituted him a part. And if a system of competitive examinations were established, difficulties and evils

would be developed even more serious in the popular estimation than are those which are brought against the present system. With the exception of postmasters and their assistants, the great body of offices are in the departments at Washington, and will any one maintain that there can be anything like an equal distribution of these places among the citizens of the country under any system of competitive examinations? Can an aspirant for a twelve hundred dollar clerkship come from Oregon, or Texas, or Minnesota, or Maine, and spend one, two, or three weeks in Washington with only the dreary prospect of standing at the head of the column when the examination is ended? And however lofty may be the intentions of those who advocate a system of competitive examinations, the result will be to give to the inhabitants of the vicinity of Washington a monopoly of office-holding in that city and in the country.

If, however, a system of competitive examinations could be defended on the ground of expediency, there would remain an obstacle interposed by the Constitution of the country, which cannot be overcome.

In clause two of section two of article two of the Constitution it is declared that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments." Here is a grant of absolute power to the President and Senate, without any limitation whatsoever as to the manner of its exercise, coupled with a grant of authority to Congress to transfer the exercise of that power in a class of cases; but the mode of its exercise must remain the same.

Manifestly it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to place the whole subject of appointments to office beyond the control of Congress as a legislative body. Congress can create offices, or refuse to create offices; it may fix the compensation of officers and establish their tenure; it may prescribe their duties and impose penalties; but the power to appoint to office is a grant made by the Constitution, and it is made without any limitations as to its exercise by the persons and bodies that

are entrusted with the power. Moreover, if Congress has power to delegate appointments to a committee, it may constitute the committee from its own members, either by the assent of the President or by a two-thirds vote overruling him, and thus at once combine two great attributes of sovereignty—the power to create offices and the power to fill them.

Nor can Congress glean any authority for legislating upon appointments to office from clause eighteen of section eight of article one of the Constitution:

> "The Congress shall have power . . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

There is not in this clause a grant of any original power to Congress, nor a limitation of any power elsewhere granted in the Constitution, but only authority to legislate in aid of the execution of the powers granted.

But the constitutional difficulty in the way of competitive examinations, coupled with the duty to be imposed upon the appointing power to accept those who are best qualified, does not end here. If a committee or commission, created by law to conduct the examinations, reports that A B is the best qualified of those examined for the post of Collector of the Port of New York, and the President and Senate are compelled to accept A B, is the power of appointment in the President and Senate, or is it in the Examining Committee? And if in the Examining Committee, is not the Constitution of the country set aside? To be sure, nobody proposes to examine candidates for the place of Chief Justice of the United States or Collector of the Port of New York; but if power exists in Congress to provide for the examination of inferior clerks, and to compel the appointment of those found best qualified, there is power also to institute like processes for filling the chief places in the Government.

Indeed, is it not a natural conclusion that the reasons in favor of competitive examinations increase in force with the importance of the offices to be filled? If a competitive examination furnishes any security for a wise selection, then the system should be applied to the most important offices, inasmuch as an error in the higher places is much more prejudicial to the public fortunes than is an error in the subordinate appointments.

Congress may prohibit assessments for political purposes. Congress may give to those in office a tenure, subject always, however, to the constitutional right of the appointing power, whether the President and Senate, the President alone, the courts, or the heads of departments, to make a removal and a new appointment.

Congress may appropriate money to enable the President, the heads of departments, or the courts, to institute and maintain systems of examination, either competitive or absolute, as they see fit. In the end, however, the country may reach the conclusion that the wisdom of the men who framed the Constitution was sufficient in this particular for all the exigencies of national life; and that if the President and the Senate, the heads of departments, and the courts are not safe depositaries of this great trust, it is vain to look for better custodians elsewhere.

GEORGE S. BOUTWELL.

# PHYSICAL EDUCATION IN COLLEGES.

To those who are familiar with the subject it has long been evident that there exists in the public mind a wide-spread misapprehension as to the amount and the system of physical training in American colleges. The tone of current newspaper comment,—often humorously intended, to be sure,—is nevertheless misleading to readers whom it unconsciously influences. Athletics, gymnastics and aquatics are not the chief subjects of college instruction, as certain editors would have us believe, and as a certain proportion of otherwise intelligent people seem really to suppose. And in the present article we desire, as briefly as possible, to correct this mistaken notion and to call the attention of educators to the urgent need of some system of physical exercise in our higher institutions of learning.

During the past few years the science of physiology and hygiene has made rapid advancement. The elementary laws of health have been more widely diffused and more intelligently followed by the people at large. The medical profession are trusting less to drugs and more to natural agents. Air, food, sleep and exercise, when properly administered, are great remedies as well as great preventives of disease, and doctor and patient alike begin to realize this fact. Our houses are better ventilated, our tables more healthfully provided, our time for sleep is lengthened, outdoor games are growing popular, and our styles of dress have been perceptibly modified in favor of health and comfort. This spirit of the age is recognized by the governing bodies of our colleges and seminaries, who announce in the catalogues of their institutions that due attention is given to health and physical training. Parents are attracted by these announcements, and send their sons and daughters to college in the confident hope that they will receive physical as well as mental training and development. But their expecta-

tions are seldom realized. The intelligent system of physical culture which they had been led to expect exists only in the imaginations of the trustees and faculty.

It is true that nearly all of the larger seminaries and colleges in the New England and Middle States are provided with gymnasiums, or their students have access to some place for practicing physical exercises. In a few of these institutions light gymnastics are made a part of the curriculum, and are conducted under the eye of a capable instructor. The apparatus used consists of wooden dumb-bells, wooden wands and Indian clubs, which vary in weight from one to four pounds each. The movements are arranged in a progressive series, and are designed to call into gentle activity all the muscles of the body. The time allotted to these exercises varies from one hour to two hours a week, and extends over a period of from three to eight months. In some cases regular attendance is required for the first year only, in others it is kept up throughout the school or college course. The maximum of required gymnasium work in any institution is not over two hours a week, and in one instance it is but one hour a week for a single term. No one acquainted with the structure of the human frame, or knowing anything of its natural requirements, will undertake to say that a half-hour four times a week devoted to muscular exercise is excessive, especially when the apparatus used is of the lightest description. Yet this is all that is provided in the way of physical culture by the corporation in the best of our literary institutions.

Now, what does the student do for himself? This depends partly upon his temperament and disposition, and partly upon his surroundings. If he is strong and robust, overflowing with life and vigor, he takes naturally to outdoor sports; if he is of a studious turn of mind, or of a phlegmatic or melancholic temperament, he is less inclined to active exercise and falls more readily into sedentary habits. These inherited tendencies are sufficiently strong, we think, to warrant us in grouping college students in four great classes: (1) The athletes; (2) The sporting men; (3) The scholars; (4) The idlers.

The class of athletes is made up of those who give most of their time and energy to boating, base-ball, foot-ball, and general gymnastics. Those who take part in these sports are chosen on account of their peculiar fitness for the position to be filled. A candidate for the university crew must possess at the

outset a large and vigorous frame, must be especially strong in the back, loins, and legs, and have great powers of endurance. These qualifications, we say, must be possessed at the outset, or a man cannot hope for a place in a college or a class crew, and outside these crews very little rowing is done by individual students. The improvement in the art of rowing has shut out the majority from participation in this sport. If they own boats, well and good; they can row when they like, and as long as they like; but, unfortunately, this luxury can be enjoyed only by the few. Moreover, other obstacles, such as rough water, rainy weather, low tides, obstructions in the river, and its distance from college, combine to render this sport impracticable and unreliable as the sole agent in any system of physical culture. Even where every provision is made to render this exercise accessible and attractive, but a very small percentage of the students avail themselves of it. At Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Cornell, less than five per cent. of the students row regularly; and in the smaller colleges we find that, unless a regatta is anticipated, the boat-house is hardly opened at all. A few years ago several of these smaller institutions sent representative crews to Springfield and Saratoga. The money raised to defray the expenses of these crews was subscribed under the pretense of awakening a general interest in boating, whereas it benefited only those who underwent the three months' training, and was of personal interest only to those whose physique insured them a place in the next year's crew. And when we look over the ground to-day we find that the only men who are enjoying the advantages of boating are the men who do not need them.

These remarks in regard to the boating men are almost equally true of the ball-players. The game has been reduced to a science, and only one who possesses the necessary skill and experience can hope to belong to the nine. In most cases this skill is acquired long before entering college, and the tendency thenceforward is to develop to the extreme the abilities that have already displayed themselves. To maintain the standard of excellence now required of college players necessitates from two to three hours' practice daily in the field and a winter's work in the gymnasium. This is more time than is needed to keep the body in good working condition, and more than the mass of students can spare. Hence, to the majority the advantages of base-ball are practically denied. Only eighteen men can play at

a time, and two regular nines are all that the largest of our colleges maintain. The game, therefore, is limited to a class of experts, and only those who are members of the nine get the benefit of systematic training.

The game of foot-ball opens a somewhat wider field. More men are required, the rules are easily mastered, and the qualifications demanded are more generally possessed. One should be sound and healthy in heart and lungs, and able to stand thumping and bumping for an hour or two with impunity. If to this hardiness be added a fleet foot, strong limbs, quick perception, and presence of mind, one has the requisites of a foot-ball player. But, as even this game is now played, skill is of the highest importance, so that here again we see the same tendency to raise the standard of the sport, and to narrow participation to the capacity of the few. Moreover, there are serious objections to this game. We have not the space to discuss them. It is a rough-and-tumble contest from the beginning to the end; bruises, strains, or internal injuries are its natural accompaniments. Of all college games this is the most accessible, and yet for the average and untrained student it is unquestionably the most dangerous.

The athletic contests, or "field days," of spring and fall open a still wider field for physical achievements. The exercises comprise running, jumping, walking, putting the shot, throwing the hammer, and similar sports. These afford an excellent chance for the specialist to display his abilities, and only specialists enter them. In their case the entire energy of the system has been concentrated on the development of special powers, and everything else set aside as useless. This is the great objection to athletic exercises as they are at present conducted.

The gymnasts, as a separate class have, of late years, been rapidly diminishing in numbers. Outdoor sports have grown in popularity, and the gymnasium is now used, regularly and systematically, chiefly by the boating men and the ball-players, as a means of keeping up their strength during the long winter months, and of adding something to the skill required in their chosen sport.

We have thus seen that the whole system of college athletics is based upon a spirit of competition. Symmetry of development is never thought of, nor is it ever acquired by exclusive reliance upon any of our popular sports. Indeed, we would venture to

select from any group of recognized athletes the oarsmen, the ball-players, and the gymnasts, simply from their peculiar muscular development. In many cases these peculiarities are so marked that one can readily distinguish a starboard from a port oar, the pitcher, catcher, and short-stop from the rest of the nine, and tell the piece of apparatus upon which a gymnast has won his distinction. To devote themselves wholly to some favorite sport; to make a "record" that shall be talked about by future classes; to become famous as oarsmen, or pedestrians, or ball-players: these are the ambitions of the men who are giving their time to such exercises. The tendency of college students to-day is to look upon college athletics simply as a field for rivalry.

We have thus far been speaking of the men whom we termed collectively the college athletes, but this class comprises only a small proportion of those who attend our literary institutions. There is a second class, whom we have called sporting men. In what does their physical culture consist? Mainly in attending the races and games. If the river and the ball-ground are at a distance, a tramp to either calls for a little exertion, but in the exercises themselves the sporting men never participate. "Tailorizing" is for them a more convenient method of making up for physical deficiencies. They do the betting, and contribute largely to the financial support of the several athletic organizations; but they are never seen in the waist of a boat or on the floor of a gymnasium. From this class of men, however, often comes the best athletic material. Their spirit and buoyancy are indicative of a good natural heritage, and with these innate qualities for a basis, a thorough system of training produces the most favorable results. It is just this kind of temperament that should find a legitimate channel for activity in systematic exercise. Let this exercise be mental or physical, laborious effort of some sort should be exacted daily. Perhaps the fatigue following physical effort is for this class the most beneficial, as it is rarely accompanied by nervous irritability, and it sets at rest those vague, undefined longings which often supervene after severe mental application.

Still another class is composed of those men who attend strictly to the college requirements, and who may appropriately be termed the scholars. In this group are to be found the hardest intellectual workers, men who study almost incessantly during their waking hours, and among whom are some of the most

highly organized and finely balanced students in college. It is needless to say that these men take no time for exercise or recreation. They never go to a boat-race or a ball-match, and the feats of the gymnasium are distasteful to them. A hurried walk into the country some Saturday afternoon, or a ride to the seashore, gives a little exhilaration; but physical effort of all kinds is irksome to a close student, and, unless he is accompanied by an agreeable companion, his mind is invariably brooding over some lesson or problem as he saunters along. Walking in this manner is merely taking an airing, and is no more beneficial than sitting by an open window. In the ranks of the scholars we find, however, a relatively small number who direct their college course intelligently to the acquirement of symmetrical culture. Systematic habits of study are supplemented by systematic habits of exercise, and they would no more neglect one than the other. Such men are often called machine-workers, but they are the ones who profit most by their exercise, because they take it regularly and make it subservient to their highest aims.

Of the idlers little need be said. They differ essentially from the classes we have considered, but chiefly in a negative way. They have no favorite pursuit, either intellectual or physical. They are surrounded by the stimulating influences of college life, but their inertia is seldom overcome, the golden days of youth are wasted, and the opportunities of mental and bodily training are carelessly thrown aside.

In enumerating these four great classes we have not attempted to deal with the exceptional cases. That there are many such cases in every college we are well aware. But our purpose has been to bring out the prevailing characteristics of each class as a body, to show the motives that prompt them to exertion, and to review their efforts in the direction of physical culture. To summarize, we may say that the athletes devote too much time to the development of special powers, and sometimes carry their exercises to excess; that the sporting men rely upon their inheritance, physical and financial, and make no attempt to renew their capital; that the scholars, as a class, take too little exercise; and that the idlers take no exercise at all. When we consider the relative numbers in these several classes in all our colleges, it is safe to conclude that, of the whole number of students, not more than ten per cent. give any attention whatever to physical exercise, and that less than six

per cent. take it systematically as a means of culture and development.* Surely, then, the charge that too much time is given to muscular education in our literary institutions has the slenderest possible foundation in the facts of the case. And it must be evident, too, that the members of college crews and ball nines are not in any proper sense representatives of the physical condition of the average students in their respective institutions. The bane of American college life to-day is the spirit of prize-getting which underlies and inspires the entire system. It is equally powerful in every department of education. It utterly destroys harmony of development. It unduly cultivates a student's powers in one direction, and dwarfs and stunts his growth in every other. The valedictorian has no time for exercise, or is too weary to take it; the champion athlete has no time for study, or is too stupid to begin it. One sits in his room with a wet towel about his head, and conscientiously works out his allotted task; the other stretches himself upon a lounge and has the day's lesson poured into him by admiring comrades. Both are toiling for fame, though in opposite directions. Both have won honors for their Alma Mater; so she gives them the same certificate of acquirements. And as to subsequent usefulness in the world, there is little to choose between them. There needs to be a recognition of the supreme value of unity in education, of the harmonious cultivation of a man's mental, moral, and physical nature. Now, we ask, if physical exercise is thought by our college faculties to be of so much importance that they should permit and encourage a certain class of students to devote two, three, and four hours a day to body culture, often to the neglect of their studies, would it not be well to make some provision for those who are not athletically inclined, but who are more in need of exercise, and to whom, if judiciously applied, it would be of the greatest benefit? This is to be accomplished only by furnishing every fitting school and every college with a well-equipped gymnasium, by making its exercises a part of the regular curriculum, and by having them executed under the supervision of a competent instructor. By many institutions these requirements have been met in part; that is, one college

* The reader will understand that we are speaking of American colleges as a whole, and that the general interest in physical training among the students of Harvard, Yale, and some others of our larger Eastern institutions is exceptional and not representative.

is provided with a fine gymnasium, another has a good instructor, and a third has made its exercises obligatory. We know of but two or three institutions in the country where all these advantages are combined. The gymnasium is, and has been since the days of ancient Greece, the great school of physical education. All its appliances were invented for that purpose. And as gymnasiums are used to-day, why are they not a success? Simply because they do not accomplish the object for which they were established: they fail to give every man who has access to them a complete and thorough physical training. But this is not the fault of the gymnasium in itself. Let us look at the building and the apparatus provided by some of our colleges, then at the manner of conducting the exercises, and then inquire as to the character and ability of the men who have charge of the gymnastic department and the principles upon which they are appointed. We shall doubtless find that the want of interest has not been wholly due to the obstinacy of students, but that the fault may be traced back, directly or indirectly, to the faculty or the boards of trustees and overseers.

A gentleman gives forty or fifty thousand dollars for the erection of a gymnasium. The planning is handed over to an architect who has no idea of the kind of building required, but who feels it his duty to get up something that will at least be an ornament to the campus. He generally succeeds in doing this, and the donor and the corporation are satisfied. But what can be said of the structure, as to its fitness for a temple of health? It is a building eighty feet long and half as many wide, poorly lighted, heated, and ventilated. The bath-rooms are on one floor, and the dressing-rooms in the attic or cellar. The walls, roughly finished in brick or granite, are frescoed with dust in the summer and with frost in the winter. The floor is made of spruce, and its seams are filled with gravel. In fact, incongruity and unfitness meet us on every side and in almost every detail. Why should this be so, when the amount of money contributed is large enough to meet all demands, and the ground space allotted is ample? Because the architects and builders employed do not know the requirements of a good gymnasium, and seldom seek the advice of those who have practiced gymnastics for years, and have made a life-study of the subject. The result is an edifice not adapted to the work for which it was designed. Exceptions should be made of the finely constructed gymnasiums

at Harvard and Princeton; nor would we judge too sternly those institutions which have been obliged to remodel an old building in order to have any gymnasium at all.

Having put up a building, the authorities proceed to fill it with apparatus made by the college carpenter. This is arranged for appearance' sake rather than for use. The material is selected without regard to fitness, and put together with little knowledge of its object or design. Hanging ropes are made of hemp, and stiffly tarred to make them durable. This object is effected, for they are never used twice by the same person. The parallel bars are broad at the base and narrow at the top, so as to render the grip insecure; and they are generally made of some splintering material, in order to remind the performer which way he is going. The trapeze is bolted to a beam in the highest part of the room, and left pendent twenty-five feet from the floor. Its bars are made of wood or iron, two inches in diameter, and, that the novice may have every opportunity of losing his balance, holes are made in the ends of each bar, the ropes put through and tied with knots underneath. The rungs on the horizontal ladder are three-quarters of an inch in diameter, and left rough, so that they may be firmly grasped, while in the vertical ladders they are smoothly polished. Both are carefully avoided, for, in the first case, every swing forward raises a blister; and in the second case, every step upward is attended with positive danger. The sand-bag weighs seventy-five pounds, and is covered with the heaviest kind of canvas. One solid blow removes the skin from every knuckle, and makes an impression that lasts for a life-time. This performance is never repeated. The mattresses weigh four hundred pounds each, and are filled with excelsior, or corn-husks, which from constant rolling have become matted together in lumps. One had better land upon the floor than upon one of these cradle-knolls, for the former only occasions a little tingling of the feet, while the latter invariably causes a sprained ankle. The weights are neither boxed in wood, nor framed in iron; but they start from a trough filled with saw-dust and dirt. Every movement is accompanied by a cloud of dust and a deafening rattle and bang.

This is a fair representation of college gymnasiums throughout the country. They are built without intelligent plan, filled with heavy, cumbersome, and in many cases perilous apparatus, and then left open to the hap-hazard experiment of all who choose

to try them. With however good intentions of self-improvement a student may enter a college, he is disheartened at the outset by such a gymnasium as this. He finds no appliances adapted to his needs as a beginner, and no provision for progressive development. Constant assistance and direction are offered him in every branch of college work save this; here he finds nothing worthy of the name of instruction. When we consider that two-thirds of the students who enter college are not strong enough to use the heavy apparatus with pleasure or profit, the need of introductory apparatus becomes apparent. Wooden dumb-bells and Indian clubs do not meet this need. Something is demanded by which the biceps and triceps may be brought into alternate action, and the muscles of the back, loins, abdomen, and chest, according to their requirements. If those desiring to use the heavy apparatus would prepare themselves for it by bringing the required muscles into gentle action at first, and would then go step by step through a progressive series of exercises, they would not only find themselves increasing in power, but they would experience a certain satisfaction and acquire a discipline from the accomplishment of difficult maneuvers, which no mechanical exertion can give. The apparatus which leads one gradually up to the beneficial use of the heavy appliances may be termed adjustable weights and pulleys. These can be so arranged as to act upon any set of muscles and be adapted to any condition of strength or weakness. In order that they may be used wisely, some one should be in attendance who has a thorough knowledge of animal mechanics and the action of the muscles, as well as a comprehensive idea of the structure and function of the various organs upon which vital action depends.

This brings us to a consideration of the men who are chosen to superintend the department of physical education. For every other branch of college instruction men of recognized ability are selected, and they are then required to maintain a certain standard of excellence. But in the department of physical culture the governing boards of our colleges have seen fit to make an exception. When we find the gymnasium almost deserted, there is a cause aside from poor apparatus and unattractive quarters. It is the lack of a suitable man, with sufficient authority, at the head of the department—a man who is a college graduate, a practical gymnast, and an educated physician. Such a man, we say, must have sufficient authority; for, unless he is supreme in

his own department, and can have the coöperation of the faculty, he can do no better work than an inferior man with more freedom. Many instructors possess one or more of these qualifications. Thus, some are college graduates, others are educated physicians, and a few are practical gymnasts; but all the requirements are seldom found in the same person. This is only because there has been no demand for such men. So long as college boards look upon the position as one of minor importance, and pay but a mere pittance to its incumbent, men of ability will not undergo the training necessary to prepare them for its arduous duties. Consequently these positions to-day are occupied by men who are under-graduate students working for their tuition, students in medicine or law, tutors in some other branch of college instruction, or resident physicians. In only three or four instances are thoroughly trained gymnasts employed to superintend the gymnasium. Under such circumstances the men are obliged to make their gymnasium work a secondary consideration, and a man cannot do his whole duty by this department and attend to another at the same time. Yet this is what nearly every college instructor in gymnastics is doing. He intends to make his present position a stepping-stone to something else. He devotes as little time as possible to its duties, and expends his energies in preparing for his life's pursuit. As soon as he gets his diploma he resigns his position and makes room for the next incumbent. It matters little who his successor is, but to meet the demands of the times some one must be catalogued for the place. The demoralizing effect of these annual changes can easily be imagined, and can readily be seen by those who care to visit our college gymnasiums.

We say, then, that the proper physical training of our youth can never be accomplished until our gymnasiums are put in good hygienic condition, are furnished with appropriate apparatus, and are placed in charge of thoroughly competent instructors. To these requirements we will add the most important one of all: that the gymnasium exercises be made a part of the regular curriculum. So far as relates to the training of the mind, a system of required exercises has been universally adopted; but the training of the body has seldom been deemed of sufficient importance to merit like care and attention. We cannot but believe that this mistaken idea has arisen from a misconception of the real function of physical exercise, and of

its powerful influence upon the system at large. So long as body and mind are kept in antagonism, and the demands of one thought to be prejudicial to the interests of the other, but little advancement can be made in physical education. But when it shall be generally known that the object of muscular exercise is not to develop muscle only, but to increase the functional capacity of the organs of respiration, circulation, and nutrition; not to gain in physical endurance merely, but to augment the working power of the brain; not to attain bodily health and beauty alone, but to break up morbid mental tendencies, to dispel the gloomy shadows of despondency, and to insure serenity of spirit; when men shall have learned that much of the ill-temper, malevolence, and uncharitableness which pervade society arises from feeble health, and that the great mental and moral disturbances which sometimes threaten the stability of a government may be traced to physical causes, then will the training of the body rival in dignity and importance the training of the mind, for the interests of mind and body will be recognized as inseparable. This time is coming, though as yet some of our best and greatest thinkers, while admitting the value of physical exercise as an agent of health, still doubt the expediency of making it a department of education. They argue that a college is designed to give a boy an intellectual training, and is in no way responsible for his health and physical welfare. But when we consider that it takes from six to twelve years for a boy to complete his education, that during this time he is almost constantly away from home, and that it is a period with him when the body is peculiarly susceptible to good or evil influences, it would seem that those under whose charge he is placed should have some intelligent care of his physical as well as of his mental and moral training. When boys come from the fitting school equally prepared in body and in mind for the duties before them, it will then do to talk of making our higher institutions of learning training schools for the intellect alone. But, while they are filled with students whose minds have been forced and "crammed" in order to build a reputation for masters and tutors; while class after class enters college well grounded in the classics and totally ignorant of the first principles of physiology and hygiene; while hundreds break down yearly for the want of physical stamina; while precarious health is the rule and a sound and vigorous constitution the exception, it is little

less than criminal folly to talk of such a course. The body must be cared for, and when and how are the only questions open for discussion. If our preparatory schools were more generally patronized, and more liberally furnished with appropriate appliances, we should say that here was the field for physical training. But under present conditions the work, if done at all, must be done in college; and in college the first essential is to put this work on an equal footing with every other. If attendance at chapel or recitations is required, then attendance at the gymnasium should be insisted upon. Make this one of the stated requirements, and the student will look upon it as upon any other college duty. The great majority of students are disposed to do what is thought to be best for them, and the complaint arises—when complaint is heard—from a failure on the part of the faculty or the managing boards to make provision for regular advancement in the exercises which they have introduced.

To keep a class drilling from two to four years with wooden dumb-bells and Indian clubs only, is as great a mistake in a scheme of physical education as it would be to confine the same class exclusively to the study of geometry, with a view to giving them a thorough mental training. Such exercises are elementary in their nature, and in a prescribed course they should precede all others. But, after they have done their work, which is to supple the joints, rather than to develop the muscles, the student should be allowed to go higher. A change is necessary, not only to meet the demands of increasing strength, but to keep up an interest. The pupil must have something to look forward to, something to struggle with and to master. In no place can a system of physical culture be carried out better than in a well-disciplined college. Before the freshman class begins gymnasium work every member should be examined physically, as he had previously been examined mentally, before entering college. Then, instead of putting all in one class, and adapting the prescribed exercises to the capacity of the weakest, grade the class according to the needs of its individual members, and arrange the exercises to correspond. Those with flat chests and consumptive tendencies should be put in one squad; those with weak backs and slender waists in another; those with strong bodies, but undeveloped limbs, in a third; and so on, until the whole class has been divided into squads composed of men of like capacity, and requiring similar treatment. The duration

of this special training would, of course, depend upon the condition of each student, and should be left to the discretion of the instructor. After personal deficiencies have thus been corrected, the students should be transferred to the regular gymnastic class, and the members of this class should be led on from one piece of apparatus to another, until all the popular appliances of the gymnasium have been brought into service. By changing the course of instruction from term to term, and allowing some freedom of choice, a lively interest could be maintained which would add greatly to the benefit of the exercise. At the close of the first year the class should be examined in their work, and be grouped the next year according to their proficiency. The books of the director should be open to inspection, and the vital statistics of each man recorded at the beginning of the year could be compared with those taken at the close. By such a system the physical condition of every student in college could be readily ascertained, and the value of regular and progressive exercise be put to the test. The course that we have described is essentially practicable,—is, indeed, substantially that pursued at Harvard University,—and we believe it to be the only one by which the gymnasium can be made to minister to the wants of all, and its exercises rendered educational.

As a rule, students take about the same rank in required gymnastics that they do in their regular studies. Whether this is due to a superior ability or to a better *morale*, we will not attempt to say. But we can say that those who fail in their studies, for want of application or habits of attention, will be likely to fail in gymnastics for the same reason. Mental characteristics always manifest themselves in physical exercises. We mention this in order to dispel the idea so generally entertained, that, in the so-called physical exercises, brute strength always predominates. Brain and nerve-substance is behind every well-controlled muscular movement. Indeed, the two are so closely connected that it is hard to tell what is due to the mind, and what to the body.

In the system which we propose, we do not leave out of consideration boating, base-ball, and other popular pastimes. But we would have them regarded as recreative exercises, and as such taken during the hours allotted to pleasure and relaxation. So far as they go, they afford the best kind of development; but, to

those who pursue these sports vigorously and earnestly, gymnastics must come in as a corrective. They should be put through a course adapted to bring into action the muscles which their particular pastime has left unemployed. By such a method the gymnasium is made not only a school of physical training, but a school of moral discipline. The accomplishment of difficult feats may not in itself amount to much; but the required development, the habits of self-control, and the rapid and responsible exercise of judgment which is so frequently called for, are powers gained, and cannot fail to be of service to a man in any vocation in life.

In looking over the whole field of physical sports and games we can find nothing so well adapted to the complete muscular education of youth as the exercises of a well-appointed, well-conducted gymnasium. Every variety of apparatus can be introduced, all the movements can be arranged in a progressive series, and the entire system can be adjusted to meet and remedy the physical defects of each individual student. The times are ripe for action on this subject. Public thought is turning to it as never before. People are asking with growing earnestness, if nothing can help them to resist the destructive wear and waste of American business life. When insanity and the hundred forms of nervous diseases are on the increase, and when thousands of our educated young men are falling out in the battle of life for the want of strength and vigor, there is room for anxious questioning about our methods of physical training. Help must come from some source. And the suggestions which we have briefly offered in the present article we believe will secure the approval, because they will appeal to the reason of intelligent thinkers.

D. A. SARGENT.

# THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY.

SENATOR CAMDEN.

FEW things in fiction are more wonderful than the history of petroleum since the opening of the first oil-well in Pennsylvania, on August 28, 1859. Four years before that time, Jonathan Watson, who owned a tract of land on Oil Creek, noticed oil flowing from a spring. He took a bottle of it to Hartford, Conn., to have it analyzed by a well-known chemist. This authority pronounced it an artificial product and not a natural one. Had any person then predicted that North-western Pennsylvania and West Virginia would be found to contain vast reservoirs of this oil, and that it would in a score of years have added $1,000,000,000 to the wealth of the nation, he would have been considered insane. Yet such a prediction would have fallen short of the truth. There are to-day more than 20,000 wells producing this oil, and over 100,000 persons are exclusively engaged in handling it. Railroads have been built to transport it, while through a net-work of over 4,000 miles of iron pipes, running over mountains, beneath rivers, and through cultivated fields, streams of it pulsate continually. Oil from the wells in Pennsylvania lights the streets of South American cities, cathedrals in Europe, the mosques of Asia, the shop-windows of Jerusalem, and it is known and used over the whole civilized world.

While Col. E. L. Drake has the credit of being the first person to drill successfully for oil in this country, Mr. Charles Lockhart, of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, was probably the first person who made the production of the article a business. The discovery of petroleum in Pennsylvania was followed closely by its development in West Virginia, on the Rathbone estate, at Burning Springs. The first wells bored in West Virginia yielded oil at less depth and in greater quantities than the first wells of Pennsylvania, and, in consequence, West Virginia was supposed to

be the richest territory; but the immense yield resulting from deeper boring and the discovery of new territory in Pennsylvania soon left that State without a rival.

In 1860, Mr. Lockhart visited Europe to introduce the crude and refined oils there, and although his samples attracted little attention at the time, his trip was not without subsequent good results. Beginning in 1862 with shipments of 588,000 gallons of oil to Germany, which was sold for $2,000 less than the cost of transportation across the sea, the exportation of oil has steadily increased, until it now reaches but little less than 2,000,000 gallons a day. For the first seven months of 1882 the value of the exports of petroleum and its products was $30,946,856, which was exceeded only by the exports of cotton and cereals. During the first eight months of 1882, 433,261,181 gallons of crude oil, or its equivalent in refined, were exported, against 390,016,648 gallons during the corresponding period in 1881.

These surprising results are by no means due to the simple discovery, in 1859, that oil could be obtained by drilling for it. Petroleum was no new thing in 1859. It has been known in Europe and Asia since the earliest ages of the world. Kerosene was extracted from the cannel coals of England in 1694, as recorded in the specifications of letters patent granted at that time. It was afterward made from the bog-head shales of Scotland, the albertite of New Brunswick, and the asphaltum of Trinidad. Coal oil was also manufactured from coal in Prince Edward's Island in 1846. A kerosene oil manufactory of this kind was established on Newtown Creek, Long Island, in 1854, several years before the oil discoveries in Pennsylvania. Kerosene, however, was a manufactured article, while petroleum is the natural product of the earth. It is produced in the north of Italy, and was used there for illuminating purposes before attention was called to it in this country in 1859. It is also found in Germany, France, Russia, India, in the Island of Trinidad, and in Canada.

It is plain, therefore, that it is to neither priority of discovery nor monopoly of the world's supply that the overwhelming preeminence of American petroleum is due. Quite as much as from the native superiority of the article, this preëminence results from our peculiar national genius and capacities in respect to both mechanics and commerce. The following example will serve to illustrate the difference between American and other

methods in this industry. In 1735 an oil field was discovered in Alsace. It proved a profitable investment, and oil—used there principally for lubricating purposes—is still obtainable in paying quantities. The striking peculiarity is that the working of this field has been developed to the extent of only four wells in one hundred and fifty years, while the same crude methods for obtaining it are in use now that were used in the beginning. The only improvement is that within a few years a boiler and engine for hoisting purposes have been substituted for human labor. The Cherry Grove district in Pennsylvania is not larger in extent than the Alsatian field, and yet three hundred and fifty wells were sunk there within two or three months of 1882. Still more striking comparisons could be made with other and less civilized countries where petroleum has been obtained in greater or less quantities for ages.

It may be admitted, then, that to our national characteristics is to be largely attributed the unprecedented development of the American petroleum industry. The specific agency through which this development has been mainly effected is the organization known as the Standard Oil Company, which may be defined to be an association of business houses united under one management in such a manner as to insure harmony of interests, and a consolidation of capital adequate to any possible business emergency, yet each retaining its individuality, and even competing sharply with the others.

In order to appreciate what the Standard Oil Company has achieved, it is first necessary to glance at the condition of the oil industry at the time when this company entered it. All the circumstances surrounding the first production of petroleum tended to make it an unbusiness-like enterprise. The novelty of the article, the romance of the search for it in the wilderness, the sudden and fabulous wealth that rewarded success—all these attracted especially the unsettled and adventurous elements of the community, and made the oil regions, in 1865, almost the counterpart of California fifteen years before. Truth, stranger than fiction, turned men's heads. Sober business was neglected. The one idea was to obtain a fortune by speculation or by a fortunate turn of the drill. Volumes have been written about the vicissitudes of this extraordinary period. Colonel Drake, the pioneer, wasted a fortune in speculation, and in his last years was only saved from actual want by a pension which

the State of Pennsylvania granted him (and afterward continued to his widow), refuting the old proverb of the ingratitude of republics. Shaw, who discovered oil in Canada, also lost in speculation the money his discovery had brought him, and ten years later, while working for two dollars a day in Titusville, died a stranger and forgotten. John Steele, or "Coal-oil Johnny," as he was familiarly called, the youth who went to bed one night a laborer, and awoke next morning a millionaire, squandered his wealth, and is now earning a modest living at fifty dollars a month. The Story Farm, famous for its immense production, was sold for $30,000. It soon proved to be worth a million. In May, 1865, there were two buildings in Pithole, and three months later 15,000 persons found shelter there. Land which a few months before had been sold for an insignificant sum per acre was resold in town lots at the rate of $10,000 for a piece large enough to build a house upon. The Holmden farm, which was bought for $25,000, was sold in three months for $1,600,000. Magnificent hotels and theaters were built, and railroads and pipe lines constructed to the place. A few months later the oil was exhausted and the town deserted. To-day the relics of a few houses stand to mark the spot. In another case one of these wilderness hotels, costing $65,000 to build and fit up, was suddenly stranded by the receding tide, and being sold for taxes, almost before the paint was dry, brought less than $50.

In such a condition of affairs the state of the oil industry was, of course, deplorable, from a business stand-point. The universality of speculation; the utter disregard of the laws of supply and demand, aggravated by the haste of each landowner to multiply his wells and get as large a share as possible of the underlying oil pool which his neighbors were sucking up; the lack of handling facilities, resulting in prodigal waste; the apparent instability of the whole business, which was hourly expected to vanish, and in many instances did vanish as suddenly as it had appeared—all this conspired to make the oil regions a pandemonium of excitement and confusion, and the simple statement of a man's connection with oil was a severe blow to his credit. The refining of oil at this early period was on a basis but little better than that of its production. Processes were extremely crude, and their product would to-day be unmerchantable for illuminating purposes. Still the demand for it was great and growing, and refineries multiplied. The competent and the

incompetent rushed into the business in shoals, until the refining capacity of the country was more than three times the demand for consumption. Reaction, failures, and demoralization were the inevitable consequences.

The refiners recognized the dangerous and demoralized condition into which the excessive capacity of the refineries had brought them. The world would take only so much refined oil as it needed for immediate consumption, and no more; and the manufactured article, unlike the crude, could not be stored for any length of time. Various efforts were made to correct this evil of overproduction, through pools and running arrangements, restricting capacity; but pools were broken, and agreements were ineffectual, until the lowest ebb in the oil business was reached. By this time bankruptcy had overtaken a large portion of the refining interest, and was threatening all. Such in general was the situation out of which was developed the Standard Oil Company, as a necessity, to arrest the conditions which were driving all connected with the business to bankruptcy and ruin. To limit production was impossible. The extent of the oil-field was a matter of conjecture, while the number of persons who would engage in boring wells and in prospecting for new territory was without limit. Leaving production, therefore, to take care of itself, the labors of the Standard Company were concentrated upon the refining interest, with the object of stopping the disastrous overproduction of the manufactured products. Without entering into the details of their progress,—how the principal refining interests were first united under the management of the Standard Company, and how others gradually came into coöperation, whilst those less hopeful of the future of the business were bought out for money; how ineligibly located or poorly equipped refineries were dismantled and others better adapted to their purposes were improved,—it is only necessary to state that their success was such as to vindicate the wisdom of their broad plans and to establish the superiority of their business methods. It did more than this. It demonstrated that, under such firm and intelligent control, the oil business had possibilities which the doubting ones and the public generally had not seen, and this demonstration was followed by an antagonism to the company such as all great and successful organizations have to meet. How these possibilities have been developed is indicated by the facts that a day's work of the Standard

Company at this time involves, among other things, the handling of more than 60,000 barrels of oil, the putting together of ninety tons of tank iron, and the making of 100,000 tin cans, holding five gallons of refined oil each, and 25,000 oak barrels, to hoop which requires 150 tons of iron.

But, while a commanding position in refining was thus being won, the Standard managers were equally active in the mechanical and chemical departments of the business. Under their direction the process of refining was improved more rapidly than ever before. Oils grew better, cheaper, and more uniform, and as the problems of distribution were grasped and solved, the market for these products widened continually. In a word, the phenomenal genius for organization, which all concede to the Standard, produced its natural results throughout the entire business, and from being one of the most irregular and unprofitable of American industries, oil refining and selling became thoroughly systematized; and in the train of system followed economy and success.

The question of oil transportation and storage early engaged the attention of the Standard corporation. At the outset the methods of carrying oil were as primitive as might be. Imperfect barrels carried on wagons were jolted to and fro over the corduroy roads which connected the wells with the streams, where rafts and flatboats received them for further laborious transportation. With such methods as these and the universal craze for well-boring, it is small wonder that a great proportion of the oil brought to the surface had to soak back into the earth or float off through the water-courses of the vicinity. This condition of things, however, did not last long. Railroads were built, tank-cars invented, and finally, in 1865, iron pipes began to be laid to bring the oil from the wells. During the ten years following a number of pipe line companies were organized for running and storing the crude liquid. Each company covered certain territory, and producers availed themselves of the pipe-line facilities. Each producer received a certificate of deposit for his oil, redeemable in oil at any time on payment of storage charges. These certificates, which were not negotiable, were influenced somewhat in value by the pecuniary standing of the company, but more particularly by the nature of the territory the pipe-line company covered; it was like the old State bank currency. Outside of its particular territory a

pipe-line certificate was at a discount. In 1877, the Standard Oil Company consolidated these various organizations under its own control as the United Pipe Lines. The result is that to-day an oil certificate, like a greenback, is as good in one part of the country as in another, and can be negotiated at any of our commercial centers. These certificates are practically the oil of commerce. Under the present system the collection and handling of crude oil is as nearly perfect as it can be made. The company runs a pipe to each well, even to the most unimportant and isolated, without charge to the producer for the accommodation, thus enabling him to dispense with all local storage. It takes oil anywhere, and delivers it at any railroad shipping point in the oil regions which the holder may indicate, and all this without any other than the regular storage charges. Still further: as the Pipe-line certificates are uniformly for 1,000 barrels each, the Standard, for the accommodation of producers having smaller lots to dispose of, keeps its own men constantly "at the front," ready to buy any such lots for cash, at the current market price for larger lots ruling at the oil exchanges on that day. This, as will be seen, places the smallest producer on an equality with the largest. The amount of oil held by the United Pipe Lines is gauged every day, and once each month a sworn statement is sent to a State official, and also publicly posted in the exchanges, giving the quantity and location of all oil on storage, together with certain other particulars. This system precludes all possibility of an over-issue of certificates, and warrants their integrity. During the year just passed the United Pipe Lines purchased over half a million barrels to make up shortage from the natural shrinkage of the oil which they held on storage.

It costs $250,000 for the tankage in which to store 1,000,000 barrels of petroleum, or, for land and tanks and incidentals, $300,000. A plot of one hundred acres accommodates only eighteen tanks, as they have to be detached and trenches dug around them to provide against fire. Cannon are kept at each tankage station to perforate the tanks when on fire, so as to let the oil out into the ditches, that it may burn gradually, and prevent overflow and still greater damage. Most of the fires at the tanks are caused by lightning. Losses of this kind, for the oil only, are assessed pro rata on all the holders of certificates, thus effecting the cheapest and best kind of insurance. Each tank

has a capacity of 35,000 barrels, and the loss of this amount would be made good by an assessment of one-tenth of one per cent. on all oil at present stored.

In six years there has been an increase of some 30,000,000 barrels of oil on storage with the United Pipe Lines. To provide for this increase the company constructs an average of one iron tank of the regular capacity every day. The pipe lines are now connected with about 20,000 wells, and, in addition to the 4,000 miles of pipes already referred to, the company have now in operation more than a thousand miles of trunk pipe lines, running from the oil regions to Cleveland, Pittsburg, Oil City, Buffalo, and New York, and is rapidly completing trunk lines to Philadelphia and Baltimore, of which over 200 miles are already laid. The pumping stations along these trunk lines are about twenty-five miles apart. At each are two or more tanks, one of which is being emptied while another is being filled. A six-inch pipe is used, which can deliver 16,000 barrels each twenty-four hours.

These brief statements, however, give only an outline of what the Standard Oil Company has accomplished. It has been the instrument, if not the cause, of almost the whole development of the oil industry—production excepted—during the last decade; of vastly improving and bringing to uniformity all oil manufactures; of cheapening these latter to an unprecedented degree, and pushing the introduction of American petroleum to the remotest parts of the earth; of furnishing employment to a host of men equal in number to the standing army of the United States, and of giving an impulse of prosperity to every locality in which its operations are conducted. It has probably had less trouble with its enormous laboring force than any other corporation of comparable importance in the world.

In view of this state of facts it might reasonably be supposed that the Standard Oil Company would have been entitled in some degree to public commendation for what it has accomplished, and the beneficial results produced—not that it has any claim on the score of philanthropy. It has not. It was organized and is operated to do in the best manner the largest possible amount of business. But the fact that philanthropy is not the mainspring of its corporate action cannot destroy the other fact that great public benefit has resulted from the Standard's work; greater, unquestionably, than could ever have been brought about by the use of even equal capital and equivalent energy, divided

between a score or a hundred disconnected and unfriendly organizations. In place, however, of the approbation which has been referred to, the Standard Oil Company has for some years been the target for unlimited abuse and misrepresentation. The reasons for this lie partly on the surface. No great enterprise was ever carried through without interference with somebody or something. The choicest field cannot always be saved from the advancing railroad; yet no one, save perhaps the owner of the property, will insist that railroads should not be built. The parallelism does not need elaboration to indicate the origin of much of the opposition to the Standard. But this company is at least the equivalent of a railroad in importance, and if its progress had worked actual hardship to individuals it could not be justly condemned therefor. In point of fact, however, less of such hardships can be charged upon the Standard than upon most corporations. In all its thousands of miles of pipe-laying no right of eminent domain has ever been exercised, but every foot of the right of way has been purchased by agreement with the land-owners. So, too, in consolidating its refining interests, there is no instance in which the company did not pay full value for what it received. Amongst the enemies of the Standard were men whose hardships were wholly of their own making. They were the men who, in the infancy of the combination, when all refiners were invited to ally themselves with it, and take Standard stock to the amount of the agreed valuation of their property, were ready enough to sell, but preferred money to stock, and after getting their price congratulated themselves on being wiser than "the visionaries," who were risking everything on the practicability of their undertaking and the continuation of the oil supply. When, however, the hopes of these visionaries were more than realized, the cautious sellers for cash became unhappy, and finally cried out, not, however, against their own mistakes, but against this dangerous monopoly which had wrested their property from them. There was no lack of unsuccessful oil-men, sensational writers, and persons with grievances, to help give utterance to the anti-Standard cry. The bitterest grievances were those of the small refiners, whose real complaint was that the Standard, with its improved processes and immense product, had too greatly cheapened the cost of manufacturing and marketing refined oil. As it would not do, however, for them to complain that the public was getting its oil too low, they, too, raised a clamor against the "monopoly." A class of politicians, adopting what is known

amongst themselves as "the Anti-Monopoly racket," were anxious to inflame the public mind against all large corporations. The Standard seemed most vulnerable. It could not be denied that it was a corporation, that it was rich, busy, and little given to talk; and as it paid no attention to attacks, its enemies insisted that this was a guilty silence. The public ear was gradually gained by frequent repetitions of uncontradicted calumny, and several respectable journals and magazines lent themselves, in excusable ignorance of the true state of the case, to the dissemination of the same. The Standard came to be referred to and popularly pictured as a giant monopoly, a monster of iniquity, a crusher of the innocent and helpless, a corrupter of railroads, and a stealthy foe to the liberties of the people. The effect of all this was sought to be heightened by a flavor of mystery and terror. The officers of the company were likened to the tyrants of old, and their private offices to the secret chambers of the Inquisition—and the public listened, and felt its hair rise with horror.

Meanwhile the Standard was, as usual, attending strictly to its legitimate business,—refining and selling oil, and employing its great resources in the work of increasing storage facilities rapidly enough to save the producers from the loss of their oil: but to its accusers it made no answer. Whether its indifference to public accusations was the best course under the circumstances, it would be fruitless to discuss. Perhaps it was, as all calumny eventually dies of itself. And in the oil regions, where the hostile feeling had its birth, it is indeed practically at an end. Many, however, may still be surprised to learn that the Standard Oil Company is not the monster that it has been represented; that it has never had a contract with a railroad company which a fair-minded man could pronounce to be against public policy, good morals or good business principles; that it has never broken an agreement nor committed an act of treachery; that it is not a speculator nor a manipulator of speculative prices, as has been so often charged; that it is not a monopoly, and never can become one, despite its present great preponderance in the trade; in short, that this great bugbear is nothing more nor less than an organization of laborious, painstaking men, who, with great abilities and great opportunities, have made a great success by legitimate means, in a legitimate business.

J. N. Camden.

MR. WELCH.

"Whence and what art thou, execrable shape?"

— PARADISE LOST.

THE institution of which we speak (and it is right to speak of it as an institution, for it is very much more than a corporation) has nothing analogous to it in the other institutions of this country; and still less analogous is it to the institutions of any other country. On this account the idea of it is not readily grasped by the average citizen; he does not obtain a particularly intelligent or discriminating view of it; he hears a few things and draws a conclusion, which conclusion may stand with a greater or less degree of permanence, according as his mind may be undisturbed on the subject further, or something of a more forcible character than he has yet heard comes before him, and he makes a new estimate. In speaking in this way of the citizen it is implied that the press is not well informed on this subject. The Standard Oil Company is certainly an interesting and sensational thing, and a fitting subject for press comment; but it has so many sides that it is difficult to give more than a fragment at any one time, and the most general or central facts pertaining to it newspaper men will no doubt universally agree are exceedingly difficult of penetration.

If there was ever anything in this country that was bolted and barred, hedged round, covered over, shielded before and behind, in itself and in all its approaches, with secrecy, that thing is the Standard Oil Company. The energies of Congress, of State legislatures, of criminal and civil courts, of special and general investigating committees, of corporate, journalistic and private enterprise, have been expended in investigating this subject. As a result there are tomes of literature that are rather appalling to look upon, and to investigate the investigations becomes a work of considerable arduousness. In the mass of literature produced, however, is illustrative evidence that can be succinctly set forth, and from which important conclusions very naturally follow.

There is a lateral but important branch of this subject which may as well be briefly referred to here, but which would well admit of an extended amplification and development. There is a growing sentiment in this country unfavorable to the accumulation of enormous fortunes in single hands, and, as the reverse

of this, there is a disposition on the part of those who are possessed of enormous fortunes, or who are in the way to acquire them, to strengthen themselves against the feeling hostile to them. This cannot be done in any other way so effectively as by multiplying the holders of the enormous fortunes, and enlisting the zeal of their followers. By their power in the press, in the national and in State legislatures, in the courts, in official life, in political parties, in social ramifications, in literature, in the pulpit, we see developed a body of opinion which comes to be a part of the national life, and the sentiment which aims to dislodge it is reprobated as communism or revolution, to be suppressed summarily.

The source of this spirit is not in the walks of commerce as they have been known,—mercantile, banking, shipping, manufacturing,—but in that relation which a class bears to the public, wherein the public have no alternative but to accept the offices of this class in such spirit and such manner as it chooses to render them, unchecked by the competition which governs ordinary commercial relations, and so amenable only to a public sentiment which has not found out how to assert itself effectively. Railroad transportation and telegraphic transportation, in connection with the enormous landed interests which go with the former, are the chief sources of fortunes that are a menace to liberty.

The Standard Oil Company has taken very high rank among the powers built on transportation to which I refer. Its name does not imply that its power is built on transportation, and that it is a transportation power; the name suggests commerce purely, and as commerce implies competition, the idea is not readily seized that its power is, first, of transportation and non-competitive; and, second, of commerce—the latter subsidiary to the former.

The Standard Oil Company preceded the east and west trunk lines in eliminating competition from transportation, and while these were still warring in their general business, the former had brought competition in oil freights practically to an end. What is more, the Standard became practically a dictator to the railroads of their relations to petroleum,—not in terms, indeed, and in an arbitrary way, but in a genial and conciliating one.

The Standard has occupied the felicitous position of being a transportation power that dealt and speculated in the com-

modity it transported, and a commercial body that, with fullness of knowledge, was guardian and dictator (qualified as in the preceding paragraph) of the transportation of its commodity. Those who were placed at disadvantage by this double relation of the Standard to petroleum, were refiners attempting to do a purely commercial business in connection with it, hiring their transportation as commercial firms ordinarily do; speculators in crude oil in the oil region, who would have desired greatly to know the relation the article they were interested in bore to transportation to the world's markets; and merchants or speculators, or both, in refined oil, who had a relation to it after it left the hands of the transporter and refiner for distribution in different parts of the world. This full and exclusive knowledge has, perhaps, had as much, if not more, to do than advantages in transportation rates, in assisting the Standard people to absorb the business, as it enabled them to act with great confidence and boldness in the regular channels of the trade, while others could only act timidly and falteringly. Some people love to dwell on the foresight, energy, enterprise, and ability shown by the Standard in what it has accomplished, and point to the company as a monument of all these qualities. Let any set of business men not above the average in business characteristics obtain more favorable rates of transportation of an entire commodity than anybody else; let others be constantly misled about what the favored ones are paying, and let it be a speculative commodity subject to wide fluctuations, with transportation at times a factor as important, or more important, than the first cost of the article and its preparation for consumers: could they not drive others out of the business, and occupy it in all its branches, or nearly all, however extensive these branches might be? A belief has prevailed very widely through the petroleum trade for some years that half of the Standard profits have been derived from fluctuations; that is, were of the nature of speculative profits, and were not an ordinary mercantile profit at all.

The Standard's advantages in fluctuations are extraordinary. Its position gives it an intimate knowledge of the trade. It can buy crude, and sell it out both as crude and refined; it can sell crude "short"; it is able to withhold and has withheld supplies from foreign markets, while things were ripening for an advance, and it has sold largely ahead pre-

vious to a fall, and has practiced the tactics of the "short" sales on the refined oil market. Aside from the natural fluctuations, which it is in the best position to observe, there is its own power of manipulation, which a mere contemplation of its position reveals.

Another source of extraordinary profit has been used by it. Railroad proprietors have done business at a loss, the Standard standing by and getting a benefit from the loss; and in the powers which the Standard has shown of inducing the railroads to do business at a loss they have certainly been better circumstanced at times than if it had had resting upon itself a pecuniary responsibility in moving oil by rail from the oil region to the eastern sea-board.

The following propositions, showing the relations of the Standard to transportation, are established by official records. They are mostly drawn from the printed proceedings of the Hepburn Legislative Investigating Committee of the State of New York, 1879 and 1880. From exhibits, pages 418, 573, 180, 175, 470, 473, 621, 512, 514; from testimony, pages 3398, 3689, 3705, 3472, 3475, 3664, 3666, 6669.

*A.* That it has been its aim to make the business non-competitive through control of transportation.

*B.* That railroad managers have coöperated with it in this aim.

*C.* That success has attended it in this, not in every respect and at all times, but enough to throw the business into hands.

The following minor propositions are closely related with the foregoing and are equally educed from the official records:

*a.* That its relation to railroad transportation out of the oil country has enabled it to drive competitors out of business as shippers and refiners of petroleum.

*b.* That the railroad managers have shown no consciousness of committing an act adversely affecting public interests.

In proof of these propositions, we have the following documentary evidence:

*First.* Four contracts of January 18, 1872, between the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, the Erie Railway Company, and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and the Atlantic and Great Western Railway Company, and the South

Improvement Company. In these four contracts the following passages appear:

"5. To charge to all other parties for the transportation of petroleum and its products, rates which shall not be less than the gross rates above specified; and should at any time any less rate be charged directly or indirectly, either by way of rebate, commission, allowances, or upon any pretext whatsoever, the same reduction per barrel shall be made to the party hereto of the first part, from the net rates provided for them, on all transportation for them during the period for which reduction shall be made to others."

. . . . . .

"ARTICLE FOURTH. And it is hereby further covenanted and agreed by and between the parties hereto, that the party hereto of the second part shall at all times co-operate, as far as it legally may, with the party hereto of the first part, to maintain business of the party hereto of the first part against loss or injury by competition, to the end that the party hereto of the first part may keep up a remunerative, and so a full and regular business, and to that end shall lower or raise the gross rates of transportation over its railroads and connections, so far as it legally may, for such times and to such extent as may be necessary to overcome such competition. The rebates and drawbacks to the party of the first part to be varied *pari passu* with the gross rates."

The South Improvement Company was an organization designed to accomplish, and by about the same parties, what the Standard combination subsequently accomplished.

*Second.* Contract of March 1, 1875, with the Erie Railway Company, and of January 1, 1876, with the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, determining the relation of the Standard Oil Company with the terminal facilities of these railroad companies at the port of New York.

The former notes that the Weehawken oil yards (belonging to the Erie Company) are in full and complete possession of the Standard Oil Company, which possession is further given and confirmed by this contract. The Standard Oil Company is to do the business of the Erie Railway Company at these yards in the name of the latter company, and assume the charge and collection of freight and charges on all oil transported to the port of New York over the Erie Railway, and is to be paid five cents per barrel by the Erie Company for doing this business, the latter company not to be subject to risk on the oil after arrival and delivery at the yards. These points, with the exception of the leasing of the docks, also appear in the contract of April 17, 1874.

The contract with the N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Company places the terminal facilities of that company in complete possession of the Standard, which is consequently to handle all the oil received, taking the responsibility of loss by fire after it is delivered into its possession. Nothing is said in the contract, however, about the Standard collecting charges and freights in the name of the railroad company, as in the case of the Erie Company. The Standard is to provide means of taking care of oil as received, and delivering it to consignees. In consideration of these services to the railroad company, the Standard is to receive ten per centum of the rate fixed from time to time for the transportation of crude petroleum and the refined products, on every barrel transported for the Standard, and for those authoritatively represented by it.

*Third.* Agreements of April 17, 1874, with the Erie Railway Company, and the A. & G. W. Railway Company, and of August 1, 1875, with the N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Company, and the L. S. & M. S. Railway Company, give conditions pertaining to transportation, but state that the rates should be adjusted and fixed from time to time, by agreement, between officers of the Standard and of the railroads; that the latter shall charge the former at no time prices higher than the lowest net rates paid by any other shippers to other railroads. In the case of the N. Y. C. & H. R., and L. S. & M. S. companies, if the Standard pays more than to a competing road, or than another shipper pays to these roads or a competing road, the Standard shall be refunded the excess with interest; and if the Standard pays a competing road more, the excess shall be paid to these roads with interest. The Standard itself, through an associated firm, was furnishing transportation tanks on cars of its own, and on railroad cars, and receiving from the railroads for so doing so much per mile in the former case, and so much per trip in the latter case, and taking the risk of fire and loss of oil, except from the wrecking of cars. The Erie Company, in this contract, agreed to make the surrender of the Weehawken docks, covered by contract of March 1, 1875, referred to on a preceding page, first putting buildings, erections, and appurtenances in good repair.

About this time an arrangement was entered into by the trunk lines from the oil regions to the sea-board for a division of the tonnage of oil, the division to be made by the Standard, this arrangement being independent of prices that might be

ruling for transportation. We find an exchange of letters, dated Philadelphia, October 17, 1877, between the Vice-President of the Standard and the President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The former writes:

"That you shall allow to, and pay us, weekly, such commission on our own shipments and the shipments which we may control, as may be agreed to by your company and the other trunk lines from time to time; this commission, it is understood, has for the present been fixed at ten per cent. upon the rate, and shall not be fixed at a less percentage, except by mutual agreement of your company and ours — provided, that no other shipper of oil by your line shall pay less than the rate fixed for us before such commission is deducted; and no commission shall be allowed any other shipper unless he shall guarantee and furnish you such quantity of oil for shipment as will, after deduction of commission allowed him, realize to you the same amount of profit you realize from our trade."

President Scott replies that what is proposed "is satisfactory, the provisions of which shall be duly carried out."

*Fourth.* I am only able to adduce one specific agreement as to transportation rate paid by the Standard to the railroads. Taking effect June 1, 1879, the rate on crude oil from the Bradford field to New York was twenty cents per barrel, with corresponding rates from other fields, and on refined oil. On August 1st the Bradford crude rate was reduced to fifteen cents per barrel. The nominal rate, from the Bradford field to New York, as given to the public, was reduced, in May of that year, from one dollar and fifteen cents to eighty-five cents per barrel. The public had no further intimation of a drop in the rate until it was announced, June 23d, that the rate was reduced from eighty-five cents per barrel to thirty cents per barrel. The reduction was made known to the Standard, which, before the public knew there was a drop, was selling refined oil enormously to foreign markets for future delivery. The ostensible reason for the reduction of the rate to twenty cents and fifteen cents was to oppose the new outlet from the Bradford field to the sea-board, by the Tide-Water Pipe Company and the Reading Railroad Company. The offence consisted in an injury to the new outlet, and this Mr. F. B. Gowan, President of the Reading Railroad Company, pronounced before the Congressional Committee on Commerce, at Washington, January 27, 1880, to be "a criminal conspiracy of the most dangerous character"; in an injury to the stockholders of the railroads, as the rates were

not advanced until April 1, 1880, about seventeen million barrels being moved to the sea-board at the reduced rate, which was estimated by Mr. Gowan to be only about one-half or one-third of the cost; and to foreign purchasers of the refined oil who, while enormous contracts were being made, had no knowledge that the transportation rate had been reduced. The reduction continued so long that the Standard was not only able to fill its contracts, but was able to accumulate large stocks at the sea-board to fill contracts after the rate had advanced.

*Fifth.* The American Transfer Company was a Standard organization, which at one time was a pipe company in the oil country, not differing in general character from other pipe lines. When they were all absorbed by the Standard it was supposed to have been merged with the others into the United Pipe Lines, and to have become part of that system, and from the oil country stand-point it lost its identity, and made no report to the State Government at Harrisburg, as pipe-lines were required by law to do. It seems, however, that it retained title, or attained it subsequently, to pipes connecting the United system with railroads; at Oil City, a few hundred feet of pipe across the Allegany River; at Olean, less than a mile; at Salamanca, at Kane, at Pittsburg, a number of miles, at the latter place some forty miles, substantially parallel to a railroad, so saving railroad transportation to that point, which was an important refining point, particularly for the Western trade. The oil producer supposed that the pipeage charge of twenty cents per barrel paid for transporting from his wells to the railroads the oil he produced and sold, and it did, so far as there was any recognized fee of the American Transfer Company. On February 15, 1878, however, the General Manager of the American Transfer Company writes to the Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company:

"I here repeat what I once stated to you, and which I asked you to receive, and treat as strictly confidential, that we have been for many months receiving from the New York Central and Erie Railroads certain sums of money, in no instance less than twenty cents per barrel on every barrel of crude oil carried by each of those roads. Coöperating, as we are doing, with the Standard Oil Company and the trunk lines in every effort to secure for the railroads paying rates of freight on the oil they carry, I am constrained to say to you that, in justice to the interest I represent, we should receive from your company at least twenty cents per barrel on each barrel of crude oil you transport. . . . I make this proposition with the full

expectation that it will be acceptable to your company; but, with the understanding, on my part, that in so doing I am not asking as much of the Pennsylvania road and its connections as I have been, and am receiving, of the other trunk lines."

The reply is as follows:

"Your favor of February 15th has been received, and directions have been given to allow you, from and after February 1, 1878, the commission therein asked for, until further notice."

The South Improvement contracts were published shortly after the time they became operative, and in consequence of the popular uprising of the oil country were at once annulled by the Pennsylvania Legislature through its control of the charter of that company. Nothing was known of the contracts with the New York railroads of April 17, 1874, of March 1, 1875, of August 1, 1875, and of January 1, 1876, until the year 1879, when the Hepburn investigation brought them to light. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company's letter of October 17, 1877, and the American Transfer Company's letter of February 15, 1878, were brought out by an investigation in Pennsylvania in the early part of 1879. The contracts of the South Improvement Company show already no apprentice hand in the business of establishing drawbacks, and this business is believed to have first been projected on a large scale at Cleveland about the year 1870, when the managing director of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad Company put capital into the business of refining under the management of the men who have since made the Standard Oil Company. From that time onward the steps to success were apparently taken with ease. The failure of the South Improvement Company only developed the fact that secrecy was a factor of the utmost importance. Enterprises in the oil business pertaining to the piping, shipment and refining of oil, with the noteworthy exception of the Tide-Water Pipe Company, started in 1879, and which still lives, were entered into as other enterprises are entered into, but were mostly abandoned in bankruptcy and despair, when not swallowed up by the power that had obtained an administrative relation to shipments from points of production to the markets of the world. In seeing this point we see the essential point of the Standard Oil Company. Its success has been a personal success with railroad men who have proved facile to its desires, and on this its claims to genius and

unwonted enterprise must rest; after this, with ordinary sagacity, comes merely an accumulation of clerical and mechanical work. The public mind of the oil country and of the oil trade has rebelled; but, with railroad facilities representing railroad capital against it, it has been like an imprisoned bird beating its wings against the iron bars that confined it. Private enterprises have been started, and anything like the achievement of a successful position has been the signal for an onslaught for the ruin or the possession of the property. The ground the Standard has taken for itself must not be trenched upon. Adverse opinions have been fought by securing possession of the public press of the oil country, and the man of power in opposition has been a man to be conciliated by a share of that of which there was so much. $40,315,609 of exports for the fiscal year 1881, and $61,789,438 for the great bull year ending June 30, 1877, to which is to be added one-quarter to one-third more for the domestic consumption of the United States, show sums from which a revenue was to be drawn. Its plant is now newspapers, pipe-lines, storage-tanks, oil country and Western refineries, trunk pipe-lines, oil-cars, refined oil depots, sea-board refineries, capitalized at over $100,000,000. Does this illustrate development in free America from a small beginning at Cleveland twelve years ago? The company is putting its hands on other industries, and a wider public may yet have a more intimate knowledge of it than is set forth in this article.

JOHN C. WELCH.

THE

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

MARCH, 1883.

**No. 316.**

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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1883.

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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXVI.

MARCH, 1883.


## MONEY IN ELECTIONS.

It is encouraging that there is at last an effort to stop the assessment of Government employés for political funds; but it should not be forgotten that behind such assessments is the larger fact that political parties require great sums for election purposes. These shameless levies are in truth rather a result than a cause of political corruption. That appointed officials are assessed for political purposes is secondary to the fact that elective officials (or others for them) must pay roundly for election. The election is the initial point in our political system; and so long as elections are to be gained by the use of money, and cannot be gained without it, no subsequent precautions will prevent corruption. Popular government must be a sham and a fraud unless the popular will alone tells in elections.

It has in many parts of the Union come to this,—that only a rich man, or a man who expects to make money illegitimately out of the position, can afford to run for office. The American principle, that every one who devotes his time to the public service should be fairly compensated, is the correct one, as whoever observes the working of the opposite principle in such governments as that of England may see; and on the whole we pay our officials reasonably well. But in the cases of many elective officers, these salaries, minus the expenses of election, leave an

inadequate remuneration, or nothing at all. What does the pay of a United States senator amount to as compared with the cost of many senatorial elections? Or take even the Lower House. Some time ago a rich young man of New York spent between eighty and ninety thousand dollars in a congressional canvass. He was beaten, and the newspapers said it was a popular rebuke to the attempt of a rich man to buy place with money. Perhaps it was, after a fashion; for his opponent, who did get elected, spent only some twenty-odd thousand dollars.

In the recent election a gentleman of high character and national reputation, running for Congress in New York, who had virtually no opponent, and whose election was certain, spent, it is said, ten thousand dollars in what are considered legitimate expenses. He is rich, and therefore, although there was in his case really no contest, was expected to contribute liberally to election expenses. In another case, six thousand dollars was spent by a gentleman, also of national reputation, who is not accounted rich, who has frequently gone through the ordeal of elections, who spent no money save for "legitimate" purposes, and is considered a careful manager. After the election, I heard the friends of a defeated candidate for Congress, in Brooklyn, blaming him bitterly for having made no exertion. He only spent two thousand five hundred dollars.

Thus it is in large cities. But it is doubtful if it is in the large cities that our system of government has really become most corrupt. Sparsely settled Nevada is notoriously a rotten borough, and Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and other new States, are little better. And perhaps, for the most flagrant election corruption we must go, not to the large cities with their masses of proletariat voters, nor yet to the new States with their shifting populations, but to the older agricultural communities, where population is most stable, and the voters are in largest proportion of "native American" stock. There is, so "practical politicians" say, more buying of votes among the rural population of Long Island—the descendants of the settlers of the colonial times—than there is in the city of Brooklyn; and in sheer and flagrant corruption there are many agricultural districts of the State of New York that outdo the city.

The Thirteenth Congressional District, composed of Dutchess, Putnam, and Columbia,—long-settled agricultural counties,—has been notorious in this respect. Not long since a candidate for Con-

gress spent one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in his election, beating a competitor who spent seventy-five thousand dollars. In this district substantial farmers, the owners of even five and six hundred acres of valuable land, men of position in their neighborhoods, are said habitually to sell their votes, and the prevalence of the custom is illustrated by a story of a candidate who, going into a country village, asked, "How many voters have you in this township?" "Four hundred," was the reply. "How many of them are floaters?"—*i. e.*, merchantable voters—continued the candidate. "Four hundred," was again the answer. Thanks to the efforts of the Civil Service Reform Association, a branch of which has recently been started in this district, such a stand was made against this corruption in the recent charter election in Poughkeepsie, that the money spent in buying votes was, it is said, reduced one-half, and four persons (of whom one was a deputy sheriff and two were policemen) were arraigned for bribery. They were tried before a judge who is reputed to have spent twenty thousand dollars in getting his place, prosecuted nominally by a district attorney of the same kind, and counsel for the defense made no scruple of asking how many there were in the court-room and in the jury-box who had not been concerned in like practices. The men were acquitted, though nobody seems to have doubted their guilt.

Illustrations might be given from other parts of the Union, but it is not necessary to accumulate illustrations of a notorious fact. What shows most significantly how deeply the virus of corruption is eating into our political system, is that it is only occasionally that the use of money in elections excites comment, and even then the comment can hardly be called reprobation, at least effective reprobation. The prodigal expenditure first alluded to excited some attention, but that mainly because it was a by-election, when there were no other struggles to distract. And no one dreamed of sending either of the candidates to the penitentiary. On the contrary, as a reward for the spending of a fortune in influencing the voters of his district, the loser was sent to represent the American republic at a European court, just as another New York man, who had himself contributed a moderate fortune to the Republican corruption fund in the last Presidential election, and had induced others to contribute, had been previously rewarded by being made our national representative to the French republic. So the Republican who, in the

country district to which I have referred, spent seventy-five thousand dollars in a losing struggle with a Democrat who spent one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, was given an opportunity to "recover his usefulness" as Commissioner of the District of Columbia, while his brother got a contract for soldiers' tombstones.

This is natural. So long as money is necessary for the carrying of elections, the spending of money will be deemed laudable, and those who furnish money may claim what successful parties have to give. As to where the money comes from, that will not much matter. "Beggars cannot be choosers." When Mr. Garfield wrote the "My dear Hubbell" letter, he of course knew that he was asking a ring engaged in swindling the Government to contribute to his election; when Mr. Arthur went down-town to gather in an hour the last five hundred thousand dollars needed to carry Indiana, he of course applied to those who were pecuniarily interested in the retention of power by his party. If Garfield and Arthur had been too "squeamish" to take such money, they would never have reached the Presidential chair. Washington and Jefferson once sat there, it is true. But that was some time ago. Even Lincoln had to trade off Cabinet places to get there, and to wink at the robbery of the nation when mothers were sending their sons to die for her.

The most suggestive assessment during the last presidential election was that levied upon the New York police. These policemen are appointed by a commission intended to be non-partisan, after an examination as to competency, and, once appointed, cannot be removed except upon trial and conviction of misconduct. The commission at the time of the last presidential election, was composed of both Republicans and Democrats. Here, at least, it would be thought political assessments were impossible. Yet the New York policemen were assessed for political purposes, and the money thus raised seems to have been divided between the two parties. Each party wanted money so badly, that it was willing to join its opponent in plundering and dividing. What hope for preventing political assessments by prohibition, when under such conditions political assessments can be levied?

Nor can we hope to cure corruption by mere improvement in administrative machinery. The disease is deeper seated. Growing inequality in the distribution of wealth begets a tendency to

political corruption that can be cured by nothing that does not go to the causes of inequality. And beyond this, we have induced corruption by extending the functions of government too much in one direction, and too little in another.

Our absurd attempt to "protect American industry" by a tariff brings enormous moneyed interests into politics, and, from the blackmailing tide-waiter to the wood-pulp senator, debauches the public service. The Federal internal revenue system, and in large part the revenue systems of our State and local governments, also powerfully foster corruption, while minor misuses of governmental power tend in the same direction. On the other hand, we have in large part abandoned to corporations the true governmental function of coining money, and thus raised up a power of corruption whenever their interests are at stake; and we have in most important part left to other private corporations the true governmental function of opening and maintaining highways. The truth of the axiom that "the Government must own the railroads, or the railroads will own the Government," is seen in every American State, as it is in the halls of Congress or on the bench of the Supreme Court.

Nevertheless, any reform that can be made in administration or political machinery is not only good in itself, but clears the way for more radical reforms. Money *is* power,—power of all kinds; and in normal times it will exert its power in politics just as it exerts its power in the press, and even in the Church. But while the "money power" will always exert an influence upon elections in which it is interested, that power becomes the greater just as money is necessary for elections. When it requires a large expenditure for any candidate to be elected, or even to try the chances of election, it is only such as have money of their own, and are willing to thus spend it, or such as will make engagements with those who have money to spend, that can hope for election or really become candidates, and the popular choice is restricted to the rich or unscrupulous. And when a political party must raise large sums of money, it must turn to those who have money-interests in politics, and become to that extent their servant.

We have laws enough against bribery in elections; but laws against bribery are of the nature of the Pope's bull against the comet. Where some want to buy and others to sell, the bribery goes on all the same. Some of our States have endeav-

ored to prevent the illegitimate use of money in elections by other means. The Constitution of Pennsylvania, for instance, requires the officer-elect to swear that he has spent no money in his election, save for certain prescribed purposes; but the first instance of this requirement having any effect occurred in the last Legislature, when a senator from one of the interior counties confessed inability to take the oath, and his seat being declared vacant, he was reëlected by his constituents without any illegitimate use of money. Perhaps this, and the fact that proceedings have been commenced against an officer who did, as is averred, falsely take the oath, indicate a rising sentiment that may make this clause something more than a dead letter. But the prospect is hardly hopeful.

The fact is, that the illegitimate expenses of elections grow naturally out of the legitimate expenses. The habit of raising and using money for improper purposes begins in the raising and using of money for proper purposes. To prevent the one, it is necessary to do away with the other. There should be no necessary election expenses, either to the candidate or to those who support him. This is required by the theory of our government. In that theory office is not a prize to be struggled for, but a public service to which the citizens freely elect one of their number, and for which any citizen is free to propose another citizen, or to offer himself. Yet, in making it a costly thing to run for office, we not only effect a discrimination between rich and poor opposed to the genius of our institutions; we do worse—we discriminate against the scrupulous in favor of the unscrupulous. Here is the root of the spoils system: In our elections, which are the foundation of our whole governmental structure, we treat offices as things to be paid for.

To make poor and rich alike eligible to office, to prevent public plunderers having an advantage over honest men, to give voters freedom of choice, it is necessary to so order our elections that any citizen may run for office without expense.

Let me dwell for a moment on the point that elections must be inexpensive to give freedom of choice. What we call machine politics springs from the cost of elections. Parties are necessary and useful in popular government; but in political organizations, as in all other organizations, power tends to concentrate in the hands of those who make a business of their management,

and that in proportion as the details and machinery of organization become relatively important. Evils which thus arise can be held in check only by the independence of mere organization on the part of voters,—by the ease with which new organizations can be formed, and candidates can be run outside of regular organizations. Under present conditions, the expenses of election are so great, and organization so costly and important, that it is a very difficult thing to start a new party, and, except in very rare cases, a hopeless, as well as a very expensive, thing for an independent candidate to run. The two great existing party organizations may be compared to two railroad lines. Those who do not like the terms of the one must close with the terms of the other, or else accept an alternative as hopeless as building a railroad for themselves, or trying to walk. And as the competition between railroads only operates at terminal points, so, practically, does the competition between parties only operate as to the heads of tickets. It is only as to a few of their nominees that party managers need take public opinion into account; the fortunes of the rest, save in very rare instances, depend upon the fate of the head of the ticket. As the same general causes operate in both parties to put their practical control into the hands of the men who make of politics a business, the voter is, in most cases, confined to a choice between the nominee of a Republican machine and the nominee of a Democratic ring. And, too, the axiom that railroads will not long compete when they can combine, is as true of our political machines. Nothing is more common than to find the same combination running both political parties, and playing with the people a game of "heads, I win; tails, you lose." Thus freedom of choice is destroyed, and, under the forms of popular sovereignty, we are ruled as completely as though our institutions recognized a governing class.

To get rid of machine rule, we must adopt such measures as will lessen the importance of the political machines in elections by lessening the cost of elections. This must be sought in various ways, adapted to the necessities of the case or the abuses that have grown up. In addition to pointing out this as a direction which effort for the purification of our politics should take, I only wish to offer some general suggestions.

The legitimate election expenses of political parties, which make it necessary first to assess the candidates and then to

assess office-holders, and to levy or solicit contributions, are mainly the expenses of presenting the ticket to voters, and the printing and distribution of ballots. Under the first head fall the expenses of advertising, distributing documents, holding meetings; and in presidential elections, or strongly contested State elections, of banners, transparencies, uniformed clubs, and torch-light processions. Under the second come not merely the expense of printing very many more tickets than can by any possibility be used, and of mailing or sending them to voters, but of employing "workers" to stand at the polls to offer ballots and solicit voters. In some sections, where the payment of a poll-tax is a requisite to voting, it has become customary for the parties to pay poll-taxes; in others, it has become customary to send carriages, not only for sick voters, but for those at work.

To begin with what I conceive would be the greatest single reform. By adopting the Australian plan of voting, now for some years in successful operation in England, we could abolish at one stroke all the expenses of printing and distributing tickets, and all the expense and demoralization consequent on the employment of "workers," and very much lessen the importance of party nominations and party machinery. Under that plan the ballots are printed at public expense, and contain the names of all persons duly registered as candidates. When the voter approaches the poll he is handed one of these ballots. He enters a compartment, where a pencil or pen and ink are provided, and, concealed from observation, strikes off the names of those he does not wish to vote for, or, as in England, indicates by a mark those he prefers, and then folding up the ballot, presents it. Some objections may doubtless be urged against this plan, but they seem to me trivial as compared with the gains. The final date for the registration of candidates should be fixed at such a length of time before election as to secure opportunity for scrutiny, and the lists then advertised at public expense, as election proclamations are now advertised. To prevent the swelling of the lists by trivial nominations, either the number of indorsing voters required to secure registration might be made large, or a fee might be exacted; or, what would probably be still better, a deposit might be required, which, in case the candidate did not receive a certain number of votes, or reach a certain rank in the voting, should be retained for the public treasury, in other cases being

returned after the election.* Thousands of ballots would thus suffice, where now hundreds of thousands are printed. The power of nominating conventions would be reduced to the moral effort of their indorsement, since any candidate indorsed by the required number of citizens would be as well presented to each voter as the nominee of the strongest party convention. Thus the corruptions of primary politics, and the practice of selling votes in nominating conventions, would be destroyed, and the practice of blackmailing candidates by the so-called indorsements of political clubs whose only object is to make money, would also be destroyed. And not only would a large amount of money now required from political committees and from individual candidates be saved, but the practice of buying votes, and that of coercing voters by terror of discharge from employment, would be in large part, if not altogether, broken up by the difficulty of telling how a man voted. There could be no putting a ticket in a man's hand and keeping an eye on it until deposited. And thus, too, the paying of poll-taxes, where that unjust and undemocratic tax is retained, and the sending of carriages for voters, would become risky investments.

As for the banners, the torch-lights, and the marchings of uniformed clubs, which have become such a feature in our presidential elections, there would, I think, be little objection to their prohibition save on the part of manufacturers of "election goods." Each party resorts to them, mainly because the oppos ing party resorts to them; and a prohibition which would put all parties on the same level and save large expenditures would meet little opposition, and would be, I think, generally approved by public opinion. Pennsylvania has already prohibited torch-light processions within a certain time preceding election, and there is more to be said for absolute prohibition than the mere saving of cost. When a man puts on a uniform, or carries a torch in procession, his self-pride is enlisted in the success of the party, and all appeals to his reason are vain; and these glittering displays of partisanship are not merely disgraceful to a people whose government can only find stable foundations in the reason of the masses, but they are positively injurious.

It seems to me, moreover, that it would be good public policy, and a wise and fruitful expenditure of public money,

* One of the faults of our system that most need reform is the election of many officials who properly should be appointed.

to lessen the expenses of election campaigns by the provision of public halls for political meetings. Every town and city ought to have its public hall or halls, which, like Faneuil Hall in Boston, could be had, under proper restrictions, for any public meeting on the payment of the cost of lighting and cleaning. In the country districts the school-houses are frequently used for such purposes, and in the cities every grammar school might be provided with such a hall, which would have other good uses than for political meetings.

The practice of "treating" by candidates has, in many parts of the country, grown into an evil of formidable magnitude. The old custom of a personal house-to-house canvass has, in our cities, degenerated into a visiting of liquor saloons and "corner groceries." The candidate is expected to visit each groggery in his district, to present his card, and leave on the bar a ten or twenty-dollar bill, for which no change is given, while all the loungers about the place are called on to take a drink. In some places the custom is for him to pay for a keg of beer. So large in the aggregate are the amounts of money thus disbursed by candidates, that in many towns it is said that one-half of the saloons could not be kept open but for the elections. So strong is this custom that even avowed temperance men, when running for office, frequently feel themselves obliged to conciliate the bar-room influence. A very prominent member of a great temperance society was a while ago a candidate for office in Brooklyn. He, too, went the regular rounds. He did not enter the saloons, however. At each one he gave "the boys" who accompanied him a bill, and went around the corner while they left his card and "set up the drinks." At another election, in New York, the president of a national temperance society ran for Congress. He did not go around the corner while the drinks were set up for him by proxy. He ascertained about what each saloon-keeper in his district expected to make out of him, and sent him the money.

It might be worth while to consider how far prohibitory legislation would be useful in preventing this and similar customs by which candidates are bled. As a great deal of the money spent in elections is extorted from candidates rather than voluntarily spent by them, it might to some extent be useful as furnishing an excuse for refusing. But I am inclined to think that a change in the manner of voting, which would dispense with

the "worker" and the "ticket-peddler," and render it impossible to see how any man voted, would so destroy the influence of the groggery in politics as to do away with this species of blackmail, and as well with the many other forms of extortion practiced upon candidates.

No mere improvement of political machinery will suffice of itself to give us pure government; but it ought to be possible to so improve our methods that a citizen can run for office, and be elected to office, without spending a large sum or mortgaging his official acts. It ought to be possible to break up that system which tends to bar all but the unscrupulous rich, or the still more unscrupulous poor, and which demoralizes the people while it corrupts the government.

We need in public service the very highest character and the very best ability, and this need increases with social development. We can command them, if we make character and ability free to come forward and offer their services without derogation to manhood, and the people free to select them: for there is in the public service that which is attractive to the proper ambition strong in every unspoiled man. What most astonishes one who realizes how corrupt and corrupting is the mire of our practical politics, is the virtue and patriotism there yet is, despite it, in our public service.

That democratic government is with us becoming a failure, is clear; that we are driving toward oligarchy and Cæsarism in a new form, may be seen by whoever will look. But they are weak and foolish who say that democracy is therefore condemned, or that universal suffrage must be abandoned. Let us fairly try democracy before we condemn it; let us give universal suffrage opportunity before we vainly talk of curtailing it. Not only is it impossible to go back; but the dangers which menace us come merely from bad adjustments. When there is danger that his sails may be taken aback, the good seaman shifts his helm and trims his yards. He does not chop away his masts. Nor does the good surveyor condemn a stanch ship because she has been suffered to foul with barnacles.

HENRY GEORGE.

# THE SUBJUGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

THE Mississippi River Commission was created by Act of Congress, approved June 28, 1879. It consists of seven members, appointed by the President, of whom three are required to be from the Engineer Corps of the Army, one from the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and three from civil life, of whom two shall be civil engineers. It is provided in the act that the commission shall—

> Take into consideration and mature such plan or plans and estimates as will correct, permanently locate, and deepen the channel and protect the banks of the Mississippi River; improve and give safety and ease to the navigation thereof, prevent destructive floods, and promote and facilitate commerce, trade, and the postal service.

The commission was duly organized, and, after consideration of the subject, reported a plan of improvement, which has been adopted by Congress, and for the execution of which an appropriation of $1,000,000 was made by Act of March 3, 1881, and another of $4,123,000 by Act of August 2, 1882, all to be expended below Cairo. Under these appropriations the work is now in progress, its execution being in the hands of officers of the Engineer Corps detailed for that purpose by the Chief of Engineers. Its completion, according to the plans proposed, will require a number of years, and further large appropriations. There is, therefore, added to the interest which belongs to the subject as a great engineering problem, that which attaches to every object of public expenditure.

It is the purpose of this article to set forth briefly the general plan proposed by the commission, and the reasons upon which it rests. In order to a clear apprehension of the questions involved, a short description of the river in its unimproved condition will be useful.

At the city of Cairo, upon the southern extremity of the State of Illinois, are gathered together the waters of five great rivers, viz.: the Missouri, the Upper Mississippi, the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. Between that point and the Gulf of Mexico lies the Mississippi River proper, 1,097 miles in length as it flows. Its course is through an alluvial plain, six hundred miles long and from twenty-five to eighty miles wide. In this basin is embraced an area of 41,000 square miles, of which 32,000 square miles are liable to overflow. Borings made at eighty-three places between Cairo and Vicksburg show one hundred and thirty-one feet mean depth of alluvial soil. From Cairo to the mouth of the Red, the width of the river between banks varies from 1,900 to 13,800 feet, the mean being 4,400 feet. Below the Red the width rarely exceeds 3,500 feet, the mean being 3,350. Between Cairo and Memphis its least depth at low water is five feet; between Memphis and Red River, six feet; and between Red River and New Orleans, fifteen feet. The variation in its discharge is enormous, passing from 100,000 cubic feet per second at low water to 1,600,000 at the highest flood. The range between high and low water mark at Cairo is fifty-two feet; at Memphis, thirty-five feet; at Vicksburg, fifty-two feet; and at New Orleans, fourteen feet. In its greatest floods its water surface stretches from hill to hill, across the entire valley; at extreme low water, it flows between banks from thirty to forty feet high. The depth of its inundation bears no comparison with its area, being, on an average, less than three feet over the arable lands. In the swamps it is much more. Its flood elevation at Cairo is three hundred and twenty-two feet above the sea. Its fall from Cairo to Memphis is about six inches to the mile. Thence to the gulf its fall steadily diminishes, being about one and a half inches per mile at New Orleans. It is one of the muddiest rivers in the world. The greater portion of the sediment received by it at Cairo comes from the Missouri, but this supply is constantly reinforced by the caving of its own banks, which are washed into the river at an estimated rate of 5,000 acres per annum.

All plans for the improvement of the Mississippi that have been prominently discussed rest upon one of two theories: one, that the remedy for the evils existing consists, essentially, in the concentration of the water of the river and the equalization of its flow; the other, that it consists in the subdivision and

diffusion of its volume. The former theory is the one held by the commission and adopted by Congress, though the other has advocates, whose views continue to be urged in Congress and through the press.

There are numerous opportunities to let out of the channel of the Mississippi large portions of its water. The Atchafalaya, which receives its waters from the Red River, at a point only six miles distant from the junction of that river with the Mississippi, is there several feet lower than the Mississippi. At the present time the water of the Red rarely reaches the Mississippi at all, but, for the most part, flows down the Atchafalaya, augmented by a large outflow from the Mississippi. It is only when the Red is high and the Mississippi low, that there is any flow from the former to the latter. The difference of level between the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya increases as they descend, so that at Plaquemine the difference is twenty-two feet, and the distance between them eleven miles. On the east bank, at Bonnet Carré, the difference of level between the river and Lake Pontchartrain is twenty feet, and the distance between them five miles. At Lake Borgne the difference of level is fourteen feet and the distance six miles. So that it is quite possible to make outlets by which the flood-water, or, for that matter, all the water of the Mississippi, could find its way to the gulf by shorter lines and lower levels than those of the present river. And when men stand appalled at the sight of its devastating floods, the suggestion of quick relief by outlets seems at first sight so practicable and reasonable that it is not strange that it should find favor in many minds.

The reasons which lie against this theory require some thought for their clear apprehension, but rest, as is believed, on well ascertained laws.

The three most difficult factors in the problem are, the wide variation in the volume of the river's discharge, the quantity of solid matter transported by its current, and the softness of its banks. If any one of these three elements were absent, the questions presented would be comparatively simple.

To contain the river at its flood requires a great channel. Its banks are so friable that its constant tendency is to make itself room by tearing them down. When the flood subsides the material of which they were composed is found scattered over the broad channel in obstructing bars and shoals. Over and

among these the low-water river has to make its way by such tortuous and changing path as it can find or make for itself. It is then that navigation becomes difficult and dangerous. There is water enough in the river at its lowest stage to furnish ample depth for navigation, if it were confined in a channel of suitable width; and it would make and maintain such a channel for itself, if it were not for the interference of the floods.

The problem of the river's improvement comprehends, therefore, in its broadest sense, these two requisites—a high-water channel capacious enough to contain its floods, and a low-water channel narrow enough to afford the depth necessary for navigation. And the more nearly identical in location these can be made, the more permanent and perfect will be the improvement attained.

In the consideration of any plan for the accomplishment of these ends, it is to be remembered that there are very rigid limits to the possibilities of engineering methods applicable to the case. To build upon a foundation of bottomless alluvium any breakwater or training-wall of stone or timber, that shall withstand the floods that pour down from the north like an ocean let loose, is impossible. To dig and keep open a channel for a river that flings down in its own pathway a sand-bar a mile square as though it were a handful of ashes, is equally impossible. Hence, if at any point a deeper channel is needed, the river must be compelled to dig it; if a new bank is needed, the river must be coaxed to build it. Its own Titanic hands are the only instruments equal to either task.

If any one will set a tumblerful of the coffee-colored water of the Mississippi where it will remain undisturbed for twenty-four hours, he will find, at the end of that time, a teaspoonful of mud in the bottom of the tumbler, while the water will be comparatively clear. If he had kept the water in motion all the time he would have found it as turbid as when he took it from the river, and no deposit at the bottom. In this tiny experiment is illustrated the most important law of the Mississippi River's life, viz.: that the power of water to sustain and transport sediment depends upon its motion. The exact relation between the velocity of moving water and its silt-carrying power is not ascertained. It varies with the size and specific gravity of the particles. But enough is known to warrant the general statement that every diminution of the velocity of a running stream dimin-

ishes its silt-transporting capacity. It is not necessary, in order to produce this result, that there shall be a cessation of motion in the water; a diminution of its rate is sufficient.

The operation of this law is universal and invariable, on the largest scale and on the smallest. The miniature torrent that sweeps down the plowed furrow in a hill-side field scours its bed clean as long as it maintains its headlong velocity. But when it slackens its course at the foot of the slope, it throws down its load of sand and loam in an instant. The delta which forms at the mouth of every sediment-bearing river is the same phenomenon on a larger scale.

Upon the Mississippi River the traveler is never for a moment out of sight of visible evidence of the operation of this law. The following examples will be familiar to any one who has been upon it. In the outer curve of every bend, where the current is swift and strong, the channel is deep and clean. On the inner side of the return curve there is slack water and a bar. Wherever the channel is narrow and deep, there is a high velocity and no deposit of sediment. Where it is excessively broad and shallow, bars accumulate rapidly.

At a bank full stage the river has a rapid current and is heavily loaded with sediment. At the overflow stage the water escaping laterally over the banks is suddenly checked in its velocity, and immediately begins to drop its load, leaving a diminishing deposit as it recedes. To this layer the next flood adds another, each being thickest at the margin next the river, where the escaping water experiences the first diminution of its velocity. In this way the river builds up its own banks by overflow; and in consequence of this method of building them they are highest nearest the river, the receding declination sometimes reaching twelve feet in a mile, and being rarely less than five.

Following the course of great overflows through the forests adjacent to the river, the observer will find on the farther side of trees, logs, and other obstructions, sand reefs and areas of deposit marking every place where the advancing water was checked in its velocity.

It occasionally happens that the river cuts off a long bend by a short channel across its neck, leaving a horseshoe-shaped section of the old channel unused. At the open ends of this abandoned channel the water in it mingles with the current flowing past, and so has a gentle inward and outward flow as the

river rises and falls. The consequence is a deposit of sediment at the entrances of the abandoned channel, by which they are ultimately filled up and cut off entirely from the new channel, forming deep, clear, crescent-shaped lakes. There are many such lakes in the valley, some of them now several miles from the river. Such a cut-off occurred at a bend opposite Vicksburg in 1876, leaving the city upon one arm of the abandoned bend. The lower end of that arm is already filled up to the height of twenty-five feet above low water, and fifty feet above the old bottom, leaving the city's wharves and elevators a mile and a half inland at ordinary and low stages.

By shiftings of the channel, the formation of islands, and other causes, the subsidiary channels, called chutes, are formed in large number. If a swift current set through a chute, it enlarges; if a sluggish current flow through it, it fills with sediment. Sloughs and outlets leading out of the river into the swamps, in which the free flow of water is obstructed by willows, are often permanently closed in the same manner.

As the river elongates its bends by caving off the outer bank, there is commonly formed a sloping bar on the inner bank, which advances as the outer bank recedes. As fast as this bar rises above ordinary low water, it is covered by a growth of willows. At high stages, the water flowing over the bar is obstructed by this growth, and successive deposits of sediment are thus caused, which ultimately build the bar up to the full height of the adjacent banks. By this process the river shifts its channel, tearing down one bank and building up the other as it goes.

Some of the methods of channel improvement now in use have been copied from the processes of nature just described. When it is sought to narrow an excessively wide channel, permeable screens, made of piles and interwoven brush or poles, are set on the bar where it is desired to form new banks, at intervals of a thousand feet or less. The water, in flowing through these screens, loses so much of its velocity that it drops its sediment very rapidly after passing them. The effect produced by such structures is sometimes quite remarkable. In favorable localities a fill of forty feet in depth has resulted in a single season. At Horsetail Bar, below St. Louis, may be seen an area of more than a thousand acres of land, which has been built up from the river-bed to an average depth of twenty-five feet by the means

just described. A mere line of piles, eight feet apart, will often produce a heavy deposit below them.

These numerous examples have been cited in order to illustrate and enforce the proposition stated at the outset: that the greatest law of the river's life is that it shall be forever laden with a burden which slips from its grasp the instant it loiters by the way. The whole valley is itself the result and the proof of the existence and the operation of this law. There is not a shovelful of earth in all its square miles that has not been dissolved in water, and carried by water to the point where its journey ended, for want of velocity to carry it farther. Every grain of sand, every drop of water, every inch of movement, every low stage, every high stage, every flood, is equally obedient to the same great law. The engineer who has learned its meaning well has taken the first step toward a successful solution of the problem of the river's improvement. He who ignores or defies it puts himself in the pathway of forces as irresistible in their operation as the march of a glacier.

This brings us to the practical question. Here are so many cubic miles of water per annum to be conducted to the sea. It is desired to do it in such manner as to afford the best possible low-water navigation, and the least possible high-water inundation. Shall it be confined in its course to one channel, or shall it be subdivided or allowed to subdivide itself into several?

The excavation of a river-channel is work. The transportation of sediment is work. The accomplishment of either involves the expenditure of energy. So that it is but another statement of the same question to say: How will a given quantity of water perform most work—in one concentrated volume, or in subdivisions?

To this inquiry the experience of every person furnishes a ready and true answer. A gentle rain, falling on the earth's surface, leaves its lightest vegetable mold undisturbed. The same quantity of water, descending in a waterspout, tears away its solid hills. The water which trickles over a field through thousands of infinitesimal and broken channels, without producing the least abrasion of its surface, would, if concentrated in one volume on the same surface, plow it deep and wide. There is nothing else in nature of which it is so literally and familiarly true that "in union there is strength," as of

water. Subdivided finely enough, it is the morning mist; concentrated largely enough, it is nature's master mechanic, the continent-builder of the world.

Taking its whole life together, there is, in the phenomena of the Mississippi River, as elsewhere, a perfect correlation of forces. It does all the work it can all the time. It excavates its bed as deep and wide as it can. It carries out of its channel as much of the sediment mixed with its water as it can. When it drops from its broad shoulders a hundred thousand cubic yards of sand on one bar, as it often does, it is because it can carry it no farther. It never drops a spoonful except for the same reason.

All the conditions of the river are the result of its own forces. It has no antecedent banks, bars, width or depth; all these are its own creation. It made yesterday the things that make it to-day; it is making to-day the things that will make it to-morrow. Its present inadequacy to meet the wants of men is the result of its inadequate work in the past. It overflows its banks because its channel is not capacious enough to contain its flood. To make its channel more capacious requires more work. At low water it stumbles over bars which it lacks strength to displace. To remove them requires more work. It makes its shoal places shoaler by the deposit of sediment which it wants energy to carry farther. More work would do it. So that if the river of the future is to subserve the interests of mankind better than the river of the present, the river of to-day must be induced to do more and better work. This is to be accomplished by the conservation, concentration, and wise direction of all its energies. That this means the conservation, concentration, and wise direction of its *volume* seems too obvious to need repetition.

Depletion, or subdivision, is a step in exactly the wrong direction. It is a change toward weakness; not toward strength. An outlet may serve to lower a flood for the time being, but the result is a temporary advantage gained at enormous future cost. The diminution of volume produced by the outlet means diminution of energy. It means a smaller, weaker river from that point to the sea. And that means a river less able to remove bars, less able to excavate a channel, less able to carry sediment, less able to contain a flood.

It is in the nature of things that each portion of the river shall, in its turn, bear the burden of the complications above it. The bars that obstruct it came down from above. The sediment that loads its water came down from above. Hence, there is the clearest necessity that it should, as in the order of nature it does, augment its strength as it descends. An outlet reverses this order of nature and of reason. It diminishes the energy of the river below, without lightening, in any like degree, the burdens cast upon it by the river above.

It is not possible, without accurate and expensive observations and measurements, to trace all the injurious effects of an outlet upon the river below. But enough is visible to common observation to show the unvarying operation of the laws stated. At its mouth the Mississippi has tried the outlet system of its own accord, by subdividing into four distinct channels. From New Orleans down to the widening of the channel, preparatory to its subdivision, it has nowhere less than a hundred feet of depth. In its four subordinate channels the depth rarely exceeds fifty feet; and at the mouths of all, except the one improved by the jetties, it is about sixteen feet. Suppose the same subdivision had taken place two or three hundred miles higher up, would not like results have followed in the channels below?

Outlets in the form of great crevasses have frequently occurred. They are always followed by increased deposits in the bed below them.

Channels conveying unfiltered Mississippi water invariably contract their dimensions to the smallest space that will contain the water flowing through them. The law governing chutes has been stated already;—a swift current keeps them open; a sluggish current fills them up with sediment. When an island appears in the center of the river, it is rare that a good channel is maintained on each side of it. Something will occur to disturb the equilibrium between them: one will begin to rob the other of water: whereupon the other will begin to fill with sediment,—a process which increases in rapidity as the disproportion of flow grows greater.

At the mouth of the Red River is a remarkable illustration of the same law. The Red formerly entered the Mississippi at the apex of a bend. In 1831 the bend was cut off. For a time the Red used the upper arm of the bend as its channel, during which time it rapidly contracted to the dimensions suitable for the

conveyance of the water of the Red River alone; while the lower arm of the bend closed up entirely. Afterward the Red abandoned the upper arm of the bend, and cut a channel just large enough for its own flow through the lower one; whereupon the upper one filled up. Later, the enlargement of the lower Atchafalaya, whose head is in the apex of the old Mississippi bend, near the original mouth of the Red, produced an active outflow from the Mississippi, which has been already described, and, in consequence, the channel is now enlarging. So that, in the space of six miles, between the Mississippi and the head of the Atchafalaya, there have been, within fifty years past, first, a Mississippi channel 3,500 feet wide, and probably sixty feet deep; then a dry bar; then a Red River channel three hundred feet wide and ten feet deep; and now a rapidly growing outlet.

The use of the word "unfiltered" in the general statement above is material, and marks an important distinction. The statement is not true of a channel conveying clear water. The Yazoo River is one of this class. There was formerly, at Yazoo Pass, nearly opposite Helena, an outlet which diverted a large volume of water from the Mississippi into the Yazoo, which that river returned to the Mississippi at Vicksburg. By this means the channel of the Yazoo was excavated deep and wide. The pass was closed a number of years ago. Since then the chief water-supply of the Yazoo has come from the swamp-drains, which discharge clear water, and from Mississippi overflows, which are thoroughly filtered by the woods and swamps through which they travel before reaching it. So that we have to-day in the Yazoo a clear water stream, flowing with slow velocity through a capacious channel which does not perceptibly decrease in size. No such result ever occurs in the case of water charged with sediment.

Nature has made the channel of the Mississippi of increased capacity for discharge as it descends. The permanent diversion of a substantial portion of its water by outlets will reverse that order, and shrink the channel below them to the size required by the diminished river. This shrinkage will take place first by decrease of depth, as the depositing sediment falls to the bottom, and thus the interests of navigation will be the first to suffer. But the mischief will not stop there. When the river and the outlets shall have adjusted themselves to the new conditions created they will, all together, be less able to discharge a great flood than the unimpaired river was alone; and there

will be no place for it to find vent except over the shallow rim of the shrunken channel.

It is not within the purpose of this article to describe in detail the methods by which it is proposed to execute the general plan of improvement recommended by the Mississippi River Commission. Suffice it to say that the retention of the river's water in one undivided volume is the cardinal principle of the plan; and that it is proposed to seek this end by such means as will introduce the fewest artificial conditions into the river's life, and apply most economically and effectually its own forces to the work of improving its own channel. These consist chiefly in the closing of chutes and outlets; the contraction of the channel in places where it is excessively wide, by the creation of new banks from deposited sediment; and the revetment of banks where caving is exceptionally rapid and injurious.

ROBERT S. TAYLOR.

# GLADSTONE.

On the thirteenth of December, 1882, the English press announced the re-organization of the ministry. That day was the anniversary of the Prime Minister's first election to Parliament fifty years before. The new ministry is of historic, and even picturesque, interest. Every party and every cause which had struggled for existence and success through the forms of the British constitution is, in its final evolution, incorporated in this, the strongest ministry known to English history. In it the old Whig lion grown tame, and the Radical lamb grown bold, lie down together. The crowning of his edifice will appear to Mr. Gladstone in the acceptance of a place in his cabinet by the Earl of Derby. He would not be so cruel as to wish that the late Earl should have lived to see his son and heir, consecrated to the Toryism he led like a Rupert, bringing the social and political traditions of Liverpool nobility to swell the triumph of a Liverpool merchant's son; but he might be pardoned a passing sigh that Lord Beaconsfield has not lived to see this hour. When, at the victorious close of the Egyptian conflict, the Prime Minister appeared at the Lord Mayor's banquet, M. John Lemoinne said in the "Débats": "Who could have ever foreseen that the man named Gladstone, the glorious hero of letters, science, philosophy, and theology, the standard-bearer of peace, light, and civilization, would enter the city of London crowned with laurels, in a car of victory, and followed, like the Roman consuls, by slaves and captives from Africa and Asia." But Gladstone, entering the House of Commons at the head of his new ministry, is attended by more surprising symbols than these. The Stanley in his train is a sign that the ancient war between Whig and Tory is past, like the War of the Roses, however noisily their ghosts may fight on over their sepulchres. The great Qu[illegible] ommoner sitting apart, and the

glitter of military decorations, mean that jingoism is transferring its acclamations from the party that purchased the Suez Canal to that which occupied Egypt by force of arms; while, on the other hand, the dusky captives of the train, attesting that "British interests" and "British honor" are safe under the rule of the middle-class Premier, appear so happy and comfortable,—Cetewayo on his throne, and Arabi posturing as "the Blest" amid palms waving in the spicy breezes of Ceylon,—that the Peace Society, and the Aborigines Protection Society, and even the Egyptian Committee, are also visible with their broad-brimmed hats and white neck-ties, touching elbows with warriors in this amazing triumphal procession.

These symbols and signs of greatness a little while ago surrounded Lord Beaconsfield; but they merely made him a tableau-figure, as if at the end of one of his own gorgeous romances. His career was a brilliant romance, but it had to end in an anti-climax. But Gladstone is contemporary history. Fifteen years ago, when Robert Lowe pointed to him and said that the hour and the man had arrived, Disraeli exclaimed, "I believe the clock goes wrong and the man is mistaken." But Lord Beaconsfield lived to discover that it was Disraeli who was then mistaken. In the jubilee year of his parliamentary career, Mr. Gladstone must be regarded as, in some sense, the political incarnation of the English people. That the realities he represents should now invest themselves with the symbols and shows of power, is mainly interesting as an indication of the extent to which he holds the heart and mind of the nation in his hand. These splendors and emblems are offered at the feet of the man who personally cares least about them. As the oriental world invested Buddha with the legends and glories of their deities, whose existence he had denied, so is this plain prosaic Englishman worshiped with relics of the idols he has shattered. In saying "worshiped," we may weigh the word and will retain it. Not long ago the writer of this happened to be conversing with a Liberal member of Parliament, and criticised some part of Gladstone's Irish policy. The honorable member looked cautiously around to be sure that others were not listening, then drew his chair closer, and in a lowered tone said, "Between you and me, Gladstone is carrying us to the"—but, no matter where it was, the precautions taken to secure the confidential character of the opinion proved the vani[illegible] During the two sessions

of 1882 it was as much as many a member's parliamentary life was worth to vote against any measure introduced by the Government. The worship of the country for Mr. Gladstone could not be gathered from London. The metropolis has many virtues, but "republican simplicity" is not salient among them; in fact, it must be admitted that a large amount of snobbery surrounds the great center of wealth and titled magnificence, and it has never been satisfied with the leaden casket in which the mace has been concealed during the Gladstone *régime*. A queen in chronic mourning was somber enough without the counterpart of a premier without wealth or state, whose chief delight seemed to be cutting trees on his farm in the intervals of laying low lords at Westminster. Through a curious combination of circumstances, the liberal *salon* has been a conspicuous desideratum in recent years, the relations of the ministry to "society" being chiefly represented by two American ladies, whose husbands belong to the cabinet. The contrast between Mr. Gladstone's private residence and that of an average alderman, between the Lord Mayor in his coach and the Premier in his cab, is striking, and London prefers the gold and silver caskets. Nevertheless, even London has shown signs of surrender since the military parades began. As for the rest of the country, to return to that, its enthusiasm for this man is extraordinary. During the sessions of 1882, the tables of Liberal members groaned under the piles of letters entreating, persuading, or still oftener commanding them to stick by Gladstone through thick and thin, and vote with him whatever he might do. When the expedition to Egypt was resolved on, nothing could be more opposed to the non-interventionist and peaceful policy which Gladstone had so zealously fostered; but the Liberal and Nonconformist press of the country, with few exceptions, naïvely declared that, odious as such a scheme would have been under another prime minister, they must conclude that Gladstone would not undertake it unless it was right, and must trust him though he slay them. Even when Alexandria was bombarded, under pretext of protecting a canal not threatened, a hundred miles away, and John Bright left the ministry, the veteran orator formed no cave of Adullam. The country attributed his retirement to Quaker peculiarities, and Gladstone's shadow remained potent enough to keep silent that voice which never before failed in eloquent denun[illegible] of a war he deemed unjust.

There have even been some indications that Gladstone-worship exists in the United States. Several American papers have caught the English enthusiasm, and one Boston paper mentions the loss of a subscriber by having admitted into its columns a criticism on Gladstone. Finally, if anything were needed further to show the intensity of this feeling, it might be found in the corresponding intensity of hatred felt for him by Conservative partisans. The "Saturday Review" recently used the heading, "A New Age of Faith," for an article on the implicit faith of Liberals in Mr. Gladstone, and the religious phrases used above on the same subject cannot be thought extravagant or merely metaphorical by any one who has lived in the political atmosphere of England during the last two years. Indeed, this ardor of enthusiasm bears indications rather of faith in Mr. Gladstone than of personal liking for him. It is even doubtful if he could yet be accurately called a popular man,—he is certainly not loved by his chief supporters in Parliament,—while his political strength in the country is unprecedented.

The reasons for this enthusiasm for a man who, less than eight years ago, had so lost his hold on the country and his party that he resigned his office and leadership, are not remote. Mr. Gladstone was returned to power on a wave of moral and religious feeling. The menaces of the Beaconsfield government toward Russia were largely theatrical, but they became dangerous, and their effect was made to recoil on the threateners by Gladstone. The Premier's "want of humor" is proverbial in Conservative circles, and they had good cause to deplore it when he was going through the country with the vehemence and burden of a prophet. While the old Russophobia to which Lord Beaconsfield appealed was found to be antiquated, the cynical disregard of alleged "Turkish atrocities" by Tory speakers shocked the moral sense of the nation. There was also a good deal of religious feeling awakened by tidings of the massacre of Christians by Mohammedans, and for once Lord Beaconsfield's Jewish soul betrayed his Christian tact. Although Mr. Gladstone did not directly appeal to religious animosities, they who listened to his impassioned arraignment of Turks and Tories were never suffered to forget that Bulgarians and Russians were their fellow-Christians. To the moral and religious sentiments thus excited was added the strength of the commercial interest, the first article in whose creed is "peace at [illegible]." Yet, when Mr. Gladstone

again took his place as Prime Minister, in 1880, he was, with all this support, by no means the idolized leader of the nation that he is to-day. This is due to the internal crisis of the nation with which he has had to deal, to the fact that he was the one possible pilot of the tempest-tossed ship, and that he sleeplessly watched and worked at his perilous post, night and day, through the long storm.

The latest Irish revolution has been peculiar in several respects, but of these one was especially alarming, namely, the degree to which parliamentary government in England was involved. The argument for a parliament in Dublin was so strongly enforced by the violence of its probable elements when imported to London, that for a time the business of the House was interrupted, and the legislative arm seemed threatened with paralysis. This grave danger, accompanied by murderous deeds in Ireland and menaces in London, gradually assumed such dimensions that the English people recognized that they were amid a revolution of the deep and deadly kind. As is inevitable under such circumstances, there was something like a panic in the country, and criticism of Mr. Gladstone had an appearance of disloyalty. They who complained that his measures for the pacification of Ireland embodied principles inimical to the rights of property, or that his rules for "closure" in parliamentary debate threatened freedom of discussion, appeared to the people generally like the passenger on an endangered ship who should annoy the captain with his apprehensions for the fate of a spar or a wine-cask. The criticisms were based upon undeniable facts, and consequently could only be answered by outbursts of loyalty on the part of the patriotic multitude. As amid these cheers the septuagenarian statesman was seen toiling like a Hercules, bent but unbroken beneath his burden like an Atlas, framing measures which involved complete mastery of financial and legal questions, and of all details in administration; as, night after night, he stood calm amid the uproar, patient under complaints and sneers, and forcing down opposition by a knowledge of the facts which none could equal, stated with an eloquence that none could surpass, the cheers for Gladstone made way for more reverent tones. His seventy-second birthday (December 29th) found him on that eminence which military heroes have sometimes reached, but rarely statesmen, where men are regarded as the saviours of their country. Whether the

country is really saved or not is another question; that Mr. Gladstone is doing all he can to save it, and that he will save it in the end, and bring lasting peace and prosperity to Ireland, is the faith of the large majority of the English people. If the dreary and tragical history of the Irish trouble ever becomes a memory of the past, it will not seem wonderful that the country should to-day regard it with somewhat the same heaviness of painful foreboding, verging upon despair, that patriotic Americans felt regarding slavery, and that they should see in Gladstone, as Unionists saw in Lincoln, the fiery pillar of a great hope leading across a weary wilderness to a land of repose and prosperity. One thing is certain: that Mr. Gladstone has wearied out opposition to his Irish policy. Whatever virtue may or may not be in it, it will be fully and fairly tried. The speech made at Manchester, on the evening of the "Gladstone Jubilee," by Lord Derby, in which he formally gave in his adhesion to the Liberal party, indicates the determination of the landed interest in England, so far as it is not partisan, to accept the risks and sacrifices necessary to insure a fair trial of the land act.

The special circumstances just mentioned sufficiently explain the accession of enthusiastic support to Mr. Gladstone in the last two years; but that he should be the one man in England to whom anybody would dream of confiding the country in such a crisis, is a more important and interesting subject for political study. "The way of fortune," says Bacon, "is like the milky way in the sky, which is a meeting or knot of a number of small stars, not seen asunder, but giving light together; so are there a number of little and scarce discerned virtues, or rather faculties and customs, that make men fortunate." It is common to hear Englishmen say, "Gladstone is the luckiest man that ever lived." But there is no luck about it. The "virtues, faculties, and customs" of the English people have flowered in the success of this most English of living men. Their favorite faults are in him. That love of large principles, and dislike of pressing them to logical conclusions; that suspicion of applying large inductions to practical politics, which led John Stuart Mill to the belief that it would be almost fatal to a cause in England to prove itself entirely reasonable and just, find many illustrations in the career of Mr. Gladstone. The complex character of the British Constitution, the unique mixture of ideals and survivals in its institutions, have deter-

mined the evolution of this statesman, who pauses while writing High Church tracts to abolish the Irish Church, who denounces Strauss and makes a pilgrimage to Darwin, who uses the royal prerogative to popularize the army, and whose democracy is dressed in a chasuble. Men of equal culture and ability with Mr. Gladstone there are in England, but they are apt to perceive the anomalies of their country; they have misgivings, they take sides; they tolerate the other side, but critically, and if they defend its practical rights, it is without heart. But none of these misgivings divide the strength of Mr. Gladstone. His proverbial lack of humor is the other side of his unconscious ingenuity in harmonizing inconsisten
become an instinct. Plato says all clear ide
Gladstone's wonderful facility of clear stateme
make a contradiction seem simplicity itself, a
every detail appears a generalization. One of
reported as saying: "I hate Gladstone, beca
confoundedly in the right." There never wa
who so overshadowed his colleagues, and the
that he has been the unconscious means of
opment of some of them into statesmen, b
forth all his projects, large and small, as
and on moral heights where he alone ca
them. Even his financial statements in t
times been made so solemnly that it appea
to criticise them. However unpleasant all
or rival politicians around him, it makes
the country. In an age of skepticism
doubts; in an age of vacillation, he
vacillate. Whatever is in him is orga
religious elevation, and the people
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whom his father was one, and
emancipation of the slaves; and
Chancellor of the Exchequer, he
had made the Southern States a

has been abolished by England and America without the aid of this most historical of statesmen. He began his career as a Tory,—his first encounter with Disraeli being when the latter was on his way from the Liberal camp to take the vacated place,—and he resigned his place in the Peel Ministry (1845) because of a bill introduced by the Government to endow a Roman Catholic college in Ireland, which bill he immediately supported. He arraigned the Government of Naples before the world; he invited Garibaldi to be the guest of England, then showed him the door when he found that the honors paid to his guest displeased his old friend Napoleon III., with whom he had
ial constable in London at the time of the Chartist
In these last years he made the ears of England
ingle with his eloquent invective against the
by Moslems on Bulgarian Christians, but all
Jews in Russia could not extort a protest from
the anomalies of Mr. Gladstone's career would
too long. The last of them is his course with
or member for Northampton, so long excluded
he House, after repeated elections, because of
ligious subjects. Mr. Bradlaugh, misled by
-officers among others, believed he had the
ween taking the oath or making an affirma-
at, and chose the latter. The courts decided
y oath was not included in the act allowing
urts, and Mr. Bradlaugh then offered to
Mr. Gladstone defended his right to do
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Gladstone sat still on the treasury
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ed entirely by the inaction of the
and who had previously declared
be supposed that a minister who
the oath the words "on the true

faith of a Christian," in order that Jews might be admitted to Parliament, had any technical objection to the method by which alone the House had decided that an atheist could be admitted.

In all these changes and apparent inconsistencies a notable thing has been the absence of any effort to explain them. Mr. Gladstone sitting on the treasury bench, and shaking his head without opening his lips, amid the clamors of his friends for a certain act, is typical in its way. It belongs to that species of inconsistency which is a jewel of the English soul. Whatever general principles may be laid down about religious liberty and the right of private judgment, there are unwritten reservations in them. If the statesman who once declared that the King of Naples had raised atheism into a system of government had been the means of introducing an atheist into the legislature, the non-conformist and the evangelical pulpits of the land would have fulminated to such an extent that his tenure of office would have been endangered at a critical moment. His relations with the Queen—who still hesitates to transfer the Garter of her deceased favorite, Lord Beaconsfield, to the only man who has any right to it—could hardly have been rendered more pleasant by a move which would have befriended the radical who has sharply attacked the House of Brunswick. Mr. Gladstone is much stronger now than he was then, but when he gave out his *non possumus*, with that silent shake of the head, he represented the exact sentiment of the country, which was neither willing to limit religious liberty nor to admit Mr. Bradlaugh.

Dick Whittington is a municipal ideal, but not national. Prime ministers do not rise from the proletariat. Gladstone's father was a merchant, but he was also a baronet, and his fourth son, whom the English call "the grand old man," is by no means indifferent to the aristocratic side of his country. Personally, indeed, he has not sought title; in fact, he might easily have been a peer long ago had he been willing to give up his leadership in the Commons for it. But a title still represents a bit of the history and constitution of England to him, and he has repeatedly shown deference to it. On one occasion, when a late duke petitioned for a divorce, Gladstone was summoned as a witness, and, in reply to a question as to whether he was an intimate friend of the duke, replied, "As intimate as the difference in our positions permits." A smile went round the court-

room, the Prime Minister being far above the duke in every respect, and the reply was deemed rather snobbish. Perhaps it may have been so in a sense, but it meant mainly a bow to British institutions. Another such bow was lately seen in the Sunday labor which church-goers saw bestowed on the decorations prepared for the reception of the Queen next day at the new law courts, and which workingmen contrasted with the bars maintained by the Government at the doors of the British Museum and National Gallery on the same day. The commandments must accommodate themselves to British royalty, not because it is royal, but because it is British. The people do not believe in equality, and therefore their "grand old man" does not. They do believe in democracy, and so therefore does he. Mr. Gladstone is never found espousing the cause of a minority. A principle is invisible to him until it has the support of the country; then he will discover one, even where it is invisible to all other eyes.

Thus, after fifty storm-and-stress years of parliamentary life, Gladstone remains an Englishman. As the "Pinafore" chorus says:

> "Despite of all temptations
> To belong to other nations,
> He remains an Englishman."

In this case the other nations would be the new England represented by the Dissenters, the Rome of Ritualists, Norman caste, European culture, and continental skepticism. With most of these Mr. Gladstone has coquetted, or formed friendly relations, but he has never given himself to them. On the contrary, he has far more brought them over to the Right Centre, of which he is the embodiment. It could only have been a personal force that had the weight of this little English planet pulling with it, which was able to put John Bright into court dress, and even for a time into war-paint. Sir Charles Dilke, and Fawcett, coming under the same attraction, forget the radical wild oats they used to sow, and Chamberlain brings Americanized Birmingham, with its caucus, to be made into the bulwark of a new sacerdotal liberalism. Ritualism is rather irreconcilable toward the man who once accompanied its devotees to the very door of Romanism, but Dissent receives his patronage with ecstasies. By disestablishing the Irish Church, though bishops cried "sacrilege!" Mr. Gladstone sanctioned the principle that a state church

is the creature of a majority; the dissenters have only to roll up a majority against the English Church, and that would have to go too. They will never be able to do it. When the Church of England is disestablished it will not be in favor of non-conformism, but more probably in favor of something which it hates more than the Church. However, the reduction of the Church in Ireland to the condition of a sect, and the secularization of its endowments, were in harmony with the non
gramme in the rest of the kingdom, and it
Gladstone's hold on the dissenting sentiment
remembered that, whatever objections the se
lords spiritual, they generally have as decide
lords temporal as other Englishmen have.
country is not in the direction of abolishing
seeing them all falling into file under the hea
and non-titled commoner. This ideal is fair
jubilee ministry just announced, in which Gla
twenty titled servants in his political livery;
hand, the aristocratic bosom swells with prid
out of the fourteen seats in the new cabin
members of their order. It must be confesse
Gladstone has not always held his head ere
rated shoulders of his government. The
Frederick Cavendish to be Lord Lieuten
hardly explicable by any other theory tha
ing esteem for the one nobleman of his fa

Whether any personal feeling mingle
ister's practical reply to the murders i
or whether under the blow he merely
rough plane of English pluck, in eith
was lost. Ninety-nine hundredths of
recoiling from that horror, held out
and the Government struck it with
ment. Even Lady Cavendish had s
in many minds that the blood of t
gone to Ireland as a messenger of
atonement, which would be the b
reavement. But the moral sense
only to be humiliated, and the ob
prevent reconciliation, was rend
answer of the Government. An

in Dublin, representing Mr. Gladstone handcuffing Ireland at the moment when a masked figure is stabbing her in the back

This kind of resentment, however, is by no means characteristic of Mr. Gladstone. On the contrary, he has often shown himself—as in the withdrawal from the conflict with the Boers, and the restoration of Cetewayo—able to do what he considered right in the face of taunts about "yielding to pressure," "want of courage," and the like. There were sneers enough of that leased the Irish "suspects" from prison. That statesmanship of a very high order has been in the case of Arabi. A very severe pressure ear upon Mr. Gladstone to induce him to make he most scholarly of Egyptians, a scapegoat the land of bond-holders. This pressure was ame of "British honor," but beneath it was that England should alienate Egyptian popu- the Tory desire that the Premier should sentiment of his own countrymen. The par- his residence in Ceylon amounts to that— intment to his enemies, and greatly strength- t prepared the way for the general adoption ive moral justification of the invasion of t the Government didn't mean it, but was threat into an act by the rash boldness n France withdrew from the demonstra- f Arabi is now an English mortgage on rabi is indebted to English advocacy and ife, and no one will be surprised if, in London, and return to Egypt as the ion which conquered him.

s has just voted a considerable sum ne. That will be the first visible n the classic land. It will be set up out Homer, and his restoration of al German or English specialist in who knows least about Homer, dstone." If an ethnologist, or a ked who knows least about the probably make a similar reply. ry Greece of Mr. Gladstone is eric ideas antiquated, his enthu-

siasm for Hellenism Byronic. But this conventionalism he has made a political fact, and a factor of European state-craft; so that Greece properly raises a statue to its modern creator. The incident is significant of Mr. Gladstone's relations to the Greece and Rome, and the Palestine also, which exist at his own doors. He does not know what it is to doubt. Lord Beaconsfield, born on St. Thomas's Day, stood between Judaism and Christianity, between the past and the future, as if all the solstitial spirits had hovered over that day of his nativity, the shortest day of the year, which it terminated in the pre-Christian calendar. He said, "The impossible always comes to pass." But Mr. Gladstone has never looked beyond what has come to pass, and never halts before a s tive future. His powers are concentrated upon the sur before him. Others may look beneath the facts; he wil e the most of them just as they appear. Etymologically me is from the Scottish "glead-stane," meaning "hawk and it has a quaint coincidence with his beak-like n far-reaching eye, and a sort of predatory expression i eneral look; but the hawk might be still more fitly his s an orator. He hovers for a little, softly poises, the os down on his point, or upon his antagonist, and ma feathers fly. This force, as of a winged thunderbolt, is irable when one sees it pouncing upon somebody else's with which one happens to have little or no sympat it becomes formidable when it is found hovering nea own brood. Outside of politics, Mr. Gladstone takes the nventional view that he does of Homer and Greece, the same formidable power to make it out the rig against all competitors. Whether it be religion, churc ure, philosophy, or smaller things like Trojan reliques rical vestments,—for he aspires to play many parts,— gs to the treatment of each question an unquestioning , a moral earnestness, and a solemn ingenuity, which ca veight of authority equally to things about which he now and things about which he does not know. To tist, th philosopher, the scientist, to every progressive igator non-political subjects, Mr. Gladstone is a chief of Philistin An advocate without wig, a clergyman without g , and a character that still more disarms suspicion, this ost un scious of casuists has consecrated more commo aces

the rhetoric of liberalism than any Englishman living. Emerson, speaking of eloquence, said there is an acceptable statement possible for every man of that proposition he is most unwilling to believe; but here is an eloquence which can invest with the dignity of high philosophy that which every man is most anxious to believe.

Whatever influence this superficial universality of Mr. Gladstone may exert on the higher culture of his country, there can be no doubt that it is characteristic of his profound organic relation to the people he represents. He is the President of England, and nothing English is foreign to him. He is not a factitious president,—no king in frock-coat whose greatness is put on at one election and taken off at another. He is a president, not by popular election, but by long national evolution; his only halo the luster of his services; his authority is the precise weight of his character and ability. I had nearly written genius, and, but for Carlyle's definition of genius as an infinite capacity for taking pains, one can hardly deny it to Mr. Gladstone. Although must be denied him, and it must be admitted that his capacity for work rather than taking pains, he is all the more the phenomenal political figure of Europe. What the natural development of constitutional monarchy must inevitably be was foreshadowed by the Laureate when he spoke of England as the "crowned republic"; but it has come very near realization under the administration of a prime minister who has given jewels to the crown that shine through its somber veil like stars. A war with America averted, a serious difficulty with the United States settled by arbitration, the Irish Church abolished, the equal rights of married women entirely secured, the ballot, the laws revised, the courts reorganized in a grand edifice removed from the shadows of Westminster, and an admirable system of national education,—these are eminently the achievements of a British president who, for over fifty years, had no dignity to win, his ambition could aspire higher than the services he could render his country.

MONCURE D. CONWAY.

# RAILWAY INFLUENCE IN THE LAND OFFICE.

In the early days of the anti-slavery struggle, Harriet Martineau predicted its speedy triumph, and that "other sorts of freedom besides emancipation from slavery would come with it." She believed "that with every black slave a white would also be freed," and that "the aristocratic spirit, in all its manifestations, would be purged out of the community." These inspiring prophecies have not been fulfilled. Slavery, indeed, has been abolished, at least so far as legislation could take away the power of the master; but the freedmen have not yet been emancipated from the thralldom imposed by property and intelligence upon the helplessness of poverty and ignorance. The spirit of aristocracy has not been "purged out of the community" in either section of the Union, but has simply taken refuge in other forms, and is still putting forth the full measure of its evil power. While the chattel slavery of the Southern negro is at an end, the animating principle of the old slave-masters still finds manifold expression. It reveals itself in industrial servitude, which borrows its life from the alliance of concentrated capital with labor-saving machinery. Its maxim is, that the chief end of government is the protection of property, which is easily translated into the kindred maxim, that capital should own labor. Its tap-root is pure cupidity, and, if left to itself, it degenerates into a system of organized rapacity, with conscience and humanity turned adrift. Commercial feudalism is another form of aristocratic rule. It wields its power through the machinery of great corporations, which are practically endowed with life-offices and the right of hereditary succession. They control the makers and expounders of our laws, and are steadily advancing along their chosen line of march toward absolute supremacy. The system of agricultural serfdom, which we call land monopoly, is not less hostile to the life of free insti-

tutions. It has recently added to its triumphs in the purchase by foreign monopolists of millions of acres of land, which should long since have been devoted by law to actual settlement and tillage; while its power is constantly on the increase through the multiplication of great estates. When we add to these fearful forms of slavery the startling debasement of our politics through the corrupt use of money, which thus foreshadows the political serfdom of the people, we cannot fail to see that the realization of Miss Martineau's dream of a democratic millennium must be postponed to some indefinite time in the distant future, and that it can only become possible by the ceaseless vigilance of the people.

These general observations will serve as an introduction to the special subject of this paper, namely, The power of our great railway corporations over the government which created them and prodigally endowed them with its lands. The policy of stimulating the construction of railways by grants of the public domain had its beginning in 1850, in the grant then made in aid of the Illinois Central Railway. The act gave "every alternate section of land designated by even numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said road and branches"; and it provides that, "in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the line of said road and branches is definitely fixed by the authority aforesaid, sold any part of any section hereby granted, or that the right of preëmption has attached to the same, then it shall be lawful for any agent or agents appointed by the governor of said State, to select, subject to the approval aforesaid, from the lands of the United States most contiguous to the tier of sections above specified, so much land, in alternate sections or parts of sections, as shall be equal to such lands as the United States have sold, or to which the right of preëmption has attached as aforesaid. . . . . Provided, that the lands to be so located shall in no case be further than fifteen miles from the line of the road." It was the theory of this policy that in a belt of lands thus restricted in width the reserved sections would be duplicated in value by their proximity to the road, and that, while it could work no hardship to the settler to pay a double minimum for lands thus doubled in value, the Government would lose nothing, and the fund thus raised would enable the road to be built. This act became a precedent for all subsequent land-grants for the following twelve years; and had it been

adhered to, with adequate guards against monopoly, it would have been perfectly defensible, and generally most beneficial to the public. But, in the year 1862, a radically different policy was inaugurated. Simultaneously with the passage of the Homestead Act, and, as if purposely intended to nullify its provisions, our land-grant policy put on new shapes, and entered upon its historic career of recklessness and extravagance. The grant made in aid of the Union Pacific Railroad, of July 1st, 1862, as subsequently amended, gave ten sections per mile on each side of the road, within the limit of twenty miles. The grant to the Northern Pacific Railway was of every alternate section of public land, not mineral, to the amount of twenty sections per mile on each side of its line, with the privilege of making up deficiencies within ten miles on either side of the land granted, or fifty miles from the line of the road. The grant to the California and Oregon Railroad, of July 25th, 1866, was twenty alternate sections per mile on each side of the line, with the right to make up deficiencies within ten miles of the land granted; and the same quantity was granted to the Atlantic and Pacific, by Act of July 27th, 1866; and to the Southern Pacific, by Act of the same date. The grant to the Oregon Central Railroad, of May 4th, 1870, is ten sections per mile on each side of its line, with the right to make up deficiencies within twenty-five miles. The grant to the Texas Pacific Railroad, of March 3d, 1871, is twenty alternate sections per mile on each side of the road, with the right to make up deficiencies ten miles beyond these limits; while no limits are prescribed as to a portion of the route, and the company is allowed to make up deficiencies in the State of California within twenty miles of the lands granted. In some of the rapidly multiplying grants made between 1864 and 1870, the reserved even-numbered sections were granted after the odd ones had been exhausted; while, in one instance, the grant, as construed by the Land Department, had no lateral limits, and thus was a palpable perversion of the letter and spirit of the original policy. The people at last became so thoroughly aroused, that Congress, over eleven years ago, was obliged to call a halt; but it was not till more than two hundred million acres of the people's patrimony had been appropriated—an area as large as that of the thirteen original States.

I have not referred to these facts for the purpose of dwelling upon the enormous and irreparable mischiefs of this system, but

in order to clear the way for some pertinent and practical considerations suggested by this series of legislative acts. My task is threefold. I wish to invite attention to the power of these railroad corporations over the land department of the Government, in securing the illegal apportionment of large areas of the public domain; their power over Congress, through which they have maintained the prolonged monopoly of great areas of lands after their forfeitfure for non-compliance with the express conditions on which they were granted; and their power over the Federal courts, as seen in recent adjudications involving their rights. I shall deal with these topics in their order.

The administration of land-grants is committed to the General Land Office, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior; and the manner in which the work has been performed for nearly the third of a century, under every administration of the Government, shows how easy it has been for the companies controlling these grants to appropriate to their own use, under the forms of law, but contrary to its letter and spirit, immense tracts of the public domain. As an illustration of what I mean, let me refer to the language already recited from the Act of 1850, making a grant to the State of Illinois, which is substantially the same as in all later acts. It grants "every alternate section of land designated by even numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said road and branches"; with the proviso that, "in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the line of said road and branches is definitely fixed by the authority aforesaid, sold any part of any section hereby granted, or that the right of preëmption has attached to the same, then it shall be lawful for any agent or agents, to be appointed by the governor of said State, to select, subject to the approval aforesaid, from the lands of the United States most contiguous to the tier of sections above specified, so much land, in alternate sections or parts of sections, as shall be equal to such land as the United States have sold, or to which the right of preëmption has attached as aforesaid." It will be seen by this language that indemnity is only awarded where the United States, at the date of the definite location of the road, "have sold any part of any section hereby granted, or that the right of preëmption has attached to the same." In those cases other lands are given in lieu of such of the granted lands as the United States have otherwise disposed of prior to such location, and subsequent to the passage of the act.

Lands disposed of before the grant was made most certainly were not granted by it, and could not, therefore, be the subject of indemnity; but the Land Department, from the beginning, has administered every railroad grant upon the theory that the company was entitled to indemnity, as well for lands disposed of *prior* to the date of the grant, as for those disposed of between that date and the definite location of the line of the road. This construction of the law is an absurdity, and can only be accounted for by the presence and influence of the railroad companies, and the absence of any party claiming an adverse right. Their view of the law has been accepted without question; and yet, in the case of Wilcox *vs.* Jackson, 13 Peters, 498, the Supreme Court of the United States had declared, ten years before the Illinois grant was made, that, "whenever a tract of land has been once legally apropriated to any purpose, it becomes, from that moment, severed from the mass of public lands, and no subsequent law, proclamation, or sale, will be construed to embrace or operate upon it, although no reservation be made of it." But this decision was unheeded, and every administration of the Government—whether Democratic, Whig, or Republican—continued to administer every railroad grant as if it had embraced lands disposed of prior to its date, and as if indemnity were due on account of such lands.

But the claim of the railroad companies, so long acquiesced in by the Land Department, was at last settled adversely by the Supreme Court of the United States, at its October term, 1875, in the case of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company *vs.* the United States, 2 Otto, 733, in which the very principle in controversy was directly involved. The question presented was whether the Osage ceded lands of Kansas, which fell within the grant made by Congress to said railroad company, were included in the grant, or were reserved from its operation by the treaty which had set them apart for the Indians. Justice Davis, in pronouncing the opinion of the Court, says:

"Only the public lands owned absolutely by the United States are subject to survey and division into sections, and to these lands this grant is applicable. It embraces such as could be sold and enjoyed, and not those which Indians, pursuant to treaty stipulations, were left free to occupy. Since the land system was inaugurated, it has been the policy of the Government to sell the public lands, at a small cost, to individuals; and, for the last twenty-

five years, to grant them to States, in large tracts, to aid in various works of internal improvement. But these grants have always been recognized as attaching only to so much of the public domain as was subject to sale or other disposal, although the roads of many subsidized companies passed through Indian reservations. And such grants could be treated in no other way; for Congress cannot be supposed to have thereby intended to include land previously appropriated to another purpose, unless there be an express declaration to that effect."

In this opinion Judge Davis expressly adopts and re-affirms the language of the Court in the case of Wilcox *vs.* Jackson, already cited, as a rule of construction. In speaking of these Indian lands, he says: "They were not in a condition to be granted, and for this reason were excepted from the category of lands to be donated to a State to aid it in building railroads. And it would be strange, indeed, in a land-grant act, if Congress meant to give away property which a just and wise policy had devoted to other uses." In interpreting the words of the indemnity clause of the Act of Congress in this case, he says they "show clearly that the only purpose of that clause is to give lands outside of the ten-mile limits for those lost inside by the action of the Government in keeping the land offices open between the date of the granting act and the location of the road. This construction gives effect to every part of the act, and makes each part consistent with the other."

In the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger, decided at the same term of the Court, 2 Otto, 761, the same principle was explicitly affirmed. This case involved the title to a quarter-section of land in California, which was claimed under a grant made by Congress to the Western Pacific Railroad Company, and contested by the claimant of the same tract as a part of a Mexican grant, which had been reserved from the operation of the Act of Congress. Justice Davis, in re-affirming the decision of the Court in the previous case, says: "The acts which govern this case are more explicit, and leave less room for construction. The words Public Lands are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. That they were so employed in this instance is evident from the fact that to them alone could, on the location of the road, the order withdrawing lands from preëmption, private entry, and sale, apply." These decisions fairly ended all controversy; for if lands covered by Spanish grants and Indian reser-

vations cannot be granted by Congress, and so cannot become the basis of indemnification, it is equally obvious, independent of the express language of Justice Davis, above quoted, that lands already disposed of by the Government, by sale or pre-ëmption, cannot be.

But, although it is now more than seven years since these decisions were rendered, the railroads have not lost an acre of land which has been illegally awarded them as indemnity, with the single exception of the Osage Indian lands involved in the case cited, and the tract in dispute in the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger. In his report for 1876, the Commissioner of the General Land Office stated that suits were to be instituted to vacate the patents illegally issued to railroad companies, and that lists of the lands covered by them were in course of preparation. In his report for 1877, he says that little progress had been made in their preparation, but that data for use in the suits to be instituted were being prepared. In his report for 1878, he referred to the necessity for re-adjusting railroad grants under the decisions of the Supreme Court, and said the work had been delayed by the smallness of his clerical force. In his report for 1879, he stated that suit had been instituted against the Western Pacific Railroad Company by the direction of the Attorney-General, and that lists of the lands erroneously patented, prior to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger, were being prepared as the basis of suits to vacate such patents. But as all these patents were void, they could convey no title, and had no legal effect whatever. There was nothing on which a court could act. It could only decide that the junior patent conveyed the title, the earlier patent being void. It could declare that if the lands covered by any of those patents were, at the date of the withdrawal of lands for the railroad, of the same status as the land claimed by Sanger at the date of its withdrawal for the Western Pacific Railroad Company, they were void for the reason stated by the Court in his case; but this was a question coming exclusively within the jurisdiction of the department having control of it. It is not necessary that every case should be passed upon by the Court, for, when a principle is fully established in one case, the department must follow it until modified or set aside. To send every patent into court would, doubtless, have suited the railroad companies; but what was wanted was the restoration to settlement of all the lands erroneously pat-

ented, and their disposal under the Preëmption and Homestead laws.

There was, therefore, no serious difficulty in the way of a proper re-adjustment of titles, made necessary by the decisions in the cases cited, if the Land Department had really desired it. Very unfortunately for the rights of settlers, it was the servant of the railways, and singularly fertile in expedients for guarding their interests. Soon after the decision of the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger, the Acting Secretary of the Interior overruled the practice which had prevailed in the department since the year 1848, as to issuing second patents in lieu of void ones previously issued. He admitted that this practice had the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States, but he refused to be governed by it, and held that although in the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger the patent was declared void, yet, in the case of other lands within the limits of the same grant, the patents were voidable only, and not void, till declared so judicially. How completely the department thus became the ally of great corporations and the enemy of the people will more fully appear as I proceed.

Another advantage gained by the railroads had its origin in an opinion given by Attorney-General Black, in the year 1857, when the railroad companies were anxious to obtain certified lists of their lands before they had been earned. Mr. Black held that these lists were simply in the nature of information from the records of the department, and that he could see no objection to issuing them to any person who desired to make a proper use of them, just as any other information would be furnished from the records; and that they could have no influence on the title to the lands. Under this opinion, the department issued the certified lists as requested; but in May, 1880, the Secretary of the Interior decided that when any of his predecessors have certified lands under railroad grants, their acts are final and conclusive, and binding upon him as their successor. He further held that a complete legal title was conveyed by such certified lists, and that the latter were in all respects equivalent to patents. This cut short the work of re-adjustment as to these lands, and left the railroad companies with nothing to fear from the department. They escaped with their plunder; and if we take into account only the companies whose grants have been earned by an honest compliance with their conditions, it may be safely stated that

they have had awarded to them an illegal excess of indemnity lands amounting to more than ten million acres, or enough to make sixty-two thousand five hundred farms of one hundred and sixty acres each. All these lands should have been opened to settlers at the government price, instead of becoming the spoil of corporate monopolies, and sold at rates imposed by themselves.

In this connection, it may be proper to refer to a kindred illustration of the readiness of the Land Department to do the bidding of these corporations. I allude to a ruling of Secretary Delano, in May, 1875, in the case of the Western Pacific Railroad Company *vs.* H. E. Dillingham *et al.*, in which he overruled the previous practice of the department, and held that land within the claimed limits of a Mexican grant, but subsequently excluded from the confirmed limits, or released from reservation by the rejection of the grant claim, was not reserved from a railroad grant made while the Mexican grant claim was *sub judice.* As there are in the State of California nearly six hundred Mexican grants, each including from one to eleven leagues of land, and aggregating within their exterior limits many million acres, it is readily seen that very large areas would fall within the limits of the different railroad grants intersecting that State, and that the question as to whether they were excluded from them or would inure to their benefit on becoming released from reservation, was one in which the railroad companies of California were deeply interested. This ruling of Secretary Delano was made about a year before the decision of the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger, which showed it to be unauthorized, and made with the knowledge that the point involved in his action was then before the Supreme Court. But he was faithful to his employers, and prosecuted his work with such dispatch that before the decision was announced many thousands of acres were patented to the California railroads; and having the patents, and the possession of the lands covered by them, they are now in the same condition as the companies that obtained the illegal excess of indemnity under the ruling of the Secretary of the Interior in 1880, already referred to. After the lapse of seven years they are still holding on to their booty, save as to the particular tract involved in the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger. After the decision in that case, the Commissioner of the General Land Office suspended, or pretended to suspend, the practice of awarding such lands to the California roads; and in his annual

report for 1879, as already shown, he stated that suit had been instituted against the Western Pacific Railroad Company by the direction of the Attorney-General. But it turned out that, on the motion of the railroad company, this suit was dismissed, because the purchasers from the company had not been made parties. No other suit has been instituted to set aside any of the numerous patents illegally issued for lands embraced within the exterior limits of this or any other Mexican grant holding the same *status* as the land in the case of Newhall *vs.* Sanger. These "voidable" patents can thus only be set aside by judicial proceedings, while such proceedings have been abandoned by the Government, after all its pretended preparation, leaving the railroads the masters of the situation, through the game of fast-and-loose which has been played for their benefit.

But they were still exposed to possible danger under the adjudications referred to, and naturally felt the need of some further security. This they found in an opinion of Attorney-General Devens, dated June 5th, 1880, and asked for by Secretary Schurz, as "an authoritative expression of his views." Although the distinguished secretary is not a lawyer, he is uncommonly skilled in the use of English words and perfectly familiar with their import, and it seems a little remarkable, therefore, that he should have found it necessary to ask for this legal advice, in view of the clear and unmistakable language of three decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the very question now submitted, with others, for interpretation. But the opinion of the Attorney-General is still more remarkable than the request of the Secretary, and cannot fail to surprise every member of the legal profession who may chance to read it. He finds no difficulty in disposing of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Quoting the words of Mr. Justice Davis, in the case of The Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad Company *vs.* The United States, in which he declared that indemnity could only be allowed for lands within indemnity limits "lost by the action of the Government between the date of the grant and the location of the road," he says that this "is a dictum entitled only to the weight which is given to the dicta of eminent judges." He then refers to an unreported opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, in the case of the Madison and Portage Railroad Company *vs.* The Treasurer of the State of Wisconsin, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of that State, in which it

is stated that "deficiencies in place limits, caused by sales or preëmptions previous to the location of the route, whether before or after the passage of the act, may be supplied from the indemnity limits." But the principle thus affirmed was not involved in this case, except as a side-issue. Several points were decided; and the opinion, which I have before me, is of considerable length. The language quoted occurs in the latter portion of it, where the Court was considering the question whether "The Wisconsin Railroad Farm Mortgage Land Company," as the successor of "The La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company," was entitled to lands under the grant made by Congress, June 3, 1856, or under that of May 5, 1864. The Court held that the right of the said "Farm Mortgage Land Company" was under the former grant. The proper interpretation of the indemnity clause of the Act of 1856 was not before the Court, and the statement of Justice Harlan, which I find written on the margin of the printed opinion, is, therefore, a mere "dictum." The opinion, moreover, discloses that the case was to be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for final adjudication; but the Attorney-General says, "in view of these conflicting opinions, it would seem to me that the safer course for the department would be to return to its original construction"; and the department promptly acted upon this advice, and still continues to stand by the railroad companies in their work of plundering the people through the forms of law. The Attorney-General does not discuss the question decided by the Supreme Court. He takes no notice of the clearly expressed and impregnable principles on which Justice Davis bases his opinion, merely referring to a brief passage, which he called "a dictum," while himself appealing to the mere "dictum" of an inferior tribunal, in a case which was to be appealed to a higher court. The Secretary, more than keeping pace with the Attorney-General, not only accepted this opinion as better authority than that of the Supreme Court,—although it was merely advisory,—but added the words "otherwise disposed of" to the specifications of prior losses for which the Attorney-General declared indemnity might be allowed—thus greatly enlarging the scope of the opinion. The mischiefs of this shameful prostitution of the Land Department can be more fully appreciated by remembering that it imposes upon the settlers who purchase these indemnity lands a tariff of at least a hundred million dol-

lars more than they would cost at the Government price, and that this sum is drawn from their pockets without any warrant of law, for the benefit of the ravenous monopolies that exact it; while, if the rule of the Supreme Court were followed, a large majority of railroad and other grants could at once be closed up, the remaining lands restored to settlement, and the titles to any unsold lands heretofore improvidently conveyed in excess of their legal grants, recovered by the United States.

But the most remarkable fact remains to be stated. The Land Department, having procured the opinion of the Attorney-General justifying this wholesale plunder of the public domain, is still not satisfied. The opinion, it should be remembered, follows the decisions of the Supreme Court as to the specific case of reserved lands. It admits that for them no indemnity can be allowed. But the department disregards this opinion in the interest of the railroads when it becomes an obstacle to their purposes. I understand that the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé road has been allowed an illegal excess of indemnity for lands reserved at the date of its grant, amounting to about eight hundred thousand acres, according to the principle affirmed in the case of The Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad *vs.* The United States. Of this excess more than four hundred thousand acres have been awarded contrary to the opinion of the Attorney-General, and since it was given. This road had received four hundred and eighty thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven acres of land before the decision in the case referred to was rendered, having before received two million two hundred and seventy-four thousand six hundred and eighty-six acres; and a large additional allowance, it is understood, will soon be made, notwithstanding previous illegal excesses carelessly awarded before the department required the company to designate the tracts in lieu of which it claimed indemnity. The Kansas Pacific and the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad companies, in Kansas, have each received an illegal excess of more than one hundred thousand acres, by treating land reserved at the date of the grant as the subject of indemnity, while the aggregate of lands thus illegally held by Kansas railroads would probably much exceed a million acres. This amount is increasing from year to year as the work of adjustment proceeds, and very little attention seems to be paid to the decisions of the Supreme Court or the opinion of the Attorney-General, when

either stands in the way of the roads. Of course, no effort is being made to restore these lands to the United States; and nothing but an act of Congress, imperatively requiring a re-adjustment in the case of each grant, will meet the difficulty.

I pass to other facts equally significant and startling. All acts of Congress, making grants of land for railroad or other purposes, within the mineral regions of the country, expressly reserve mineral lands, which are held for disposal exclusively under the laws making provision therefor. When the character of the lands so reserved is controverted, the question is usually adjudicated on the application of the railroad companies, whose vigilance and influence give them a decided advantage; and if the land is adjudged to be non-mineral, the railroads take it, notwithstanding the fact that it was expressly reserved from the operation of the grant, and was subject to homestead and preëmption settlement the moment the adjudication was made. This has been done in the case of the Central Pacific and other great roads passing through the mineral districts, and it is as open a defiance of law and as flagrant a wrong to actual settlers as the appropriation of Mexican grants and Indian reservations already referred to, or the award of indemnity for lands never granted. The claims of the railroad companies are always recognized by the Government as paramount, while the settlement of the public domain and the legal rights of the citizen seem to be regarded as matters of little moment. The Land Department adopts the principle that a railroad grant is an adverse claim to lands excepted from it, and in behalf of the company construes the exception strictly and the grant liberally. Settlement claims are strangely treated as contests, and the settler is required especially to notify the railroad company of his application to enter or make proof, just as if it were the owner of the public domain. Notice by publication is not sufficient notice to a railroad. If the company does not appear, or does not desire to contest, it makes no difference. It is regarded as a contest in any event, and the settler must run the gauntlet of the special rules governing contests, which have been devised in the particular interest of the company, instead of allowing him the unhindered assertion of his rights under the laws of the United States, and requiring the company to make out its claim affirmatively under its grant. Every presumption is against him, and no mistakes are ever made in his favor. The rule is

different in cases involving the title to school lands, for there no great corporation is interested.

The same principle is applied to the large class of cases where settlements have been made on lands within the limits of a grant prior to the date of the granting act, and are subsequently abandoned. The lands in such cases become public lands, and are open to settlement by other parties, because they were reserved from the grant and have reverted to the Government. But in nearly all such cases the railroad companies appropriate them, and the perfectly unquestionable rights of the settlers are denied. The law is openly defied, and thousands of settlers have thus lost their lands and improvements. The same rule is applied under the Amended Homestead Act of 1864, permitting soldiers in actual service to make their affidavits of intention to claim the land selected by them before a commanding officer. Great numbers of soldiers availed themselves of this privilege, hoping to secure a home for their families after the termination of their service. But they did not always return, and their families, in some instances, could not move on to the land. For these and kindred reasons, the law could not always be complied with, and the entries were canceled. Such entries, however, while existing on the records, reserved the land under the general rules of law applicable in such cases. But, in the year 1879, the department ruled in one of these cases that the soldier's entry was *primâ facie* invalid in its inception, and therefore that it did not operate to except the land from a railroad grant. All the lands covered by these entries had been reëntered by others after the previous entries had been canceled. For fifteen years, settlers had been taught by practice and precedent to believe that second entries, made after the cancellation of the first, would be respected. They did not know that railroad companies had rights that were denied to the citizens, but they were undeceived by this decision; and those to whom it applied lose their improved farms, which go to the railroads, while its application has been made to govern a much larger class of cases than that of the precise one decided. In cases that have arisen since this decision was rendered, the Land Department has volunteered to order hearings for the benefit of the railroad companies, and has required the present settler to prove, affirmatively, the validity of the former entry. In these and kindred cases, however, the rulings of the department have not been uniform. Quite

recently, as I learn, they have been more favorable to settlers; but they have very generally been against them.

The conduct of the department in the illegal withdrawal of railroad lands is of the same remarkable character. Until the numbers of the sections to be withdrawn are known by the survey, and the map thereof showing such sections is received at the local land office and marked upon the record, and notice thus given to the world of the appropriation, the withdrawal of the land is not operative, and the lands may be entered by any legal applicant. Settlers on them, prior to such legal withdrawal, are expressly protected by law. But this law is set aside by the department, and many thousands of settlers have thus been robbed of their homes. Formerly, all lands within railroad limits were withdrawn as soon as the granting acts were passed, and before anything had been done to attach the grant. This was done on the assumption that the act vested the title to the lands at once, irrespective of the conditions of the grant. In some cases lands have been withdrawn before the act making the grant had passed, as in the grants in the northern peninsula of Michigan. The effect of these various withdrawals has been to award many millions of acres to the railroads before any right to them had vested, and to withhold them from settlers whose right was perfect.

But the withdrawal of lands within indemnity limits is equally unauthorized and mischievous, and still more inexcusable. This has been done in every grant. In that made to the Northern Pacific, the Southern Pacific, the Atlantic and Pacific, the Texas and Pacific, and other similar grants, the withdrawal of indemnity lands is not authorized, either expressly or by implication, but is impliedly forbidden in each case by the express provision that all other lands on the line of the roads than those granted by the act shall be open to homestead and preëmption entry. One of the distinctions between lands within the indemnity limits and those granted is the difference in price; the former being sold at a dollar and twenty-five cents, and the latter at two dollars and fifty cents per acre. But both are withdrawn for the benefit of the roads, and the right of settlement thereon denied; while, in every instance of an actual subsequent settlement, and in a majority of instances of prior actual settlement, the lands so occupied by settlers have been awarded to the railroads. The decision of the Supreme Court,

that no rights exist under railroad grants to land within indemnity limits until a selection is actually made, and the laws of Congress expressly reserving such lands, are nullified by decisions and rulings of the Land Department in the interest of the roads, while settlers are thus obliged to pay the companies two dollars and fifty cents per acre for lands not owned by them, and which should be disposed of at the minimum price. These are intolerable evils. It is estimated that more than one hundred million acres remain withdrawn from market and settlement under various acts of Congress; and of this aggregate a very large proportion has been illegally withdrawn as indemnity lands before selection, or as granted lands before the definite location of the line of the road, and could be restored to the public domain without any declaratory act of forfeiture by Congress.

The administration of railroad grants has been singularly reckless and indefensible in other respects. In many instances lands have been certified greatly in excess of the grants. Examples of this kind are to be found in the Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad, which has received an excess of 98,746 acres; the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad of Iowa, which has received an excess over the possibilities of the grant of 48,390 acres; the St. Paul and Sioux City Railroad of Minnesota, which has received an excess of 350,358 acres; and the Winona and St. Peters Railroad, which has received an excess of 238,007 acres. These examples could readily be multiplied, and the aggregate of such illegal appropriations amounts to several millions of acres. In other cases, the lands certified have been greatly in excess of those actually earned, as in the Mobile and Girard Railroad, in which all the public lands within the grant for its entire length of three hundred miles were certified, and all or nearly all those within the indemnity limits were patented, being an excess over the amount earned of 482,408 acres.

In some cases the roads for which the grant was made have never been constructed, while in others the construction has been partial. The Coosa and Chattanooga Railroad was never built. The grant expired in 1856, but all public lands in odd-numbered sections along its line, thirty miles in width, have been reserved since 1858. There is no official report of the construction of any portion of the Pensacola and Georgia Railroad, in Florida.

Its proposed length was four hundred and eight miles, and a million and a quarter acres of land were certified or patented in advance of construction,—the excess over the amount given for the construction of the road being probably a million acres. The lands granted along the whole length of the contemplated road for twelve miles in width, and eighteen miles of indemnity limits, were withdrawn, in 1857, and so remain. In the case of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad, in which the grant was made in 1866, the road has not been built, and the grant has been abandoned by the company for a different location; but the lands are still in reservation for twenty miles on each side of the line originally proposed. The grant to the North Louisiana and Texas Railroad expired in 1866. Of the entire line of one hundred and sixty miles, ninety-four are unofficially reported as constructed, and 333,211 acres of land are certified or patented in advance of construction. The Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, with 1,400 miles of unconstructed road, has, in addition to its withdrawal of a belt one hundred miles in width through the territories of New Mexico and Arizona, a withdrawal of sixty miles in width along the line of the Pacific coast in California. The Southern Pacific road has a like withdrawal overlapping the coast withdrawal for the Atlantic and Pacific road; and, although the withdrawal for one company is regarded as invalid, as against the claim of another, it is held in full force and effect as against settlers. Lands within the limits of the withdrawals for both these roads across the State of California, aggregating one hundred and twenty miles in width, though no road has been built and none is being constructed, are still in reservation. In the case of the New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg road, the grant expired in 1876. No road has ever been built under this grant, nor line definitely located. Its proposed length was three hundred miles, and the lands were illegally withdrawn on a preliminary line, and are still in reservation. Under the Texas and Pacific Railroad grant, no road has been constructed, nor line definitely located, but the belt of land withdrawn in 1871, from El Paso in Texas to the Pacific Ocean, being eighty miles in width where the road passes through the territories, are still withdrawn. These illustrations of the management of railroads by the Land Department are, in fact, illustrations of the management of the Land Department by the railroads.

Another administrative abuse of railroad grants has been the frequent and unauthorized changes of location of the line fixed by the companies under the granting act. When a grant takes effect, upon the designation of a particular line, the lands withdrawn from market within the granted limits are understood to be appropriated for its use. Settlements are made and money invested with reference to the fact; but changes of location frequently take place without any authority of law, making a wide divergence from the original line. In such cases, the practice of the department has been to give the company the same land as if no change had been made, thus disregarding the action of Congress and the principle and policy of these grants. Sometimes locations have been assumed and the rights of settlers concluded on a particular line, and afterward an entirely different line has been located, on the theory that the first was preliminary only. In some of the cases the changes have been of great extent in length of the line, reaching as high as from twenty to fifty miles in breadth in Dakota, and a hundred and fifty miles and upwards in Idaho, with frequent and broad divergencies, extending from twenty-five to fifty miles in width, in Washington. In that Territory a withdrawal was made for a branch line of considerable length that was not authorized to be constructed, and to which no grant attached; and the subsequent release of this withdrawal was deemed to justify further changes, and a solid area, one hundred miles wide, remains withdrawn across the southern and central part of the Territory, with a further withdrawal of forty miles in width in Oregon, for the same distance and the same road. Changes in the line of the Northern Pacific Railway have been frequent, and very embarrassing to settlers. Under a preliminary location of the western portion of this road, in 1870, withdrawals were made in that year for forty miles on the Washington Territory side of the line, and twenty miles on the Oregon side, which latter amount was doubled two years later; and the claims of settlers who went on odd-numbered sections of public lands, between the years 1870 and 1872, within a distance of twenty miles beyond the limits of the withdrawal of 1870, have been rejected by the Land Department for the last ten years, on the ground that a reservation created in 1872 took effect two years before it was made!

It is needless to multiply these examples; but I must refer to some further facts which deserve notice. Under the present

organization of the Land Department, the Commissioner has frequently been obliged, by the pressure of his duties, to affix his signature to decisions he had never examined. In controversies between railroads and homestead or preëmption settlers, the examination of the testimony, in the first instance, is confided to ordinary clerks, who are not skilled lawyers, but very frequently men without legal knowledge or experience. The issues to be decided may turn upon difficult questions of law, and affect important public and private interests. A single case may involve millions in value. Questions of fact, to be determined upon *ex-parte* testimony, or the record of preliminary trials before local officers, are passed upon, in many instances, by men unacquainted with the rules of evidence; while it is computed that, in ninety per cent. of all the cases decided, the ruling is final. As a general rule, settlers are not able to employ competent counsel, and have to depend upon themselves and the protection of the department; while the railroad companies always have their attorneys, and of the best class. They have access to the chiefs of divisions, and their constructions of the law are generally impressed upon the minds of the clerks having the cases in charge, notwithstanding the regulations of the department prohibiting conferences between attorneys and clerks, except upon permission. In the final hearing, the corporation attorney goes in person to the General Land Office, examines the papers, and, if necessary, follows the case to the person having it in charge, and argues the superior rights of his company to the land. There are no formal hearings, and the pressure brought to bear upon clerks is the pressure of the power and influence of great corporations, which are practically unopposed; and since the adjudication, in all such cases, must depend upon the preliminary settlement of the facts, it is easy to see the helplessness of the settler. He can only get his land after the most critical examination of his case, and by meeting every technical defect in his claim; while, for thirty years, the practice has been to certify lands in bulk to railroad corporations without definite knowledge on the part of the Land Office as to whether the companies were entitled to them or not, and in utter disregard of the well-settled principle of law, that railroad grants are to be construed strictly against the grantee.

Many of the particular facts I have now recited, touching the reckless and prodigal management of the public domain, are

given on the authority of experienced land-office officials, and may be found in their sworn testimony before the Senate Committee on Public Lands of the present Congress, printed with other evidence, as a part of the report of that committee, which is numbered 362. This testimony has been sharply criticised by the railroad companies, but has not been substantially impeached. It should have the widest publicity, and deserves the serious consideration of every believer in an honest administration of public trusts. The great home department of the Government, which should be the agent and representative of the people, is rapidly becoming an appurtenance of our great railways, and a mere bureau in their service. This is not specially due to the delinquency of individual officials in the Land Department, but to a bad system. It is not the fault of the present chiefs of that department, who are new in their positions, and will have the right to be judged by their record. What is wanted is a thorough reorganization of the machinery and working force of that department, such additions to that force as shall be adequate to the work to be performed, and such an increase of compensation as will bring into the service the highest grade of capacity and integrity. No remedy can be found in simply lopping off the branches of the evils I have attempted to depict; but Congress must strike at their root, and cannot strike too vigorously or too soon. The mischief to be remedied involves the very existence of republican government. The commercial greed of great corporations, reënforced by great landed estates, threatens the subjugation of the people; and the people themselves must organize for the work of self-protection. They have no right to arraign the executive officers of the Government for succumbing to the power of great corporations, while they hold in their hands the sovereign remedy for these evils, and fail to apply it in the selection of honest and capable public servants. Nor does this duty necessitate any warfare against railroads. No one disputes their inestimable value under a just administration of their affairs, and while content to act as the servants of the public; but they are built under charters conferred by the Government, and must be resolutely subordinated to its paramount authority and the welfare of the people.

GEORGE W. JULIAN.

# THE PYRAMID OF CHEOPS.

When we look at the ruins of some ancient abbey, Netley, Melrose, or Tintern, at Stonehenge in its solitude on the Wiltshire plains, or the pyramids of the sandy tracts that border on the Nile, near Cairo, the idea suggested to the mind is that of a vast antiquity. The thoughts range back to the time when the builders of the structure before us were living men; and as we picture how generation after generation has passed away since their time, we are forcibly impressed with the nothingness of our lives compared with the life-time of our race. Yet, to the student of science these structures are but young; even the longest-lasting of them is but short-lived. To the antiquarian the pyramids seem built to last forever; the geologist finds in the continuance of the stone mounds for a few thousand years only evidence of the far vaster duration of the time-intervals during which the mounds of nature must remain. Yet even of these he has learned that

> "The hills are shadows, and they flow
> From form to form, and nothing stands;
> Like mists they melt, the solid lands;
> Like clouds, they shape themselves and go."

Knowing this, and that even the everlasting hills remain but for an instant when their duration is compared with the life-times of planets and suns, the astronomer is half disposed to smile at the thought of attributing a hoar antiquity to these monuments, which had not even been built when already the now existing hills were hundreds of times older than these stone mounds will ever be. The geologist, too, finds in the very stone of which the pyramids are built the evidence of æons of years for each day that they themselves have lasted. He sees from the structure of this stone that it was formed in a far-off period (the eocene age)

when a vast sea, probably covering the whole region where the pyramids stand, received slowly a deposit of sandy débris, mixed with the remains of multitudinous forms of submarine and pelagic life. During tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of years the nummulitic limestone was being formed beneath the waves of ocean. The sands which helped to make that limestone belong to an older formation still, itself formed in turn from still older rocks; and so he looks backward over the oft-times repeated change, a single oscillation only of which is pictured in the words:

> "There rolls the deep, where grew the tree;
> Oh, earth, what changes hast thou seen!
> There, where the loud street roars, hath been
> The stillness of the central sea."

Compared with the vast periods of time thus brought before our thoughts as among the demonstrated yet inconceivable truths of science, the life-time of such a structure as the great pyramid seems but as the duration of a breath. Yet, viewed as men must view the works of man, the pyramids of Egypt derive a profound interest from their antiquity. Young, compared with the works of nature, they are, of all men's works, the most ancient. They were ancient when temples and abbeys whose ruins now alone remain, were erected, and it seems as though they would endure till long after the last traces of any building now existing, or likely to be built by modern men, has disappeared from the surface of the earth. Nothing, it should seem, but some vast natural catastrophe ingulfing them beneath a new ocean, or hurling them down from the slopes of a new-formed mountain range, can destroy them utterly, unless the same race of beings which undertook to rear these vast masses should take in hand the task of destroying them.

Thus viewed, as the most ancient and the most impressive works of the human race, the pyramids have an interest to all students of human history and of human nature. It is impossible to consider carefully any of the works of man without learning something of the events which took place when those works were carried on, and something also of the character, the ideas, and the beliefs of the men to whom those works were due. If we can solve the problem presented by these strange structures, we shall have learned a lesson in the most ancient of all histories;

we shall have gleaned some knowledge worth having about the ways and thoughts of the oldest civilized race whose material records have reached our time.

In undertaking an inquiry of this sort, on which many have already entered and which presents difficulties of the most serious character, it is well that we should note the conditions under which such a problem can alone be successfully dealt with.

In the first place, we must resolutely determine that, when setting forth to find a theory, no theory shall lay hold of us, and, taking possession of our minds, prevent us from duly weighing the evidence for and against not only that theory, but others.

Secondly, we must be prepared to find an element of truth in many of the theories advanced on our subject of inquiry, even though these theories be not absolutely correct.

Thirdly, it should be noticed that the true theory must accord, not with this fact or that, but with all the known facts. It is singular what mistaken notions are held by some on this point, who seem to think that the holder of a theory ought to be ready to concede that some facts are inconsistent with it. A true theory must accord with all known facts; that is, though we may not always be able to show how certain facts are to be explained by it, we must no longer hold a theory after we have been forced to admit that even a single fact is opposed to it or inconsistent with it.

Lastly,—a point I have not seen noted yet,—we should direct our attention first, not to the more easily explained facts, but to those which seem most perplexing and least readily to be interpreted; it is among these that we are most likely to find a key to unlock the mystery of our problem. A theory which explains them can hardly fail to be the true theory; whereas several theories, of which one only can be true—if any is—may explain the ordinary commonplace matters to which many direct their first attention.

Thus viewing the considerations which should guide us in dealing with the pyramids, we proceed to the inquiry, hoping that our solution may not only answer such questions as the antiquarian, the architect, the astronomer, might ask, but may tell us also something of the history and character of the princes and people who built these marvelous structures.

The first and most striking peculiarity in the pyramids, and especially in that one with which we are chiefly to deal, deservedly called the Great Pyramid, is the enormous amount of

labor bestowed on their construction. The mere mass of masonry in the Great Pyramid, as originally built, amounted to nearly ninety millions of cubic feet, or in weight to nearly seven millions of tons. The base covers a space of about thirteen acres, an area considerably larger than that of Lincoln's Inn,—the largest of the London squares. The second pyramid covers about eleven acres, contains sixty-six millions of cubic feet, and the mass of stone-work cannot weigh much less than five million tons. The materials of which all the pyramids are built have been brought from considerable distances,—some greater, some less. To give an idea how little labor was spared, I may mention that, according to Dr. Richardson, the passage leading to the subterranean chamber of the Great Pyramid is lined on all four sides with finely polished slabs of large-grained red granite of Assouan, and Assouan is some five hundred miles from Ghizeh! We are not concerned just here to discuss how much labor and time were given to the construction of the pyramids, to decide whether Herodotus had been truly told that one hundred thousand men worked for twenty years in erecting the first pyramid; or whether those are right who say he meant ten thousand men working for two hundred years (since, they say, one hundred thousand men could not have worked at once on the pyramid); or whether that architect is nearer the truth who, allowing an average of fifteen miles for carriage, and three hundred days a year of ten hours a day for labor, assigned one hundred and sixty-four years as the time necessary for quarrying, elevating, and finishing the Great Pyramid. So far as the significance of the enormous amount of labor involved is concerned, it matters little at the outset whether we consider that more men worked for a shorter time or fewer men for a longer time. It is wonderful and most significant, no doubt, to think of a system by which the rulers of a country could keep together one hundred thousand men working in relays, day and night and every day for twenty years; but it would not be less wonderful or significant to learn that during two hundred years, or for seven generations of rulers and people alike, an army of ten thousand laborers had been constantly kept at work on this one alone of the pyramids of Ghizeh.

We learn, in any case, that the rulers of ancient Egypt possessed despotic power over the people, but not necessarily that the kings possessed excessive power over the aristocracy,

who must, in all probability, have taken part in urging on these stupendous and, at a first view, almost useless labors. We note also that labor must have been cheap, since otherwise self-interest would have prevented Cheops, Chephren, and the rest, from devoting so much of it to these structures. The population of Egypt must at that time have been very great, food very cheap, labor abundant, and (it would seem) the lives of the people of little value either to themselves or in the eyes of their rulers. So far, indeed, as mere labor was concerned, we can hardly speak of the pyramids as costly structures, for probably Pliny was not far from the truth in conjecturing that the rulers of Egypt built the pyramids partly out of state policy, to keep the people in employment,—not, however, "to divert them," as he imagined, "from mutinies and rebellions," but because, as Dr. Zincke suggested, in those days "labor could not be bottled up." Labor was available in such enormous quantities, and so much food was stored up yearly in consequence of a system by which taxes were paid in kind, that practically the laborers and their wants cost almost nothing.

Nevertheless, we must not forget that the erection of the pyramids would have been a costly undertaking, even if the work of ordinary laborers had cost nothing. Apart from mere material, much more than ordinary labor had to be provided. As Hekekyan Bey well remarks: "These pyramids were evidently national undertakings; their plan and execution were decided after mature deliberation; laws were passed and revenues provided to carry out the public decision" (not the popular decision, be it noticed, for the rank and file had nothing to do with the matter) "by the executive authorities."

Let it next be noticed, as among those facts least questioned and most important in considering the pyramids, that they were undoubtedly associated with the religion of the people. This statement, be it observed, includes their unquestioned use as tombs. If there is one thing clear about all the pyramids of Egypt, including the Great Pyramid, it is that they were intended to cover (not merely to inclose) the bodies of the monarchs who had erected them. Chevalier Bunsen says they were "exclusively giant covers of rocky tombs"; and his long study of Egyptian antiquities justifies us in accepting his statement, omitting only the word "exclusively," simply because there is abundant evidence to show that they had other purposes. Mari-

ette Bey is equally positive that they were exclusively tombs, equally likely to be right in considering that, whatever else they were, they certainly were that. "With regard," he says, "to the use to which the pyramids were destined, it were doing violence to all that we know of Egypt, to all that archæology teaches us of the monumental customs of that country, to see in them any other thing than tombs,—tombs, massive, full, everywhere stopped (even in their passages) most carefully, without windows, without doors, without exterior opening." If any doubt could exist as to the tombic character of the pyramids, it should be removed by the consideration that they are surrounded by tombs: as Mariette Bey has well said, "every pyramid is in the middle of a cemetery." M. Chabas, speaking of the tombs around the Pyramids of Ghizeh, says: "A certain number of these tombs were commenced at the same time as the Great Pyramid, and were completed before that colossal monument." Dr. Birch writes thus: "The tombs around the Great Pyramid are those of the princes and other members of the family or time of Khufu" (Cheops or Shofu). Lepsius sees in this cemetery "an official almanac of the Court of Kings Cheops and Chephren, the tombs giving so many names of their officers." Renan says: "The tombs, so numerous in the sands of Sakkara and at the foot of the pyramids, are all dated from the first six dynasties." Mariette Bey states that the Necropolis of Ghizeh "was absolutely closed as early as the time of Teta, king of the sixth dynasty, a hundred years or so after the building of the Great Pyramid." "He has discovered the tomb of a grandson of Snefrou, king of the third dynasty, and several *mastabas* (or chapels exterior to tombs) of the age of Snefrou, and asserts that the age of some of these tombs belongs even to that 'of the predecessors of the founders of the Great Pyramid.'"

But the clear proof thus afforded that the pyramids were mausoleums—chief tombs within whole cemeteries of tombs—proves indisputably also that they were associated with the religious belief of the Egyptians. All that we know of the early, as of the later (but still ancient) religious belief of the Egyptians assures us that it included full faith, of a very material sort, in a future life,—and that it was their faith in a resurrection of the body which led them to provide with such extreme care for the protection of the body. The kings and princes, high priests, chief ministers, generals, governors, court officers.

stewards, and so forth, who provided tombs and cemeteries to protect the embalmed body of each according to his position, but always in a place effectually closed up and removed from all communication with the outer world, did so because they believed it to be worth their while. The body of which they took such extreme care was to be theirs again at some later time; and it was desirable that, when wanted, it should be in good condition; if Pelion would not suffice to protect it, then Ossa must be piled on Pelion to do so. A system was adopted, having direct reference to the religious belief of the Egyptians, by which it was provided that Cheops and Chephren, and all their family, with all the officers of their court and kingdom, should be preserved together, yet each in his proper and appropriate resting-place.

All this, combined with what is known of the religious character of the Egyptian faith in a future life, agrees well with the doctrine of those who find something of the temple as well as of the tomb in the pyramids of Ghizeh. All tradition points the same way. According to the most ancient Egyptian monuments, Cheops, or Shofu, or Khoufou (for his name is given in all these ways), the builder of the Great Pyramid, was a pious king, who planned a temple to Hathor, the virgin mother of the gods, offered images of gold and ivory to the gods, and wrote a book on religious matters, called in these hieroglyphic inscriptions "the sacred book." Close by the Great Pyramid has been found the tomb of "Eimei, the chief priest of the habitations of King Shofu," who Gliddon thinks was in all probability "the architect according to whose plans and directions the mighty edifice, near the foot of which he had once reposed," was built. The name of Shofu is found in tablets of the old copper mine of Mount Sinai, on which he is called "a pure king, a sacred priest."

We may hope then, in examining the best known and most striking facts respecting the Great Pyramid, to learn the nature of the religion of the Ancient Egyptians. Yet in passing, be it remembered (for our guidance as we go, perhaps), that we do know some things about Egyptian religion. We know on the one hand from the religion which the Jews brought from Egypt after their long sojourn there, and on the other from the doctrines and practices which the priestly rulers of the Jews were continually denouncing, that the Egyptian religion included, if it was not founded upon, the worship of the powers of nature, and chiefly of the host of heaven. Throughout the Jewish system of

ceremonial, purged though the Jewish religion was from the grosser doctrines of Sabaism, we recognize astronomical relations. Sunrise and sunset were considered in the morning and evening sacrifices, the movements of the moon and planets in the weekly observances,* the new moon in the monthly festival, still named after her by the Jews, the passage of the sun over the celestial equator ascendingly in the Feast of the Passover, and his passage over the same chief circle of the heavens descendingly in the Feast of Tabernacles, the two great annual festivals of the Jewish ceremonial system. And while this system was enjoined on the Jews by Moses and his successors, the very efforts which they made to divorce the people from the worship of sun and moon and stars show what a hold this worship had taken of the Jewish mind during the time that the people stayed in the land of Egypt. Very intense must have been the Egyptian faith, at that time, in the powers of the heavenly bodies, to have produced such an influence on the people sojourning with them that, despite the hatred felt for them by this people, the influence of their faith remained, strong even against the appeals, the warnings, the denunciations of those who had brought them out of the house of bondage.

We have next to consider the actual structural features of the Great Pyramid: some peculiar to it, others shared, in greater or less degree, by the other pyramids of Ghizeh. We shall not consider minute details, to which too much attention has, perhaps, already been directed, but only those general features which are most striking, and at the same time most instructive.

First and foremost is the care shown in placing the pyramids with their four sides facing the cardinal points. In all the pyramids of Ghizeh this has been carefully attended to, but in the Great Pyramid it has been done with such exceeding care that only the exact instrumental astronomy of post-telescopic days

* The Sabbath, found also in Assyrian sculptures anterior to the time of the Exodus, was manifestly among Assyrians and Egyptians an observance derived from the lunar quarters which gave the week,—the oldest of all time intervals for labor,—and its solemnity was originally due to its association with the planet Saturn, the highest, in the old astronomical sense, of all the planets, and from time immemorial associated with the thought of misfortune and gloom. The slow-moving, dull-looking orb which, according to ancient astrological ideas, ruled that day, was aptly suggestive of solemn rest, if not of absolute ill-luck should work on that day be undertaken.

could have done the work better. The great quadrants of Tycho Brahe would assuredly have given no better results.

That there was an object in this, and that this object was in some way connected with the religion of the builders, can hardly be doubted. But, apart from that consideration, the way in which the thing has been done is worth observing. Even the exclusively tombic theorists (to use Professor Smyth's odd phrase), even those who believe the pyramid was a temple, as well as those who see in it only a mystic meaning, agree that the exact orientation is there, and must have been obtained by very exact astronomical work; so that we are in no sense attacking their views in endeavoring to show how the result was secured.

Now, putting myself in the position of the ancient builders and architects, and trying to see how, with such astronomical knowledge as they undoubtedly possessed, with such means as they had, and as their knowledge of mathematical and optical laws would suggest, they would actually proceed, I have found myself led to precisely such peculiarities of structural detail as we find actually existing within the Great Pyramid. Not one of all the features which have attracted attention, and have been interpreted in more or less fanciful ways, but is found to be essential to the exact orientation of the pyramid,—when it is remembered that not the base only, but the whole structure was to have its faces four-square to the four quarters of the heavenly sphere.

First, the only exact way of squaring the base—a costly way, but cost was no object, and besides, another and all-important purpose was at the same time subserved—was by a slant passage through the solid rock, directed on the pole star of the day at the time of its passing the meridian below the pole (above the pole would have served as well for exact northing, but then the slant of the passage would have been greater). This would suffice for the base, and also as layer after layer was added, provided the opening of the passage at the rock surface was within the base. But after awhile the prolonged passage would reach the northern face of the growing pyramid, and thenceforward the orientation could no longer be corrected by pole star observations through this passage;* yet a resource presents itself by

* Dr. Richardson, one of the few who have descended into the subterranean chamber, says that the sky can be clearly seen along the stone-lined

which this difficulty may be met. If from some point along the passage a reflected beam of light from the pole star (at sub-polar passage) were taken from the surface of still water, and used instead of the direct beam, another passage could be carried up southward instead of northward, and until this in turn met the southern face of the growing pyramid the orientation would be preserved, and might even be made more and more exact as layer after layer was added. Such a passage would, of course, according to the well-known laws of reflection, be inclined at the same angle to the horizon as the other.

This is precisely what we find within the Great Pyramid, the only one, it would seem, where such exact orientation was considered necessary. There is a passage through the solid rock and upward through the masonry of the pyramid, of beautifully fitted stone-work. From the very spot most suited for taking off the reflected beam along another passage, just such a passage is carried, at just the right angle for the reflected beam. At the place where the reflecting surface had to be, the stones are fitted with such exceptional closeness that the peculiarity has been regarded as a piece of profound symbolization. Stones such as would be essential for blocking up the lower part of the descending passage at each observation by the reflected beam (one or two each year would suffice) were found stored in the Queen's chamber at the level of the reflecting surface. (Many of course had been used, and afterward slid down the descending passage to the subterranean chamber, where their fragments remain to this day.) The fitting of these sliding stones (some of which may well, as appears likely, have been used later, expressly to block up the passage) was so perfect that one observer says a knife could hardly be inserted between the stone and the walls of the passage.

But more striking than the outside astronomical character of the Great Pyramid, significant though that is, more interesting than the simple but mathematically beautiful method by which

tube, some three hundred feet long, through which he had descended to that chamber. This shows that even now this long, inclined passage preserves its straightness. He adds — evidently at a venture — that at night the pole star can be seen through this tube. But the tube commands a field of view only some forty-six minutes in diameter, the center of which is less than twenty-seven degrees above the horizon. The pole star descends no lower than twenty-nine degrees above the horizon of the pyramids.

the orientation was secured, is the grand gallery into which the second ascending passage opens. Considering it as it was before the pyramid was completed and closed in after the death of Cheops, this gallery had all the properties which an astronomer desires in a transit instrument. Twenty-eight feet in height, it commanded a long vertical slice of the southern sky, precisely divided in half by the vertical line of the meridian. This would have been of little use for exact time observations if the walls of this lofty gallery (nearly one hundred and sixty feet long), had been aslant, yet the architect would have assured the astronomer (supposing they were not one and the same person), that aslant the walls of such a gallery must certainly be, or it would yield under the pressure of the mighty mass of masonry which was to be placed above it. What, however, do we find? The walls are aslant to suit architectural requirements, but they are vertical to meet the wants of the astronomer. They run up in a series of vertical steps, very shallow measured horizontally, very long measured vertically. Every part of the walls is thus vertical, yet the cross breadth of the long, lofty slice thus cut through the pyramid in the plane of the meridian, diminishes gradually toward the top, insuring perfect architectural stability.

This means more than astronomical orientation; it means astronomical observations, and specially with reference to time. The modern transit instrument (as its name implies) tells the time when the heavenly bodies pass across the meridian; the great pyramidal transit-tube, while as yet its aperture remained uncovered (which we may be sure it did so long as Cheops remained alive), told observers, suitably placed down its length, the time when those same bodies passed the meridian of Ghizeh. So is interpreted the tradition of old, that priests, placed on the top* of the pyramid, announced when this or that orb was passing. Passing where? To Proclus or Diodorus Siculus explanation might have been difficult,—the astronomer sees that passing the meridian was meant, and that, therefore, a meridional instrument, like the grand gallery in the Great Pyramid, must have been employed.

All this accords well with the belief that the Great Pyramid

* Not the top of a nearly complete pyramid, as Flammarion absurdly imagines, setting observers to observe planets and comets, while scarce able to balance themselves on the pyramid top!

was a temple before it became a tomb. These astronomical observations were, in fact, religious observances; the astronomers were priests; their astronomy was star worship. But, if the astronomers were priests, they were also prophets. From them and their kindred in Chaldea have descended to us, not only so much of our ceremonial observances as we have derived from the Jews (so much that it takes an astronomer rightly to frame the calendar of fasts and festivals), but also those astrological superstitions which still bear sway over millions, still influence our language and literature, and if no longer, as of yore, in the ascendant, form even yet potent factors of our civilization. It was not only that they might worship the stars that the kings of Egypt built these temple tombs: their priests were also to read the stars, and, by reading, to rule the stars. The old tradition recorded by Ibn Abd Alkokm, that "in the beginning of the Great Pyramid was a fortunate horoscope," was no mere fable. This tomb-temple was the horoscope of the king-priest. We might infer this from the sacred character attributed to their rulers by the Egyptians; we might be certain in any case that the astronomico-religious observances of which this great temple was the scene during his life-time only, were astrological in their character; but all doubt seems to be removed when we note that after his death the pyramid had no longer a use, save to cover his embalmed body. Enormous though the labor had been that was bestowed upon it, costly the work of preparation, the material, the building, the ceremonials observed upon and within this temple,—all was useless to his successors. The passages within were filled with stones above the tomb of the king in the subterranean chamber; the upper part of the pyramid was completed; a fine marble casing was placed all over it, beginning with the apex, and working downward to the pavement. For centuries after his death not a flaw or crevice existed in the "satin" surface, as the Egyptians called it, of his costly tomb.

The story of the pyramid tells us much of those who built it, of their mode of government, of the wretchedness (as to all that constitutes the dignity of manhood) of the people, and the worthlessness of their lives in the eyes of those who ruled them. It tells us also of their religion, with what full faith they believed in a future life, what powerful gods the heavenly bodies seemed to them. It speaks of their faith in priestly prophecies,

and of the belief of all (save, perhaps, the priests themselves) in the teaching of the star-strewn skies. For my own part, I find a further interest in the thought that those astronomers of old worked like their younger brethren now. Whatever superstition mingled with their labors, whatever errors they may have taught, or been taught, respecting the heavenly bodies and their aspects, I can say, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes:

> "I am as old as Egypt to myself,
> Brother to them that squared the pyramids;
> By the same stars I watch. I read the page
> Whose every letter is a glittering world,
> With them who looked from Shinar's clay-built towers,
> Ere yet the wanderer of the midland sea
> Had missed the fallen sister of the seven."

RICHARD A. PROCTOR.

# PROTECTIVE TAXES AND WAGES.

THE discussion of protectionism in the United States constantly turns upon questions of wages. The question has two forms. The employed argue that protective taxes will make their wages high. The employers argue that protection is necessary for them, because they have to pay high wages. Here there are two parties, whose interests are as antagonistic as those of buyer and seller, who expect to be both favored at the same time by protective taxes.

The protectionist economists do not hesitate to encourage both wage-payers and wage-receivers to see their interest in protective taxes, and the protective legislator does not shrink from the task of satisfying both antagonistic interests by a single measure. The employé wants wages high; that is, higher than he has been getting,—higher than he could get in another country. The legislator promises him that he shall have them. This threatens injury to the employer, who wants wages low. It will not do to make wages low, however; so the statesman promises to produce the same result by making prices high. It sounds badly to talk of levying taxes to make prices high; so it is affirmed that, after all, protective taxes lower prices. Here, then, we have one and the same device, which makes wages high and low and prices high and low both at the same time. Surely the secret of universal happiness is discovered, if the buyer can give a low value and the seller get a high one, both at the same time. It seems strange, at the first look, that any one should so far insult the public intelligence as to maintain that employers importune Congress for a measure which shall raise wages, and that producers exert themselves to get a law passed which shall lower the price of products; but the real wonder is that some men (practical men, too, be it observed) actually believe this, and affirm it in good faith.

Changes in rates of wages can only be produced by changes in the amount of capital distributable in wages, or by changes in the number of persons competing for wages. If it is alleged that any measure will raise wages, it must appear, upon analysis, that that measure will act either to increase capital or to lessen the number of competing laborers.

The conditions of industry in the United States, as compared with Europe, may be very easily described. In the United States a sparse population has not yet fully taken possession of the continent, and has not yet taken off the cream of its productiveness. It is not even necessary here to pursue painstaking industry: superficial industry pays better. It is not necessary to employ much capital in tilling the ground. No skill and little division of labor are required in agriculture. It follows that every man who has but a pair of strong arms and a minimum of capital can win from a cheap, abundant, and fertile soil, by a little labor, a far greater return than he could, under similar conditions, win in Europe. The great mass of immigration is of persons of the unskilled labor class, because the advantage for them is far greater than for any other class. The ranks of the competitors for wages are continually depleted by those who go to the land. The minimum below which the wages of manual labor can never fall is the grade of comfort which could be won from the land. As this comfort is high, the minimum of wages is high. Hence the status of the American laborer, as compared with any other laborer, is high, because the economic conditions of the country are favorable to the well-being of men.

At this point appears the politician, and denies that we have correctly explained the state of things. According to him, it is the statesman who has caused all the well-being of the American laborer. How? By taxes! The immigrants have not come over here because the untouched earth here offered to the industrious laborer rich reward for his toil. They have not, since they came, created their own well-being by using diligently the chances which nature offered. According to the statesman, the immigrants came because taxes were high here, and they never would have been able to prosper, if the statesman had not carefully kept up a system of heavy taxation.

But this is not all. In the speeches and editorials of the protectionists we are constantly told that the American laborer

ought not to be reduced to some undefined but low grade of comfort. It is assumed that there is some grade of comfort which is due to the dignity and self-respect of the American laborer. The politician sees what this grade of comfort is, and, as he has the wonder-working genie tax under his control, he just gets for the American laborer, by taxing him properly, the suitable grade of comfort. According to this view of the matter, the American laborer makes up his mind what he wants in this world, and serves notice on nature to produce it. If she does not respond, the politician arranges it. Certainly the fallacies which surround this subject are dense and numerous, when men will expose themselves to ridicule by such preposterous notions.

What, then, can taxes do about our welfare?

Taxes on immigrants would not raise wages in the United States, because, in a nation situated as this is, new-comers will go upon the land. They do not add to the competitors in the labor market. They open up new land and add to the capital of the country. They count as hands to help in the work more than they count as mouths to increase consumption.

If taxes on immigrants could not raise wages, certainly no taxes on commodities could do so. Protective taxes aim to keep foreign products out of the country, in order to secure the home market to the home producers. These taxes, therefore, make commodities dear, scarce, and hard to get. But the commodities in the country are what constitute the wages of laborers. If the amount of these commodities is rendered smaller than it might be, how can that raise wages, looking of course not at money wages, but at real wages, or the comfort attainable by the laborer? There is no real propriety in discussing wages apart from other elements in the comfort of the population. Protective taxes lessen the available comfort in the reach of all members of society; they curtail the enjoyment which each citizen might get out of each hundred dollars of income. If I discuss wages as a separate question, I do so only because the question has been so raised, not because I concede that the laborers have any separate interest which can be, or ought to be, discussed by itself. It is pure demagogism to represent it as one of the functions of the Government to make wages high, or in any way to pet the laboring class. The protective taxes press upon all, even upon the protected, who mutually plunder each other. The lowering of real wages, by making commod-

ities scarcer and dearer, is the way in which the wages-class are subjected to their share of the effects of protective taxes.

Let us look next at the effect of protective taxes on the alternative open to the laborer to go upon the land. The protected interests prey upon each other, but they do it unequally. So far, then, the effects of the system are hap-hazard, and they fall out as they may. But there must be somewhere an available resource to meet the total expense of the system. The expense consists of three items: (1) the expense of all the custom-house machinery, which is kept up to *prevent* revenue from being collected, and to establish the barrier which secures the home monopoly; (2) the wages of all the laborers, and the profits on all the capital in the protected industries, for, if the protected industries would not exist but for the tariff, they cannot pay these expenditures; (3) the losses incurred by the protected industries. The only resource available to meet these expenses is the product of the strong and independent industries of the country. In England the agricultural industries were protected at the expense of the manufacturing industries, which were there the vigorous and independent ones. The burden fell on the manufacturing industries in the shape of taxes on food and raw materials. In our case the agricultural industries have to support manufactures as parasites. The burden falls on agriculture in the shape of enhanced prices for clothing, tools, machinery, furniture, blankets, fuel, and transportation. The enhanced prices of all the goods for which agricultural products are exchanged lower the profit of agriculture. Everything which has that effect lowers the value of the laborer's alternative, lowers the minimum of wages, lessens the attractiveness of the land, throws laborers on the market for wages, and so lowers wages. It has been argued that there should be a rule or method for protection, and, if there is to be protection, it would certainly be a great gain to have it regulated by some principle. The proposed rule is to just offset by protective taxes the difference in rates of wages between this country and Europe. If that rule were carried out the protective taxes would just take away from the laborer all that advantage in this country which led him or his ancestors to cross the ocean. Not even a war could permanently take away from the American laborer the blessings which nature here offers to him. I see only one power which could do it, and that is protective taxes, made heavy enough and continued long enough.

The fallacy in the notion that protective taxes make wages high is the same as the fallacy in the notion that trades-unionism makes wages high. Protection and trades-unionism act on the same principle. Trades-unionism inculcates negligence, slackness, and shirking. It teaches the men not to take pains, not to try to excel, not to do good work, and the philosophy of it is that the men should not try to produce, but should try not to produce, on the theory that if things are made scarce and dear and hard to get, that makes "work," and so makes wages high. If that philosophy were sound, all the classes which consume but produce nothing—like soldiers, paupers, idle women, idle rich, gamblers, criminals, and convicts—would be all the time raising wages, and they would lower wages if they should go to work, and not only consume but also produce. On the same philosophy, the Pittsburg rioters were sound economists when they let the city burn down, thinking that it would make work and raise wages. The protectionist and the trades-unionist both think that wages are increased when things are made scarce and hard to get. First they confuse wages with work, and then they confuse work with toil, and they think that they have increased wages, that is, good things to enjoy, when they have only increased the toil by which things are obtained. The truth is that wages are raised only by industry, thrift, temperance, prudence, and economy, producing abundance and increasing capital, not by any dark and crafty devices for producing scarcity and bad work.

We may now look at the other notion,—that high wages make protective taxes necessary. People who believe this must have a queer idea of the economic laws of society. They must think that a blessing and a calamity are not to be distinguished from each other. The wages paid in any industry are only one of the conditions of production, even from the capitalist's standpoint, and it may be only one of the least important. If a capitalist says that he cannot pay the current rate of wages, the first answer that should be made to him is to tell him not to do it then, for he must be misapplying his capital in some way or other. The market rate of wages is set by the supply and demand of labor, and there must be some industries which are able to win profits while paying that rate. But when our petitioners appear before committees of Congress to ask for protection, and allege that they need it because wages are high, when has any one of them ever been subjected to an examination to

learn whether he understands the business he has engaged in, or has an adequate capital, or has faithfully devoted himself to business, or has judiciously located his establishment, or has bought his raw materials wisely, or has adopted new machinery rapidly enough, and yet not too rapidly, or has organized his industry with good judgment, and so on indefinitely? Surely these inquiries would be to the point, when a man pleads for power to tax his fellow-citizens to make up the losses of his business. Wages are one of the essential expenses of any business. If it cannot pay wages at the market rate, it is not a "business"; it is either a play or a swindle. If it is said, as it constantly is, that American industry in general should be protected because American wages are high, the decision is made to turn on a single point when there are a score of conditions of industry which would need to be taken into account. What are the facts as regards cost and convenience of raw materials, facilities of transportation, cost and quality of machinery, climate as affecting industry, character of the people for industry, intelligence, and sobriety, security of property and order under the Government, excellence or otherwise of the tax system? These are the conditions of industry as between nations, not comparative rates of wages.

It is constantly assumed that wages and profits displace each other, and that the employer can make no profits if he pays high wages. The most familiar facts contradict this. There is no connection at all to be established between wages and profits. They may be both high together, or both low together. Indeed, they generally do go together, both high in good times, both low in bad times. One may be high, and the other low. If the laborers are diligent and effective, the employer may easily win greater profits while paying high wages. Therefore, if it be a fact that wages are high here, that fact gives us no ground at all for affirming that protective taxes are necessary.

It is said that we cannot compete with those who pay less wages than we. There are two classes of persons with whom one cannot compete,—his inferiors and his superiors. A physician might find that he could not compete with a laborer in digging a ditch, or with a great financier in managing a bank. Could any tax enable him to compete with the banker; that is, to compete with his superior? On the contrary, if he should

complain that he could not compete with the laborer because he could not afford to employ his time in an occupation which is less remunerative than his own, every one would ask him why then he desired to compete? Now, could a tax enable him to compete with the laborer? Indeed, it could. It could intervene to deprive him of the services of the laborer, and force him to dig his own ditch, abandoning a profession in which he could earn ten dollars a day to spend his time in an occupation worth only a dollar. This last is the only way in which protective taxes enable us to compete. They put us in a position such that we abandon occupations in which we might earn the high American rates, in order to do things which other people would do for us at half the price. Lower wages abroad, therefore, are not a reason for protective taxes, but just exactly the contrary. Our high wages are a proof that we can better occupy our time. They are a proof that we have means of employing our capital and labor, which are highly remunerative; and to make them an argument for protection is like arguing that a rich man needs charity, or a strong man help.

The competitor whom we always fear the most whenever this subject is opened is England. The wages paid in England are higher than those paid anywhere else in Europe. If comparative rates of wages decide whether one nation can compete with another, how does England pay the highest, yet beat them all? If she is able to beat them all because other considerations come in, why could not we beat her, at least in our own home-market with transportation in our favor, although we pay higher wages, because other considerations come in? If there are any laborers in Europe who could, with any justice, be called paupers, they are agricultural laborers. Our farmers raise products by labor remunerated at American rates, send them across the ocean, paying transportation, and beat the pauper laborers in their own market. How can this be if the test of possible competition lies in comparative rates of wages? The fact is, that the long lists of comparative wages which have been published would not have any value at all for this controversy, even if they were trustworthy.

W. G. SUMNER.

# SOME ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE.

In all institutions for the sale of insurances on life, life annuities, or endowments,* a risk, either positive or negative—that is, either against or in favor of the institution—is to be considered. The great defect in the early history of the business was that, in fixing the sums to be paid for the benefits, the risks were either not taken into consideration at all, or not settled by any rational rule.

A rational rule is possible, and in fact was substantially discovered and applied by the Rev. Richard Price, a particular friend of Dr. Benjamin Franklin, and who, but for his ill-health, would probably have been the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. It has been slightly improved by observation since, and sufficiently for all life insurance purposes.

In all life insurance calculations based on a mortality table, except when, by the old trick of "gross valuation," all the expected funds are discounted into real and existing assets, and the whole term of the policy is in some sense considered as a unit, a policy year is considered as the unit of time during which the risk remains constant, and is to be paid for, or is supposed to be fully paid for, by its amount multiplied by the tabular fraction expressing the probability of dying in that year of age, and discounted one year, if paid in advance. The rate of mortality is always assumed high enough, and the interest low enough, with a reasonable addition to the resulting net premium for expenses, to make such payment generally more than suf-

*Pure endowment is always a negative risk, but practically it is almost always combined with insurance in the same policy, in which case, as will be presently shown, it is simpler and more intelligible to eliminate the negative risks, and consider the combined policy as consisting of a series of yearly insurances, with an increasing bank accumulation, operating every year as so much self-insurance.

ficient. When the advance premium, as well as the face of the policy, is the same from year to year, and consequently interest is deeply concerned, a year is the unit of time on which interest is compounded; but when the yearly premium and face of the policy do not vary, it by no means follows that the company's risk does not vary from year to year.

The table itself, without any calculation, gives the normal cost, at every age, of insuring one dollar for one year, which, if discounted one year on account of advance payment, is sometimes called the net natural premium. But if one at the age of thirty should get insured for his whole life, paying only the natural premium of each year in advance, and should not die till his hundredth year, he would have paid $9,224.73 on a policy for $1,000. But if he should have paid the commuted level premium (by the Actuaries' Table at four per cent.), and lived to the same age, he would have paid only $1,188.04 for $1,000. Expenses are thrown out in both cases, and the mortality is supposed to be exactly that of the table. The difference results from the early excesses of the commuted premiums being accumulated at four per cent. per annum. This is something for the members of coöperative life insurance associations, who pay for death-claims only as they occur, to think of. The pure insurance method has the advantage of endowment insurance only when the insured dies early.

| *Age.* | | *Risk of Co.* | *Nor. Cost.* | *Self-Ins.* | *Nat. Prem. per $1,000.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 | *A bB....B'....B''* | $989.76 | $8.02 | $10.24 | $8.10 |
| 35 | *C dD* | 933.25 | 8.33 | 66.85 | 8.93 |
| 40 | *E fF* | 866.14 | 8.63 | 133.96 | 9.96 |
| 45 | *G hH* | 786.60 | 9.24 | 213.40 | 11.74 |
| 50 | *I jJ* | 696.41 | 10.67 | 303.59 | 15.33 |
| 55 | *K lL* | 595.83 | 12.41 | 404.17 | 20.83 |
| 60 | *M nN* | 483.25 | 14.10 | 516.75 | 29.17 |
| 65 | *O pP* | 353.88 | 15.00 | 646.12 | 42.39 |
| 70 | *Q rR* | 190.91 | 11.92 | 809.09 | 62.44 |
| 75 | *St* | | *T* | 1,000.00 | 91.89 |

A whole life policy is not the policy to be taken by any sensible person at thirty, or perhaps any other age. Its premium is calculated as if it were an endowment insurance, payable

at one hundred or previous death; but the terms of the policy do not make it payable till death, no matter how far beyond the age of one hundred that may be. At thirty an endowment insurance for $1,000, payable at seventy-five or previous death, may be had by the payment of forty-five annual premiums, each not quite one dollar greater than the net annual premium for a whole life-policy, being $17.85 instead of $16.97. This is because the excess goes to the self-insurance fund, which decreases the company's risk and reduces it to zero at 75.

A very simple diagram, with a few figures, will illustrate this policy better than pages of words. Let the line AS represent forty-five years, divided by the points C, E, G, etc., into nine half decades. Let AB′ represent the net annual premium, which is $17.85, and AB″ the gross premium, which is usually about $25, the difference being a provision for expenses and excessive mortality, which, if not required, comes back as "dividend." The lines AB, CD, EF—ST, represent the net natural premiums per $1,000 of risk, at the ages thirty, thirty-five, forty, etc. If all the forty-five net natural premiums were paid, the payments would amount to $1,198.23, and with $7.15 a year for expenses, etc., to $1,519.98, and yet there would be no endowment on reaching the age of seventy-five; but to secure the benefit, if death should occur in that year, another net natural premium of $91.89 would have to be paid, with something for expenses. But if the commuted premium of $17.85, with $7.15 for expenses, should be paid in advance every year from the start, then only $1,125 would be paid in all, and an endowment of $1,000 would be secured on reaching seventy-five.

The reason of this is obvious when we notice how the legal four per cent. reserve, at the end of the policy year, or self-insurance, diminishes the company's risk by just so much, so that the lines A*b*, C*d*, E*f*, G*h*, etc., represent the whole normal costs of the company's risk each year at those respective ages, no risk at all being run in the last year. If the lines for the intervening ages were drawn, those representing the net natural premiums for $1,000 of risk would all terminate in a curve drawn through B, D, F, etc., to T; and as representing the normal costs of the company's risks, they would terminate in a curve drawn through the points *b*, *d*, *f*, *h*, etc., to *t*, which coincides with S. Of the whole $803.25 of net level annual premiums paid, it takes $477.04 to pay the normal costs

of the company's risks, leaving $326.21 for deposits in the company's bank; and if this bank account does not grow to $1,000 in forty-five years, it will be because either an interest of four per cent. per annum cannot be realized, or $7.15 per annum will not cover expenses and extra mortality, or because deficiency occurs in both respects. There must, however, be bad, if not dishonest, management to have any failure of the endowment with such payments. I must beg the reader's pardon for being so painfully elementary, but many managers of immense companies deny that there is any banking element in the business at all!

Banking or no banking, equity requires that each policy should contribute to the death-claims of each year in the ratio of the risk the company runs upon it in that year. If there is a bank account (reserve at the end of the policy-year), the sum at the company's risk is the difference between that and the face of the policy, and its value is determined by the natural premium per one thousand dollars at the present age of the insured. If there is no bank account, then the value of the risk is the face of the policy multiplied by the fraction expressing the probability of the insured dying in that year, or the net natural premium per dollar for his present age.

Rev. Dr. Price's great reform in life insurance, by which the natural premiums were so commuted as to necessitate banking, had one serious imperfection. He did not, as he might easily have done, provide any rule for the equitable surrender of the policy. The company was left to exact, as a forfeiture for breach of contract, the whole or such part of the bank accumulation as it pleased. It would ordinarily promise, outside of the policy, in some general prospectus, to pay an equitable surrender value, if applied for, the policy still being in force; but, till some very recent legislation in Massachusetts, no rule of surrender has ever been proposed founded on any principle of equity. The practice, on the contrary, has always been so far the reverse of equity as to make the surrender charge the larger, the smaller the future probable contributions of the policy to death-claims may have become. In other words, the longer a policy-holder has continued to pay, the more it costs him to withdraw. Dr. Price's method of commuting the natural increasing premiums into the level banking premium is simply discounting the future premiums, each by itself, by both mortality and interest, and dividing the sum of the present values by the

present value of a one dollar annuity for the annual premium. By a precisely similar calculation, and equally certain, the present value of all the probable future contributions of any policy to the death-claims is ascertained, and it is technically called "insurance value." On every banking policy fit to be taken, this value grows less from the start, and even on a whole life policy it diminishes rapidly after the age of fifty-eight or sixty. It hardly needs saying, that if the health of an insured person has become impaired, the company can better afford to pay him his full bank account and let him go, than to receive his premium and continue to insure. The theory is, that no impaired life will let a policy lapse, or apply for surrender, and therefore the company must make as much as possible out of the healthy, who lapse or surrender. But the statistics of the business show nothing of the sort. For, after half or more of the policies in any large company have lapsed or been surrendered, the remaining lives do not show a mortality greater than that of the table, even on those lives that have been longest insured. Undoubtedly, in justice and prudence, there should be a surrender charge deducted from the bank account on every healthy life that withdraws, and the balance only should be paid as surrender value,— either in cash down or a cash annuity. And, in view of the statistics, it is hardly possible that the maximum surrender charge need exceed eight per cent. of the "insurance value" of the policy at the time of surrender or lapse. Such a surrender charge is more than any well-managed company is willing to give to procure as much new insurance value.

What would be exceedingly amusing to the public, if commonly understood, is that the executive managers of life insurance companies that hold tens of millions in their banks so wish to keep the insurance and banking undistinguishably mixed that they carefully avoid using or alluding to the terms "self-insurance" and "insurance value." "Oh, no, we don't do any banking," said a life insurance president, with more than $30,000,000 in bank, when asked to give an equitable cash surrender value on a policy which had more than half its face in his bank.

A "business man," dealing in an imperishable commodity, who should refuse to buy back the goods he had sold, when by doing so he could make as large a profit as he did in selling them, would be accused either of stupidity or commercial super-

stition. The life insurance managers who hold in aggregate about $400,000,000 of cash assets in their banks—every cent of it individual "self-insurance"—have yet to show why they should make their business an exception to the plainest dictates of common sense, common honesty, and public convenience. Are they ready to confess that they consider their vast "mutual" institutions, in any sense, mere milch cows for themselves? No intelligent person can deny, or wishes to deny, that the insurance they do, and the banking they do, are both exceedingly valuable, if not indispensable, to civilized society. They have policies in force amounting probably to something more than $1,500,000,000 on about half a million of lives, all of which are reasonably sure of being paid at maturity. But is that any reason why they should pretend to be insuring $1,500,000,000 while they have in bank $400,000,000 of individual self-insurance? They are really insuring but about $1,100,000,000. Their working expenses were returned to the Census Bureau for 1879 as a little over $13,000,000, and the death-claims paid as $23,000,000. Allowing $2,000,000 as the expense of the banking business, it took $11,000,000 of expense to manage the $1,100,000,000 of insurance, or to get, not the $23,000,000, but that sum less the self-insurance, to the widows and orphans. Now, no man knows, for no company ever tells, how much, paid on a policy, comes from the self-insurance fund in bank, and how much from the insurance premiums of the year—the company's bet that the insured would not die in that year. The probability, or reasonable guess, is that about four of the twenty-three millions paid for death-claims came from the bank, and $19,000,000 from insurance. If so, as far as the insurance is concerned, it took $30 to carry $19 to the beneficiary, on the average, or $1,598.70 to carry $1,000. It would seem that a well-established company must do a little better than this to hold the public confidence permanently. Some of the smaller "coöperative" companies, as they are called—even when operating on the crudest of equity—make a better showing than this. The eighth annual report of one such, consisting of 485 members, is before me, in which it took $5,166.47 to carry $4,425 to two beneficiaries, or $1,167.50 to convey $1,000.

One very small swallow does not make a summer, to be sure, but the "winter of discontent" among the holders of 1,261,905 policies returned to the Census Bureau as having lapsed or been surrendered during the decade from 1870 to 1880, must have

made a vast flock of swallows of the sort above alluded to; and whether their economy of operation is more or less than that of the banking insurance companies, plainly it is possible for them to make three dollars pay more than two to the beneficiary. And, summer or no summer, the multiplication of swallows will go on, till the holders of millions in life insurance banks consent to give equitable surrender values, and let the people know exactly how much it costs, on the average, to get a dollar of insurance or a dollar of endowment to the beneficiary.

I can only glance at a question which is now perhaps the most important before the life insurance banks,— which is, How should their reserves be invested? If they cannot be made to yield, on the average, a little more than four per cent., or to net that, a larger part of the premium must be held in reserve,— enough to amount to the same at a lower rate of interest. Is there likely to come any necessity for such a change? So far as I can see, no. The following table, derived from the census, gives the mode of investment and the rate of annual income, under five heads, including about ninety-nine per cent. of the reserves for the year 1879:

| *Investments.* | *Amount.* | *Percentage.* | *Interest per cent.* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Loans on real estate security | $184,753,300 | 44.86 | 7.06 |
| Cost value of bonds and stocks | 115,302,677 | 28.00 | 5.83 |
| Cost value of real estate | 63,829,691 | 15.05 | 2.45 |
| Premium notes | 30,527,151 | 7.41 | 6.08 |
| Loans on bonds, stocks, etc. | 14,107,157 | 3.43 | 5.38 |
| | $408,519,976 | 99.02 | 6.15½ |

The only remark I have to make on this is, that the people who most need life insurance in this country are also most in need of homes in fee simple. They have abundantly proved, in many of our own cities as well as in larger cities abroad, that to escape rent they can well afford to pay an interest of seven per cent. per annum, or higher, on the value of a suburban residence, with a garden, where there is less chance of wife and children dying before they can receive any benefit from a policy. Such persons are safe borrowers, and with an endowment insurance and a small margin, sure to sweep off the debt. Why should not the life company build for them?

ELIZUR WRIGHT.

# EDUCATIONAL NEEDS.

PROF. HALL.

As the first principle to be observed in the education of children, I would place hygiene; and, as perhaps first and most teachable of its many elements, proper muscle-culture. Few realize how dangerously near weakness often is to wickedness, how impossible healthful energy of will is without strong muscles which are its organ, or how endurance and self-control, no less than great achievement, depend on muscle-habits. Nearly one-half of the body is made of contractile tissue, controllable by the will; and it is because the brain is developed, while the muscles are allowed to grow flabby and atrophied, that the deplored chasm between knowing and doing is so often fatal to the effectiveness of mental and moral culture. The great increase of city and sedentary life has been far too sudden for the human body—which was developed by hunting, war, agriculture, and manifold industries now given over to steam and machinery—to adapt itself healthfully or naturally to its new environment. Let any of us take down an anatomical chart of the human muscles, and reflect what movements we habitually make each day, and realize how disproportionately our activities are distributed compared with the size or importance of the muscles, and how greatly modern specialization of work has deformed our bodies. The muscles that move the scribbling pen are an insignificant fraction of those in the whole body, and those that wag the tongue and adjust the larynx are also comparatively few and small. Their importance is, of course, not underrated, but it is disastrous to concentrate education upon them too exclusively or too early in life. The trouble is that few realize what physical vigor is in man or woman. Both in Germany and Greece a golden age of letters was preceded, by about a generation, by a golden age of national gymnastic enthusiasm which constitutes, especially in the former

country, one of the most unique and suggestive chapters in the history of pedagogy. Symmetry and grace, hardihood and courage, the power to do everything that the human body can do with and without all conceivable apparatus, instruments, and even tools, are culture-ideals that in Greece, Rome, and Germany respectively have influenced, as they might again influence, young men as intellectual ideals never can do save in a select few. We do not want "will-virtuosos," who perform feats hard to learn, but then easy to do and good for show; nor spurtiness of any sort which develops an erethitic habit of work, temper, and circulation, and is favored by some of our popular sports, but too soon reacts into fatigue. Physical training does not reach its end till it leads the young up to taking an intelligent, and serious, and life-long interest in their own physical culture and development. This is higher than interest in success in school or college sports; and, though naturally later than these, is the earliest form of self-culture in which it is safe and wise to attempt to interest the young for its own sake alone.

A great need for children of wealthy parents is often more exposure, lower temperature in the nursery and less heating coverings when playing out-of-doors, colder baths, etc. Exposure to cold and heat in their season is the only "gymnastics for the unstriped muscles." Excess is dangerous, but so is defect; and when I see, as I often have, children playing kindergarten games in hot rooms, to suit the teacher's sluggish pulses, and remember Fröbel's dictum, "The child is a plant and should live out of doors," the fear is deepened that, to the more distinctively American causes of physical decline (manifest not in the growth and stature of adolescents, but in the absence of staying quality later), such as excitement, overwork, the comparative lack of national sports and games, military service, recreative habits and physical ideals generally, together with a peculiar and exceedingly trying climate, in which the experiment of civilization has never before been made, school-life instead of being corrective sometimes adds another cause, far more serious than those of short-sightedness, spinal curvature, or even color-blindness, important though these may be. "How many of your boys have graduated sound in health to their teeth?" I lately asked the masters of six city grammar schools. Their replies have all ranged between three and fifteen per cent. Though good health is more often said to prevail by both teacher and

pupil, I doubt, from the sallow languor, the anxious, nervous, worrying tone so generally seen in the faces of our brain-worked girls in high and normal schools, if the case is much better there. A four hours' nooning for all primary children with but four hours' school, beginning at eight, and large central halls with movable apparatus, where classes of both sexes, of grammar-school grades at least, should be required to exercise in turn under teachers two hours or less per week, keeping the gymnasium full, and teachers there busied all day as the different classes march to and from it and their schools,—these devices, as in some German cities, would be a great improvement. Progress not great or striking, but in the right direction, has begun here; and the ways and means, on which all depends in education, of doing better than we are doing, are within the reach of teachers who seriously seek them.

Secondly, we must study and follow the child's nature as it actually is. Every step forward in methods since Comenius has resulted from a deeper insight into children's psychic growth and activity. Pestalozzi and Fröbel followed their pupils in their sports by day and to their beds at night, regarding nothing too trivial or too sentimental; studying toys, games, seeking inventories of every object or impression which interested them; lying in wait for their secrets; angling for their confidences; experimenting on them with stories, riddles, songs, and proverbs; and exploring the lines of least resistance into their minds for each element of instruction. Learned and able men, whom universities had honored, devoted themselves to primary teaching, protesting that any one who did not learn far more from the children than he could ever hope to impart to them was not fit to teach. Most of us regard children, even our own, whom we have seen daily for years, in the light of traditional ideas, sentiments, mental categories, etc., commonly ascribed to or implied in them in our juvenile literature and art, and philosophies of mind. The divine instinct of the mother, if not specially instructed, meets little more than physical needs. The few dozen impressions of our own childhood before eight, or even ten or twelve years, are corrupted with what others have told us of our childhood,—with dreams mistaken for realities in the lapse of time,—and are like the filmy tracing of the long decayed seed-acorn of a ten-year old oak tree I lately saw after a land-slide. Knowledge of childhood from memory of our own is as defective as a knowledge of acorns from such traces alone would be.

Individual and untaught tact, intuition, and sympathy have been mainly depended on for a knowledge of the child's soul; and without these no method can be worked. But they only reveal the possibility of something far better. These qualities are apt to be restricted in their field, and to die out after secreting a few dogmas or working out a new rut, while any really high and adequate degree of either is as rare as genius. This, indeed, is felt; and hence those many abstract schematisms of mind (according to Hamilton, Hegel, and many others less known), so often called in to take their place—schemes resembling the adult mind, indeed, but only as a manikin resembles a living body, If one would know physiology, we send him to the laboratory, and put the instruments and the living tissues before him, and do not send him to Galen or Haller, or even to Ludwig's or Hermann's books till later. But a normal-school pupil, who wishes to practice on the juvenile mind, is often given an outline of mental philosophy from a past generation, if not century, and practices teaching mainly on his or her classmates, who act the roles of young children, even to whispering, giggling, etc. The worst result of this method-cram, by which so much time is lost, is that pupils graduate with only the most scanty knowledge of the subjects taught, and with a method behind which they would feel quite confident of concealing their deficiencies in undertaking to teach, as one lately boasted to me he could, anything to any class, at half an hour's notice. They work at and nag their classes till they get or "develop" what is wanted, the pupils learning less often to trace natural order in natural ways, than to catch unconscious hints and suggestions of the word or thought wanted, by a process of mind-reading so subtle that the teacher thinks it a triumph of his method. This is true of far too many of our otherwise excellent normal schools. What we want is careful inventories of what children of successive ages may be safely assumed to know; what they can do; what sets of impressions their minds are busied with most and least hours per day; classifications of common errors in articulation; in understanding the natural objects about them; in the meaning of words; which senses are most teachable; what tastes, beliefs, habits, etc., are common to children and primitive man; the influence of sex, age, and nationality; how the religious, social, and moral instincts grow; when each successive interest may be assumed to be at its height and most available in instruction; how children feel toward pets and toward each other; when does

animism toward flowers, dolls, stars, etc., cease. These, and very many more problems of this sort,—surely no less important than the study of butterflies or the instincts of ants, and surely less complex than the adult mind, for which many widely admitted schemes have been laboriously wrought out,—are now, thanks to the many methods which many sciences have lately brought to bear on psychophysics, ripe for study. How does nature teach and learn, is now our problem.

Thirdly, moral training is needed. Religious instruction, as now given, is neither universal nor pedagogic enough; and virtue has never yet been effectively taught from ethical text-books. Morality is training far more than instruction, and all teaching that passes through the intellect, and affects the will and emotions, has a moral character. So far as the pupils can not only know, but do what is taught, so far as possession ripens into faculty,—whenever any element of memorized, worded, theoretical, or bookish, or passively received, knowledge is made practical, experimental, or industrial,—there is moral gain. On the other hand, wherever the bulk, rather than the degree of assimilation, is measured by examinations, etc.; wherever a curriculum of shreds and patches of many sciences is followed; where the conceit of comprehensiveness, as expressed in seemingly learned abstract allusions, as often in text-books in history and literature, as well as in school compositions, is tolerated; wherever good precepts are allowed to remain peacefully beside bad and discordant habits,—moral weakness is directly cultivated. Yet the moral problem is more commonly what, than how, to teach. The moral value of teaching is, all agree, great; as is also that of the contents of the school reading-books; and we must scrutinize the effect of each historic period and each poetic selection, the character of school music, etc., in our teachers' meetings. This is a higher and larger and later question than how these should be taught. How compactly and spontaneously do the elements of each topic shoot together during that long and epochful adolescent age, when brain-growth seems to concentrate on the "association fibers" which bind the cell-groups of adjacent centers together. With all these and many more open psychic and ethical questions, many of which are more or less ripe for research, one of our greatest needs is an institution where the best educational books which have appeared during the last century can be consulted, and where

schools and children can be systematically observed in the light of what has been done in our own country and in Europe. While other departments of science, far more extensive, are equipped at a dozen centers, there is at present not one man in this country devoting himself to the studies of education with anything like proper facilities, to say nothing of the proper qualifications for such work; and that, too, in a time of educational awakening, deeper and more general than any this country has ever witnessed.

Fourthly, and not to be separated from the principles of teaching, is the need of greater competence and a more professional spirit among teachers. The only way to secure this,—as it seems to the writer,—is more department-teaching. The music-teacher is already more or less professional, and goes from school to school, and teaches only music. Why should not the teacher of arithmetic, reading, geography, etc., be allowed to teach only these studies in several schools, and qualify and pass his examination for higher and higher classes? This method has been very successful in Europe, and would have certain peculiar advantages here. One who has taught geography or mental arithmetic only for ten or twenty years will be sure, if he has energy, to give his work a more professional character in many ways than if he must teach a dozen subjects. Some of the best German professors rose from this work, and the system cannot fail to bring higher and secondary education into closer relation. This system, which must not be carried too far, is one cause of the excellence of the German schools, and of the thorough character of discussions in their teachers' meetings. The effect of a not too frequent change of instructors is stimulating on the children, and a healthful spirit of emulation between the teachers, and sometimes even between gymnasium and university work, results. Complaint of overwork is often heard; but it is often our teachers and their methods that make things hard. If a teacher is full of his subject, and can induce enthusiasm in his pupils; if his facts are concrete and naturally connected, the amount of material that an average child can assimilate without injury is as astonishing as is the little that will fag him if it is a trifle above or below or remote from him, or taught dully or incoherently.

Finally, examinations should come in the cooler months, as is so common in Germany, and not in June, when, with many,

physical relaxation is at its greatest. At our present examination season, or earlier, the nervous systems of even the animals we experiment upon in physiological laboratories have so much less vigor as to be unserviceable for certain scientific purposes. Even if fresh, cool air do not actually increase arterial tonicity, and send the blood inward to strengthen the vital centers, the winter is nature's season for indoor and bookish work, while June days bring languor and give a fresh attraction to out-of-doors that comports ill with the culmination of the mental efforts of a year.

G. STANLEY HALL.

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PROFESSOR ADLER.

THE public are growing uneasy. It is feared that the brains of our little ones are overworked in the schools. Physical deterioration is the inevitable penalty of such overwork.

I would suggest, in the first place, that a commission be appointed to visit the schools, and determine how far the evil may be exaggerated—how far it exists. If it is possible to obtain tolerably accurate statistics, why should we depend upon vague conjectures and letters in the newspapers? But assuming, as we have reason to do, that there is ground for complaint, is it logical to cry out against the number of studies attempted in the schools? Might it not be wiser to seek the fault in the method rather than in the matter of instruction? Do we find that the amount of knowledge imparted to the pupils is out of proportion to the faculties of young children, or greater than is actually assimilated in the best private schools of this country and Europe without detriment? If this is not the case, we are led to infer that the cause of the evil is largely in the worry, waste, and tedium which result from bad methods. The children are mentally burdened; hence it follows that they must be more or less physically affected.

Without entering into a discussion of methods, the following points may be suggested: Let not the development of the memory be exaggerated at the expense of the understanding. Let the wholesale system of teaching be abandoned. Let the size of the classes be reduced, so that greater respect can be paid to the individuality of the pupils. Above all, let us have teachers who

are themselves trained in rational methods. Give us the right sort of teachers, and our chief difficulties will immediately disappear.

Judging from the utterances that we often hear, the presumption in many men's minds seems to be that the acquisition of knowledge is a hardship for the young; but what more damning accusation can be brought against the prevailing system of teaching than the fact that such ideas should become current? Who that has observed children has not seen how eager they are for knowledge, what numberless questions they delight in asking, and with what freshness and eagerness their young minds seize upon the facts of the world? If, then, the instruction of the school wearies and repels them, we must not suppose that the intellectual pabulum itself is distasteful, but that there is something in the condiment with which it is seasoned, or in the manner in which it is served, that causes so unnatural a repulsion. The great fact to be borne in mind is that instruction becomes interesting as soon as the self-active reason of the pupil is appealed to, and he is taught to reach results by the exertion of his own thought, instead of receiving a bundle of facts, ready made, from the hand of the instructor. There is absolutely no lesson—not the dry arithmetic lesson, not the reading lesson, not the history and geography lesson—that will fail to become fascinating and delightful to the pupils, if the instruction given be fully saturated with the rational method. The children will then take in knowledge as a hungry person takes in food, as one who is thirsty drinks water from a clear spring.

But there are especially two points to which I desire to call attention. It is well known that, in changing from one kind of physical exercise to another, we experience a sense of relief which is often preferable to entire rest. The same is true of mental exercise, as every student knows. Why not apply this principle to the teaching of the young? If our pupils complain of overwork, this must be due in part to the fact that there is not sufficient alternation in their daily tasks. An excellent means of obviating this difficulty would be to introduce technical instruction and art-modeling into the schools. In the school workshops the pupils would obtain a gymnastic of the eye and hand, practical knowledge of mathematics, refinement of the taste, a new species of moral influence, physical invigoration,

and a welcome change from the purely intellectual part of their instruction. If the hours spent in the workshop are properly intercalated between those spent in the class-room, the pupils will pass with joyous spirits from one to the other; they will do more and better work in both departments than is now accomplished in one alone, and their mental freshness will remain unimpaired throughout the day. The additional charge which the introduction of this system would involve—and this appears to be one of the chief objections urged against it—is in reality by no means so considerable as is commonly supposed. The material used in the school workshop is of the most inexpensive kind. The tools are simple and easily managed, and the graduates of normal colleges, if adequately trained and under proper supervision, ought to be able to impart this instruction without further charge upon the community.*

The second point to which I would refer is, that technical education and art-modeling in the schools would be a means of testing the ability of the pupils in a new direction. The introduction of industrial education into the schools is often urged as a means of fitting the children of the poorer class for their future station, and enabling them to gain higher wages later on. If placed on this ground solely, it is justly resisted by the fraternity of teachers, who insist that the school shall be kept sacred to the enlightenment of the mind and the building up of character, and should not be degraded to serve "the bread and butter interests" of later life. But technical and art education in the schools ought to be advocated for educational reasons chiefly. They are as important for the children of the rich as of the poor; for those who will eventually enter the professions and the higher walks of life gen-

* The beneficial effect of alternate practical labor and mental application is admirably illustrated in the English half-time schools. The pupils of these schools are compelled by poverty to work in the factory during the greater part of the day, and only attend instruction during three hours. But experience shows that they learn as much in half time as other pupils in full time. They are quick, alert, their attention is more easily concentrated, and there is no doubt that their training in the factory has given them these advantages. We do not recommend the sending of children, even of the poorest class, into factories, where they are exposed to horribly injurious influences that more than outweigh any incidental advantage; but we can secure the benefit that arises from the alternation of practical work with abstract study by introducing the school workshops.

erally, as for those who will follow the humblest trade. This educational value must be kept in view. It is because hand and eye education are a new means of brain education, that we are justified in recommending their inclusion in the curriculum of the schools. Instead, therefore, of diminishing the number of studies, we ought rather to increase them. Not in such a way, however, that all studies shall be made obligatory upon all pupils, but so that a sufficient number and variety of tests may be placed at the teacher's disposal for discovering the aptitudes of his pupils, and encouraging each one in the direction in which his individuality points. In the Workingman's School we have seen astonishing instances of young children, who seemed hopelessly inapt in all the ordinary branches of instruction, easily taking the lead in the school workshop, and excelling their companions in the accuracy, finish, and beauty of their results. Is it not true that in any of the public schools such children would have been hopelessly lost? Their repeated failures would have crushed their self-respect, and, perceiving themselves to be despised as dunces, they would have accepted the verdict of their teachers and their whole future might thus have been blighted.

How important is it, then, that we should apply a sufficient variety of tests to the aptitudes of our pupils, and rouse the talents that may be slumbering in the corners of the soul. The profession of the educator is a golden profession, not in its pecuniary recompense, perhaps, but all the more in its substantial value to the state. Let us not listen to the cry of those who would develop only certain faculties, such as can be turned to account in money-getting, and leave undeveloped the total humanity of the children. In dealing with the latter generously, we are but fulfilling the duty which one generation owes to the next; in building them up intellectually, æsthetically, and morally, we are truly building the future of the republic.

In conclusion, since the question of the schools has come before the public, I would add a word concerning the management of our public school system in general. Of what avail, we ask ourselves, are such suggestions as the above, and much wiser ones that may be brought forward by others, unless there is some means of giving effect to what is suggested? The Board of Education, in whose hands is the control of our public schools, fills an indispensable office in watching over the admin-

istration of the school funds, in planning and superintending the erection of new buildings, and in caring for the well-being of the schools generally; and the fact that men of high social standing and responsibility devote themselves to this duty is a most gratifying one, for which we cannot be sufficiently thankful. But the question to which I should like to direct attention is, whether members of boards of education, as a rule, are specialists in the science of education. Are they versed in the principles of pedagogy? Have they the time to become profoundly acquainted with the results of recent research in the educational field? Can they possibly keep abreast of the best kind of educational literature that comes to us from abroad? Are they enabled to follow the course of educational experiments elsewhere, and do they conscientiously, weighing the *pros* and *cons*, decide what is applicable here and what is not? Is it not, on the contrary, true, that the very fact that these gentlemen do occupy high positions, that their time is valuable and their energies engaged in other directions, must preclude them from giving exhaustive attention to the purely theoretical matters upon which they are yet constantly called on to decide?

The question, then, which I put is, whether persons who make a specialty of the science of education — experts in education — should not be allowed to exert some influence upon the course of studies and other like matters in our schools. Far be it from me to recommend that these specialists should be allowed to legislate. The final decision, the authoritative vote, may still remain in the hands where it is at present lodged. What I propose — and does it not seem an obviously just proposition? — is that recognized students of the science of education should at least be allowed a hearing before a board of education, and should be recognized in some official way. It has been suggested by one who is competent to speak on these subjects, that it might be best to appoint a commission of educators, whose duty it should be to visit the schools annually, biennially, or even at longer periods, to inquire into existing evils, to recommend such changes in any direction as they may deem necessary, and to lay their report before the board for action. Who does not remember what an impetus to the course of reform in England was given by the Parliamentary commissions, which have from time to time reported on special subjects. If we had such commis-

sions on education, I am certain that the cause of educational reform would make rapid strides forward. Valuable hints, fruitful suggestions, would be the result of their labors. Their published reports would stir up public sentiment, and boards of education, which are now impeded in their efforts at reformation, would find themselves buoyed up and supported by a healthy and more enlightened public opinion.

What I respectfully submit is that, in the management of the public schools, an advisory commission of educators should have a voice. We allow bakers to bake our bread, and shoemakers to make our shoes; why should we not allow those who make a specialty of the science of education to give us at least their advice in regard to the education of our children.

FELIX ADLER.

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PRESIDENT HUNTER.

A GREAT deal has been said of late, in the newspapers and elsewhere, about overwork by the pupils of the public schools. If half that has been asserted be true, it is high time that the remedy should be applied: for any education at the cost of permanent ill-health is too dearly purchased. John Stuart Mill's definition of education is general and comprehensive, and includes physical as well as moral and intellectual perfection. "Education," he says, "includes whatever we do for ourselves, and whatever is done for us by others, for the purpose of bringing us nearer the perfection of our nature." Any system of education that disregards the health of the children is faulty; and, if it injure their health by overwork, it is criminal. The trite aphorism, *Mens sana in corpore sano*, should be the motto of every conscientious teacher and every educational system.

Overwork in the public schools may arise from several causes. First, from the folly of teachers in making the lessons to be studied at home too long; secondly, from the neglect of teachers to thoroughly explain the lessons at the time they are assigned for home study; thirdly, from unwisely establishing a course of study for the schools which must, of necessity, press heavily on pupils and teachers; and, fourthly, from creating and fostering a spirit of unwholesome competition, which drives

pupils and teachers to work for high marks at examination. In addition to these principal causes, several minor ones might be mentioned: the inability of some pupils to study at all, because they have never been taught how to study; the lack of all decent facilities for home study by the children residing in the poorer apartment-houses; and the imperfect classification of the pupils, which, perhaps, entails the greatest evils of all—to wit, worry, terror, and overwork. The pupils placed above their proper grades struggle with their studies as weak swimmers struggle with a stormy sea.

It is no easy task, however, to regulate the work for and in the schools so as to prevent indolence on the one hand, and overwork on the other. The road to learning may be made so smooth and pleasant as to weaken mental activity, or so rough and disagreeable as to create an abhorrence of books and studies. If over-instructed, the pupils may become mere passive recipients of knowledge; and if under-instructed, they may waste their time in futile efforts and worry themselves into ill-health. Recurring to Mill's definition, "Whatever we can do for ourselves," falls under the head of home-study; and, "Whatever is done for us by others," falls under the head of instruction in school. The nice balance of these two will make an almost perfect system of education. One of the rules of good teaching is, "Never tell a child anything that he can discover for himself." Of course, there are reasonable limits and exceptions to this rule. It should not be forgotten that a set "task" exercises an admirable moral influence on a child's mind. Every time that a boy lays aside his top, or the girl her doll, for the purpose of learning to-morrow's lesson, there is in this simple act of giving up a pleasure to perform a duty an education of the will which is vastly more important to the future welfare of the child than the little learning acquired from the school-book. The child may fail next day to recite the lesson. But what of that? An act of self-denial was performed, and a proper effort was made. Even in the poorest quarters of great cities, simple tasks should be assigned for home-work. The child should be trained to self-reliance and self-help, and hence he should be required to do something by his own unaided efforts. Study at home, however, should never be required until the child has reached his tenth or eleventh year. Up to this age he should study in school under the supervision and guidance of his

teacher, and the school time should be divided, as nearly as possible, into three equal parts—one-third for study, one-third for recitation and instruction, and the remaining third for recreation and physical exercise.

But it is of the first importance that a child should be instructed how to study. The question then becomes, When and how should study be commenced? It would be absurd to begin before the child had learned to read in a simple reader of the third or fourth primary grade. The methods of teaching reading in vogue in some places are utterly ridiculous and stupid. The children's minds are occupied in "minding their stops"; in looking out for commas, semi-colons, and periods; in keeping their voices up at some of these points, and in letting them fall at others; while all the time the book may be imperfectly punctuated. By this method the children gain no proper understanding of the subject-matter of the book, but, on the contrary, acquire a "sing-song" style of reading which is anything but agreeable to the listener. This is the elocutionary reading of many schools. What is the main object of the great majority of the people in learning to read? Is it not to receive information? How many of them are ever asked to read aloud after they leave school? How many of them ever become orators? The ability to receive knowledge by silent reading is of the utmost importance—of prime necessity—and this silent reading furnishes the very best means to enable the teacher to instruct the pupils how to study. The teacher should give the children of the primary and lower grammar grades, at least ten minutes for the silent reading of a lesson in the class reading-book; at the expiration of this time the teacher should request the children to mention any words whose meanings they did not know. If any are mentioned, the definitions should be given, if possible, by members of the class; but, in case of failure on the part of the children to do so, the correct meanings should be clearly and concisely stated by the teacher. The children should then close their books, and tell the story in their own words; the errors and omissions should be pointed out by members of the class. The teacher should be very careful to correct all inaccuracies of speech. The habit of using good English at this early period of their lives will do more to cause the children to "speak and write with propriety" than all the English grammars ever published. By means of exercises of this kind, the

pupils' vocabulary will be increased, and their minds enlarged. When the story of the lesson has been told by the children, and the teacher has become satisfied that they understand the meanings of the words, they may then open their books and read aloud. It will be found that the reading is much more expressive, and that it contains much less of the "sing-song." When a child has once learned to receive knowledge by silent reading, it becomes a very easy matter to study geography and history in the higher grades, and, indeed, to learn all his lessons in a very short time. The habit of learning in this way, if once thoroughly acquired, would put an end to the memorizing of unmeaning words, and greatly, if not wholly, check the overwork recently complained of by some of the newspapers and a portion of the public.

Study at home should be regulated according to the social condition of the children. In the poorer localities of great cities, little dependence can be placed by the teachers of even the higher grammar grades on home-study; nevertheless, it ought not to be entirely abandoned. The children should be trained to do something for themselves by their own unaided efforts; but the work required should be small in quantity and simple in quality—assigned, as before stated, for its moral influence rather than for its intellectual value. In the wealthier localities, where the children possess the advantages of homes more or less refined, and of the insensible culture that proceeds from contact with educated parents, the lessons to be studied out of school should never require more than two hours' work even in the upper classes of the grammar grade; and if the classification has been made with care, and the previous training has been thorough, the time for home-study might well be reduced to one hour. At any rate, the first consideration with parents and teachers should be the preservation of the children's health and the prevention of overwork and worry.

Water cannot rise above its level, nor the pupil above his teacher. The great aim of every system of public instruction should be to secure the services of teachers specially trained, precisely as the members of any other profession are trained, to produce the best results in the shortest possible time. Experience has proved that a good education alone is not sufficient to make a man a good teacher. Not infrequently the best scholars are the worst teachers. The efficient teacher needs either natural

aptitude or careful training. The born teacher is as rare as the born poet. Hence the necessity for normal schools. The great and growing states of the Old World, realizing the importance of an economic system of public instruction, have established normal institutions by the thousand. In the United States there are only about two hundred normal schools to recruit the ranks of an army of three hundred thousand public-school teachers. As a matter of course, then, there must be throughout the country many incompetent teachers, men and women, whose highest idea of teaching is to "hear" lessons, previously committed to memory, parrot-fashion, from a text-book. Under such teachers there will always be overwork, worry, disgust, irritation, and, if permitted, frequent allopathic doses of rattan.

THOS. HUNTER.

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DR. PUTNAM JACOBI.

MY knowledge of the public schools is derived, partly from personal recollections as a pupil in one of them; partly from professional and personal intercourse with a certain number of teachers and scholars; partly from such general acquaintance with the system as is accessible to every citizen. In regard to the hygiene of the schools, I have had occasion to study it perhaps rather more in the case of the female teachers than of the pupils. The most important infractions of hygienic rules have seemed to me to affect these two classes of persons about equally. This is conspicuously true of the habit, which widely prevails among both, of passing nearly the entire day without food, or with a lunch at once unsubstantial and indigestible. The apparent inability of the female sex to comprehend any fixed relation between food and work is the cause of many of its woes. The habit of working without eating is first contracted at school, and in thousands of cases initiates the dyspepsia and frontal headache which are so readily attributed to excessive mental exertion. The old New England custom of keeping school from nine to twelve, and again from two to four, is certainly much more favorable to health than a single prolonged session from nine to three, with half an hour's intermission for the double purpose of lunch and exercise. Short periods of

work, alternating with periods of recreation, are equally essential to children and to the women who teach them. No one can enter an afternoon school-room without noticing the flushed faces and listless attitude of the pupils, and wondering on what principle, or for what reason, these young things are still chained to their desks.

School-hygiene cannot fail to be defective so long as the main object of school-life is held to be the learning a certain number of lessons. So soon as the problem of education is recognized as bearing upon the development of a dual organism in all its parts, it will no longer be considered proper to devote eight hours a day to the training of the memory, and fifteen minutes to inadequate calisthenic exercise of the muscles. The enormous massing of children in the public schools leads, furthermore, to serious infractions of public hygiene in regard to ventilation, sewer drainage, and the communication of contagious diseases. How far it is at present possible to provide adequately for all the needy children, while well-to-do parents are permitted to send their children to the public schools, seems to me a question requiring serious consideration from both the sanitarian and educational point of view. It is incredible that any real education can be afforded to the large classes now herded together under the care of one teacher. Twenty or thirty children are certainly all that a single brain can pretend to teach; but our public-school classes habitually contain sixty, eighty, and even more pupils.

The vitiation of the atmosphere of the school-room by overcrowding, the nervous strain and worry to the teacher in merely keeping such a class in order, the nervous excitement to the children from prolonged contact with one another in such masses, are all influences antagonistic to health. Another such influence of great importance for the health of both children and teachers is the system of competitive examinations for promotions. It is difficult to see what useful purpose is accomplished by this system. It is certainly rational to select, according to some standard (not necessarily the existing one), the children who have shown most capacity in the grammar schools, to be recipients of more advanced instruction. But it does not follow that children under fourteen should be urged to a pseudo-demonstration of capacity beyond their real powers. That no strain should be imposed on a growing organism is a

postulate that should be an axiom. But it is utterly and necessarily disregarded by any system which engages children in competitive strife. From this they should be steadily discouraged, and really only allowed to do what they can do easily. Effort is then more likely to be directed toward the invention of methods by which, through increased development of power, a previously difficult task may be rendered easy. The development of mental power, that may become available when the pupil deals with new facts, is quite as important as the acquisition of any one group of facts. It is evident that this requires much individualization, at present impossible, in the systematized chaos of the educational machine.

I do not think an opinion of sufficient practical value can be formed in regard to the question of overwork, by estimating the difficulty of the examination papers upon which admission to the colleges depends, and around which the education in the upper classes of the grammar schools centers. What may be perfectly easy for one child, may be immensely difficult for another, whose real capacity may nevertheless not be inferior, only he may require to have been taught in a different way. The system of examination papers, or even of oral examinations conducted by a stranger, however plausible and however proper for adults, is unsuited to children. There is no use in obtaining average or percentage estimates of their ability. Any good teacher with a class of reasonable size, could tell much better at the end of a year what children were fitted for promotion without than with these laborious percentages and cram examinations, which make such an imposing show on paper.

True, some system of control must be provided to constantly test the work performed by so many different teachers. But what is the worth of the test which consists simply in ascertaining how many children can answer the same set of questions, prescribed beforehand as a procrustean rule to which every individual in the class must be adjusted? It seems to me conceivable that the examiner should first inquire of each teacher concerning the subjects toward which attention has been directed, the particular method pursued in the special class, the varying aptitudes and tastes of the different scholars under his or her care, and that the examination should be based on the information so afforded, and thus differ in each case. It should be radically different from examination in professional studies,

which necessitates the acquisition of a certain minimum of information on prescribed topics; whereas the object here is mainly to ascertain the degree of development of the children. Reading, writing, and arithmetic once mastered, the kind of further knowledge to be acquired might vary indefinitely.

In the present system, so far as I understand, little or no scope is allowed any individual teacher for development of individual method, or talent, or originality; all tendency to invention is crushed in the mighty working of the educational machine. Not only so, but, so far as I have been able to observe, the female teachers at least become cowed into an attitude of timid submissiveness absolutely fatal to any independent judgment concerning their own work.

I have been particularly requested to give my opinion in regard to the evil effects of mental overwork. I find it extremely difficult to disentangle the element of mental strain from among the various existing conditions inimical to the health of children. In addition to those already mentioned, I suggest that the one-sidedness of an education addressed almost exclusively to the verbal memory is a serious cause of mental—*i. e.*, of nervous—strains. According to the prevailing system, not only are a large number of intellectual faculties—imagination, invention, judgment, reasoning,* perception—left without systematic training, but the senses, the first avenues of mental impressions, are disregarded altogether.† Memorizing is an effort, and involves strain only when the object to be remembered has not produced powerful impressions on the mind. When it has, the remembrance ceases to be difficult: it becomes inevitable.

Now, it is impossible to make powerful impressions on the minds of children by means of verbal symbols only. Children must be addressed through their senses, including the sense of touch, upon which we are all originally dependent for any conviction of reality in the world around us.‡ When words must

* A certain amount of training of reasoning, however, is afforded in the study of arithmetic.

† With the exception of such training of the eye as is obtained from study of maps. I am told, however, that neither teachers nor pupils are expected to draw maps, as is done in Germany.

‡ Dr. Seguin, Sr., has published a remarkable study of the effect which may be produced even on an idiot brain by systematic training of the sense of touch. In Professor Adler's Workingman's School, handiwork training is adopted as an essential part of a mental curriculum.

be used apart from things or pictures, they should certainly first be employed by the mouth of the teacher before the child is sent to find them in a book. The difference between teaching children orally, and teaching them by means of books, may be compared to that which exists between nourishing a baby at the breast or feeding it on condensed and dead milk. A child does not read a book as an adult does, and few persons take the trouble to detect the grotesque effect which may really be produced on his mind by the phrases he glibly professes to understand. My personal experience in the professional education of adults has shown me an extraordinary prevalence of the habit of reading words without any distinct idea of their meaning—a habit fatal to intellectual integrity. Yet this slipshod habit is largely fostered by the attempt to educate children in huge droves at our public schools.

It seems to me singular that the subject of ethical education in the public schools is for the moment so entirely left out of sight. The somewhat absurd squabbles over the reading of the Bible serve rather to emphasize a tenacious adherence to a name which conceals a real indifference to the thing. Yet surely, education in the principles that should govern the mutual relations of human beings might be expected in schools provided by the State, that expects to permanently dominate these relations. Such education would demand a high grade of intelligence and inventiveness on the part of the teacher. It is not enough to enunciate a precept: the end is to create a sentiment. This can only be done by practical exercises in situations combined or created by the teacher. But what a field for rich and varied activity might here be thrown open!

Recognition of the enormous difficulties of the task assigned to the public-school teacher should be followed by willingness to provide higher compensation, when this task is intelligently and conscientiously performed. So much talent, enthusiasm, training, knowledge, and vigor are required for the adequate performance of the teacher's duty, that the supply of really competent teachers must fall far short of the demand. The apparent excess in the supply is only the result of the low standards of attainment and of the mode of appointment. And here I may touch upon a question that, in my opinion, is worthy of consideration. Is it not strange that, in the city of New York, which employs three thousand female teachers, and undertakes to educate many thousands of female children, there are

no women in the Board of Education or among the school trustees? Not only the financial management, but the inspection of the schools, the appointment of the teachers, the scaling of their salaries, their promotions,—everything connected with their discipline as well as with that of the children,—is in the hands of men, not teachers, not educators, but generally politicians. The same kind of influence as governs the Department of Charities and Corrections rules the Department of Public Education. Is it to be supposed that in this department appointments are always made according to merit, and never by favor?

The London School Board, which has done such remarkable work in the last few years, contains many women, sitting side by side in council with some of the most distinguished men of England. Women of intelligence and leisure can certainly find no better occupation for both than in such wide and thorough study of the principles of education as should fit them for the responsible position of trustees and inspectors of the schools. Teachers who have spent years in faithful service should have the opportunity to bring their practical experience to bear on the discussions of the Board of Education. The fact that women are restricted in the exercise of political rights and influence should be rather an advantage than otherwise. It might be hoped that they would thus tend to counterbalance the influence of political motives, which, it is said, do now not unfrequently sway the decisions of men; and in those bodies presumably removed from political influence,—as the Faculty of Professors at the Normal College,—it seems, to an outsider, at least, perfectly incredible that the line of promotion should not be open to long-tried women teachers, as well as to men.

MARY PUTNAM JACOBI.

SOUTH END

THE

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

APRIL, 1883.

**No. 317.**

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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1883.

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## APRIL, 1883.


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SOUTH END.


# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXVII.

APRIL, 1883.


## DIVORCE.

REV. DR. WOOLSEY.

THE subject of the present article is not whether marriage can in any case be dissolved, but for what causes the state may rightfully dissolve it, or rather, may listen to a petition from a husband or a wife, or from both, for its dissolution. Properly speaking, a divorce can never be required by the state, but only permitted. There may be marriages which, for some reason and chiefly on moral grounds, are void *ab initio*, and therefore were never valid. To declare that marriage never existed in such cases is not to dissolve a marriage, but to dissolve a cohabitation which never was a marriage. That the state, if any power, ought to do this, is generally admitted; and it is quite as generally admitted that the state ought to define the causes for which dissolution of marriage, if ever allowed, may take place. In such cases the married party who is aggrieved may apply for a remedy, and here a court must intervene; or the party aggrieved may condone the offense of the other, and here the condonation precludes all action of the state through its courts. Whether the remedy ought to include the right of remarriage, as well as that of separation, is the important point which we shall try to discuss. It seems clear, however, that the state ought never to adopt the rule of granting divorce by mutual consent, for in every such

case the parties will consult only their own interests and desire; while the state, as the guardian of the highest interests of a community which has perpetual existence, must look to the permanent good of all. Moreover, religion and morals have more to do with marriage and the welfare of the family than with any other institutions; so that, if the state should make light of these spiritual powers, or even disregard a pervading opinion entertained concerning them by the people, it may do itself an injury which admits of no reparation.

The feeling that family relations are sacred did not come at first from the Hebrew scriptures nor from the Gospel, but was suggested by old experiences of mankind. How the Romans felt in their earliest times is shown by the antique, solemn forms of *confarreatio*, in which the two persons to be united in marriage partook of a cake of spelt (or *far*, as they called it), in the presence of one of the principal priests, and before ten witnesses. This may be called a sacramental rite, betokening the communion, or common life, of the family. Opposite to this was the rite of *diffarreatio*, connected with divorce, which was pronounced by a court composed of family relatives. According to the historian Dionysius, no divorce took place at Rome until five hundred and twenty years from the foundation of the city (2, § 25). But this is hardly credible.

Nowhere is the closeness of the union between man and wife more forcibly and beautifully set forth than in an early passage of Genesis, where it is said, "For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and they shall be one flesh." Here we notice first that a son is expected to quit the parental roof and find a wife away from home; hence shunning the crime of incest, and forming a new household with a stranger, besides binding the parts of society together. He is to cleave to his wife, and they are to become one flesh. In this passage polygamy and divorce are forbidden. For how could one man be incorporated with more women than one, and how could so close a union as oneness of flesh admit of separation?

This passage is used by Christ in the gospels (Matth. v. 31–33, and xix. 3–9, Mark x. 2–12) as a support for his command concerning divorce. In Luke also (xvi. 18), a general rule is given which needs to be interpreted by the other more full statements. That Paul also was acquainted with the words of Christ, is evident from I. Corinth., vii. 10, 11. In Matthew, ch. xix., the

Pharisees are said to have put the question to Jesus, whether it was lawful to put away a wife for every cause; and to have received from Him the answer (verse 9) that "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery" (or "maketh her an adulteress," as it stands in ch. v. 32, or, "committeth adultery against her," as in Mark x. 11); and "he that marrieth her, when she is put away, committeth adultery." This last clause is wanting in some early MSS. in ch. xix. but is found in ch. v. 32; and in Mark x. 12 we have the words, "If she herself shall put away her husband and marry another, she committeth adultery." This last passage is singular, as including a woman's putting away her husband; which was not known to Jewish law, although allowed and frequent among the Greeks and Romans, and at that time practiced in the Herodian family to some extent. The Jews living outside of Palestine may have gone beyond the original permission of divorce, which was confined to the husband only.

This restriction of divorce to the single cause of adultery was met on the part of the Pharisees with the question: "Why, then, did Moses command to give a bill of divorcement, and to put her away?" to which Jesus answered: "Moses, for your hardness of heart, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it hath not been so." That is, Christ, although admitting Moses to be a divinely appointed legislator, did not admit that the law was a perfect code. The license of divorcing a wife was owing to an inveterate habit of the Hebrew people, which had no justification in the nature of marriage or of the family, but rather sprang from a vicious state of society than from man's nature at the first or from an ordinance of God. A wise lawgiver will sooner endure some rooted evils in a state which he is founding, than by too great restraint expose his institutions to ruin.

Christ proceeds to explain what he intends by "but from the beginning it hath not been so." "Have ye not read," says he, "that he who made (or created) them from the beginning, made male and female, and said, 'for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the twain shall become one flesh?'" (*the twain* appears in the Septuagint, but only *they* — which implies the twain — in the Hebrew). Then he adds, as his own comment or deduction, "so, then, they are no more twain, but one flesh." Then comes his command:

"What, therefore, God has joined together, let no man put asunder." It is a command resting as an inference on the idea that marriage is a divinely constituted union, broken, so long as the twain are alive, by one crime only, which destroys it and prevents its fulfilling its end. And as a command it has had, since it was first given, both in the Church of Christ and in societies which do not fully acknowledge him, a vast influence. The history of the Christian idea of marriage, of legislation growing out of it, of the contest between the new views in the Christian Church and the law of the Roman empire, if we could give it in such a brief article as this, would show what a might has been wielded by a few words, believed to come from a legislator who had a divine right to reform and purify the most important of human institutions. And this power will always belong to them, until a general decay of faith in God and in Christ shall spread over all nations that can now be called Christian. What has been done by this brief command consists in its declaring that marriage is not to be dissolved except in one single case. If it has done any good, this good has been effected by the prohibition of divorce for all other causes.

It will, I think, be generally conceded, that the sanctity of marriage, its indissoluble character, except as obliterated by one crime, and to a great extent the reverence felt in Christian lands for the family virtues, are chiefly due to the few words which Christ pronounced on the subject of divorce — words let me add which not only frown on the laws of divorce in the Old Testament, but forbid, also, its introduction into the Christian Church. But on one point of some difficulty he expressed no opinion. The new religion would inevitably cause divorce rather than peace as it entered heathen lands: a husband, it might be, would adhere to his old religion, while the wife would be attracted by the new gospel from Judea. In other cases, where both became converts to Christianity, difficulties might arise between them, and one would forsake the other. In this last case the wife is commanded by the Apostle Paul to be reconciled to her husband, or to remain unmarried (I. Cor., vii. 10–11). The command he gives as from "the Lord," and it is an easy inference from the words of Christ which we have already noticed. In the other case, where one of the parties was an unbeliever, the apostolic authority of Paul could be acknowledged by the believer only. He or she, therefore, is ordered not to leave the

unbelieving partner, but to continue the union unless he departs; and the Apostle adds these remarkable words, that the children of such a family, when only one of its heads is a Christian, are holy children. Why, then, should a Christian desert his or her duties in a consecrated place? But the unbelieving or heathen man or woman might insist on breaking up the union. Here the Apostle says to the Christian wife, "if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God hath called us in peace." By this we understand, with Meyer, Stanley, Neander, Tholuck, and even with De Wette, that the Christian believer is not under the severe bondage of preventing disruption of marriage by active measures of his own, yet that it does not follow that in such cases liberty of remarriage is allowed. Much less would the apostle approve of this where both parties were professed Christians. (Compare I. Cor. vii. 11.) But earlier Protestant exegesis did find in this passage a permission to the Christian party thus deserted by the heathen to marry again, and it extended this allowance to a case where a professed Christian acted in a heathenish way, and deserted his or her consort. When this path was once broken, Protestant lawmakers, with the sanction of Protestant theologians, allowed the courts to grant divorce for desertion. Nor could they in many countries stop there; but whatever struck as severe a blow at the family union as was struck by desertion brought with it the same privilege, at least to the injured party, of dissolving the union and forming another with some one else.

Thus a new set of causes for divorce was introduced, especially within the last century and a half, into the laws of a number of Protestant countries, as into those of Prussia and of many other German states, of the Scandinavian lands, and of most of the States of our Union. The remedy is variously applied, being more generally complete divorce, but sometimes separation only, although for causes unnoticed by early law. In England and Wales, where for a long time the ecclesiastical courts granted only separation, following the old Catholic system, a new plan of legislation, in 1857, 1858, and 1860, abolished the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, and constituted a new court for divorce and matrimonial causes. Here divorce may be granted for the cause of the wife's adultery, and for certain grosser forms of this crime on the husband's part, and judicial

separation is the remedy for certain other causes. In many Catholic lands ecclesiastical law gave way, in or since the French Revolution, to a threefold legislation under the control of the state. Some of these lands adhered to the Catholic doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage, and now grant only separation for certain determinate causes. Such is the case in France since 1816; in Italy, since 1866; in Portugal, since 1868; in Spain, since 1875—where, however, if we mistake not, the law furnishes its remedy of separation in civil marriages only. Belgium, again, gives option between divorce and separation, according to the choice of the complainant; while Austria has special laws for Protestants, Jews, and Catholics, according to their religious professions.

We are now prepared to inquire, What condition of law, of public opinion, and of sentiment, is best for the religion, morality, and permanent welfare of the state—that in which divorce with liberty of remarriage can be obtained by an injured wife or husband for any one of a large number of causes, or that in which marriage can be dissolved for one cause only, while separation is the legal remedy for any causes for which it may seem best to the law-makers to allow a wedded pair to live apart? The question also deserves to be looked at, whether the law itself, by its own strictness and limited relief to a discontented wife or husband, may not lead one or both of them to the higher crime which makes divorce possible. These inquiries, however, may not admit of a satisfactory solution, since the condition of morals and of national opinion varies not a little in the different countries of the Christian world, in the same age, and much more in different ages. We see these differences reflected in the literature of different nations. In one nation, books painting the overpowering sway of passion, and making all plausible excuses even for adultery, corrupt the sentiments of many; while, in another, the tone of the poet or the novelist will be on the side of independent thought and pure morals. And again, in one land the administration of justice may be such that the judge thinks that he has done all that he ought when he decides a divorce case on the most perfunctory examination; while, in another, he is expected to endeavor to reconcile the parties, and to give due diligence to prevent and ferret out collusions. In one country a case of divorce may be decided in an hour; in another, law is as slow in such cases as elsewhere. Of the delays

in such suits, a French writer says to those who expect a speedy decision: "Profonde erreur! On se marie vite, on ne se sépare de même"; and adds, "Oh! les lenteurs de procédure; il faut en avoir été victime pour les connaître."

We must not, therefore, in making comparisons of the marriage and divorce statistics of different countries, infer at once, from the different ratios between the number of divorces and that of marriages or of population, the relative standing of these countries in regard to one of the most important points of social morality. A much safer rule is obtained when we take considerable periods together and find divorces increasing at a much greater rate than marriages or population or both. And the diminished rate of marriages, of itself, for a few years, may be due to temporary causes; so that only long periods of such diminution betoken the decay and deterioration of society at this vital point. Of this the condition of Rome at the beginning of the empire, as contrasted with the era of the fall of Carthage and the invasion of Greece, furnishes a striking illustration.

But another matter more closely concerns us. What does experience teach to be the best law for society and the family? One which allows absolute divorce for adultery only, permitting separation for a number of wrongs against domestic welfare, or one which holds out liberty of remarriage as the relief in all cases of unhappy wedlock? The main consideration here is that the law, by making a discrimination between the highest crime and all the other wrongs against marriage, best expresses the feeling of a moral and pure society in regard to the heinousness of adultery. This crime bears the same relation to the family as treason to the state and murder to human life; and the penalty of death attached to it in many ancient codes, especially the exculpation of the injured man for killing the injurer when taken in *flagrante delicto*, shows how mankind have very generally looked on this offense against morality. But in modern times things are altered. If any penalty is inflicted it is fine or imprisonment; and when adultery is made a cause for divorce, it is very often not made a ground for legal trial and punishment. All this shows a great want of moral feeling in the community. As if to avoid the shame and scandal produced by a trial were a greater evil than the exposure and punishment would be a good, even although by such exposure the evil would be greatly diminished. In England it is allowed

to the wife divorced for her adultery to marry her paramour at once; thus the law helps the guilty parties to gain the end for which they committed the crime, while in many communities the guilty party, or at least the party guilty of adultery, is forbidden to marry at all during the life of the party which has brought the complaint.

It will be said, however, that to place adultery by itself as alone terminating marriage offers a premium to the crime itself. That this may happen under laws like that of England I can easily conceive. Chancellor Kent says on this point (Comment. ii., 106), that he has "had occasion to believe, in the exercise of a judicial cognizance over various cases of divorce, that the sin of adultery was sometimes committed on the part of the husband for the very purpose of divorce." But is there not a very easy way of preventing the law itself from tempting married persons to committing this sin? Is pity for a fallen wife so rational that it ought to extinguish the feeling of justice and overbalance the public good? Let such marriages between the guilty be prohibited, as we have already said, and there would be fewer instances of similar guilt.

But we pass on to those divorce laws in which no distinction is made between the crime of adultery and any other wrongs affecting the relation of marriage. There are two such classes of laws: the one grants divorce with the liberty of marrying again in all cases; the other grants no divorce in any case, but separation as the sole remedy for all matrimonial wrongs. The latter of these classes of laws naturally originated in Catholic countries. As long as the old Church was able to keep intact its power over marriage, divorce, legitimacy, and even over inheritance, there was no dissolution of the tie between two Christians; but when in Protestant countries the sacramental theory of marriage ceased to be believed, and at a later period, when faith in the authority of the Church was weakened, the states once Catholic took into their own hands the power of altering the laws touching family relations. But almost everywhere, over the Catholic countries of Europe, the liberty of remarriage after separation was prohibited, both on account of the old feeling still remaining of the sacredness of marriage, and perhaps also on account of the fear lest the wider opening of the gates should introduce extended immorality. The experience of France in the Revolution, in this respect, may have taught Europe a healthy lesson.

The benefits resulting from this refusal of full divorce in all these countries are principally confined to the possibility of reconciliation and the resumption of the former condition of marriage between alienated parties. The same system, in short, which the Catholic Church adopted and undoudtedly with much good effect, of reconciling husbands and wives, may be and is continued with considerable benefit by the judicial authorities. Thus, in the present kingdom of Italy, between the beginning of 1866, when the new code came into operation, and the end of 1879, there were, in a population of over 26,000,000, 11,431 suits for separation, or an annual mean of 81.7 for fourteen years. Of these suits, 151 were abandoned before they came under the cognizance of the presiding judge, 1207 reconciliations were effected by that magistrate, and 2,815 suits were abandoned during trial.

This is a new experiment, and for that reason may not serve as a rule. The increase of suits for separation, where only separation can be obtained from the courts, is illustrated by the experience of France through a longer period. Between 1840 and 1874 the suits granted were 43,486, and the ratio of the separations to marriages for the first ten years was nearly as 1 to 371.8; but in the last five years it was as 1 to 151.7, or considerably more than double. Adultery furnished a cause for one out of ten of these suits.

In Belgium,—a Catholic country,—divorce and separation are both allowed by law, according to the choice of the complainant. Here the advance between 1840 and 1874 was in divorces from 28 to 144, or more than four times as many, and in separations from 25 to 57, or as 1 to 2.3. The same increase of applications for divorce (which are for adultery only), as compared with the separations, is found in the English tables (1867–1878). The petitions for divorce are about four times as many as for separation, and the decrees for divorce six times as many as for separation, leaving out of the account the decrees *nisi*. It is evident, from the preference in Belgium, where the choice is open, and in England where the petitions for divorce represent adultery only, that the leading and growing desire is to be separated from a consort and to be authorized to marry again.

We can say but a word or two on the laws which are in force through most of the Protestant countries of Europe and through most of the United States, wherever full divorce is the sole

remedy in matrimonial complaints. Here there is no temptation to commit a crime like adultery in order to be able to marry again, and yet the evils are as great, if not greater, than under any other form of legislation. In the United States the number of divorces has been long on a steady increase in some States, while in others there may be a tendency to reach a maximum and remain stationary. But a ratio like that in Connecticut, of one divorce to 11.06 marriages for twenty-one years; or that in Vermont, of 1 to 17.6 for nineteen years; or that in Massachusetts, of 1 to 35.8 for the same period, beginning with 1 to 51.0 in 1860 and ending in 1878 with 1 to 21.4, shows no healthy condition of society. The increase of divorces in this latter State is accompanied, says Mr. Carroll D. Wright, by an increase in the number of the leading crimes against chastity and infant life. What if the disease does not appear in the better classes of society; is it not a terrible thing to have a corrupt lower class increasing in these old and staid communities? Nor can we believe that the condition of things is any better in those States which do not publish statistics, if we may judge from single specimens. In St. Louis the number of divorces in 1879 was 490, or as 1 to 700 inhabitants nearly, and in San Francisco the divorces were 333 in 1880, or about as 1 to 702; while in Connecticut the ratio of divorces to population was about as 1 to 1906, and in Massachusetts, in 1878, about as 1 to 2971. In Wayne County, Michigan, containing 200,000 inhabitants, according to a recent treatise of Judge Jennison "on the pleadings and practice of the Court of Chancery," there was a ratio of 1 divorce to 796 of the population; and in Kent County, in sixteen months since January 1, 1881, there were 921 marriages recorded and 202 divorce suits commenced in a population of 75,000. On the whole, there can be little, if any question, that the ratio of divorces to marriages or to population exeeds that of any country in the Christian world.

*Sed manum de tabula.* The considerations advanced in this article lead us, we think, to the following, among other conclusions:

*First.* An increase in the number of causes for divorce granted by law increases, at least for a long period, the number of divorces themselves. But separations are by no means so much in demand as are divorces when the law permits them to be granted for similar causes.

*Second.* To grant separations without leave of remarriage is not so disastrous to family life as to grant divorces, which but spread the evil for which they are provided as a remedy. Such separations may be granted for gross violations of matrimonial duties without coming into conflict with the feeling or faith of the great majority of Christian believers.

*Third.* But, to grant divorce except for adultery, does come into conflict with the faith and discipline of large bodies of Christians. This is a very serious evil. It holds out a relief which multitudes are taught to believe to be unlawful. It destroys the dread which breaking up and reconstituting families is fitted to excite. If it tempts to commit the most serious crime in order to obtain a relief which could not otherwise be obtained, there are or can be laws which will make such a step costly to one who takes it.

*Fourth.* There is a common, and we fear, well-grounded opinion that the procedure of many courts in divorce cases is very loose. This, if it be true, evinces a want of due regard for the most sacred things among men, without the protection of which there could be no morals and no religion. We fear that the number of divorces cannot be lessened without stricter action on the part of the judges. And to those who may feel that it is an idle thing to keep alienated parties together, we offer the opinion of a great English lawyer, Sir W. Scott (Lord Stowell): "If it were once understood that, upon mutual disgust, married persons might become legally separated, many couples who now pass through the world with mutual comfort, with attention to their offspring and to the moral order of society, might have been at this moment living in a state of mutual unkindness, in a state of estrangement from their common offspring, and in a state of most licentious and unreserved immorality."

THEODORE D. WOOLSEY.

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JUDGE JAMESON.

SOME misconception prevails in regard to divorce laws and their administration in the Western States. No city has suffered more from its supposed laxity in this respect than Chicago. Considering the origin and magnitude of its population, made

up by the confluence of the separate overflows of all nations, the public will doubtless be surprised to learn that that city lags behind many parts of the East in the relative number of its divorces. By those who know the facts, this has been publicly admitted. In a sort of pastoral allocution delivered two years ago to her various churches, through the mouth of one of her clergy speaking from the platform of the Boston Monday lectureship, New England made sorrowful confession of her own preëminence in this unsavory business. If her mouth-piece, the Rev. Dr. Dike, is to be believed, the liberal divorce system among us is to be reckoned as a New England idea. Before inquiring, as we purpose doing, into the operation of the divorce laws of Illinois, it may be worth while to ask whether the prevailing system of divorce is to be credited to New England. In brief, then, before the rise of Christianity, the leading nations of the world allowed unlimited divorce, either by the consent of the parties, or at the will of the husband. This was the law of the Hindoos, the Chinese, the Jews, the Romans, the ancient Britons, and, with some reservations, of the Greeks. Christianity, reënacting the supposed divine law, placed strict limits to the right of divorce, confining it to a single cause, adultery, by which seems to have been meant only the adultery of the wife. From the union of the Christian and Roman arose the canon law, which, as the law of the Church of Rome, became, as to marriage and divorce, that of Christendom. Down to the Reformation, divorce *a vinculo* was by that law allowed only for causes arising before the marriage, as precontract, consanguinity, and the like, which were declared to make the marriage void *ab initio*. Adultery and other causes, subsequent to marriage, to the common mind equally justifying causes of divorce, were made grounds merely for a separation *a mensa et thoro*. The early reformers revolted against these canonical restrictions, and in all communities in which their principles have prevailed a more liberal system of divorces has been established. Milton, in his "Tractate on the Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce," laid down the authorities and the reasons supposed to justify this change.

So far, then, from being a New England idea, liberality in granting divorces is a step in the general movement for greater social freedom which characterizes our modern age. If New England has become distinguished for it, it is because she has reverted farthest toward the original type. When diverse ten-

dencies have become balanced and the system has reached its best, there will be much freedom of divorce, but with it a constant and powerful pressure of moral considerations tending to prevent it. Whether the pendulum, swung by the early Fathers too far in one direction, has not by many communities been swung too far in the other, is a great social question, which, doubtless, is not settled by pointing to the practice of New England. But the fact that New England has a particular practice, to many minds proves that it is not obviously immoral, and that it must have plausible reasons to show for itself as a social necessity.

The diversity of modern law and practice of divorce rests upon differing conceptions of the nature of marriage. The extreme secular theory is that marriage is a mere civil contract, subject to be dissolved, like any other contract, by the civil tribunals. That of the Roman Church, and of those communities which have adopted or inherited the canon law, is that marriage is a sacrament, dissoluble only by death or by papal dispensation. A third theory, advanced by writers on private international law, is that marriage is a civil contract, and more, that it is the creation of a *status* which is of public, and even of international concern; and that while it may, for sufficient causes, be dissolved, it is not the Church alone, nor the immediate parties to it alone, that are concerned in its dissolution, but that the state in which the parties are domiciled has a controlling voice in fixing its causes and its consequences. Properly viewed, divorce is a religious question only for the Church; for the state it is merely a social question, and, consequently, as intimated by Hume, "all regulations" touching marriage and divorce are "equally lawful and equally comformable to the principles of nature"; hence, they are equally subject to modification by the public authorities. Indeed, diverse customs and laws touching these subjects have been but attempts at different stages of civilization to reach the golden mean, where, either by the enforced continuance of marriage or by divorce, the evil to all concerned should be the least, and the good the greatest,—the test question being, What regulations will best subserve the interests, first of society; secondly, of the children; and lastly, of the parties themselves?

The arguments bearing on the question of liberal or of restricted divorce are very nicely balanced. Where by law

marriage is indissoluble, or where too great obstacles are thrown in the way of its dissolution, the discontented parties are likely either to abscond, or to defy law and religion, and sink into flagrant immorality. This presents the least injurious phase. Compelled to continue a hated union, they may endeavor to cast off their burden by crime, or seek revenge by brutal treatment of the innocent standing in the way. The law of England before the Divorce Act of 1858 illustrates these principles. Before a husband, for instance, wishing to marry again, could procure a divorce from his wife who had robbed him and run away with and married another man, he must have had recourse, at great cost, to three separate tribunals, ending with the House of Lords. This regulation, which rendered men desperate, was a fruitful source of crime. The experience of Rome was to the same effect. The maxim laid down in the pandects, *bona gratia matrimonium dissolvitur*, was much restricted by the later emperors, but the Emperor Justin restored the ancient license. The reason given was that "the hatred, misery, and crimes which often flowed from indissoluble connections, required as a necessary measure the restoration of the law by which marriage was dissolved by mutual consent."

On the other hand, the knowledge on the part of married persons that they may easily, or for slight causes, dissolve their relation, tends to make all marital differences irreconcilable. But, if it be known that no divorce will be allowed for any cause, or that nothing but an offense of the most serious character can be made the ground for it, and that only at great cost in money and in social ignominy, quarrels will be settled and a *modus vivendi* discovered. This is the chief argument against liberal divorces. Whether it is of such weight that it ought to lead to a return to the restricted system of the canon law, or to a material modification of our divorce laws, is a question that can be determined only by studying the results of those laws as shown in experience.

The experience of South Carolina, though perhaps exceptional, is remarkable. Down to the period of reconstruction in 1868, no absolute divorce had ever been allowed in that State for any cause, and the general opinion seemed to be that the system had worked well. During the first years of reconstruction the old law was repealed and divorces were freely allowed. After a few years' trial the old law was restored, experience having taught

the law-makers of the State that the old law worked better than the new. Whether, under the former, those desiring divorce had emigrated to other States, thus swelling unfairly their divorce statistics, does not appear, and doubtless the experiment in an isolated community, under such circumstances, must be far from decisive.

In Illinois, divorces *a vinculo* are granted for adultery, extreme and repeated cruelty, desertion, and habitual drunkenness continued for two years, and for felony. Some other causes are specified, but they are of rare occurrence and may be omitted. Cook County, in which is the city of Chicago, had a population, in 1880, of 607,468. In the year 1882, divorces were granted in 714 cases. Of these, 665 were cases in which no defense was interposed by the party accused, and 49 cases in which there was an issue tried by a jury or by the court. In something over two-thirds of the cases (the exact figures are not given), the wife was the complainant. During the same year there were in Cook County 9,605 marriages. That gives one marriage to every 63.2 of the population; one divorce to every 13.4 marriages, and one divorce to every 850.7 of the population. Of the 714 divorces granted, 318, or 44.5 per cent. were for desertion; 142, or 19.8 per cent., for adultery; 141, or 19.7 per cent., for cruelty; and 93, or 13 per cent., for drunkenness. These figures are undoubtedly painful ones, but, as intimated, they are below those exhibited by some of the older States. Thus, in Maine, in 1878, there is said to have been one divorce to every 819 inhabitants; and in Penobscot County, the seat of a theological seminary, one to every 820 inhabitants. In the Western Reserve, a district of Ohio originally settled by emigrants from New England, there is said to have been, in 1878 and 1879, one divorce to every 11.8 marriages; in Ashtabula County, one divorce to every 8.5 marriages; and in Lake County, one divorce to every 7.4 marriages. When it is considered that Vermont is an old State, with a fixed population of nearly pure American descent, the ratio of one divorce to every 14 marriages, in 1878, indicates a much greater laxity in its divorce laws than prevails in Illinois, even if no credit be given to the assertion made by citizens familiar with the facts, that in a certain county of Vermont, out of 22 divorces granted at one term of court, 21 were believed to be collusive. These figures remind us of the activity of the French courts during the Revolution, when, in the first

three months of 1793, according to Burke, there were 562 divorces in Paris alone, being about one to every three marriages, and the same ratio continued for several subsequent months.

In respect to the nativity and the business and social standing of the parties to divorce suits, it is, of course, impossible to make precise statements; but it is believed that a large majority consists of freshly arrived immigrants from Europe, and from other States, the latter class preponderating. This arises, in many cases, doubtless, from the lessening of social restraints by change of residence, while in others the change was made probably for the purpose of procuring a divorce. Foreign-born applicants for divorce would rank, in point of numbers, thus: Germans, including Austrians, Prussians, and all others speaking German, Bohemians, Poles, Scandinavians, English, Scotch. To these may be added a few Irish and a few Jews, generally persons upon whom religious restraints have ceased to be operative. No business or profession fails to contribute its quota to the throng seeking divorces, but the number of so-called professional men is not large. The bulk consists of workingmen, mechanics, runners for commercial houses, clerks, saloon-keepers, actors, gamblers, farmers, and other classes of rather obscure men. Boarding-house life is especially fatal to permanence of the marital relation, perhaps because in it wives are commonly left without employment, and fall a ready prey to sinister influences. Every one, also, conversant with divorce trials, is struck by the frequency with which wives or husbands in the humbler walks of life tire of their connection, and abandon their homes, the wives carrying with them all that those homes contain, the husbands taking their ready money and most valuable effects, and neither ever returning. The more uneducated and inconspicuous the married persons, the more numerous are their divorces. And the number of the well-to-do, or rich, seeking divorces, is very small; not because they are necessarily more virtuous, but because the social pressure upon them, and perhaps their intelligent perception of consequences, is greater.

But by far the most important question relates to the rightful causes of divorce.

It is conceded by all codes that permit divorce at all, that adultery is a sufficient cause. In the history of opinion in regard to it, however, there may be noted three grave inconsistencies: in the Bible the adultery held to justify divorce *a vin-*

*culo* seems to have meant, as it did among the ancient peoples generally, only the adultery of the wife; when the rule was extended so as to deal equally with both sexes, the divorce permitted for it was confined to a separation *a mensa et thoro;* and finally, the sincerity of the Church in opposing divorces was placed in doubt by its practice of authorizing them for money, by papal dispensation—thus, for mere purposes of revenue, winking at an infraction of the supposed divine law against divorces. As to the first, the reason given for the limitation was, in the main, a selfish, pecuniary one, personal to the husband—the danger of having cast upon him the care of spurious offspring. Spurious as to whom? Of course, as to him alone, since as to the wife, the term could have no application. But was the offense, when committed by the wife, ever intrinsically more destructive of the integrity of the marriage, or in its consequences more fatal to the interests of the family, or of the public, than the adultery of the husband, formerly winked at by the law and tolerated by the Church? What force to justify even a separation, as against a wife, was there in the danger of spurious offspring, in a state of society like that which existed in France from the time of Louis XIV. down to the Revolution, of which there could be no more graphic or accurate description than that of Mehemet Effendi, a Turkish ambassador, when he said to a Frenchman: "The Turks are great simpletons in comparison with the Christians. We are at the expense and trouble of keeping a seraglio, each in his own house; but you ease yourselves of this burden and have your seraglios in your friends' houses." So of the rule authorizing divorces *a mensa* for the adultery of both sexes, it clearly was not the rule of Jesus, but an extension of it to meet social exigencies. If the rule could be extended at all for such a purpose, why might it not be extended so as to cover all the real exigencies of society? Looking alone to the consequences, is adultery, by whomsoever committed, deserving of greater condemnation than extreme cruelty, which, if repeated, is made the ground of divorce? Cruelty is defined as physical violence endangering health or life, and making longer cohabitation practically impossible. From the nature of the case, such cruelty is commonly exercised by the husband upon the wife. A brutal temper can wreak itself upon its object in but two ways—by acts of violence, and by injurious words. The

acts are commonly blows with the fist, or with the first weapon that comes to hand, dragging the wife by the hair of the head, and the like; the words, those dreadful epithets which, addressed to a woman, wound more cruelly than blows. If the offender be the wife, there are assaults with dangerous weapons, poison in one's coffee, with the most opprobrious adjectives in the language applicable to man. Such conduct indicates a temper incompatible with the marital relation, and, while it may inflict a less poignant mental distress than the scriptural cause, it ought not to be permitted, on any terms, to continue. It renders one great object of marriage, the right training of offspring, impossible.

Consider, also, the case of desertion. We have seen that nearly one-half of all the divorces granted in Chicago during 1882 were for that cause; in a majority of the cases, for desertion of the wife by the husband. The typical case of desertion is that of a worn-out, heart-broken mother left by her wretch of a husband to struggle against poverty, alone, with his children; their natural protector in the meantime playing elsewhere, perhaps, the role of father, after a fraudulent divorce from her, or a criminal second marriage without divorce. In many cases the deserting husband has returned, after his wife, by years of struggle, has acquired a little home and a comfortable support for his children, and quartered himself upon her, contributing nothing to her support, and often selling her household furniture for drink. The great extent of our country and the migratory habits of our people make these the commonest of all the histories of domestic misery in our courts.

So we might go through the whole catalogue of causes. We shall refer to but one more, that of habitual drunkenness. In the present state of our laws there may be much drinking of spirituous liquors without legally endangering the *status* of marriage. So long as a husband is able to give to his family a maintenance and education suitable to their condition in life and adequate to their physical necessities, however loathsome he may be to his wife, however unkind to his children, however useless to society, he may continue to squander his means, to brutalize himself, and to disgust his friends, with impunity. Before he can be divorced for drunkenness, he must fail to give to his family a pecuniary support. As if the mere failure to feed and clothe his wife were the greatest, the most intolerable injury to

her, and the compulsory making of her, year after year, the mother of offspring likely to become drunkards, ought to go for nothing! While demanding the production of the technical evidence required by law, no judge, passing upon cases of that kind, can or ought to overlook the terrible evidence of physiological fact exhibited in the swollen face, the shaking hands, and the tainted breath. No such man ought to be allowed to become the father of any woman's children. The best good, therefore, of the wife, of the children, and of the public, demands that some divorces shall be granted for non-scriptural causes. This no one much conversant with the trial of divorce cases will deny. But, when this is said, all has been said that can be truthfully said in favor of liberal divorces as they are granted in Illinois. It is our firm conviction that, if the truth could be ascertained, at least two-thirds, perhaps four-fifths, of the seven hundred and fourteen cases of divorce during the past year in Chicago either were fraudulent in fact, or, with a reasonably conciliatory temper on the part of the couples divorced, and under sufficiently stringent legal conditions, were avoidable or preventable. There is, beyond question, fraud in the inception of many cases. Most proceedings for divorce being against non-resident persons, brought into court by advertisement, of which a copy has been mailed to the residence of the defendant, if known, in a great many cases the residence is sworn to be unknown, and the result is a mere *ex parte* trial. In others, doubtless, there is real or virtual collusion: if there is no actual agreement not to contest the divorce, there is a willingness that it should be granted. A divorce suit is the only one known to the law in which both parties may desire the decree asked for in the bill. If disposed to collude, the fact is very difficult of detection. So, in all cases of resident defendants not appearing, one or all of these conditions may, and often doubtless do, exist. While fraud or collusion may be suspected, if the technical proofs, well understood by the bar, are furnished, even if they have been manufactured, the court is generally powerless to look behind them, and the decree is granted. In far the greatest number of cases, no court, listening to the narratives of the parties, can doubt that, had they been held together by an iron bond making divorce impossible for any cause, they would, at an early stage of their marital differences, have effected a rec-

onciliation; the fatal step of revealing to gossiping friends their real or fancied wrongs would not have been taken, and so their mutual wounds would have healed "by the first intention."

If some divorces on all the grounds stated ought to be granted, and if, as the laws are, there are vast numbers that ought not to be granted, what shall be done to remedy the evil? The answer is, the proceedings must be so modified as to reduce fraud and collusion to a minimum; the consequences of a decree must be made to the guilty party highly punitory, and the public sentiment in regard to divorces must be corrected. The first requisite to an honest divorce is an actual domicile of the complaining party, for a considerable time, within the jurisdiction. The one year required by Illinois law is not enough. It invites immigration for the purpose of divorce. The next requisite is actual notice to the defendant, by copy of the bill, or proof to the satisfaction of the court that his or her residence cannot be ascertained. This would cut off a large part of all the fraudulent divorces, rendered upon notice by publication in a newspaper. Still more important is it that all third parties interested in the suit, the children and the public, should be made parties, and be represented by counsel. Not only is a divorce suit the only one in which both the ordinary parties may be colluding to procure the same decree, but it is the only one in which parties directly and often the most deeply interested, like those mentioned, are never made parties. To correct this evil, there should be appointed for the children a guardian *ad litem*, and it should be made a condition to the commencement of a divorce suit, that, unless exonerated from it by special order of the court, the complaining party should deposit with the clerk a reasonable fee for such guardian, and that the guardian should be required to make careful inquiry, and, if possible and just, an actual defense in the case. A similar regulation should exist as to the public, save that the State's attorney should be required to appear and defend all suits for divorce.

So much touching the notice and defense. Beside these changes, there should be one in the consequences of decrees of divorce to the offending parties. To permit both divorced parties to marry again is to place a premium upon the commission of the offenses by law made the grounds of divorce. Chancellor Kent speaks of one case in which he was satisfied adultery had been committed for the very purpose of bringing about a divorce.

If that was true in New York, where no marriage is permitted to the offending party, how much more likely is it to be so where, as in Illinois, both parties may marry again. In one case, at least, in the experience of the writer, that species of fraud was committed. In cases of desertion, it should be provided that, if the complainant be a wife, the court should have power to grant the divorce, or, at her option, to continue the case, to await her application for a requisition to compel her husband to return and resume the performance of his marital duties. Upon his undertaking to do so, he might be discharged, upon reasonable conditions as to future good conduct; or, upon his refusal, he might be ordered to be committed to prison, if it should appear that he had absented himself from her without reasonable cause and against her will. That this scheme of legislation would involve a Federal enactment authorizing requisitions in such cases, constitutes no objection to it. One who has lost a watch worth fifteen or twenty dollars, by theft, in Maine, may set in motion the formidable machinery of State and Federal law, and drag the thief back to that State from the remotest corner of Oregon. Why should the wretch who has left his helpless wife and children, in the same State of Maine, and "gone West to grow up with the country" and another wife, not be dragged back from Oregon as well? If it be said that theft is a crime, and that the desertion of one's family is a mere social wrong, then let the wrong, so infinitely surpassing the crime in its meanness and in the misery it entails, be reclassified, or a definition be given to crime which shall embrace it. Doubtless a Federal statute upon that subject ought to be supplemented by others regulating the whole subject of marriage and divorce, now, under the varying statutory regulations of the States, the despair of courts and publicists and the opprobrium of the law. Finally, the most effective remedy will be the elevation of public sentiment in regard to the sanctity of marriage; not sanctity in the ecclesiastical sense, which makes of it a sacrament, but in that of the highest social obligation that can bind the conscience of a man of honor and honesty —the obligation to keep the faith he pledged in marriage to his wife and to the state, and which he renews upon the birth of each of his children, to abide with her until death, unless separated by law for strictly necessary causes.

JOHN A. JAMESON.

# A CANADIAN VIEW OF ANNEXATION.

ALTHOUGH the question of the annexation of Canada to the United States does not figure prominently in the political programme of any of the great parties on either side of the line 45°, there can be no doubt that it is one of those important dormant issues never wholly out of sight. To those in the Dominion who assert that "annexation is dead," I reply that its ghost is far from laid, that it will keep flitting through the political atmosphere, and assume more vigorous and aggressive life than it has yet shown. That it will be a *fait accompli* within the present generation, if not sooner, many of the far-seeing public men of Canada believe. There is no denying, however, that besides the place-holders, ministers, and aspirants to office and imperial favor, there is in the Dominion a loyal section of the population, largely composed of the "old fogies" of British birth and the Orangemen of Ontario, who will stoutly oppose its realization. I may also place on this side a number of English and Scotch merchants, above middle life, many of the clergy, together with a considerable body of timid Conservatives, who naturally shrink from the idea of radical change. But, on the other hand, there are multitudes, even of British Protestants, who set the slightest possible value on the connection with England, which they were only too glad to escape from in order to better their condition. As for the Irish Roman Catholics, who are intelligent, industrious, and law-abiding, and number about one-fourth of the entire population,— say one million,— their loyalty to Great Britain is unequal to the mildest strain. While they and their children, born and reared in Canada, may not ardently desire annexation to the United States at present, it is undeniable that the great majority would, were the question put to a quiet vote, prefer annexation, to the government under

which they live. Admitting that they are fairly satisfied with British policy toward the land of their adoption, they are by no means pleased with even the present treatment of Ireland, while any reference to the past produces the reverse of a soothing effect on the average Celtic mind. With reference to the present generation of native Canadians, say from forty years of age downward, and to the immigrants some time in the country, the majority, besides experiencing those cosmopolitan influences so actively at work among the most advanced communities within the last thirty years, have gradually come to regard the United States as an extension of the United Kingdom and Canada. They consider its people a race with which they must have business and social relations, and among whom many of them may, sooner or later, take up their permanent abode. The republic, in their estimation, affords them the most profitable sphere for their energies, and vast numbers of them annually enter it to push their fortunes. The fact that there is scarcely a family in the Dominion, French, German, or British, but has members or relatives living in the United States, operates as a mighty moral force in the interest of peace and closer communion. The feeling toward England is very different. However much she may be admired and loved by a great portion of the colonists, the masses of Canada feel that their fortunes, with those of their children's children, are involved in the fate of this northern continent.

As all men are influenced by their own interests, it is easy to understand that the trading classes would like free access to larger markets, which political and commercial union would afford. They keenly feel, particularly in times of depression, that their field of operations is very limited, with a population of only four millions, scattered over a territory nearly four thousand miles from east to west, with little more than an attenuated line of frontier and river settlements. Most Canadians are aware that the United States offer every variety of climate as well as of vegetable productions, to suit all constitutions, tastes, and necessities. The vast development of their manufacturing and mining industries, together with the rapid settlement of their wild lands, holds out substantial prospects of profitable employment to all comers of whatever race or craft. In fact, the marvelous expansion of the industry, commerce, and population of the Republic during the last twenty years, despite the terrible

losses, panics, and demoralization resulting from the Civil War, has produced a profound impression upon all Canadians.

There has long been apparent in Canada a tendency to "look to Washington" in times of hot party controversy, arising from real or fancied injustice on the part of this or that section or dominant faction. During the bitter party disputes of 1837 and 1847, in which French and British prejudices were keenly aroused, an annexation party was openly formed in Montreal and other places. Among the leaders were several prominent men of the day. Before confederation, Ontario Liberals talked of applying to the Government at Washington for that justice which the Conservative majority, led by the late Sir George E. Cartier, had long refused to concede. This kind of agitation has continued, more or less, ever since among the public men of Canada. In numberless instances it ends in the transference of their allegiance to the United States. Men of less ambition and of conservative tastes plod along in the old ruts while their circumstances remain tolerable, conscious, however, of the probable necessity, sooner or later, of a movement southward.

It is not at all strange that a widespread distrust of the future of Canada, under its present isolated constitutional and commercial system, should widely prevail in the Dominion. The progress of the country, notwithstanding the union of the provinces and the acquisition of the North-west, is lamentably slow compared with that of the adjoining Republic. The greatest emigrating races, the Irish and Germans, for the most part give it a wide berth. This region is only now being explored and surveyed for the attraction of pioneers and for the construction of a Pacific railway, upon which the future of the Confederation is staked.

One of the greatest misfortunes of the country is the enormous price it has had to pay for the union of the old provinces and the acquisition of the North-west. For instance, to satisfy New Brunswick and Nova Scotia,—the latter of which could hardly be even thus placated, a powerful minority threatening annexation till the additional bribe of a much larger annual subsidy was conceded,—the Intercolonial Railway, costing thirty-five million dollars, had to be constructed, entailing for several years after its completion a heavy annual loss to the country. Again, after paying the old Hudson's Bay Company several millions for Manitoba and the region farther north and west,

the Conservative government of Sir John A. Macdonald and the late Sir George Cartier, with the greatest recklessness, enticed British Columbia into the Confederacy by the promise of the building of a railway to the Pacific—through what the Hon. Edward Blake, the leader of the opposition at Ottawa, graphically describes as "a sea of mountains"—within ten years, viz., by 1882. Not one of the ministers had set foot on the prairies, or seen the Pacific, even by the American road, through a much milder and pretty well settled region. Only a few Hudson's Bay officials, adventurous sportsmen, zealous missionaries, and some of the half-breed population of the Red River, had any knowledge of the soil, climate, and general characteristics of the Canadian North-west. Even at present an army of surveyors is at work in the territory, a very large portion of which is enshrouded in darkness as thick as overhangs the center of Africa. It is true that, at an expenditure of several million dollars, large tracts near the Canadian Pacific Railway, and farther north, as also in British Columbia, have been opened up to settlement; but a large outlay must yet be incurred to make the Saskatchewan, Peace River, Athabasca, and other immense tracts even moderately known. Now, admitting, as I cheerfully do, the incalculable value of much of this northern region in an agricultural point of view, I much regret, as a Canadian who would like to see his country prosperous, its great cost and the perilous obligations connected with it. The Canada Pacific Railway will probably cost to Canada in money, land, and completed railway, one hundred and ten million dollars, in return for which the Syndicate is to expend not more than forty-eight million five hundred thousand dollars. The Toronto "Globe," from which I have taken the above figures, says, in reference to this,—"a bargain which places the whole North-west at the mercy of a monopolist corporation!" This is paying dearly for a trans-continental railway, even though one-third of the price is land, which would be of no great value without it. Unquestionably the new railway is being rapidly constructed, at the rate of two or three miles a day, and there is good prospect of its reaching the Rocky Mountains by the end of the coming year. Considering the impracticable nature of the country, fair progress has been made in British Columbia, on the Ocean and Fraser River sections; but the most difficult and expensive sections, through the mountains, across the Rockies,

and north of Lake Superior,—a wintry, mountainous, inhospitable region,—must subtract heavily from the future enormous profits of the company on the prairie sections and the lands utilized in speculation.

The contract with British Columbia was a blunder on the part of the Government. Appeals to national good faith, threats of imperial displeasure, and all kinds of party devices were employed by the cunning, interested party leaders to reconcile a startled, apprehensive people to the myriad oppressive consequences involved in this agreement. The country showed its disapproval in the political revolution which transferred power from the Tories, in 1873, to the Liberals, though the former had for years enjoyed an overwhelming majority.

It must be confessed that the construction of the Canada Pacific Railway and the other costly efforts made to open up and make known the advantages of the North-west, attracted a larger immigration the last couple of years than was ever witnessed before. Probably 80,000 settled in that country, the forerunners of a much larger influx. The Dominion will thus receive some compensation for her immense outlay; but, *per contra*, the bulk of the new-comers are from the older provinces, mainly Ontario, which need all their own, and more, to develop their abundant resources.

Beyond doubt, the main element of popular uneasiness and uncertainty—I might say alarm, on serious reflection—consists in the rapid increase of Government expenditure and the public debt. The disbursements for all purposes rose from $13,687,928, in 1868, to $24,205,092, in 1874, and thence to $31,810,000, by Sir Leonard Tilley's estimate, in 1882. There was no proportionate increase of the population, which was about 3,363,201 in 1868, and is now probably 4,418,714. The taxation was $4.07 per head in 1868, against some $7.02 now. The net debt at Confederation, in 1867, was but $75,728,641, and in 1881, $155,395,780; gross debt, 1867, $93,046,051; 1881, $191,861,537, the latter showing an increase of 115 per cent. This picture is still further darkened by the certainty of material additions to the load of debt and taxation within the next decade, while a considerable period must elapse before any substantial return can be expected from the gigantic outlays on public works and the North-west. Indeed, some of the former may be styled non-productive, as regards the public purse, notably the canals,

which have cost some $40,000,000, and the trifling income from which will doubtless have to be sacrificed to offset the abolition of the Erie tolls.

Thoughtful persons contrast the experience of Canada with that of the United States in the matter of national responsibilities, and thence draw conclusions highly favorable to the latter. The reduction of the American debt, now $1,392,245,450, by over $800,000,000 since the close of the Civil War, the year just expired witnessing the extinction of $162,289,150 of the total, is a feat unparalleled in history, notwithstanding the doubt that many reasonably entertain as to the wisdom of subjecting the present generation to such a strain. Such an achievement, however, has proved an impressive advertisement of the resources of the Republic abroad, if it has oppressed to some extent the masses at home.

There can be no denying the fact that one of the results of the late Civil War was the postponement of the closer union of Canada and the United States. The enormous war debt has also been held up, *in terrorem*, before Canadian eyes to excite contentment with their situation and aversion to "Yankee connection." But events are too strong, and nothing can arrest the tide of popular opinion, which ceaselessly, though calmly, flows in the direction of closer connection, if not political union, with the republic. A great many straws might be pointed to at this time, to show how the wind blows; but I need only indicate one or two: On the 13th of December last, the Corn Exchange of Montreal, numbering several hundred merchants, petitioned the Federal Government in favor of the abolition of canal tolls, and the obtainment of a new reciprocity treaty with the United States.

Nobody in his senses is ignorant of the fact that even reciprocity would lead to a material increase of Canadian trade with the United States, and that such would be beneficial to both nations; but who could set bounds to the mutual advantages of a commercial or, better still, a political union? The fructifying influences of that wondrous American enterprise, supported by illimitable capital, would soon vigorously develop the great resources of Canada. Her vast solitudes of forest and prairie, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the southern boundary to the most northerly line of profitable cultivation, would be converted into the comfortable homes of prosperous millions. Under all

her disadvantages, climatic and commercial, including heavy duties at the American frontier and a protective tariff designed to put a check upon importations from Great Britain and the United States, her export trade in the year ending June 30, 1882, reached one hundred and one million dollars, or three million dollars in excess of the previous year, and her imports one hundred and nineteen million dollars, or fourteen million dollars above those of 1880–81.

To show what the Dominion, with her enormous undeveloped resources, is capable of becoming, under the quickening influence of a close and friendly union with the Republic, and how much the latter has to gain by free access to such a ready mart for trade, I may state that a recent parliamentary blue-book sets forth that the surplus revenue of Canada, for the past six months, reached $5,546,262; or, at the rate of over eleven millions for the year, or four and a half millions over 1881–2, notwithstanding the abolition of important duties last spring. These may seem small results to the people of the United States, but they are unquestionably substantial for Canada.

One of the most powerful factors in the work of radical change in the position of the Dominion is, undoubtedly, the straitened financial condition of the majority of the provinces. While New Brunswick and Nova Scotia can barely meet their local engagements in prosperous years, they enjoy little or no prospect of any material improvement in circumstances, with a constant drain of their population to the United States and the North-west, and but little to attract foreign emigrants. Both provinces feel that their natural interests draw them toward their nearest and best market,—the adjoining Republic. The province of Ontario enjoys fair prosperity, having a better soil and climate than her sister provinces to the eastward, and boasts of a surplus of between four and five millions. The province of Quebec, with its debt of over eighteen millions and the distracted state of its political parties, including the lack of sympathy between French and British, is in a deplorable condition. For the last few years the ordinary income has fallen short of the disbursements, while the prospect now is a gradually increasing expenditure with no corresponding augmentation of revenue. The provincial resources have been squandered for the benefit of partisan lumbermen, speculators, and new railroads in which members of parliament possessed a large personal

interest. Her condition is critical and prospects most gloomy. To escape the costly machinery of a local government, many of the people are looking to legislative union, which, however, would be most repugnant to the French Canadians. The latter, rather than accept this, would, with the Roman Catholic clergy at their head, advocate annexation to the United States.

The population of this province, despite the fecundity of all races, the French Canadians in particular, has been for twenty years almost at a stand-still. A quarter of a million of French Canadians settled in the New-England and other States, with crowds weekly leaving the province to join them, notwithstanding the pathetic appeals of their clergy, is not a cheering outlook; indeed, many of its most intelligent citizens see no hope for the province short of annexation. Meantime the province possesses abundant resources in cleared and wooded land, minerals, water-power, and fisheries, which might yield, with more capital and enterprising inhabitants, handsome results.

The London "Spectator" has lately produced a sensation in many quarters by the assertion that there is a great deal of republicanism in England, though in the latent, non-demonstrative form; that this feeling spreads quietly, leavening popular opinion to a considerable extent, and that it bids fair to keep on expanding, with the prospect of momentous results in the not distant future. Of course it is admitted that the official and aristocratic class, with the leaders of the principal parties, form the head and front of the monarchical party, and they usually make much ado about their sentiments. But they touch the great middle and lower classes at only a few points, affecting their opinions and conduct but slightly, and would probably be carried away like corks on the stream of any wide-spread popular movement. The "Spectator," not a disloyal or sensation-loving journal, and one of great influence among the intelligent classes, illustrates the strength of the republican feeling by recording the general admission, when the question of monarchy comes up in conversation, that another George the Fourth would not be tolerated,—would end, in fact, the existing constitutional system.

Now, these assertions and conclusions are still more applicable to Canada, in which republicanism has been growing more popular every day. It is not that the bulk of the people concern themselves much with the merits of republicanisn or monarchy in the abstract, but they do draw practical conclusions as to the suc-

cessful operation of the former in the United States. They find there a captivating illustration in the existence of the most powerful and prosperous nation on earth,—a nation whose prospects of future greatness overshadow those of all the other leading nations put together. Canadians feel that they have lost enormously in the matter of immigration, the application of the necessary volume of capital to the development of their great resources, and an extensive beneficial trade with their American cousins and neighbors. And this is mainly owing to the miserable artificial line of separation maintained by a small, noisy, political class, principally for party effect and the gratification of traditional prejudice.

The indifference of the Queen's ministers in regard to changes in colonial opinion was shown by the conferring of knighthood upon Sir A. T. Galt, some years ago, though he had previously informed them that he advocated Canadian independence. The ultra loyalists, political aspirants to imperial favor, and new-fledged knights, who form the nucleus of a petty official aristocracy, were bewildered and shocked beyond description at the behavior of the Gladstone-Bright ministry on this occasion. In the opinion of those sticklers for permanent British connection, it was to the last degree unwise to waste such honors upon an Independent, an "Annexationist in disguise," while true, blue-blooded loyalists played their little fussy parts unnoticed by her most gracious Majesty. But yet, spite of the Independence contamination, both Canadian parties, Liberals and Conservatives, have gladly coquetted with Sir A. T. Galt, employing him and catering for his support, the latter party having given him his present appointment of Canadian High Commissioner at the Court of St. James. Late dispatches from England state that this gentleman has again changed his opinions. He now advocates Imperial Federation, which some of his Ottawa masters do not well like, it is believed.

Returning to the main point, the explanation of the preference of so large a body of the Canadian people for annexation is to be found in the settled conviction that it would at once greatly increase the trade of the Dominion, and, in a short time, its general prosperity. Then there is the Independence party to be noticed, comprising not a few of the most intelligent men in both party camps, perhaps more in the Liberal. The Conservatives strive to damage the Liberal cause by calling its

leaders and followers Independents, or "Annexationists in disguise," which accusation will help more than hurt them with the young, practical, and intelligent portion of the people. Hon. Mr. Huntington, Postmaster-General in the last Liberal, the Mackenzie Government, was an avowed Independent.

In analyzing the elements of Canadian public opinion, in order to convey to the reader some idea of the forces operating in the direction of Annexation, I have not by any means exhausted the subject. I prefer moderation in both statement and forecast. But I can not pass over such telling indications of public sentiment as the efforts of the Liberal party, last winter, in the Federal Parliament, to obtain for the Dominion the right of making her own commercial treaties, nor the recent speech of Mr. Edgar, a Liberal leader, in favor of Canadian commercial independence. I may here, too, mention that at a caucus of the Liberals held at Ottawa, on the 13th February last, the policy of Canadian Independence was generally indorsed by the party.

It may be asked by some of my American readers why, if these statements with regard to Canadian public opinion be correct, there is no systematic agitation for annexation afoot, no propaganda of republicanism to bring about a union of the two nations. Several reasons might be given in explanation of this matter, only a few of which I will notice. In the first place, in ordinary times, in the absence of burning questions and harassing popular troubles, most people feel a natural aversion to entering upon revolutionary crusades, involving much notoriety, sharp collision with the partisans of the old system, with other *désagréments* usually experienced by radical reformers at the outset. Many also prefer to take the easiest and quietest method of securing the benefits of annexation, by themselves silently migrating to the Republic, and encouraging thereafter all their friends to follow their example. This, the quickest and most effectual remedy, renders a resort to noisier and more tedious experiments unnecessary. And should the present state of things continue, the people of the United States will have the satisfaction of yearly annexing many thousands of Canadians, as a preliminary to the annexation of their territory itself, a little later. Perhaps, on the whole, it will be best to have the people first,—the country will be sure to follow afterward.

The difficulties besetting the formation of a united, compact state out of a chain of widely scattered provinces, reaching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, appear insuperable. Dumb-bell like, the greatest bulk and weight is at each end, the connecting bar being represented by some one thousand two hundred miles of lacustrine shores, rocky deserts and portages, varied by swamps and lakelets,—the forbidding, silent wilderness stretching from the head-waters of the Ottawa to Thunder Bay, and thence to Manitoba. What, then, can a candid thinker conclude from the above facts, save that the present and future interests of the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island can be best promoted by a close and friendly union with the American Republic? The Northern and Eastern States adjoin these provinces, and supply them their nearest and most profitable markets, and have long been connected with them by the bonds of good neighborhood and mutual trade. There is everything in the natural, social, and commercial circumstances of the two countries to favor such a happy consummation, which could not fail to gratify the pride, stimulate the energies, and enormously augment the wealth and resources of the two young Anglo-Saxon nations of North America. Already over a million of Canadians, French and British, intelligent and enterprising, have founded homes in the Republic, the number yearly increasing. There is no reason why the remainder should not sensibly anticipate the future, and unite their and their country's fortunes with the greatest and most prosperous nation the world has ever known.

P. BENDER.

# NATIONAL AID TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

THE advantages of the public school system of our country are now universally admitted; yet this institution, like other advantageous elements in the development of social and national life, has had to push its way upward from a small beginning against a host of opposing forces, such as prejudice, superstition, and dogmatism.

In the year 1635, Boston, then but five years old, resolved that "our brother Philemon Permout be appointed school-master for the instruction and education of our children," thirty acres of land being appropriated at the same time for his support. Thus was the seed sown that has developed into our present extensive system of education. But five years' experience taught our pilgrim fathers that there were other difficulties to be overcome than simply providing means for the support of the teacher; parents were found so regardless of the welfare of their children as to wholly neglect the advantages offered them. Hence it was enjoined, that whenever a family shall be found in which so barbarous a state of things exists, as that the head thereof did neither by his own efforts, nor those of others, endeavor to give his children and servants sufficient instruction to enable them to read fluently the English language, and acquire a knowledge of the penal laws, a penalty of twenty shillings should be imposed for such neglect."

Here the word "servants" is worthy of attention, and if we were disposed to speculation might prompt the question, What would have been the effect of such a clause in the codes of the Southern States in their earlier days? Had such a law been in force, we should never have had such a record on our census

tables as the following, which is but typical of the state of education in the South at the time designated:—

ATTENDING SCHOOL, 1860.

| | Total. | Native | For'gn Born. | WHITE. | | COLORED. | | Total White Population. | Total Slave Population. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Male. | Female | Male. | Female | | |
| Mississippi. | 66,524 | 66,147 | 377 | 35,308 | 31,214 | ..... | 2 | 353,899 | 309,878 |

Two slaves attending school, in 1860, in the whole State of Mississippi out of a slave population of over three hundred thousand!

But let us return to our pilgrim fathers. Finding that punishing the parent did not instruct the child, they further ordained that the children and servants of such parents and masters as, after warning, persisted in neglect, might be placed by the authorities under the guardianship of other heads of families —the boys until the age of twenty-one and the girls until eighteen. It was also further ordained, in 1647, that every town of fifty families should be bound to support a schoolmaster competent to teach reading and writing, and every town of one hundred and fifty families to support a grammar school. Such was the commencement made by our New England ancestors in the work of education; and although the turmoil, strife, and hardships of the Revolutionary War well-nigh destroyed the little plant which had sprung from this seed, yet there can be no doubt that to this germ we owe our present educational system.

The progress of popular education, however, was slow and fitful until about the year 1835. At this time, the public mind becoming aware of the alarming amount of illiteracy existing, a movement was begun, of which I believe Horace Mann was the leading spirit, to remedy this evil. This resulted in the adoption of the present common school system, which has wrought so marvelous a change in many of our States. These efforts have been stimulated and aided by the policy adopted by the General Government of setting aside a certain amount of public land in aid of education, and of granting certain sums as equivalents to the States which did not receive any benefit from these land

grants. With these exceptions—which were undoubtedly of great value—the States have been left to themselves in this most important work; no attempt to grant permanent national aid or to institute a national system of education has been made. But States, like subordinate communities, are subject to inequalities in advantages and hinderances, so that it is not possible for them all to advance with the same rapidity in any one line of development. One has advantages in which another is deficient; one is subject to disadvantages and drawbacks from which another is free. Difference in numbers, difference in wealth, commerce, etc., even where equal efforts are put forth, will cause a proportional difference in the results, a fact specially evident in reference to education.

As the rapid advance in the means of intercommunication has effected such vast changes in our social relations that the people of the several States are brought into more intimate relation with each other than subsisted between the different sections of the larger States half a century ago,—what was true then of the effect of illiteracy in parts of a State upon the general welfare of the individual commonwealth is now true in regard to the nation as a whole. And the reasons which were then advanced in favor of a system of common schools, aided and supported by the State, are as applicable now to the nation as a whole. As it was then found necessary to provide a system of education applying to the whole population of a State, so now we have reached that stage in our progress when it becomes necessary, if we would meet the demands of the age, to provide means for extending this system in its most advanced and complete form over the whole country. That this can be done only by the General Government must be admitted by every one who will give the subject a moment's thoughtful consideration.

How should this be done? I answer, first, that it should be done in such a way as to be just and fair to all parts of the country, and that the burden may be borne, as nearly as possible, equally by all sections; second, that it should be done in such a manner as will cause the least possible disturbance to the system now in operation; and, third, that the least possible official machinery should be used.

To meet these several requirements, there is, so far as I can see, but one plan—and that is to distribute annually to the several States and territories a certain portion of the Govern-

ment revenue, to be applied by them, on certain conditions and under proper restrictions, to the aid and advancement of the present common school system. In no other way can the burden be apportioned so equally, nor can any other means be devised by which it will be made less oppressive.

The reasons for distributing this fund to the several States and territories, and having them expend it in educating the children, are doubtless apparent to every one. In most, if not all of them, there are already systems of free schools and organized plans of education aided and fostered by the State or territory, and also the appliances and corps of officers necessary to carry on this work. For the General Government to establish a separate national system of education would, as a matter of course, not only entail upon the people an additional and unnecessary expense, but would undoubtedly bring the national and State authorities into constant conflict. In other words, it is impossible to carry on in the same territory, at the same time, two distinct systems of public schools for the same children. It is, therefore, apparent that if the General Government undertakes to assist in this work, it must do so by aiding, building up, and perfecting the system now in operation, and not by any method which will conflict with it. But this aid should be granted only upon certain conditions and under certain restrictions. First, the States should be required to adopt a uniform system; second, no State or territory should be allowed its proportion of the amount appropriated except upon the condition that such State or territory appropriate at least an equal amount for the same purpose; third, the National Bureau of Education should be charged with the duty of executing the provisions of the appropriation acts, and should also have the right to decide whether the conditions were properly complied with.

If the step proposed should ever be determined upon by Congress, it is probable that the two most difficult points to decide satisfactorily would be the gross amount to be appropriated, and the ratio of distribution. I shall not attempt to discuss the former, as that would require the presentation of a large array of figures and statistics, but will simply state as my opinion that the annual appropriation for this purpose should not be less than forty million dollars; nor do I think it would be wise, at least for some years to come, to have it exceed sixty millions. To the second point, "the ratio of distribution," I propose devoting the remainder of this article.

A proposition has been brought forward in Congress to appropriate some ten or fifteen million dollars for this purpose, to be distributed only to the States showing the greatest percentage of illiteracy. While the object aimed at by this proposition is a good one, yet it is so manifestly unjust and inequitable that it were better to give no Government aid than to give it in this way. Assuming that all States and territories in which the illiteracy exceeds twenty-five per cent. should receive the benefit of this appropriation, we find, by examining the census returns of 1880 (Census Bulletin No. 303), that these are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. As a matter of course, in most of these colored persons who are illiterate compose a very large proportion of the population, and this fact forms the chief argument in favor of the proposition mentioned. But let us look a little below the surface and see whether justice and equity require this unequal or partial distribution of aid. In 1860, according to the census of that year, out of 32,629 colored children attending school in the United States, there were but 1235 in school in these States. In fact, as is well known, slaves were prohibited from obtaining even the rudiments of an education. The illiteracy, therefore, of the colored population, now complained of as such a serious burden, is the result of the deliberate policy of these States in the past. But admitting that the sins of the fathers should not be visited upon the children,—and that as all this has been changed, we should not cavil over the cause, but aid in remedying the evil effect,—let me ask whether, even in this view of the case, such a proposition as that referred to, if carried into effect, would be just to the other portions of the country?

Turning to the Census Bulletin before quoted, we find that this startling degree of illiteracy is not by any means wholly due to the presence of the colored population, but to an unwillingness on the part of the people of those States to tax themselves as others do in order to maintain public schools. We find from this that in Alabama, 24.7 per cent. of the white population, of ten years and upward, are unable to write; in Arkansas, 25 per cent.; in Florida, 19.9 per cent.; in Georgia, 22.9 per cent.; in Kentucky, 22 per cent.; in Louisiana, 18.4 per cent.; in Mississippi, 16.3 per cent.; in North Carolina, 31.5 per cent.; in South Carolina, 21.9 per cent.; in Tennessee, 27.3 per cent.; in Texas, 15.3 per cent.; and in Virginia, 18.2 per cent. On the other hand, the ratio in

Connecticut is 5.5; in Dakota, a pioneer territory, 4.2; in Illinois, 5.9; in Indiana, 7; in Iowa, 3.8; in Kansas, 3.7; in Maine, 4.2; in Massachusetts, 6.4; in Michigan, 4.8; in Minnesota, 6; in Nebraska, 3.5; in New Hampshire, 5; in New Jersey and New-York, each, 5.3; Ohio, 4.9; Pennsylvania, 6.7; Vermont, 2.9; and Wisconsin, 5.6.

But even this does not bring out fully the contrast. If we limit our comparison to native white persons alone, the difference is still more glaring, as seen by the following ratios:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 25.0 | Connecticut | 1.0 |
| Arkansas | 25.5 | Dakota | 1.8 |
| Florida | 20.7 | Illinois | 5.3 |
| Georgia | 23.2 | Indiana | 6.8 |
| Kentucky | 22.8 | Iowa | 2.6 |
| Louisiana | 19.8 | Kansas | 3.1 |
| Mississippi | 16.6 | Maine | 1.9 |
| North Carolina | 31.7 | Massachusetts | 0.7 |
| South Carolina | 22.4 | Michigan | 2.3 |
| Tennessee | 27.8 | Minnesota | 1.9 |
| Texas | 13.9 | Nebraska | 2.3 |
| Virginia | 18.5 | New Hampshire | 1.1 |
| | | New Jersey | 3.2 |
| | | New York | 2.2 |
| | | Ohio | 4.3 |
| | | Pennsylvania | 2.9 |
| | | Vermont | 2.4 |
| | | Wisconsin | 2.0 |

This shows that the percentage of illiteracy among the native whites in the Southern States is, with a single exception (Texas), greater than when the foreign element is included. This state of affairs certainly cannot be attributed to the presence of the colored population. If we compare the amount expended per capita for the enrolled pupils in the public schools, we find evidence of the same unwillingness or failure, from some cause, on the part of most of these same States to contribute liberally to the support of their public schools.

In Alabama, the amount is $2.09; in Georgia, $1.99; Kentucky, $3.85; Mississippi, $2.70; North Carolina, $1.12; Virginia, $3.82; South Carolina, $2.42; while in Connecticut, the amount is $17.80; Illinois, $9.61; Iowa, $12.25; Massachusetts, $14.93; New Jersey, $9.48; New-York, $10.09; Ohio, $8.59, and Rhode Island, $11.63 (Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1880, p. 413). If we compare the whole amount raised by taxation

for school purposes in 1880 with the number of white pupils alone it gives a per capita expenditure in Alabama of only $3.50; in Georgia of only $3; in North Carolina of only $2.58; in South Carolina of only $5.30, and in Tennessee of only $3.16. (I can give no other examples for want of data.)

The only absolutely correct test in this comparison would be the percentage obtained by comparing the amount raised by taxation for school purposes with the real value of the property in the State. But the fact that a large portion is raised by local taxes, and that the assessed value as compared with the real value varies widely in different States, renders this impossible. Using the assessed value, as given in Mr. Spofford's American Almanac for 1880, I find that the rate is generally highest in the North-western States and lowest in the Eastern and Southern States. For example: in Alabama it is 00.21; in Arkansas, 00.22; in Connecticut, 00.39; in Georgia, 00.20; Illinois, 00.85; in Iowa, 01.04; in Kentucky, 00.27; Massachusetts, 00.28; Missouri, 00.41; Nebraska, 00.81; New-York, 00.36; North Carolina, 00.22; Ohio, 00.43, etc.

Now, if the General Government should undertake to do anything in aid of common school education that will be adequate to the wants of our people, it should be done with a liberal hand and in a manner that will show manifest justice to all sections. While ten or fifteen millions may, and undoubtedly will, do much good if granted to one section on the conditions already named, those who are imposing heavy burdens upon themselves in other sections to educate their children will have just grounds for complaint of unfairness. While Illinois taxes her people over four-fifths of one per cent. of the assessed value of her property, Iowa over 1 per cent., and Ohio two-fifths of one per cent. for school purposes, in addition to the revenue raised from other sources, Georgia taxes her people but one-fifth of one per cent., North Carolina but one-fifth of one per cent., and Alabama and Georgia the same, for this purpose.

This difference cannot be charged to inability, for there is no reason why Georgia, North Carolina, and other States may not tax their people to the same extent as Illinois, Iowa, or Ohio, to educate their children. Instead, therefore, of charging this difference to inability, we are compelled to attribute it to neglect or want of appreciation of the value of education. For the Government now to grant this help to States which have so willfully

neglected to provide such means of education as are within their power, would not only be unjust, but would have too much the appearance of rewarding the negligent who are unwilling to help themselves. I believe it will be a wise policy on the part of the General Government to grant aid to the States for their common schools, and to grant it with a liberal hand, but I believe such aid should be distributed to all alike,—to those who have striven most to help themselves as well as those who have been negligent. The only way in which this can be fairly and equitably done will, as I believe, be by distributing such funds as may be appropriated for this purpose to the States and territories in proportion to population. I am as desirous as any one can be to assist those States which are in the background in this respect, for I am fully aware that most of them labor under difficulties which do not apply to their sister States, but I think the Government should be just in distributing its favors.

A distribution in proportion to illiteracy is, as we have seen, unequal and unjust. If made according to the number of children of school age or enrolled, it will then depend on unreliable statistics and on figures made up by States and territories, and not on statistics made under Government control. The only entirely satisfactory enumeration is that of population made by the National Census Bureau. This is a sure and satisfactory basis, and a distribution made upon it cannot be complained of as unjust or unequal.

JOHN A. LOGAN.

# THE DANGEROUS CLASSES.

It has been our habit to look for national disaster from the lower strata of society. We fear the ignorance and vice of the masses. We see the appalling instances of recklessness and brutal violence in the haunts of infamy, as they are recorded in the daily press, and naturally conclude that this element of evil only needs growth — such growth as the rum-shop and a bribed police will promote — in order to overthrow the existing order and carry desolation through the land. The reasoning is just. We have seen in our own country what a power for evil these debased classes are, in the riots of 1877. New York city saw these wild forces at work in 1863. History will ever point, as to one of her most conspicuous pages, to the Reign of Terror in bleeding France, where the fierce passions of men who were nearest the brute made havoc with all that was beautiful, or orderly, or good. But he whose mind rests upon these lower classes as the cause of these horrors is no philosopher. He is content with a superficial view. A philosophical analysis of the explosions of the populace which have so often desolated neighborhoods and nations would reveal a series of causes leading far away from the populace itself. In ancient Greece, the revolutions which established the democracies were movements of the lowest classes of the people; but, before these risings, we find in many instances the tyrannical oppressions of a despot and his court, which to-day would be styled a "ring." It was the long period of fearful oppression in France, represented by the selfish and voluptuous courts of Louis the Fourteenth and Louis the Fifteenth, during which the peasant was but a beast of burden or a tool of greed, which produced the reaction of the Revolution. Gunpowder is innocent until you ignite it. The coarse vice which prevails in the

lowest classes can be perilous to the State at large only as it is turned into insurrectionary channels by the gross injustice of the higher classes. This coarse vice may indeed do local harm. It may generate thieves, burglars, and murderers, and it certainly will do this, but the ordinary machinery of government is sufficient to keep these developments in check. The motives which lead to the local crimes are not those which produce revolutions. They are simply personal greed or enmity. These local crimes can seldom move a multitude, or, if they do, the movement takes the shape of a temporary riot. The lowest classes are in themselves the dangerous classes only so far as this.

The greater danger — the danger compared with which all this local disorder is as nothing, the danger which threatens the uprooting of society, the demolition of civil institutions, the destruction of liberty and the desolation of all — is that which comes from the rich and powerful classes in the community. What we have to fear is the encroachments of these influential elements upon the rights of the people, until, under a sense of oppression, the people, who are naturally timid and slow to act in organization, are forced into united resistance, which necessarily (from the constitution of the masses) becomes destructive to civilization and social well-being. Mere demagogues, even with socialistic or nihilistic ravings, are of no avail with the masses, unless a real grievance of a formidable sort supports them. Herr Most is only ludicrous in America, but in Russia he would be a firebrand to a magazine. It should be our aim, amid our liberties, to prevent our country from becoming a Russia.

The form in which danger threatens us is that of units of vast money-power. Power-units are the cause of oppression everywhere, and in this country the power that is recognized is money. Dynastic power and military power are not present dangers, and probably never will be, except as outcomes of revolution caused by the abuses of the money-power. But everything with us fosters the accumulation of money in the hands of a few individuals or of allied corporations (allied for their common success). The endless resources of material wealth in our mines and our means of communication enable the quick and unscrupulous to become oligarchs of this money-power, ordinary ability and honesty being run over and trampled under foot in the competition. The men who wield this power can control legislatures,

courts, and executive officers, and so cover their tyrannical acts with the semblance of legality. Their most oppressive conduct will be shown in obedience to some law, or, at least, in opposition to no law. Where favorable legislation for them is not obtained, unfavorable legislation is prevented. But is not this bribery? Of course it is. But it is bribery prosecuted with all the refinement of art and all the dignity of statesmanship. It is bribery so sinuously practiced, and on so colossal a scale, that the public eye is dazed and the public mind deceived or bewildered. Under its effects, transactions which, in the narrow sphere of a petty thief, would send him to prison, are wrought on every side in the millions of railway stocks, and the perpetrators remain as members of the most reputable political and commercial society of the land. Men of this stamp are even elevated to the highest offices of state—men whose daily life has violated every principle of justice.

It is by the growing power of this class of tyrants that our country's safety is now threatened. And the danger will come in two forms: the demoralization of society and the sanguinary vengeance of the oppressed. The morals of a community work downward from the higher classes. Like priest, like people. Corrupt the prætorium and you corrupt the empire. A licentious Court will be imitated in every provincial neighborhood. If the educated and wealthy classes of America treat fraud as a virtue, we shall have dishonesty the characteristic of the whole nation. Trickery will be counted for wisdom, and lying for prudence. We shall reach the happy condition of Turkey and Persia, where every man has to guard against his neighbor as a thief, and find security for himself and his property only in cunning, falsehood, and secrecy. That this demoralization is fast affecting our society is evident in the light way in which our newspapers speak of flagrant outrages upon justice, and the readiness with which the manipulators of nominations (and the electors themselves) forget the baseness of men whom they set up as candidates and seek to place in responsible office. Men who have been sentenced to punishment by our criminal courts are nominated and elected. Both nominations and elections are promoted and sustained by what are known in the community as honest and honorable men. Furthermore, these men whose lives have been marked by fraud and other immoralities are admitted into social circles which are called pure, their wealth or their serviceableness in behalf of

wealth being a sure passport. In this way the poison permeates all society. The source, as we have seen, is in the units of vast money-power, a power which effectually crushes everything that opposes.

Beside the moral desolation caused by this aggregation of wealth in a few hands, the political safety of the country is especially endangered. The making and maintaining this concentered wealth demands a system of plunder and oppression of the poorer classes and of the public generally. Prices are made, not through the natural laws of demand and supply, but by "corners" and conspiracies. Fair competition, which is the life of trade, is utterly crushed by the giant foot of this money-swollen monster. A few monopolize the entire trade of any given article by reason of their money-power, remorselessly destroying any one who dares even to glean in the field they have made their own by robbery. The word "robbery" is not a misnomer, for the money has been forced from unwilling hands by immoral, though sometimes legal, means. A widow, having the care of a family of small children, puts her money in railway stock. She is advised to do so by a director in the railway. It is the widow's all. Soon afterward this director, and a few with him, seeing the importance of their road and its capabilities, determine to secure a controlling interest in the stock for themselves, thus both increasing their investment in a profitable concern, and at the same time obtaining a power to do what they please with the road thereafter, as occasion may demand. Accordingly, their first step is to run the stock down. This they accomplish by paying agents to go to places where the stock is owned, and, by brief articles in the local newspapers, to insinuate that the road is shaky. Every little fact against the road is exaggerated. If a dividend has been passed in order to an important improvement, this omission of a dividend is ascribed to the road's approaching bankruptcy. By these means the public are soon led to believe that the road is financially a failure. Our poor widow holds on to her stock, until from par it drops to twenty-five. She is then thoroughly frightened. She hears many now say, "Sell out your stock, or you'll lose all." So she sells her stock and loses three-quarters of her property, which even before was only enough to keep her and hers in the ordinary comforts of life. Meanwhile, our high-minded director and his partners, having brought the stock down to a low

enough figure, buy it all in through their agents. Soon the stock mounts to its original value, and our director has made a million dollars by the transaction. The widow is financially ruined. How? By the rascality of the director, who has been to her as truly a merciless tyrant as ever was Nero or Caligula to the Romans. He has by fraud wrested from her her living to increase his enormous wealth. This is but an instance of what is done daily by these money-magnates. The fraud takes different shapes according to the circumstances, but the system of amassing lordly fortunes now in practice is essentially a fraudulent system. And cruelty is the natural companion of fraud. A rich concern makes twenty-five per cent. on its capital for ten years, and has then more than trebled its property. It employs three hundred workingmen at wages that just support them and their families. A year comes in which the managers perceive that they can only make seven per cent. instead of twenty-five. At once they discharge two hundred workingmen into poverty and despair. The men have worked faithfully in trebling their employers' fortunes, and now, to save a trifle of these trebled fortunes, these faithful men are cast out without mercy. This is a common form of the cruelty of the wealthy units among us.

The power exercised in fraud and cruelty knows no limit for either except in its own interests. Individuals are directly and indirectly cheated. Not only are laws framed for the benefit of the moneyed oppressor, but his power enables him to refuse obedience to wholesome laws. If any laws should be most carefully and equitably administered, they are those which relate to the taxes of the community. Every citizen should bear his equal proportion of the public burdens. Yet the wealthy units have no difficulty in throwing the weight of taxation upon the poorer classes, by evading the payment of their legitimate taxes. A college professor by my side, getting a meager salary of $2000 a year, and having as his only property a mortgage of $10,000, conscientiously pays his 2½ per cent. ($250) a year of personal tax on this mortgage, receiving as interest only 3½ per cent. ($350), while a neighbor worth three millions pays not one cent of personal tax, although he is owner of fifty mortgages, beside a large amount of railroad stock. By a fiction of debt he escapes his tax. The wealthy units practice this trick almost universally, and the authorities are perfectly aware of it. Their wealth is the power that protects them.

If suits should be commenced against any of these wrong-doers, their money enables them to tire out the complainant by the use of technical delays, by spiriting away witnesses, and by corrupting courts. This is so well understood that no one who has any worldly wisdom dares to enter the lists of law against any one of these gigantic reservoirs of capital, and they on their side understand this impunity and immunity, and improve it diligently. These power-units of wealth gather about them a *clientèle* of faithful, because well-paid, dependents, who speak, write, and act for them as occasion demands, and who by their wit and effrontery manage to guide much of public opinion in behalf of their masters. Some of these dependents are editors of influential journals, who skillfully make the worse the better reason and call evil good, so that honest-minded readers are found to be sympathizing with the unfortunate capitalist, against whom the wicked proletariat says such hard things.

But this state of things cannot always continue. The sense of oppression on the part of the people at large becomes deeper and stronger. They begin to learn that their reform leaders are bought up by the money-power, and that the so-called reforms are but tubs thrown to the whale. They see that only violent measures can relieve them, and a common feeling of revenge unites them. Now comes the catastrophe. At the first stroke they find themselves a power, and when men first discover their power they are reckless how they use it. They carry destruction on every side. They revel in slaughter. They waste property. They burn dwellings. They overturn all institutions. They paralyze trade. They annihilate society. The tyranny of the moneyed units has accomplished what nothing but tyranny can accomplish—the united action of a heterogeneous and naturally unorganized populace. It has raised a spirit of evil which it cannot allay. It has unchained the tiger and whetted his appetite for blood. These must not be considered as exaggerated prophecies. History shows that we are sober in our statements. The community cannot be plundered forever; combinations of capitalists and legislators to rob the poor for the benefit of the rich will eventually meet with counter-combinations which will not confine themselves to robbery. This is human nature as well as history.

The present peril of our country is exactly here. The dangerous classes among us are those who are engaged in amassing colossal

fortunes—the giants who tread ordinary men under their heel, and care not how much the people suffer. They are absorbed with their own greatness, lifted by their wealth out of all sympathy with the mass of mankind, and live as if the world belonged to them. The cries of want and sorrow are unheeded by them, the appeals of charity and benevolence are spurned, the demand for coöperation in works for the public weal is slighted,—while all their millions are poured into the channels of their own selfishness. In monarchical countries, so long as the people can find a living, they will endure the oppression; but in a republic like ours the time of account will come sooner. Here the people will not wait until they are ruined. They have some notions of rights, and some forethought of impending evil, and they will anticipate their own crisis by making a crisis for others. How is this catastrophe to be avoided? The answer is simple. The dangerous classes must be rendered harmless. But how can this be done? Only by righteous laws, righteously administered. These laws will neither be administered nor made until we put men in office who will spurn bribes direct or indirect. The first thing, then, for the safety of our country is the election of honest and upright men to office. We see now in our legislative halls, gamblers, drunkards, libertines, *et id genus omne*, who must take bribes in order to keep up their licentious lives. A low set of liquor-sellers make the ordinances of the city of New York. Politics are run by rowdies and criminals, with whom decent men cannot associate, except to be defiled. Questions are decided not on their merit, but on the money in them. Until this system is entirely changed, and honest men are elected to office, we can have no check to the dangerous classes and their schemes. And the system will not be changed until rum-shop nominations are ignored, and honest men vote for character and not for party.

The second thing for our safety is the enactment of laws to defend the poor man against the rich oppressor. No man should be allowed to lord it over the industries of the land; no man should be allowed to hold sway over the highways of the nation in an irresponsible absolutism. There must be a limit to individual wealth if we are to be preserved as a republic. Then, corporate wealth should be under strict supervision and its management subject to just governmental control. Furthermore, the wages of the laborer should be secured to him for a year at a time, as in the case of a salaried officer, to be forfeited only for such mis-

conduct as the courts would recognize. Severest penalties should be adjudged for the avoidance of tax-paying, and bribery should be punished by permanent loss of citizenship and ten years' imprisonment.

The third thing for our safety is an executive force, from governor to policeman, who will watch for the public and see the laws enforced. Now we have to support a special private society to enforce any special group of laws, as, for example, the Excise, Gambling, and Treatment of Animals laws. Without these societies there is no effort to stop the infraction of law. Men of integrity and of just pride in their office and its true functions should be the guardians of the law.

Again we insist that these are sober words of ours, to which it were well a lethargic community should give heed. Cease, ye men of pleasure and of business, cease from thinking only of yourselves. Give thought to the community in which you dwell. Do your public duties. Discharge the solemn trusts imposed upon you by your country, your conscience, and your God.

HOWARD CROSBY.

# RACE EDUCATION.

QUESTIONS of race furnish the most difficult of all the problems with which practical statesmanship has to deal, and the people of this country are now confronted with three questions of this kind. Two of them, "the Indian question" and "the Negro question," date from the early annals of American colonization; while the third, "the Chinese question," has only recently come to perplex our politics.

At the end of our civil war, the political status of the freedmen determined the whole policy of Reconstruction; and the only three amendments added to the Constitution, in order to conserve the results of the war, were amendments which had for their object to protect the emancipated slaves in their freedom and citizenship. These amendments put an end to "the Slavery question" in the United States, but they made "the Negro question" more than ever a dominating issue in our national life. In the days of chattel slavery, the Negro was in the Republic, but not of it. To-day, he is part and parcel of our civil and political organism.

Although for the present there is a lull in the conflict of races at the South, it is a lull which comes only from the breathing-spells of a great secular contention, and not from any permanent pacification founded on a resolution of the race problem presented by the Negro question in its present aspects. So long as the existing mass of our crude and unassimilated colored population holds its present place in the body politic, we must expect that civilization and political rights will oscillate between alternate perils — the peril that comes from the white man when he places civilization, or sometimes his travesty of it, higher than the Negro's political rights, and the peril that comes from the black man when his political rights are placed by himself or others higher than civilization. Arabian story tells of ships pulled to

pieces by the Lodestone Mountain, which drew the nails out of them as they approached it; and certain it is that the joints and seams in our ship of state have more than once sprung aleak under the stress put upon them by our mountain of unintelligent and unorganized suffrage — a mountain, too, which is streaked with its white strata as well as its black.

Meanwhile, the fair-minded people of the country are equally solicitous that none of the Southern States shall be "Africanized" after the manner of South Carolina in the days of her humiliation, and that not a single Negro shall be "terrorized" out of his civil or political rights, after the manner of the so-called "Mississippi plan." The trouble is to find the *tertium quid* which, avoiding either horn of the dilemma, shall reconcile the twin interests of civilization and of civil freedom — interests which were once congenitally united in our voting population, but which have been temporarily rent in twain at the South by the wrench and strain of a great civic convulsion, followed by the wrench and strain of a great civil enfranchisement which came too soon, because it came too late.

The first section of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, in its application to our freedmen, had the force and effect of an instantaneous and collective naturalization act. The fifteenth amendment made this naturalization effective for voting purposes. Previously our naturalization laws had been made and construed on the assumption that only men of European extraction could qualify under them for the rights and duties of citizenship. No distinction was made among the white citizens or subjects of European states, because the people of all those states were held to be practically of the same social tissue. And similarity of social tissue had heretofore been held to be the criterion and condition precedent of political fusion.

As nobody among us contemplates the fusion that springs from a physical amalgamation of the two races, it remains to consider the processes by which the black race may be brought into such intellectual, religious, moral, civil, and political assimilation with the white race, that the elective franchise conferred on the former may work the least possible detriment to the civilization of the latter.

Our problem has some differential elements which distinguish it from all former problems in race education. The assimilation of different races by contact with each other is nothing new in

history. Sometimes the assimilation has been initiated by a process of social transfusion, as when Shalmaneser poured Israelites into Assyria, and Assyrians into Samaria, for purposes of international unification. Here mechanical mixture was made the prelude and condition of a gradual social and religious assimilation, which became in the end so complete that all trace of the ten tribes of Israel has been subsequently lost. *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit* is a school-boy's commonplace, but by this phrase nothing more is meant than a literary assimilation between races of similar ethnical fiber. The Northern barbarians were partially civilized by contact with Roman life, manners, and institutions. But we may say of these barbarians, as has been said of one among their great leaders and organizers, that they were barbarian *magis natione quam ratione.* In the elements of manly character, and in the elements of ethical practice and social subordination, they were superior to the degenerate and mongrel Romans whom they dispossessed of place and power. These same pagan tribes were subsequently brought within the fold of the Church; but their conversion was, in its initial stages, effected with the least avoidable change in their hereditary ideas and national customs.

Merivale, in his history of the Roman Empire, expresses the opinion that the success of the old Romans in assimilating to themselves the barbarian races of their day was owing, in a great degree, to the low moral standard of the conquerors themselves, which brought them nearer to the level of their subjects, as, in our own times, "rough whalers and brutal pirates have done more," he thinks, "to Europeanize the natives of Polynesia than the missionaries." This process of political and civil assimilation has come, he adds, to be deemed "one of the lost arts" of modern governments; and in modern Christendom he conceives that there is "no harder trial of our faith" than the failure of the Church (among the Chinese, for instance) "to strike the chord of sympathy by which, as we must believe, all nations of the earth are actually bound together"; while Balmes, the Roman Catholic apologist, laments that the modern Church, in the conduct of its missionary operations, "has been stricken with a radical sterility" which, beginning with the Protestants, has extended to the Catholics themselves,—and all because, as he charges, of the great schism created by the Lutheran Reformation.

When the phenomena of all former assimilations, whether in

religion or polity, are viewed in connection with the teachings of anthropology and with the history of civilization, it will be found that no "art" has been lost either by governments or churches, but that the problems of modern assimilation have been raised into a plane infinitely above that in which the Roman Empire or the Roman Church wrought its social transformations. The political assimilations of the Roman Empire, in their initial stages, were wrought by force. Policy ended, it is true, what arms had begun; but the policy of despotic governments is simple, because its ends are neither many nor high. In like manner, the religious assimilations of the Roman Church, in their initial stages, were wrought by insensible changes, which made the transition from paganism to Christianity as little abrupt as possible. But civilized governments rule to-day, and are ruled, by public opinion, insomuch that no assimilation of alien but confederated races can be called complete until it rests on the basis of a common intelligence and a common morality. Churches, too, rule to-day, and are ruled, not by the thaumaturgic signs with which St. Boniface worked on the simple-minded Teutons when he felled the sacred oak of Geismar; and not by compulsory edicts, as when Bishop Amandus procured from the Frankish King Dagobert an order commanding the Frieslanders to be baptized; but by the simple moral force of their spiritual ideas, and by the self-evidencing power of their spiritual principles. "The Church and serfdom," says Hegel, in his "Philosophy of History," were "the two iron rods" with which paganism and barbarism were beaten out of the German race; and after arguing that, in the *causal nexus* of events, "it was not so much from slavery as through slavery" that humanity was morally and mentally emancipated in Europe, he ventures to add, with a rhetorical extravagance which rather weakens than strengthens the truth of his statement, that the mediæval ecclesiasticism fought its battle against the rude sensuality of the barbarians in a temper "as wild and terroristic as that of its antagonists." But to-day, because of its own high ethical sense, and because of the high ethical pressure under which it works, the Church can properly use only the forces which are germane to a moralized state of society, and these forces are feeble in the case of a degraded and unspiritual race.

That "abomination of desolation," the modern slave-trade,

accomplished for the American Negroes the same mechanical transfusion which Shalmaneser accomplished for the Israelites. It broke their connections with Africa, with clan government, and with the religious institutions of fetichism and Devil-worship. The slave-master trained them into habits of industry, but these habits were imposed on them from without for the master's benefit, and not being evolved from within, as the sign and symbol of any "increasing purpose" in the Negro himself, they marked a change that was functional and superficial rather than structural and deep-rooted in the Negro's character. And the change could never become structural so long as he remained a slave. But now that he has been introduced into the sterner competitions of free society, the change must become structural if he is to be other than a hewer of wood and a drawer of water. And what is true of the Negro's industrialism is equally true of his religion, morality, and politics — they must be brought into structural affinity with the religion, morality, and politics of the white race if the Negro is to be other than a ground of stumbling and a rock of offense among his fellow-citizens and fellow-Christians.

And all structural changes of this kind must not only be the work of ages, but they must result from a whole complex of factors working in the bosom of society toward the evolution of a higher civilization. Some of these factors are ponderable, and some of them are imponderable. Some of them work with observation; but some of them, and the best of them, work, as the kingdom of heaven comes, without observation. In its lower stages every civilization, in common with every civil polity, may be said to plant its roots in physical coercion of some kind; but, with each advance in rationality and morals, the necessity of a resort to physical coercion recedes more and more into the background. A self-government of freedom comes more and more to the front. To the mind of the late Professor Joseph Henry every status of civilization presented itself as a coerced condition, with the poise of an unstable equilibrium in its constituent elements, the coercive forces in each case varying in kind according to the grade and culture of a people. In this sense the educational training of individuals and of separate races may be said to epitomize that of the whole human family, as seen not only in the successive stages of universal knowledge

and of moral culture, but also in the ascending series of the coercive forces by which the whole race is lifted to higher and higher levels of science, virtue, freedom, and righteousness.

Race education must, moreover, not only proceed from a complex of many forces, but these forces must run side by side, that is, must run *pari passu*. They cannot spring *per saltum*, now in this direction and now in that, without dislocation or strain of the social and political organism. It is the law of every organism that all increase of function which works to edification of structure must result from the coöperative forces of the whole body "fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth," for then only is it that the increase comes "according to the effectual working in the measure of every part." St. Paul's conditions of normal growth in an organism are the same as Herbert Spencer's. Disjunction and schism in the members lead sometimes to convulsions and sometimes to atrophy. What the obligations of morality and religion, even as confessed by Christian men, are worth to a people who have no community in the political economy and civil institutions of their neighbors, we may read in the tragical fate of Eliot's "Praying Indians,"—"those poor, despised sheep of Christ" (as Gookin called them), who none the less had wolves' heads put on them by their fellow-Christians, the Massachusetts Puritans. What high industrialism can do for a people whose political and intellectual life is congested in the heads of a mandarin class whose morality is low and whose religion is unspiritual, we may see in the stolid, immobile, and materialistic civilization of China. What a neophyte Christianity can do for a people whose political life, morality, and general intelligence are left at the low level of paganism, we may see in the terrible pagan reaction which followed the apostolic labors of St. Francis Xavier in Japan. What the Christian religion can do for even a cultivated people, when, becoming an end to itself, it degenerates into a thousand doctrinal subtleties without transforming manners, morals, or laws, we may read in the bloody annals of Christianity under the Byzantine Empire. What high political rights can do for a people whose religion, morality, intelligence, and industrialism move in a lower plane than that of their fellow-citizens, we may witness in the present attitude and relations of the Negro race as recently enfranchised by constitutional amendment. What abstract considerations of humanity or religion are worth, even in this nineteenth century,

to a people who have neither part nor lot in the political economy, polity, or politics of their neighbors, we may see in the forlorn condition of the Indian tribes, whose destiny librates now as it has for centuries librated between the slow process of asphyxiation and the more summary process of military extermination. What political economy, even when reënforced by abstract philanthropy, by fundamental maxims of polity, and by "glittering generalities" about "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," is worth to a people who intrench themselves in the single stronghold of "cheap labor," without having any other muniments of title in our religion, morals, and politics, we may read in the civil excommunication denounced by act of Congress against the Chinese laborers.

All history, it would seem, combines to point the moral that there is a certain logical and necessary interdependence among the industrialism, the religion, the morality, the intelligence, and the political status of every people at each given stage of their civilization; and if they are abnormally raised in one direction, there will be disturbance and effervescence of the social elements in other directions, until a new equilibrium is reached. And under free institutions this new equilibrium, through whatever alternations of spasm and quietude it may be reached, will not be final, in the case of a great enfranchisement, until the process of political assimilation has been practically made complete by giving to each citizen his equality of right and privilege, and by giving it to him with no less advantage to his fellow-citizens than to himself.

When Neander says that the Christian civilization had to be imposed on the German barbarians in one of two ways,— either by working from above downward under the guidance of some single predominant power, or by working from within outward at a multiplicity of separate centers until, like leaven, it had leavened the whole lump,—he does not so much specify an alternative method as two very distinct, successive, and widely separate stages in every civilizing process. It is not until the civilizing process begins to work from within outward, at a multiplicity of points, that the process has become organic and structural in any given community. And we can measure the civilization of a people at any given epoch by the degree in which the action, reaction, and interaction of the social elements have become powerful, pervasive, and rapid. It has been well said by Mr. Hubert Howe Bancroft, that what we call civilization "is a

something between men no less than a something within them," and the "progressional force," which lives and works among men, will be determined by the differentiation and integration of the intellectual, moral, religious, and political principles which have been implanted in them, and which have taken root in them; for it is not until these principles "take root downward and bear fruit upward" that they can be regarded as an organizing and structural part of the social system. The Bushmen, as Sir Bartle Frere tells us, were for a time the eager purchasers of little glass bottles, containing a cheap German scent, not because the love of perfumery had become organic in their unæsthetic habits, but because they had found a structurally savage use for little glass bottles by splintering them into arrow-heads. A Sunday-school teacher in one of the colored Baptist churches of Washington was found, a few years ago, to be using the Roman Catholic catechism in her classes, and this because her mental and religious development had not been brought into correspondence with polemical theology. The root of the matter determines the quality of the fruit. So true is it, as the Teacher of Galilee said, that new cloth cannot be patched into an old garment without making the rent worse, and new wine cannot be put into old wine-skins without bursting the skins. And it is not the rending of the old garment that does the damage, but the waste of new cloth; not the breaking of the old skins, but the loss of new wine. There must be a change of the whole *Weltanschauung* with every radical change which translates a people from heathenism to genuine Christianity, from superstition to science, from government by force to government by opinion.

If, as Hume has said, mingling epigram with political philosophy, "it is unreasonable to expect that a piece of woolen cloth shall be wrought to perfection in a country where ethics are neglected and astronomy is unknown," much more unreasonable is it to expect that political rights can be used by a race without detriment to themselves and to the commonwealth if their intellectual state is low and their moral sense undeveloped. Not until the Negro race has been "leveled up" to the average of the white race in all directions will Negro suffrage be other than more or less of a solecism in our politics.

For the complex purposes of our political problem the training of the common school will not suffice. Our common school system, top-heavy with multiplied studies which look to

mental "cram" rather than the compound discipline of head, heart, and hands, is but ill-adjusted to the real wants of even the white race. "As for the dream," said Hugh Miller, "that there is to be some extraordinary elevation of the general platform of the race achieved by means of education, it is simply the hallucination of the age—the world's present alchemical expedient for converting farthings into guineas, sheerly by dint of scrubbing." Not but that education is good, he adds—not but that general education is indispensable, I will add—so far as it "develops faculty;" but as there are only certain limits within which the whole race improves, so there must be particular limits within which alone particular races can be expected to profit by such education as is open to them. Hence the need not only of thrusting education, and the right kind of education, upon our colored fellow-citizens, but also of waiting long till intellectual forces become "progressional" among them.

Nor will the training of the Church, if added to that of the common school, be entirely equal to the exigencies of our political situation. Everybody agrees that intellectual culture is a poor boon without morality; and for morality, both public and private, the Christian teacher finds a basis in the Christian ethics. If it be true, as Matthew Arnold says, that "conduct is three-fourths of life," we can easily see that the teacher who works for conduct works for more than the teacher who works for intelligence alone; but the mere inculcation of ethics does not carry with it the practice of virtue. Ethical doctrines, to be operative in society, must be translated into social spirit and social life. The old Hebrew prophet saw as clearly as we do that the moral transformation of a people is a process as slow as the physical transmutation of typical marks in species and races. "Can the Ethiopian change his skin?" exclaims Jeremiah, "or the leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good who are accustomed to do evil." Hence the duty of plying the colored race with the ethical disciplines of practical life, and of waiting long for their fruitage in customary moral law and social order.

To public intelligence and public morality, even supposing them to have become organic in the colored race, there must be added for our political purposes the civic sense that comes from the quickening touch and fostering matrix of free institutions. But this civic sense cannot be "added"—it must grow, and must grow from a *humus* of intelligence and virtue, deep enough and rich enough to sustain and nurture it. It was not in a

forcing-house, but in the arena of long and wearisome conflict, that our ancestors learned how to get and how to keep the civil liberty which, "broadening down from precedent to precedent," has become the peculiar heritage of the British race. This civil and political liberty rests on civil and political habits, and on inherited political traditions which have become institutional among us. And it is only in so far as civil liberties and political franchises become institutional in a people that they work with steadiness, beneficence, and harmony.

But here, happily, our political extremity is in some good measure our political opportunity. For nothing is so educational as a political institution which, at the cost of preventable mischief, requires public intelligence, which with public intelligence requires public morality, and which with public intelligence and morality requires the genesis of political habits of thought and action; only we must not expect these habits to become organic in an uninstitutional race in the course of a few generations. Political institutions, worked by universal suffrage and placed under the guardianship of public opinion, are the very incarnations of political propagandism, and as such become the most potent of educational forces in the figure of civil society. They are the digestive organs of the state, capable of being overtaxed, but endowed also with wonderful powers of assimilation. Hence the preëminent place assigned to them by M. Guizot, in his history of European Civilization, and by Dr. Lieber in his treatise on "Civil Liberty and Self-Government." It is because the educational power of institutions was seen to be so great that Moses surrounded the Jews, from the day of their birth to the day of their death, with rites, ceremonies, rules, regulations, and statutes which made the whole life of a Jew one continuous series of "object-lessons" in personal cleanliness, in sanitary prudence, in private morality, in public ethics, in national sentiment, and monotheistic religion. Indeed, the principles of race education from slavery to self-government, and from barbarism to civilization, have been summarized and recapitulated in the history of this most remarkable people, as in no other nation, and nothing is more remarkable in their history than the power of peculiar institutions to mold and perpetuate a peculiar national sense.

I have confined this discussion to the race education of the Negro, because as yet the race education of the Indian has not been seriously undertaken among us, while that of the Chinese has been put in abeyance. "The Indian question" makes a

comparatively feeble impression on the mind of the nation at large, because the Indian has not been fully implicated in our labor system, in our polity, or in our politics. And when we remember that "the principal end" of British colonization in America, as declared in the charters and letters-patent granted to the early settlers of New England, was "the conversion and reduction" of the Indians "unto the true worship of God and the Christian religion," it must be admitted that there has been a great mistake somewhere — in the terms of the aforesaid charters, in our Christianity, or in our Indian policies. The first step toward the race education of the Indians will not be taken, as I conceive, until all the Indians, in common with those already enrolled as United States citizens, shall be made the responsible subjects of civil government, instead of being "corraled," as some of them are, in Government reservations, to be there alternately gospeled by the missionary, and beguiled by the Indian agent; or, instead of being allowed, as some of them are, to run wild in their native hunting-grounds and mountain fastnesses, to be there baited by the casual rifle of the frontiersman, when they are not hunted to death in the more systematic foray of an "Indian campaign." The education of a few Indians at Hampton and Carlisle, while this system lasts, will be a waste of new cloth and new wine. Old Shalmaneser could better teach what are the first principles of race education, for he first brought a recalcitrant people under government, and then mixed them with enough of Assyrianism to leave an indelible stain in their social tissue. On Indian education, as also on the right and duty of the Government to suppress war-dances in the residentiary tribes, it is impossible to cite with too much praise some practical suggestions made by Secretary Teller a few months ago.

It will be time enough to discuss the race education of the Chinese when the Chinaman shall again be freely allowed to come among us; and perhaps it will be time enough to let him test our national hospitality, and the extent of our faith in the "Right of Expatriation," when we shall have learned how to manage our other race problems, without doing despite to civilization or political rights, and without falling as far below the wisdom of the serpent as the innocence of the dove.

JAMES C. WELLING.

# THE WATER-SUPPLY OF CITIES.

A COPIOUS and constant supply of pure water is a source of comfort, luxury, safety and health, and has become a necessity of modern civilization. The most refined and cultivated nations have always been large consumers of water. With the Orientals cleanliness is akin to godliness. Mahomet directed a disciple to commemorate his mother by digging a well, and Jacob's well is one of the oldest relics of antiquity. The baths of Diocletian and the aqueducts of Rome, with the reservoirs of Jerusalem and Damascus, are colossal triumphs of engineering. Yet, despite the magnitude of the water-works of the Orientals, Greeks and Romans, and their lavish supply for public uses and in the houses of the rich, the ancients seem to have had no conception of the modern use of water as a sanitary necessity to the community at large. Furthermore, many modern applications of water, as for fire service, sprinkling streets and lawns, flushing sewers, and to supply manufactories, laundries, hotels, elevators, steam-engines and railroads, were wholly unknown to them. The great cities of the past were supplied from huge rock-hewn cisterns for receiving and storing rain, or by aqueducts which often extended for miles, spanning valleys and rivers, and conveying a daily supsupply for each inhabitant often three or four times greater than we can now provide. With the introduction of Christianity, and owing largely to the immoral practices connected with public bathing, the latter habit was discouraged by religious teachers and fell into disuse, so that personal cleanliness became exceptional, and the filthy habits of the masses undoubtedly promoted the spread of the plague and other great mediæval epidemics.

Dublin was one of the first modern cities to introduce a public water-supply. This occurred in the thirteenth century, when in most cities of the European continent the supply was provided by street carriers. A curious regulation provided that the pipes

connecting with individual dwellings should not exceed the size of a goose-quill, which indicates the value put upon the water. London did not have a public supply until some four hundred years later, and then through the munificence and public spirit of some lord mayor or sheriff anxious to distinguish his term of office by conferring so great a boon upon his constituents. In 1582 a Dutch engineer erected a water-wheel at London Bridge, the first pumping machinery used in England. The earliest efforts to supply Paris with water were under the patronage of religious bodies, the oldest aqueduct having belonged to the Abbey of St. Laurent. Paris depended upon the Seine and small aqueducts until within a few years.

An English chronicler quaintly describes the "contempt, scorn, derision, yea, and desperate despight" which the early projectors of water-works in London met with from "accursed and malevolent" persons. Afterward, when numerous water companies had been chartered as purely commercial enterprises, the rivalry bred by competition was carried to the verge of ruin. The different companies finally consolidated, and the interests of consumers were sacrificed to monopoly. The supply was intermittent, flowing only a few hours each day or even week; storage-tanks were necessary in every house; very large mains were needed to convey the supply within a brief period, and duplicate mains were required for fire purposes; the domestic cisterns were exposed to contamination, and their contents became stale and warm; while, worst of all, the original source of supply was polluted with sewage and factory refuse. Parliament finally interfered, and decided that the principle of competition was not applicable to water companies. The cholera epidemic of 1848–49 caused such a panic that the companies were forced to take their supply from more distant points. Numerous royal commissions have since pointed out the unsatisfactory character of the London water. In 1871 a bill for the compulsory purchase of the water companies by the Government was introduced, but failed to pass. At present the evils of the system are becoming intolerable. Large masses of population are dependent upon shallow wells in sewage-soaked soil. Dr. Frankland, the eminent chemist, reports that the largest volume of water conveyed to the city is seriously polluted with sewage, while the water examiner for London states that the storage-cisterns are fertile sources of impurity. At a public meeting held at Exeter Hall, about two

years since, Cardinal Manning, the Bishop of London, and other speakers insisted that the authorities must take some action in the matter to protect both morals and health.

The amount of water required for a community depends upon the character of the population. Where bathing is habitual, the supply must be copious. So, too, in a manufacturing city, it will not do to restrict consumption; a single paper-mill, brewery, or gelatine works may consume more than a thousand individuals. An abundant supply is also needed for boilers, elevators, public fountains, to extinguish fires, and to wash the streets, while the whole amount is finally used to flush the sewers —an important sanitary service. The amount of water usually required to meet all domestic demands is estimated from ten to forty gallons per head. The temptation to waste, however, is so great, that two and three times this amount per day is often drawn. In London, exact measurements show that workingmen's families consume four and a half gallons per head if taken from street-hydrants, but from five to fifteen gallons if from separate taps in each house. In large houses the consumption often reaches seventy gallons per head. Thirty gallons per head is considered a liberal allowance for ordinary sewered towns with average manufacturing interests. The domestic consumption is largest on wash-days. In hot weather it increases twenty per cent.; but in time of frost the excess, chiefly from waste, is from thirty to forty per cent. New York consumes ninety-five gallons daily per head of population; Liverpool, sixty; London, thirty; Paris, thirty-eight; Dublin, sixty; Glasgow, fifty-two; Manchester and Birmingham, each twenty.

In calculating the amount of water to be provided, allowance must be made for future as well as present needs. Provision should also be made, in case of emergency, for an amount greatly in excess of the ordinary consumption. At the great Boston fire of 1872, when the daily consumption averaged twelve and a half million gallons, the fire department used eighteen and a half million gallons, mainly during the first eighteen hours of the fire. Where the daily consumption exceeds five million gallons, duplicate pumping apparatus are considered necessary to meet the chance of a break-down. If the consumption is less, a reservoir capable of storing a week's supply will suffice. Next to the question of quantity comes that of quality. A potable water should be colorless and clear. It

should be soft and have little mineral matter in solution, while it should be absolutely free from organic contamination. Most persons will reject pure water which happens to be turbid, in favor of sparkling, colorless water, drawn from a polluted spring, provided it has no peculiar taste or odor; yet, in localities where clear waters are hard and unfit to drink, turbidity becomes a recommendation.

Pure water, to judge from the statements of chemists, physicians, and sanitarians, is a rarity in most localities. In rural districts, as a glance from any railroad car window will prove, the uniform nearness of wells, cisterns, stables, pig-pens, cess-pools, in the usually porous soil, leaves no doubt of the contamination of the water-supply. An English analytical chemist of large experience says that scarcely a single sample of water brought to him from farms, country-seats, and private houses in the country, had proved to be pure. The Sixth Report of the Rivers Pollution Commission states that twelve millions of people depend upon shallow wells "almost always horribly polluted." Mr. James C. Bayles's clever parody upon "The Old Oaken Bucket" should be in every collection of household poetry; it shows that in too many cases the ordinary domestic supply, instead of being the sparkling and refreshing water of the poet's fancy, is really more akin to Macbeth's witches' hell-broth. It is a curious circumstance that, if a child or servant falls ill in the country, the water rarely comes under suspicion; but, if cattle are affected and die, it is at once examined. People will freely use water which has to be filtered of visible and even living impurities. Bad drinking-water is an ever-present peril to rural residents, and an ever-recurring one to their occasional visitors. Hence, diseases due to polluted water prevail as largely in the country as in the city, and are often imported from the former to the latter.

Nevertheless, for many communities, wells, if properly located and guarded against contamination, may prove the best available source. When houses are more numerous than two to the acre, dependence must be placed on driven wells, which may supply a whole community, if judiciously placed. The permanent yield of any well depends upon the local geological formation, and such an expensive work as sinking one should never be undertaken without competent professional advice. A slight intelligent examination will often determine whether the proposed

source of supply is inexhaustible or temporary and intermittent. Driven wells of iron tubing are well adapted for localities where the soil is free from stone. They have been much used in military expeditions from the rapidity with which they can be sunk, but they need to be protected from contamination.

Artesian wells are often used to supply small towns or establishments consuming large quantities of water, as breweries, hotels, laundries, mineral water manufactories, etc. Their yield is sometimes large, and, as the temperature of the supply is low, a great saving may be made in the outlay for ice. In London, where these wells penetrate the chalk-beds, a yield of from one and a half to two and a half million gallons per day has been obtained. Wells of like capacity exist in Liverpool, Paris, and other cities. There are eighteen hundred in New-York city, with an estimated daily product of twenty million gallons, which saves one thousand dollars per day to their owners. In Boston nine-tenths of the large factories are supplied from similar sources. Among the places supplied from wells may be named Memphis, Covington, Ky., Kansas City, Mo., Dayton, O., Long Island City, Garden City, and Prospect Park in Brooklyn.

Artesian wells are costly to bore, and often fail to yield good water, while their supply is not always permanent. The famous Grenelle well in Paris, one of the deepest on record, at first yielded eight hundred thousand gallons daily, and afterward declined to two hundred thousand. Again, the water from deep wells is generally strongly charged with lime or more objectionable minerals, which renders it unfit for domestic use. It is too hard for laundry purposes without boiling, and it causes incrustation in boilers, and is often unwholesome. A late examination by the New York Board of Health, of fifty samples of water from such wells, showed a large proportion of mineral and organic matter.

The effect of water-pollution upon health has been repeatedly published. Goitre is caused by drinking water impregnated with animal matter, and disappears when pure water is substituted. In Great Britain one hundred and sixty-four epidemics of enteric fever were traced in four years to impure air or water—usually both, and six thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine deaths occurred in a single year from these causes. In the historic outbreak at Over Darwen two thousand cases of sickness and a hundred deaths resulted from a polluted water-supply. A simple test for pure water, such as might be used by

ordinary householders, is very desirable; but none exists, and it requires much skill to prove that water is absolutely pure. Chemical tests are uncertain. The taste is not to be depended upon, as the most palatable water is often the most impure. In India, examination of some of the wells used by the pilgrims showed that the so-called holy water consisted of almost pure sewage. The frequent outbreaks of cholera among these visitors is therefore explained. So difficult has it become to obtain pure water on the Continent of Europe, that the eminent English physician, Sir Henry Thompson, in a letter to the London "Times," warns travelers never to touch a drop in any place, or under any circumstances, unless it can be boiled before using.

Fresh-water ponds and lakes are perhaps the best source of public supply. They are less apt to become turbid, matter in suspension being deposited as sediment, while organic matter in solution is purified by the oxidation of the air. They are also less likely to be selected as sites for manufactories or towns, and hence are less exposed to pollution by the waste products of industry or sewage. Shallow ponds are not desirable, or those whose margins are liable to be exposed in seasons of drought. Ponds are so numerous as to afford an almost unlimited supply. In Massachusetts alone their area is estimated at ninety-two thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight acres.

The banks of rivers from time immemorial have been the sites of towns, whose inhabitants have naturally used the streams as sewers, while their water privileges have invited manufactures, whose waste products have been added to the first source of contamination. Some of these waste substances are harmless to health, but many are unwholesome. A great deal has been done in the direction of rendering them innocuous, but it is almost impossible to do this completely. In England the consequent pollution of water-courses has excited public alarm, and led to stringent legislation. Owing to the greater size of American rivers, this evil has not become so formidable here; yet, in the case of the Merrimac, the Passaic, and the Ohio, not to name others, it is attracting serious attention. There is a prevailing impression that large flowing streams are self-purifying, and chemical tests have apparently confirmed this belief, from their failure to show serious contamination in streams at a distance of some miles below a point where sewage or other products were discharged into them. This, however, is a mistaken view.

Even though by oxidation, deposition, and dilution, the potency of many impurities may seem to be greatly lessened, yet this may be only because of the inefficiency of chemical tests. In view of the extraordinary vitality of disease-germs of all kinds, and the effect of impure water in promoting typhoid and other zymotic diseases, the conclusion of the best sanitary authorities seems rational, that it is not safe to use, for domestic purposes, water known to be seriously polluted.

A further objection to rivers is that they become turbid during freshets, and receive impurities from various sources, as dissolved vegetable matter, eroded and decomposed rock, the drainage from marshes or peat-beds, etc., according to the geological formation of the locality. Their high temperature in summer is another objection, especially where ice is not abundant or cheap. Great stress is laid upon this consideration in Europe, especially on the Continent, and a uniform temperature is considered very desirable. Furthermore, rivers usually follow the lowest level, and hence there is difficulty in raising water high enough to supply dwellings without power. Where there is a fall, pressure may be produced by water-wheels, in connection with a surface reservoir, as in the Cochituate water-works, or steam pumps may be used, though they are costly in operation. A weir or dam is sometimes built across a river-bed, to allow impurities to settle before the water enters the mains.

As a security against fire, a public water-supply is a wise investment. The losses by fire in the United States, in 1882, amounted to seventy millions of dollars. A hotel, theater, church, or other large building is burned every day. The great conflagrations in New York, Chicago, Portland, and Boston marked epochs in our history. Every little while a whole village is swept away for lack of some provision against fire. The consequent loss falls on the whole community through the fire insurance companies, and it is to the interest of all to reduce it to a minimum. Private apparatus usually fails in the time of need, and a public supply is the only safe reliance. The fire protection side of the water-supply question has a vital interest to the inhabitants of large cities, in view of the growing popularity of huge flats and office-buildings filled with combustible material and only fire-proof in name, whose lofty elevator shafts and stairways are but flues to spread flames instantaneously from cellar to roof, and whose height, while inviting draughts

of wind from every direction, renders of no avail the best pumping apparatus.

The experience of New York in securing an abundant public water-supply, is typical of that of other cities. Up to the beginning of the present century, wells and cisterns were depended on, and their product was vended through the streets. The Manhattan Company was then chartered, and built a reservoir in Chambers street, from which wooden pipes conveyed the water. This arrangement was displaced by the Croton aqueduct in 1842. The population was then three hundred thousand, and the capacity of the aqueduct sixty million gallons daily. It was expected to meet the city's needs up to the year 1900, but its designers did not anticipate the rapid growth of population, or the increased consumption due to improved plumbing and the development of industrial enterprise. Instead of the single sink and hydrant, which then sufficed most householders, hot and cold baths, basins, and water-closets are now found everywhere. Many tenement-houses are better provided with water than the best dwellings of forty years ago, while the most lavish supply is needed to meet the luxurious habits of our wealthy citizens. In less than twenty-five years the city's consumption doubled, and an additional reservoir had to be built. For nearly ten years it has been necessary to force the aqueduct, at great hazard, to carry thirty-five million gallons in excess of its intended capacity. At present it is always full, and in great danger, under the existing pressure, of leakage and mishap. Since the erection of the high service works at High Bridge and Ninety-seventh street, nothing has been done to obtain an added supply, and the expenditure has been solely for maintenance. The most startling fact in this history is that the bulk of the ninety-five million gallons brought to the city is not used, but wasted. Furthermore, for long periods the supply in the Croton Valley has been so abundant that five hundred million gallons per day has been running to waste over the dam. It has, therefore, been possible to use only one-sixth of the supply which would be available if there were sufficient storage and aqueduct capacity to retain and convey it. Niagara itself would not contribute a drop more water than is now distributed by the present aqueduct. It is almost impossible, during a large part of each day, to draw water on the upper floors of most houses not provided with tanks, and hence there is no supply to flush

plumbing fixtures and prevent foul odors. These annoyances and evils must continue with the inevitable decrease in pressure from the city's growth, until a new aqueduct can be built. The remedies for the scarcity of water are, first, to build a new aqueduct; and second, to check the present waste by methods employed in other cities where the same evil is complained of, and which have already been tested here.

The chief sources of water-waste are well stated by the Water Register of Boston to be the use of so-called self-acting closets; urinals which are constructed for a continual run of water; the use of hand-hose for the purpose of irrigation; bad plumbing materials and bad plumbing-work; and the steady run of water which is permitted in winter time to prevent freezing. Close competition among manufacturers of plumbing material has caused great deterioration in its quality. The market is flooded with inferior water-fixtures, which from their cheapness are largely used, while their inefficiency and wastefulness is increased by bad workmanship. Being hidden from view, an imperfect joint, a leaky valve or faucet, may escape notice perhaps for months, and prove a source of constant waste. In Boston a single defective Hopper closet, such as is everywhere used by domestics, was found to have wasted four hundred and seventy-five thousand five hundred and ninety-five gallons, and by changing thirteen such fixtures for others a saving of three and one-quarter million gallons was made in a single year. There are sixteen thousand one hundred and thirty-seven such appliances in use in that city, which at the same ratio would waste four and one-half million gallons every twenty-four hours. A tax of twenty dollars is to be levied on such water-closets in New York, and seems reasonable, as they are usually allowed to run unceasingly.

In Chicago the consumption averages a hogshead and a half for each man, woman and child, which Mr. Chesborough justly pronounces "evidence of enormous waste." Chief Engineer McFadden, of Philadelphia, says the useless waste of water in all American cities demands a supply double that of European cities, to maintain which requires great outlays, or the introduction of meters to control this needless, if not criminal waste.

Much diversity of opinion exists relative to the use of water-meters. The general conclusion seems to be that, while they are desirable in the case of breweries, hotels, factories, stables, and other places where a great quantity of water is re-

quired, they are not to be recommended for private houses, from the chance that imposing a price upon the consumption may lessen the sanitary use of water. No restriction should be made that would lead people to avoid bathing, or freely flushing plumbing fixtures. Anything which discourages a liberal use of water is an obstacle to social progress.

In Liverpool, district meters have aided in the stoppage of leaks, and have reduced the daily consumption one-half, and in Fall River and Providence they have worked well. The Boston Water Board, in their just issued report, favors their use, but admits their costliness and difficulty of general adoption. The prime object of the meter, as its name indicates, is not to obtain revenue, but to discover and prevent waste. It is claimed that nothing but such an adjunct will lead householders to correct defects in their water-fixtures. The saving thus effected would, in a few months, pay for the cost of the meter. The problem is to insure the use of the whole available supply, not to limit it. The recovery of one-half of the water now wasted means a constant supply for fixtures on the upper floors of hundreds of houses which now are left without supply most of the day, and would obviate the necessity of storage-tanks in many places.

The New York Fire Department consumed only thirty-three million gallons last year, or a little more than one-third of a single day's supply. The elevated railways consume about one and one-third million gallons daily, and the hotels a little larger amount. Many of the latter have private wells. Steam-engines use a million gallons per day. In brief, all the larger consumers united do not consume four per cent. of the total supply, and the water-waste is chiefly among householders. Charitable institutions are said to be prodigal of water, in one hospital two hundred gallons per head being daily consumed. Fifteen thousand meters are used in New York, the charge being one cent per hundred gallons. The conclusion of the whole matter, so far as New York city is concerned, may be thus stated: the population is still growing, and with it the demand for water. No dependence can be placed upon wells for domestic needs, and the public supply must therefore be increased. Those who now have an abundance of water should not be restricted; those who are denied this privilege should have their fair quota. A new aqueduct will take years to build; meantime the present supply must be employed to the best advantage, all waste must be checked, and the public urged and required

to use the water reasonably. Householders must be taught that there is no advantage to health in letting water run continuously, and that a small stream from a faucet or valve will not flush a soil-pipe or sewer; also, that the way to prevent supply-pipes from freezing is to protect them from frost. It is noteworthy that the bulk of the waste is found in a small number of houses,—about four per cent. of the whole,—and therefore it is to the interest of the majority to stop this extravagance of a few. A plan for a new aqueduct has been prepared, which has the approval of engineers of world-wide reputation, ability, and integrity; and it is to be hoped, and seems probable, that it will be soon carried out. Longer delay is dangerous.

English experience has shown the error of allowing a watershed to be appropriated by the first comer who may come along, and that the interests of small as well as large communities must be considered. A national movement, under the auspices of the Prince of Wales, has there been set on foot to district the whole of England and Wales, so as to distribute the water-supply equitably among the whole population. Small communities often have as much trouble to obtain pure water as large cities. Hence, in constructing reservoirs and aqueducts to provide for the latter, provision should also be made for similar places along the line of conveyance.

CHARLES F. WINGATE.

# ETHICAL SYSTEMS.

ETHIC is the science of right behavior; its ground in human nature and its application to conduct. The subject presents two topics: first, the reason of right behavior, or the ground of moral obligation; second, the criterion of right behavior or rectitude in action.

What do we mean by moral obligation? Why ought I to act in a certain way, to do this or that, and not to do otherwise? The answers to this question are mainly three, and characterize three different systems of ethic. We may call them the selfish, the politic, the ideal. The first finds the ground of moral obligation in self-love; the second in social relations; the third, theologically speaking, in the will of God, or, what is the same thing philosophically expressed, in the moral nature of man.

The selfish system is essentially that of the epicurean philosophy — each one's happiness the supreme good. This principle recurs with different modifications in some later systems, and notably in that of Paley, whose Moral Philosophy was once an approved text-book for the use of students. To the question, Why am I bound to act in a certain way—*e. g.*, to keep my word?— Paley answers, because, if I do, I shall be rewarded for it in another life; if I do not, I shall be punished for it in another life. We distinguish, he says, between an act of prudence and an act of duty. Wherein does the difference consist? "The only difference is this, that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come." According to this view there would be no duty; moral obligation would not exist for one who should be so unfortunate as not to believe in a future life. Paley, then, is an epicurean, differing from the sage of Athens only in seeking satisfaction in another world instead of securing it in this.

The system of Hobbes, who preceded Paley by a century or more, partakes partly of the politic and partly of the selfish. It is politic inasmuch as it identifies right with civil authority, and denies any higher law. It is selfish inasmuch as it identifies moral obligation with the good to be gained by obedience to civil rule.

The politic systems, distinctively so called, are those in which the sole ground of moral obligation is the good of society, which measure duty by utility. The best representative of these is Jeremy Bentham, a stalwart intellect, a Hobbes redivivus; in my judgment superior, in all that concerns social science, to modern positivists. Bentham assumes utility to be the fundamental principle of morals. "By the principle of utility is meant," he says, "that principle which approves or disapproves every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question."

"If the principle of utility be a right principle to be governed by, and that in all cases, it follows that whatever principle differs from it in any case must be a wrong one. To prove any principle a wrong one, there needs no more than just to show it to be what it is, a principle of which the dictates are in some point or other different from those of the principle of utility."

"Of such principles there are several, but they all agree in not accepting utility as the ultimate standard of right.

"One man says he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong, and that it is called a moral sense. And then he goes to work at his ease and says, such a thing is right and such a thing is wrong; why? Because my moral sense tells me it is. Another man comes and alters the phrase, leaving out moral and putting in common. He then tells you that his common sense tells him what is right and what is wrong, as surely as the other man's moral sense did; meaning by common sense a sense of some kind or other, which he says is possessed by all mankind — the sense of those whose sense is not the same as the author's being struck out of the account as not worth taking. This contrivance does better than the other; for a moral sense, being a new thing, a man may feel about him a good while without being able to find it out, but common sense is as old as creation, and there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his neighbors. Another man comes and says that as to a moral sense, indeed, he cannot find that he has any such thing, but he has an understanding, which will do quite as well. This understanding, he says, is the standard of right and wrong; it tells him so and so. All wise and good men understand as he does; if other men's understandings differ in any point from his, so much the worse for them; it is a sure sign that they are either defective or corrupt. Another says that there is an eternal and immutable rule of right; that the rule of right dictates so and so; and then he begins giving you

his sentiments upon anything that comes uppermost, and these sentiments, you are to take for granted, are so many branches of the eternal rule of right."

These extracts indicate the spirit and intent of the utilitarian system of ethics as represented by Bentham—a system in which there is no recognition of any other source of moral obligation than the comfort of society, of any other right than that which consists in augmenting the pleasures and diminishing the pains of our fellow-men.

The latest form of utilitarian ethics is the outcome of that system of philosophy known as Positivism. Here, as in Paley and Bentham, there is no recognition of absolute right, and an aboriginal sense of right, in moral agents. Instead of that, we have a modification of the brain, resulting from hereditary experience of utility accompanying certain modes of action.

"Moral institutions," says Herbert Spencer, "are the results of accumulated experiences of utility. Gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space possessed by any living individual to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organization; just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of thought, apparently quite independent of experience, so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous organizations which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions corresponding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in individual experiences of utility."

The view presented in this statement I regard as a curious example of the extravagances into which a strong mind may be driven by pursuing to its ultimate one line of thought, by the despotism of a system. The analogue chosen by way of illustration—the hereditary origin of our sense of space—suggests the question, how primitive man came by his space-perceptions which, one would say, must have been rather essential to him in the operations by which he won his subsistence and got himself lived, after a fashion, in those dim years: and further (since heredity is cumulative), whether your and my sense of space is any more perfect than that of Pythagoras when he discoursed of the ἄπειρον 2,500 years ago. As to the physiology of this hypothesis,

it seems to me that if our moral perceptions are nervous modifications derived from inheritance, the sons and grandsons of upright ancestors should be preëminently gifted in that kind. But we have proof that the moral sense in such subjects is no finer than in persons of less honorable descent, in spite of the "*noblesse oblige*" of the French aristocrat. Conduct, I know, may be determined by other influences than that of moral intuition, but surely it might be expected to bear some appreciable relation to such intuition.

There is, however, a truth, a very important truth, involved in Spencer's theory. That truth is the fact of an accumulation of moral capital in civil society,—a capital handed down from one generation to another, and to which each generation contributes its own experience in works and lives. The growth of this capital is coëval with history; it is vested in historic records, in biography, in literature, in churches, and other institutions for the education and edification of human kind; but not, I think, in the intracranial ganglia of the human animal. It acts for the good of society, not as a physically plastic force, but as moral attraction, repulsion, incentive, guidance.

One investment of this capital is custom. Under this head I will name an instance in which social influence acts with almost physical force, and comes near to verifying Spencer's doctrine of nervous modification. It relates to the intercourse of the sexes. In the earliest stage of human society, when polyandry prevailed, brothers of one family did not shun to mix with a sister in wedlock, according to such form as was known to that rude time. The custom was found to be attended with evil consequences; it became obsolete; the moral sense was enlisted against it, and that so effectually, that now it is regarded as one of the blackest of crimes, and what may be called an instinctive aversion has made it one of the rarest. Here is a strong case—a solitary one, unless parricide be another—of an hereditary sentiment ripening into a moral conviction, or, if you please, a moral intuition, whether through connate cerebral formation, as Spencer claims, or, as I prefer to believe, through overpowering social influence affecting domestic education.

But Spencer's doctrine teaches that man has originally no moral perceptions, no sense of right—in effect, no moral nature; not differing in this from the brute. If this be allowed, it follows, I think, that man has no moral nature now. For civilized man

differs from primitive man, not in the ground-elements of his constitution, but in training, development, habit. He acquires by heredity the habit of acting, the disposition and impulse to act, in conformity with social well-being. But where does he get the feeling that he ought so to act, that such action is right, that he is bound to it, however adverse to his own inclination, however it may seem to conflict with his own advantage? Whence does he derive the idea of duty? The mere perception that a given line of action is conducive to social well-being will not compel a man so to act if he sees no benefit, but, on the contrary, injury accruing to himself from such action. That perception will never induce him to sacrifice himself for the common good, unless reinforced by a strong sense of moral obligation. What do I care for the common good? My own gain is more to me than any benefit the public may reap from my action. Or, suppose I feel some interest in the common weal, some public sympathy, there is in that sympathy no force sufficient to counteract my selfish inclination, no categorical imperative. But Duty comes in and says, "You must." A voice in my conscience, which I feel to be the voice of God, commands, and woe to me if I disobey. Herein precisely consists the difference between moral and political—the former finds its law within; the latter, without.

There is a radical distinction which we all feel between right and expedient. That distinction the utilitarian ethic overlooks: the terms right and wrong have no true place in that system, they are borrowed from a higher plane of human experience and surreptitiously grafted on the stock of utilitarianism. Take for example the virtue of honesty. The moral sense enjoins honesty as a form of right irrespective of use. According to Mr. Spencer the duty of honesty results from the experience of many generations, that honesty, as the proverb goes, is the best policy. The saying is not true in the unqualified universality in which the proverb affirms it. Cases may be supposed in which, so far as the temporal prosperity of the individual is concerned, rigid honesty is not the best policy. But let that pass; grant the truth of the proverb. How was it first discovered that honesty is the best policy? How came it ever to be tried? The carnal instinct is against it. When in early ages the carnal man saw an advantage to be gained by deception, and that deception not likely to be detected, and thereby to injure him in the end, he would be sure to deceive, unless a principle, other

and higher than policy, restrained him. The first man who resisted the strong temptation to deceive was certainly not moved to such resistance by the accumulated experience of ages, that honesty is the best policy, wrought into his nervous structure, otherwise he would not have been the first honest man. He must have obeyed an imperative voice within, which said to him you must not deceive, you must speak and act the truth; and doubtless he experienced a sharp conflict with himself in obeying that mandate, as the conscientious man does now when honesty and seeming advantage collide. If it were always as distinctly seen, as clearly understood, as firmly believed, that honesty is the best policy, as it is that fire burns and water drowns, honesty would cease to be a virtue, and an honest act could not, with any propriety, be termed a moral act. In the words of Sir John Lubbock, "It is precisely because honesty is sometimes associated with unhappy consequences that it is regarded as a virtue. If it had always been directly advantageous to all parties, it would have been classed as useful, but not as right."

I think we have abundant evidence of an aboriginal sense of moral obligation, a feeling of the difference between right and wrong, as old as the eldest and rudest form of society, older than the State, as old as the tribe—very imperfect, indeed, very crude, limited to very few topics, but not wholly dormant, not utterly inactive. There was never, I guess, a state of society so rude, in which a man could wrong a friend or betray confidence, without suffering remorse for so doing.

I oppose, then, to the utilitarian view of the origin of moral obligation the doctrine of a moral sense proper to man as man, and constituting a part of the original dower of human nature.

The feeling of remorse which follows wrong-doing can be accounted for in no other way. An injury done to an individual or society would not awaken that feeling except the moral sense had pronounced such injury a sin against one's self. And, on the utilitarian principle, remorse should never arise where no such injury has been perpetrated. Dr. Darwin, referring to the case of the dog which, while suffering vivisection, licked the hand of the operator, remarks that "the man, unless he had a heart of stone, must have felt remorse to the last day of his life." But why remorse, if the utilitarian doctrine is true? The man was contributing, or intending to contribute, to the uses of

science, which are the uses of society. Satisfaction, not remorse, should follow such action.

I shall not undertake to prove to those who deny it the existence of an innate sense of right; but let me recall to the reader's memory a beautiful illustration of it from Grecian history. Themistocles had announced to the people of Athens that he had in his mind a project which, if put in execution, would be of great use to the State, but that the thing was of such a nature that it could not, before the execution, be made public. The assembly deputed Aristides to be the recipient of Themistocles's confidence, and, if he approved, to have it done. The project was to burn the Spartan fleet, then massed at Gythium, and thus to secure to Athens the supremacy on the seas. Aristides reported to the agora that what Themistocles proposed would be eminently useful, but would not be right. Whereupon the Athenians concluded that what was not right was not expedient, and rejected without a hearing the proposal of their greatest general. Says Emerson: "As much justice as we can see and practice is useful to men and imperative, whether we can see it to be useful or not."

Let us pass to the third, the ideal theory of moral obligation. The ideal theory is that which finds the ground of moral obligation in the simple idea of right. Plato, and after him the Stoics, are its chief representatives among the ancients. Plato's philosophic system ls based on the assumption of eternal ideas—ideas which are not perceptions or states of the human mind, but which have an existence entirely independent of the human mind. Of these ideas the first category consists of the Beautiful, the Just, the Good. These are different aspects of one and the same fundamental reality. And man's vocation, according to Plato, is to realize and embody these ideas in his life. This is duty, this is virtue. Hence, so far from basing morals on polity, Plato's system, on the contrary, bases polity on morals.

The philosophy which, during the days of its prevalence, exercised unquestionably the greatest practical influence on its votaries is that of the Stoics. The atmosphere of that school, after converse with utilitarian and eudæmonistic theories, comes bracing to the soul, as a nor'-wester in dog-days braces the nerves. The sublimest ideas have sprung from its theory, the grandest souls have been ripened by its training. We find them at the opposite poles of the social scale. Epictetus, the slave,

Aurelius, the sovereign lord of the world — milk-brothers, suckled by the same high-hearted nurse who freed her foster-children with a freedom which bondage could not bind, and bound them with bonds from which thrones could not free.

The first principle of the Stoic philosophy was that virtue is the supreme good, the only real good. Virtue for its own sake, not for any fruits which its exercise may yield. Be true to yourself; be not disobedient to the heavenly vision, to the highest vision your mind has sight of. *Respue quod non es*, said Persius, the pure-souled poet of the sect. *Ne te quæsiveris extra.* Seek the ground of your action in yourself.

Among moderns the foremost champion of ideal ethic is also the foremost philosopher of modern time. That title, I think, the vote of experts will assign to Kant. Kant proposes the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle in morals.

"Autonomy of the will is that quality of the will by which, irrespective of the character of all particular objects of its willing, it is a law to itself. The principle of autonomy, accordingly, is to act in such a way that the maxims which govern our choice shall be included in our willing as universal law." "When the will seeks the law that shall determine it elsewhere than in the fitness of its maxims to serve for universal legislation — when, going beyond itself, it seeks its law in the quality of its objects — we have heteronomy. The will in that case does not give the law to itself, but takes it from its object through the relation which such object bears to its volition. This relation, whether based on inclination or on ideas of reason, admits only of hypothetical imperatives. I am to do this, because I desire that, whereas the moral, *i. e.*, the categorical, imperative says: I must act so or so, whether I desire the object of the action or do not desire it."

"For example, I must seek to promote others' happiness, not because I care for it, whether in the way of direct inclination or on account of the complacency which Reason may find in it, but because the maxim which should exclude it cannot be included in one and the same willing, as law for all." "Love," he remarks, "is a matter of feeling, not of willing. I cannot love because I will, still less because I ought. Consequently, to speak of the duty of loving is nonsense. But beneficence, as action, may be subject to the law of duty."

"To do good to others according to our ability is duty, whether we love them or not. And this duty loses nothing of its obligatoriness, although the sad observation should force itself upon us that our species, alas! is not of such a character that on nearer acquaintance we find them particularly lovable."

Montesquieu says of the Stoic philosophy, that it is the only one which has produced great men and great rulers. I would add that it has given us in our own day, in our own country,

the most thoughtful essayist and the most commanding moralist of recent time. When we read Emerson's essay on Heroism, we feel ourselves lifted into a higher atmosphere, we breathe the pure oxygen of the Porch. The spirit of Antoninus found in him, after many generations, a kindred soul. It inspires his poetry as well as his prose, and has given us such choice morsels as we find in some of his quatrains.

> "Though love repine and reason chafe,
> There came a voice without reply;
> 'Tis man's perdition to be safe,
> When for the truth he ought to die."

And this happy versification of Kant's sublime maxim, Duty the measure of ability, not ability the measure of duty:

> "So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
> So near is God to man;
> When Duty whispers low, 'Thou must,'
> The youth replies, 'I can.'"

I find no valid ground of moral obligation but the inborn sense of right. To the question, Why am I bound to act in a certain way? the final answer is, Because it is right. Prove an act or a course of action right, and you prove it binding. There is nothing more to be said about it. To dispute that authority is like disputing the claim to our preference of beauty over ugliness. Why must I prefer the bird of paradise to the crab? Why must I prefer the form of the crescent moon to the gibbous, the face of Apollo to that of a satyr? Because the sense of beauty in me requires it.

But now comes the question, what constitutes right? Here the utilitarian ethic has the merit of supplying most of the tests and the most universal rule of right-doing. Although utility is not the source of moral obligation, it is in most cases the end. When, in any case, the question how to act presents itself to the conscientious mind, the measurable utility of my action must, in the absence of other tests, decide the question. And in most cases, perhaps, other tests will be wanting. It is always right, and therefore my duty, to act in such a way as to benefit my fellow-men. Bentham's rule, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is well taken, provided I know what in

the long run will be for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Still, we cannot say categorically that utility is the measure of right; whereas, we can say, on the contrary, that right, as discerned by the scrupulous and enlightened conscience, is the measure of utility. There are cases in which the right and the useful appear to conflict. In a presidential or gubernatorial election, we will suppose that the nominee of the party whose general principles and policy, as compared with its opposite, I approve, and which I wish to prevail, is a bad man. He is reckoned available on account of certain popular qualities, and is nominated accordingly. But I know him to be unprincipled, profligate, bad. On the ground of utility I might be tempted to vote for him as helping to defeat the party whose policy I mistrust, whose success I believe would involve much evil to the common weal. But on the ground of right I cannot vote for him, for in so doing I should say by my act that such nominations are justifiable, and that moral qualities are not essential in the head of the nation or the State. In short, I should say: Do evil that good may come.

And this, it seems to me, is one of the dangers to which utilitarian ethic is liable — that of doing evil that good may come. It is vain to say, that cannot be evil from which good shall spring; that the only test of an act is its use; that the tree must be judged by its fruits. I accept the rule, but with a different application. The tree must be judged by its fruits. But who can foresee all the fruit that shall spring from a given act? Behind the immediate good, who shall say what evil may lurk, slowly ripening to its harvest of death? That act must be evil and a fountain of evil, which the unperverted moral instinct condemns. But the moral instinct may be blinded by interest; it may be gagged by casuistry till the oracle turns dumb, and right seems wrong and wrong right. I fear that without something in us deeper and surer than all calculations of utility, our ethic would prompt infanticide and putting to death with some mild quietus the idiots, the misshapen, the hopelessly diseased, the useless members of society. We know how in time past utility prompted tyrannicide, and we know what came of such action. Brutus thought to do a useful thing by assassinating Cæsar; he hoped to restore the republic, but he hastened its final extinction on the field of Philippi. Charlotte Corday, the beautiful enthusiast, thought to do a useful thing by killing Marat;

she would free her country from oppression, but she caused it to fall into the hands of Robespierre.

Who can measure consequences? Who, intent only on use, and knowing no other test, can be sure of the final balance of good and ill, can cast the limit of blessing or harm in acts that, prior to all calculation, have a character impressed upon them by the deep, prophetic soul, outreaching calculation, and ordaining, irrespective of seeming use, thou shalt and thou shalt not? But this we know: that the virtues not born of use give birth to uses which compensate many of the evils that vex the utilitarian mind. Say, rather, they are uses in themselves. Patience is a use; piety, fortitude are uses. Of these uses, and the duties we owe to ourselves, utilitarian ethic makes small account. These it does not especially tend to promote.

But if utilitarianism in morals incurs the danger of doing evil that good may come, the ideal ethic, on the other hand, is liable, when incontinently urged, to the opposite danger of ruthless absolutism. Kant himself, I think, offends in this sort when, in stern consistency with his lofty view of duty, he maintains that no conceivable crisis in human life can excuse the utterance of a falsehood. You must not lie, is the first commandment in his code. You must not lie to spare the nerves of the dying and secure a euthanasia which the truth would defeat; you must not lie to avert the career of a madman; you must not lie to save a nation from ruin. I cannot consent, nor will humanity bend, to this anxious interpretation of the moral law. It seems to me based on a narrow view of truth. Truth is not a question of words alone, not a function of tongue and throat, but of the heart and the life. "Doth not Nature teach you?" Nature is truth on the cosmic and secular scale; but how Nature will lie, to human perception, with false appearances which deceive even the elect! Do you say truth is an agreement between word and fact? Granted; but truth is a thing of degrees, and the higher may hold the lower in suspense, as one force in Nature suspends another; as the law of gravitation is suspended by the flight of the lark. Truth is agreement of word with fact; but truth is also fitness of means to ends. Let there be truth in the heart and truth in the will, as accordant with mercy and right, and the speech must conform thereto. But is not this precisely a case of doing evil that good may come? And do I not contradict myself, having said that what the moral instinct condemns must needs be evil? I answer

that my moral instinct does not, in such cases, condemn the verbal falsehood. My moral instinct does not require me to sacrifice sacred interests to a form of speech. My moral instinct commands me to save life, and not to destroy it.

"*Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum;*" let justice be done though the sky fall, is a favorite maxim of ideal ethic. It is one of those sounding plausibilities which, in some of its applications, the wiser mind will not approve. It depends on what the particular justice is that would get itself done, and what is the sky that is going to fall. The greater must not be sacrificed to the less. The particular justice may mean the cause of a class; the threatened sky may mean the cause of a nation. But the truth is, there can be no real conflict of moral interests, and no real conflict of a moral interest with the common weal. Let justice be done to a class, and the nation will reap the benefit in the end; and *vice versâ*, injustice to a class imperils the welfare of the whole. The truer maxim, therefore, would be, "*Fiat justitia ne ruat cœlum.*"

It would seem that no one principle of practical ethic can claim unconditional acceptance or admit of universal application. Even the so-called "golden rule," "Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you," has its limits. The judge on the bench, the jury in the box, are not doing by the criminal at the bar as they would be done by in like circumstances, when they find him guilty, and pronounce on him sentence of death. A more comprehensive maxim is that of Kant, "Act according to the rule you would wish to be the universal rule of action."

The right and the beautiful in action, though usually coinciding, are not strictly commensurate. An act is not always beautiful in the measure in which it is right, or *vice versâ*. The lie with which Desdemona excuses her murderer is beautiful, but can we pronounce it right? An act is not especially beautiful of which the contrary would be base. We bestow that praise only on acts which transcend the bounds of strict obligation and culminate into the heroic. Sidney Smith extols the act of one who, having purchased a lottery ticket for himself and another for a friend who was not informed of the number designated for him, when his own number drew a blank and the other a large prize, made over the prize to his friend. He might have changed the destination of the numbers and no one would have been the wiser; therefore he is said to have acted beautifully. But could he have respected himself had he done other-

wise? Would not his conscience have condemned the substitution as false and base? The act, it seems to me, was simply right; it could claim no special beauty.

The act of Damon in offering himself as a hostage for his friend was beautiful; the act of Phintias in rendering himself at the proper time to redeem his pledge and endure the cross was simply right. The beautiful acts which history has preserved to us, the doings of such men as Aristides and Leonidas, of Regulus, of Scipio, of Arnold Winkelried, are the beaming light-points in the annals of humanity. More instructive than all our ethics, they reveal the possibilities of human nature, and teach the utilitarian that the best of all uses are heroic souls. And these are ripened in no utilitarian school, but draw their inspiration from a source which philosophy will never sound. The great man teaches, by his doing and his being, more and better than Plato or Kant, reason they never so wisely. It was said of Cato that he was to Rome the thirteenth Table of Laws. And without the thirteenth how defective the twelve would have been!

The essence of all virtue is disinterestedness, self-abnegation. And of all unbeliefs the most execrable is that which denies the reality and capacity of disinterested goodness—the vile doctrine, not less blasphemous than it is absurd—that every good deed, every generous effort, if rigorously analyzed, will be found to have its source in self-love. The benevolent, it is said, find satisfaction in the exercise of their benevolence; it is, therefore, their own satisfaction which they seek, as the sensualist seeks his in sensual pleasures. They have both the same end in view; there is no difference between them, except in the methods they have hit upon for the attainment of that end. The one may be more cunning, but morally he is no better than the other. Martyrs, patriots, philanthropists, are all self-seekers; self-sacrifice is only selfishness in disguise. May such selfishness abound! In the words of Dr. Brown: "It is a selfishness which, for the sake of others, can prefer penury to wealth, which can hang for many sleepless nights over the bed of contagion, which can enter the dungeon a voluntary prisoner, . . . or fling itself before the dagger which would pierce another's breast, and rejoice in receiving the stroke. It is the selfishness which thinks not of self, the selfishness of all that is most generous and heroic in man, the selfishness which is most divine in God."

The conclusion is, that utilitarian ethic, however serviceable

in complementing the idea, and illumining the path, of the right, lacks the element of the moral as distinct from the expedient. There is a right and a wrong independent of use. As far as the east is from the west, so far is the right from the wrong, though all the apparent and computable utilities gather round the latter, and only its own sanctity envelop the former.

Well might Kant bow in awe before the sense of right, likening it in grandeur to the starry heaven. For does it not, like that, lay hold on eternity? And is it not precisely the strongest thing in the universe of intelligent being? Lodged in a feeble human frame which a blast may wither, it shall finally compel into its orbit all the powers that be.

F. H. HEDGE.

# STREET-BEGGING.

"Ye have the poor always with you,"

SAID the Great Teacher. There never has been a time, in any nation, when this was not true. Is it likely that anywhere, at any time, it will not be true? Even a superficial view of society will show that there are those who are really poor without blame. There are those who, for causes for which they are not responsible, and which they would gladly remove if they could, are not able, by any exertion in their power to make, to procure what is really needed. No political economy has been able to remove this social element, no religious culture has been able to eliminate it. It would seem as if the saying of the Great Teacher, with which this article opened, not only stated a fact, but also announced a general law of human society.

But there are the "poor" and the "paupers." All paupers may be poor, but all poor are not paupers. There are those among the poor who are as gifted, as learned, as refined, as noble, as self-respecting, and as respectable as their richest fellow-citizens. A rich man may be rich because he is honorable, and a poor man may be poor because he is honorable. It shows a lack of knowledge, either of human society or of the English tongue, to say of any one that "he is poor, but honest."

But paupers are ordinarily poor people whose poverty is due to themselves, and might be avoided if they were what they ought to be, and what, therefore, they might be. The word "ordinarily" is used because it is possible to conceive cases in which certain poor fall into the class of paupers for want of a delicacy which, perhaps, it would be too much to expect of them. Almost all beggars are paupers—not all, for some occasionally beg who cannot otherwise relieve their poverty; but probably

ninety-nine of every hundred beggars prefer beggary to work, to even such work as they could perform, such work as is performed by many of those very persons from whom they solicit aid.

Let it be borne in mind that the worthy poor are to be helped, and the unworthy are to be cured. Let it also be recollected that the worthy poor almost never beg, and that out of every thousand beggars infesting the streets and visiting the houses of cities, probably not more than one is a proper subject for alms. All this may sound very harsh to those good souls who say to themselves that, having the comforts of life, it would be wicked in them to refuse a dime to a brother man who is in want, and who also say that it were better to help nine unworthy than suffer one worthy to go unhelped. But is it "help"? The gist of the question lies there. If a man prefer begging to work, and you keep him from work and at begging, are you "helping" that man? Are you not injuring that man and the whole community?

Street-beggars play on the feelings of those who are kindly disposed, and they understand the art of approaching good people on "the blind side." They form a fraternity bound together by certain ties of mutual helpfulness in their "business," and by certain signs which enable them to coöperate. If these men applied the same abilities with the same industry to lawful pursuits, they would make a legitimate livelihood. But they will not work. Nevertheless, they base their appeals usually on the ground that they cannot get work. They find you when they believe you have no employment for them, and then—"if they could only get work!" They know what will pass in your mind, and that finally you will give them money because you cannot give them work, and cannot bear to turn away a fellow man who is hungry, and who does not seem to have the means of winning bread. But if you will make some little contrivance in your house, which, while it is wholly unproductive, seems to have the semblance of work, and offer these men pay, you will soon discover the real state of the case.

A number of examples of this kind are known, but only two will be given, and the reader may be sure that they are perfectly authentic. A gentleman of high character and great generosity, who has a large manufacturing establishment in the city of

New York, conducted his business where it was very easy of access to beggars. They so interfered with his work and wrought upon his feelings, that he had recourse to the test of giving the applicants apparent employment. On the floor on which was his counting-room he had a pump erected, in full view of his desk. He did not need the pump. The water which was drawn ran off unused; but still it was some work to draw the water. As each beggar came, and was told he should work for his living, his pathetic reply was to the effect of, "Oh! if I could only find work." The pump was immediately proffered, and pay at a rate which would procure a night's lodging for an hour's work. He was told he could have that work every day until he found other employment. The suffering applicant was much obliged, but in one case he had a lame hand, and in another he had a friend at the door whom he must dismiss, so that he should not be kept waiting during the hour; but it seemed to take all the rest of the day to dismiss the "friend," as the applicant never came back. In other cases there were other excuses; and the upshot of the experiment was that, while a few accepted an hour's work at good pay, there was only one man who returned the second morning, and he never came back again.

The "Sisters of the Stranger" is an organization of ladies connected with the "Church of the Strangers" in New York. They do not so much furnish money as look after strangers, giving advice, helping in emergencies, protecting strangers from imposition, etc. But they do both give and lend money, as in their judgment is best. Some months ago the lady in charge had much writing on hand for the church, for the "Sisters of the Stranger," and for the "American Institute of Christian Philosophy," whose summer-school was approaching, and whose secretary she was helping. There came in an able-bodied man, who seemed to have some culture; but, according to his account, he could not find work enough to procure him a meal. The lady asked him to write his name. It was well done. She then proposed to give him good pay for making a number of copies of a circular then in hand. He sat down to his work not very graciously, and, after having worked about twenty minutes, doing about half the lady did in the same time, he received ample remuneration, but said, as he handed the papers to the lady: "Well, this is too humiliating! I'll never ask help again." Yet,

the next morning, the lady had occasion to visit her pastor, and found that same man at the door. He had come to beg food.

By all means now known, and to be hereafter discovered, this class of men must be taught that it is not true that the world owes them a living, as they are so fond of repeating, but that it is true that every man owes the world work, and, that if he will not pay this just debt, he is a scoundrel, and, so far from being an object of commiseration, is a subject for punishment. This evil is so great that all good men and women should unite to make every practicable exertion for its cure. In this article a few suggestions are made, some of which may be adopted by each reader:

1. Let the teaching in all our schools and churches go to the root of the matter. Every human being should be taught that he is born debtor, not creditor, to humanity; that, as in entering upon life he enters upon the enjoyment of a great estate laid up by foregone generations; that he is under a debt which can be paid only to the generations which succeed him; and that this can be done only by doing all he can for the generation in which he exists. It must be shown that the possession of great wealth excuses no one. The sons of the rich should feel their responsibility. The "gilded youth" of the avenue, the daintily dressed young fellows, who go months without a day of mental or manual labor, should be made to feel that they are the frilled "tramps" at one end of society, and no more to be respected by thoughtful men than the shirtless "tramps" at the other end. Indeed, it will be well to stir the consciences of the men who spend whole days in utter idleness, or sauntering or gazing vacantly from the windows of our fashionable club-houses, by agitating among them the question how far they are responsible for the street-beggars, who are often asking themselves the question why they should not be fed without work, seeing that their genteel brothers do not work, and yet fare sumptuously.

2. Let each resident of a city make himself acquainted with the societies already existing for the relief of the necessities of various classes, and as each applicant comes let him be sent to the institution provided for his case. The resident of New York, for instance, should examine the City Registry, p. 13, "Asylums and Homes," and p. 31, "Societies," Trow's City Directory. There are columns of names of organized and operative societies, covering almost all conceivable cases of need and

of suffering. If the applicant will not be helped by any of these, then he proclaims his unfitness for private beneficence.

3. Let each citizen select some society which has an arrangement for visiting and examining cases. To that special society let him send those who apply to him, stating frankly that he does not give pecuniary aid to any who are not known to him. The result will be that those who are willing to have their cases examined will apply to the society designated, and those who ought not to receive money aid will not apply; and, more than that, they will communicate to their whole tribe such information as will keep them from making application; and, still more, the society will be aided in carrying forward its work of practical and judicious beneficence. This can be done by having in your pocket a card with the name of the society upon it, and then when you are accosted on the street you need lose no time; you simply tell the applicant to carry that card to the place designated and all will be right. Probably, in a majority of cases, the card will be thrown away. But, let it be remarked, that any man of means who regularly sends his applicants for help to a society to whose treasury he has not contributed, is on a moral level with the man who habitually draws checks upon a bank in which he has no deposits.

4. Every good citizen should give some time to the attentive consideration of the poor who come under his own immediate observation. This he owes to himself. A rich man may set apart thousands of dollars annually to the maintenance of a corps of judicious and faithful investigators, who should distribute wisely to the poor tens of thousands of dollars of his wealth, and yet, if he do not put himself in brotherly communication with some poor man, deserving or undeserving, and strive by friendly advice and help to lift him to a self-supporting plane, he will lose all that blessedness which is promised to him that "considereth" the poor (Ps. xli. 1), and that reward which comes to him that "pitieth" the poor (Prov. xix. 17). It is to be observed that the word in the first of these passages means to act wisely toward the poor, and the word in the second means to behave graciously toward the poor, neither of which is complied with by mere money gifts; nor can any man, by pecuniary gifts, purchase exemption from the duty indicated in these words. Moreover, it will be instructive to follow up the people who appeal to you on the street or come to your house for cold vict-

uals. Not long ago a woman was in the work-house, leaving outside two little boys, the younger only three and the elder only seven years of age, who were compelled by several dissipated women to collect food and money for them, the money being spent by the women for liquor. Every child-beggar should be followed up. In most cases it would be found that the circumstances of these children called for the intervention of the "Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children." In many cases they will not allow you to accompany them; they are so early trained to roguery, that they will escape from you while seeming to be conducting you to their houses. Strangers in the city should make it a rule never to give on the streets, however pitiable the story and moving the appeal. The great majority of all beggars on our streets are "professional." They know whether you are from New England, or the South, or the West, or from a foreign country. They will catch you just when it will seem most heartless to deny them, for instance, late at night.

5. All good citizens should unite in seeing that wise laws are framed and promptly enforced against mendicancy, to the execution of which every man should be willing to contribute time and effort, as well as money. To every man who says "I would work if I could get work to do," should be given the reply of a house provided, to which he should be compelled to go, and where he would find some work which he should be compelled to do. The product of the work probably would not meet the expenses of the establishment, but the balance could be procured by enlisting the interest of philanthropic men of means.

In discussions of this complex and important subject, it is always to be borne in mind that what it is desirable to vacate is not the poverty of the poor, nor the correlative burden-bearing of the rich. Neither of these is intolerable. Neither of these is hurtful to the individual, or to society. Pauperism is that which hurts society at large, by diminishing the general wealth and by injuring the character of the individual. What must we do to eliminate that which produces pauperism? First, we must abstain from everything which tends to offer a premium to those who are willing to live off the toil of others; and second, we must strive to destroy that willingness in individual cases by moral reform.

The worthy poor will always remain; but the poor who have the greatest claim upon our regard will never beg. They

will perish in silence. These must be found. We must so cultivate our spiritual and moral senses that we shall become quick to detect the needs of others, and swift to relieve. That class we should have no wish to put out of human society.

The unworthy poor are to be helped as well, but differently. Money is not help to them. They need moral culture. It is our duty to impart it to them; but it is a difficult duty to perform. Most pastors in the city will probably tell you that they can more easily obtain hundreds of dollars from their prosperous parishioners to scatter among the poor, than they can persuade one parishioner to give one afternoon in exerting moral influence over the vicious poor.

The third class, the thriftless and incompetent, are the most difficult to deal with. Patient instruction is what they need. But it is so irksome for a man of robust and energetic character to tolerate those who are born inefficient. He succeeds; why should not they? This is the question which the successful ask. He who has never had any sickness can have no conception of the burden which that man bears who has a secret malady or a perpetual invisible weakness; much less can he have sympathy. As it is with the body, so is it with the character. Wherefore we are taught by the highest authority that "we that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves" (Romans xv. 1). Life will never be without its burdens, and to all classes comes the apostolic injunction, "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ" (Gal. vi. 2). And "the law of Christ" is the highest law known in theoretical ethics and in practical good living.

CHARLES F. DEEMS.

# CRITICISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

SOME five years ago a book was published in New York entitled "The Cradle of the Christ," the author of which attempted to give an outline of the process through which the Messianic idea, originating with the Jews of the ancient Dispensation and adopted by the Jews of the Restoration, was transmitted in several forms to the writers of the New Testament, was communicated to the churches in the West, and finally became the central dogma of the Christian creed. Now the question arises, why, granting the position taken by the writer, need one abandon his Christian faith? Why should the slime that clings to the roots of the historical idea stain the purity of the idea itself? The perfect lily takes no taint from the mud of the pond it grew from. No analysis of the soil affects the flavor of the grape that produces the delicious Rhine wine of the Metternich vineyards. Surely emblems and doctrines ought to be as independent of their baser antecedents as any flower of the field or fruit of the earth, that makes no claim to a heavenly origin.

Our century has been peculiarly distinguished by the vigor and success of its researches into the beginnings of religious movements. Ewald, and lately Heilprin, have scrutinized the literature of the Israelites. The biblical researches of the Dutch school headed by Kuenen are well known. F. C. Baur, a generation ago, made a profound study of the composition of the New Testament literature, which his disciples have continued. Renan has chosen for his province the whole realm of history that includes the origin and development of the religion of Jesus. In this country eminent scholars have taken up the same subject from another point of view. In Great Britain, Robertson Smith and J. R. Seeley have made honest and valuable contributions to our knowledge. A temper purely scientific and literary, untainted

by dogmatic prepossession, is taking the place of the old-fashioned apologetics. Such impartiality is a good sign. Conclusions that seemed destructive, like those of the Tübingen school, of Renan, of Kuenen, are seen to be sincere of purpose, and as such are considered, not at once assailed. Dr. Baur, it is well known, was a preacher as well as a man of piety. Renan is religious after his way. Robertson Smith is a scholar with deep convictions. Max Müller writes in the interest of religion. One of the most single-hearted men I ever knew was author of a book called "Christ the Spirit," the object whereof was to reduce the story of Jesus to an allegory; and the most spiritually minded man I ever reckoned my personal friend was the late Samuel Johnson, a radical of the radicals, a protestant against the Church, one who declined even to call himself a Christian, but who wrote critical books, flooded with convictions, in the interest of universal faith.

The lesson of all this is the absolute distinction between investigation into the natural genesis or the historical development of instituted forms, whether of observance or belief, and the principles of religious trust. Push criticism to its farthest point, still there is a line it cannot pass over. Give real scholarship its rein in the study of the Old Testament; in the study of the New Testament; in the attempt to find the causes of observance, doctrine, church; in the effort to account for the selection of canonical writings; in the endeavor to explain the life of Jesus; demand of it acuteness, perseverance, frankness; make its difficult task as easy as readiness to accept results can make it. Its tether is short enough at the best, for the validity of spiritual truth is beyond the reach of its sharpest instruments, and, whatever results may be arrived at, faith can have nothing to fear. Suppose every miracle to be discredited; suppose doubt to be thrown on the whole legend of the gospels; suppose the theory advanced in "Christ the Spirit," namely, that the story of Jesus is mythical, to be demonstrated as far as it can be, still the religion is untouched. Neither the Trinity, nor the Deity of Christ, nor the virtue of the Eucharist, nor the reality of an Eternal Life, rests on the Bible; if they did, they would never have existed at all. This has been said a great many times, and should be a commonplace idea now. Yet there are critics who fancy that criticism will destroy Christianity, and there are Christians who fear that the critics will take away

their birthright. It is no matter for surprise that believers should take up arms in defense of favorite books or characters, for it is not human to surrender without a struggle what one loves; but it is astonishing that thinking men of this generation should feel that their defeat imperiled the citadel of faith; that grief should be identical with despair.

No one has approached Ernest Renan in unflinching application of the historical method to Christianity; no one has more patiently than he traced the fine threads on which the heavy weights of destiny were hung during the early centuries of our era; no one probably has excited so much apprehension in the breasts of believers, so much hope in the bosom of unbelievers as he. Yet M. Renan has in many places borne witness to the singular persistency of the substance of religious ideas. While asserting, in his essay on the religions of antiquity, that "deep researches would show how nearly everything which does not depend on the Gospel is merely baggage brought into a hostile camp from the pagan mysteries," he speaks of "the immense superiority of the Christian dogma," "the lofty moral spirit that pervades the Christian legend, to which nothing in antiquity can be compared." There is something that overawes him, something he cannot explain, in the grandeurs of faith. This accounts for the singular contradiction between the argument of the "Vie de Jésus" and its conclusion. He becomes illogical, incoherent, inartistic even, while trying to compress into historical formulas the essence of ideas, the sweep of aspiration. He stammers when declaiming about Christianity, and falls into rhetoric when eulogizing the Christ.

Indeed, the open-minded student of antiquity is amazed when he comes across the fact of the universality of religious symbols attesting the presence of the same ideas from age to age. The emblems which are perpetuated in stone in the galleries and churches of Rome, which flame in immortal mosaics from the walls of temples in ancient, desolate Ravenna, are found in Greek and Oriental shrines, on coins, entablatures, sepulchral monuments, old as the oldest remains of human art, old as the records of the race. The Cross, symbol of the sacrificial overflow of life; the Dove, symbol of the gentle motion of a descending spirit; the Cup, symbol of imparted spiritual vitality; the Star, sign of deathless promise; the Serpent, emblem at once of mortality and immortality, of the change-

able and the unchangeable; the Fish, the Boat, the Ark recur again and again, with every form of suggestion, in every species of combination, understood, not understood, misunderstood, but revered still.

There are crucifixions of unknown origin and antiquity—the old Irish cross of Tuam, of Asiatic design; an ancient image at Kalabche, in Nubia; a figure on the Egyptian obelisk, near the basilica of St. John Lateran at Rome; a bronze relic, brought to Ireland by Phenicians, ages ago, representing Buddha, or it may be Krishna, on the cross—which might have served as models for Christian artists in stone or on canvas, emblems of the overflowing divine love, the devoted self-sacrifice of the greatest characters, the victory of the spiritual over the natural. There is a picture of Devaki and Krishna, the Hindu mother and child, in Creuzer's "Symbolik," taken from Moore's "Hindu Pantheon," which might stand for a Christian ideal, so exact is the delineation of the Virgin with the baby Christ on her lap, and the worshiping woman in front. There is a sculpture of Venus Aphrodite in the venerable church of St. Denis in France, that, with very slight alteration, would pass for an Assumption of Mary. There are symbols of trinity—Jewish, Hindu, Persian, Assyrian, Egyptian—which distinctly foreshadow the Christian idea, showing how it was prefigured, or, rather, in some form was eternally manifest in ante-Christian periods. Our Christmas observances had their historical association with the mystical rites of Bona Dea, the Saturnalia and Liberalia,—wild festivities of pagan Rome. The "Mater Dolorosa" of Catholic art has its counterpart in Ceres. The Good Shepherd of the catacombs in Rome is a copy from the Aristæus, or from the Apollo Nomios, which show the same figure, in the same posture, on pagan sarcophagi.

The good Christian should delight to tell of these coincidences, for they suggest the omnipresence of emblems which are dear to him, and they indicate the world-wide dominion of spiritual truth. The thoughtful observer notes their resemblance, and is struck by the evidence they furnish of some divine presence: for, in studying these symbols of religion, one is impressed by the conviction that they are not of incidental, local, earthly, or even human extraction; that they are not evolved, but communicated; not poetic fancies, but fixed truths, exhibited to mankind in visible shape,—the only shape

in which they could be exhibited. The character of the symbols, which look forced and artificial as contrasted with the natural tastes of any people; their invariable association with religious festivals; their presence in temples; their connection with priests and sacred persons; the depth of significance attached to them; their introduction into the holy mysteries and into the ceremonies of initiation; their sculptured forms on funereal and other monuments, on coins and medals — preclude the theory which assigns to them a terrestrial origin. They hang above the heads, always, of the great multitude of worshipers, only a very small number of whom comprehend their meaning. In the vast majority of instances they were high in advance of the people who revered them; in some cases they must have been violently opposed to the current life. For the credit of human nature one is constrained to believe that the women of Greece and Egypt wore, against their will, images that religious associations alone hallowed; for the honor of womanhood one is compelled to think that the women of Babylon, who, once in their lives, on certain occasions, offered themselves in the temple of Venus to any stranger bringing money to the shrine, did so out of obedience to a sanction by them reputed to be divine. The orgies at the festive rites of Astarte, Ceres, Juno, Aphrodite, must have been prompted by something differing from an animal impulse. The action, however mistaken and indecent, was the involuntary result of a motive regarded as supreme. Their performances, however wild and unseemly, were acts of worship.

The interpretation of these emblems is to some degree matter for conjecture. Writers like Higgins, Inman, and to a certain extent Bryant and Knight, attach to them an earthly, if not an animal import, holding them to be expressions of an enthusiastic, even of a fanatical, temper: at the best, creations of human nature in its sentimental, visionary, fanciful, distempered moods. On the other hand, J. P. Lundy ("Monumental Christianity") regards them as of divine creation in their rudest forms, conveying the sense of heavenly doctrines. Lundy is as likely to be right as Inman; more likely, because his view accords with the evident significance of the symbols as sacred signs, while Inman's does not. That even celestial ideas should be colored, tainted, smirched perhaps, by the earth they fall upon, is inevitable. In barbarous, illiterate, sensuous, passionate epochs,

the loveliest emblems will be degraded, but no instance exists where a low, earth-born notion has climbed up to heaven.

> "Not from a vain or shallow thought
> His awful Jove young Phidias wrought."

As the pure snow that falls from the sky lies white on the "footless hills" and broad pastures, but is soon polluted in the city streets by the tread of rude feet and the clay and dirt of the pavement turning its crystal flakes into sand, so do celestial communications become sullied by contact with "a naughty world." But who can mistake the perverted semblance for the primitive revelation? In the interesting series of pictures called the "Dance of Death," painted during the papal supremacy, the Creator is represented as dressed like the Pope of Rome, with a tiara on his head, and full canonical robes about his person. Can any one suppose that the conception of a Supreme Cause arose from the painted or actual figure of a high-priest? Whatever is plainly local, incidental, temporary, must be stricken out of the image in order that it may be perfect. The known peculiarities of times and places, national traits, idiosyncrasies of race or epoch, are manifestly transitory. Higgins and Inman, however learned, are therefore liable to the charge of substituting a base effect for a divine cause, a deterioration for a principle. Their books are valuable, but only as showing to what abysses of uncleanness pure ideas may be brought by unhallowed fancy. The ingenuity is not misplaced, but the reasoning is astray which infers the higher from the lower, instead of using the lower as testifying to the existence of the higher.

For a long time yet there will be controversy in regard to the contents of the symbols mentioned. Mr. Lundy, who is a presbyter in the Church, deduces from them the articles of the Apostles' Creed. In this he has not been altogether successful, for his zeal for the faith has allowed him to indulge in fanciful interpretations. His book is astonishingly candid and generous toward the pagan myths. He blinks no facts; no fable is profane in his eyes. He quotes the enemy's writings. He reproduces pictures that seem to countenance an opposite view to his own, and cries "Bravo! Any obscenely disposed mind may make the most of it. I am of Sir William Jones's opinion." That opinion is nevertheless obsolete and untenable. All that

can be fairly claimed is that the emblems which lie at the foundation of all spiritual faith teach, first, the existence of a Supreme Mind; second, the communication of truth by that Mind to men; third, the power of a Divine Person representing Deity; fourth, the reality of a celestial influence imparted by the Deity through the Christ, whatever be his name; fifth, the experience of an eternal or supernatural life; and sixth, the necessity for self-abnegation as the means of attaining to it. The last article supposes a kind of dualism as existing between the lower and the higher enjoyment, but where the line of it runs is not indicated. The same is implied in the Christian doctrine of regeneration, which is inherent in all forms of belief, even that of Unitarians and Rationalists; every man who aspires,—St. Francis, Augustine, R. W. Emerson, striking the same chord here, though with very different touch. Beyond these "flaming universalities," as Emerson named the ideas of the Declaration of Independence, alluding to the "glittering generalities" of Mr. Rufus Choate, all is open to criticism.

Every religion smacks of the soil upon which its institutions of doctrine or form were planted. Hindu, Persian, Egyptian, Semitic, Phenician, Italian, English, take up deposits of race or civilization, and afford refuge to the creatures that are native to the ground whereon they lie. Christianity is the religion of the most intellectual races, the most active, practical, democratic of the tribes of men. It is the religion of Germany, France, England, America. It was the religion of Italy in her great days. Whoever studies its history reads its legend. But at heart, independently of its especial record, it seems to be of the same stuff with other great faiths of mankind,—not derived from them, but of one piece with them. More than a quarter of a century ago James Martineau, then minister of a Unitarian church in Liverpool, demonstrated in a wonderful article on the "Ethics of Christendom," printed in the "Westminster Review," that Christian morality owed many of its peculiar features to the primitive belief in the second coming of Jesus, so clearly enunciated in the New Testament, yet so flatly contradicted by history. Similar studies directed to other points have disclosed the temporal elements that adhere to the established ritual and dogma. Milman, of the last generation, did excellent service in this way. Stanley's works are of great value, thus regarded. In fact, this is the function of scholarship, and will be for a long time to come.

The identity of religions appears to consist in their firm possession of a few cardinal truths which they hold in common. These truths make them one. In these they sympathize. The religions are imperfect inasmuch as they are attached to local usages and to ephemeral traditions, but they lead up to one another only in the sense that one age precedes another and passes on its discoveries. The substance of faith is in all times the same. The form, literary or ceremonial, or doctrinal, belongs to the period of its domination, and is transitory as that is. One may not revile ancient faiths, therefore, because they express certain conditions under which spiritual ideas manifested themselves; one may not exalt them one above another, because their imperfections may belong to the people who honored them in their day and according to their ability. Each has many vulnerable points, but each has its heavenly aspects. Criticism seizes on the vulnerable points, — the literary records, the dogmatic formularies, the links of historical association, the priesthoods and personalities, — but faith contemplates the heavenly aspects, letting go all beside. To discredit other religions in order to eulogize Christianity is to do them less than justice; to eulogize them at the expense of Christianity is to do them more; for the latest faith belongs to the latest age which, on the whole, is the most forward in civilization. No religion is pledged to its perishable accretions; no religion is responsible for books or councils or decrees, or statements of opinion, or fictitious characters; for prophets, evangelists, apostles, or saints. Let criticism deal with these things as it must. For its spiritual ideals alone it is answerable. Alas for Christianity if it must stand or fall by its record, or by the theologies, Roman or Protestant, which attempt to explain its ineffable ideas! That pretension, not innocent but unavoidable, has been rebuked many times, never more pointedly than by Mr. Matthew Arnold, who, however, is hardly tolerant enough of the unwise zeal of honest though presumptuous divines. It is unfortunate when personal conviction stops short of central truths, for then a dogmatism enters that may easily become puerile. Theology of some sort there must be, for the human mind must give such account as it can of its beliefs, and the smallest minds are the most positive as a rule. But religion is compromised when any account of religion, which must from the nature of the case be temporal, is taken for religion itself, which is eternal; and this disastrous mistake is continually made.

All religion, it is here assumed, is in essence and origin supernatural in some sense, if not superhuman. The divine spirit is a "power not ourselves." But "supernatural" is by no means synonymous with "miraculous," in the vulgar sense of the word. Though every recorded miracle were discarded as incredible, the supernatural element in religion would not of necessity be touched, for the influx of the celestial wisdom may come in other ways, and in any event must be beyond the reach of scientific investigation, which deals only with sensible phenomena, and has no instruments keen enough to trace the possible advent of an immaterial principle into the soul of man. The eloquent author of the little book called "Natural Religion" uses the following language: "We are all supernaturalists thus far that we all believe in the existence of a world beyond our present knowledge." No doubt we are; no doubt all thoughtful people are. But supernaturalism is a supplement to knowledge, not an extension of it; it professes to give what knowledge, be it ever so advanced, cannot furnish, never will be able to furnish; can, at best, watch and determine the human conditions of, with a view to preventing its intrusion into departments where it does not belong. The same persuasive writer, in another passage, says: "We have remarked that both the Old Testament and the New lose that appearance of obsoleteness which ecclesiastical formalism has given them, and stand out as true sacred books and classics of mankind so soon as in the former Nature is written for God, and in the latter Humanity for Christ." The observation is not original with him. But is "Nature" in the Old Testament synonymous with "God"? Is "Humanity" in the New synonymous with "Christ"? If not, what is gained by an interchange of terms? Both Judaism and Christianity are misinterpreted in the interest of corruptions that are in harmony with neither, but belong to a different sphere of mind. Nothing is, in the end, secured by confusion of ideas, and a great deal may be lost.

The aim of Professor Seeley's essay is high, his purpose being to indicate a common ground on which all ideal pursuits may stand and contend as a single joint power against irreligion, secularism, the tendency to sensualism. But there may be danger of overstepping bounds in this direction, as in the plain avowal that supernaturalism is quite separable from religion, or in the judgment that art and science "have the nature of relig-

ion." Of Art, he himself declares that "we cannot honor its enthusiasm with such epithets as 'frank,' 'manly,' 'vigorous,' or 'healthy'; and yet here, too, there is a life, a determination to deal honestly with the question of pleasure, to have real enjoyment, and of the best kind, rather than the dull pretense of gladness." Yes, there certainly is life; there is a determination to deal with the question of pleasure, how far "honestly" may be a matter of opinion; likewise to have enjoyment, though one may doubt whether it be "real," or "of the best kind." The artist's ideal is beauty, but it would be saying much to allege that this ideal is common, and it would be extravagant to assert that the tendency among the devotees of art is toward ideal things in any poetic or intellectual sense. In fact, many will be of opinion that, as a class, artists, while remarkably susceptible of aspiration, are peculiarly in need of the firm, constant presentation of a beauty above that of the senses. They would make efficient allies, but they must first be won from the homage paid to Nature.

Scientific men are more promising. In the first place, their pursuits are more severely intellectual; in the next place, their love of knowledge is more single, exclusive, and absorbing. Many of them are passionate lovers of truth, confessors ready to die for it, unselfish seekers after it, at the expense of health, wealth, and worldly advantage. In some instances they are "very religious," as the apostle says, bending with awe before an "unknown God." But, in these cases, one is compelled to ask if science has made them religious; if science has done more than reveal to them the methods of creative power, and thus introduce them for the first time to the presence of presiding Mind. The study of nature has brought them to the feet of the spirit that is above nature, whose glory they had not apprehended before.

One cannot too much admire the ambition to combine every noble power in league against ignoble propensities. But may not this be accomplished by stripping religion of its objectionable features,—of ritualism, biblicism, dogmatism, moralism, Calvinism, Puritanism, ecclesiasticism, or other offensive accretions, and showing it in its perfection? If Christianity would gratefully make over to criticism whatever criticism claims as belonging to its province, reserving to itself the task of exhibiting the immortal beauty of its essential truths, it might, at the

same time, disarm its enemies and fascinate its friends. The attacks upon it are directed against its outworks, not against its citadel; against its accompaniments, its *impedimenta*, its luggage, never against its cardinal principle; against its unhandsome accidents, never against its eternal loveliness. The mistake that Christian apologists have made, the mistake which they make to-day, is in defending lines that are indefensible, and in staking the issue of their cause on a conflict where final discomfiture is certain. The ancient story of Archimedes, so absorbed in his studies as to be ignorant when Syracuse was taken, and spared by the soldiers who broke in on him because he was intent on his work, is applicable here. The task of showing the intrinsic excellence of the Christian system, of unfolding its interior glory, is quite sufficient to exercise the faculties of any class of men. To abandon positions that still appear to be tenable is not required. It is required that the defense should be conducted in an honorable, soldierlike manner, not by any treacherous maneuvers; and that positions should be surrendered man-fashion, cheerfully, when to hold them would be desperate. To drop the figure—which, after all, is not a happy one, inasmuch as, according to the supposition, the citadel of final retreat is impregnable, and not to be surrendered—the champions of Christianity should take the positive, not the negative view of their duty; should look at their situation from the sunny side, should discern the good in the dilemma they are placed in; should, in a word, be hopeful under all emergencies. By this is meant that they should sink their shafts deeper when surface deposits are exhausted, as the Swedenborgians attempt to do in regard to the doctrine of Scripture inspiration.

Of course there will be differences of judgment in respect to the positions that may still be tenable. It is an established point, according to some, that the link which unites Jesus with the Christ is lost; that the connection between the Jewish and the Christian churches will never be historically made; that the reasons for selecting such and such books as canonical will never be unfolded. Some will be prepared to surrender the Fourth Gospel; some will let the apostolical writings go; some will cease from holding up for imitation the character of Jesus; some will concede the whole New Testament story to be mythical, the narrative statement

of an idea; some will refuse to see the hand of Providence in the history of the Church; and some will agree with Professor Seeley that "religion does not brood over a future life, but is intensely occupied with the present; it does not worship a power which suspends natural laws, but the power which is exhibited in those laws; it does not shrink from political organization, but is itself the soul of all healthy political organization; it does not damp enjoyment, but is itself the principle of all rich enjoyment; it is not self-conscious or self-absorbed, and does not make us anxious about our own fate, but is the principle which destroys self and gives us strength to rise above personal anxieties." In an age of multifarious activities like ours, of such various temperaments and aptitudes, a great religion must be hospitable and persuasive, insisting only on such primal truths as constitute it a religion,—the existence of a supreme intelligence which communicates itself to men, raising them to superhuman possibilities of experience through aspiration and faith. The glory of such manifestation can never be described. The reality of such experience is by all earnest minds confessed. Let it be exhibited, illustrated, dwelt on, and all noble spirits will be drawn to its light. Even critics will acknowledge the presence of a being they cannot explain, and will gladly revere a power that excites no terror, but compels them to worship.

That Christianity will fall under the assaults of criticism is extremely improbable. That it will fall from any cause is extremely improbable—nay, is quite impossible and out of the question. Criticism may, in the end, prove a good friend to it by removing the excrescences that cloud its radiance and disfigure its beauty. The danger, if danger there be, is likely to come from its defenders who are ignorant of the use of their own weapons, and, like the passionate Peter of the Gospel, draw a sword, fetch a mighty blow, and succeed in cutting off the ear of a servant. The Master has but to appear, and his enemies sink to the ground.

O. B. FROTHINGHAM.

THE

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

MAY, 1883.

No. 318.

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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1883.

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1883.

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

## MAY, 1883.


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SOUTH END.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXVIII.

MAY, 1883.

# MEXICO.

MEXICO holds a relation to the United States which no other government or people can occupy. Canada refused to join us, and adhered to the Crown of Great Britain, when every interest and sympathy of her people would naturally have inclined them to unite with us. But Mexico looked up to us in her struggle for independence with admiration and confidence, took courage from our example, broke her chains, and, with too absolute trust in our wisdom, adopted almost the entire plan of our government as her own. If there is no just cause for any abatement of the confidence of the two republics toward each other, it would be the most grievous of wrongs to both that their sympathies should be chilled by unworthy suspicions, or that their free intercourse should be impeded by any lingering resentments which had their origin in causes that existed fifty years ago.

It is neither wise, just, nor patriotic in the present generation of the people of either republic to permit a needless check to be imposed upon the duty and the manifest desire of both to coöperate in the great work that both are doing, in proving to the world the ability of free, democratic, constitutional governments "to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty"

to their people and to other nations qualified for self-government.

Our former troubles with Mexico, like those that often arise between just and honorable people of the same race and nationality, have arisen mainly from the want of a full acquaintance with each other. There is no just cause for jealousy or estrangement between the people of the two countries. If there was ever a real sisterhood between nations, that relation exists between Mexico and the United States. So genuine was the regard of the people of the United States for their southern neighbor, that, in the long and bitter travail of Mexico during her fourteen years of war for independence, there was not a heart in an American bosom in the United States that did not share in the anguish of that desperate struggle, and rejoice triumphantly when it ended in the birth of another great constitutional republic. Mexico has done nothing to forfeit the esteem or to shake the confidence in which her people and government were held by us in 1824, when we so eagerly welcomed her into the family of nations; but much has been done since that event, which, when rightly understood, should exalt her in the estimation of mankind.

Let us briefly examine the undeniable facts on which this assertion is based, and, in doing this, let us consider the remarkable parallel which exists between our history and that of Mexico, in the difficulties that were met during the process of establishing the two republics. It will be seen that the glory of our success has by no means dimmed the honors that Mexico achieved in gaining her independence. In one respect, we had greatly the advantage of Mexico. Her people were wholly inexperienced in self-government. With them this was a lost art. Two hundred and fifty years of absolute and most despotic rule had extinguished every thought of self-government, except the tradition that Mexico had once been independent.

English rule in this country from the beginning recognized the spirit of liberty. It was established by a race of people who were highly enlightened and well equipped with every requisite for founding and governing new states. Their indoctrination in the rights of personal liberty, and the just limitations to be placed upon the powers of the rulers, was the result of long and bloody contests in which the English people had triumphed. Their teaching was practical and had qualified them, as skillful

and experienced pioneers, to lead the advance of the most powerful race that has ever existed, in founding their civilization in this land of unequaled resources. States, having little of foreign nurture or support, grew up, from the start, in rugged independence and self-reliance, under the name of British colonies. The smallest of them had the same autonomy with the greatest, and, from the beginning, exercised, almost without question, nearly all the essential powers of local sovereignty. It was only a question of time when those colonies would be free and independent states, prepared with every faculty of civil government to concentrate and put in force the whole power of their people.

Mexico, in 1810, had, by comparison, a much more powerful and obstinate foe to contend with; and there were no organized governments there to give color of lawfulness to the revolt of the people, or to furnish points of concentration to the movements of the patriots who were ready to strike for liberty. The only political departments then in Mexico were certain intendencies, with unmarked boundaries, which were designated by the vice-regal government for the mere convenience of gathering taxes and keeping the people constantly under the eye of authority.

In estimating the difficulties which the United States and Mexico respectively had to encounter in their progress toward independence and self-government, the fact is not overlooked that, in 1810, the Spanish monarchy was weakened by the burdens of her vast colonial system, and that her monarch and the royal family were forced to abdicate in favor of Joseph Bonaparte, a French usurper. But this episode was of short duration, and when the restoration came, the reactionary effect upon Mexico was among the greatest of the disasters that befell her in her long struggle for independence.

Bonaparte's usurpation alarmed the priesthood in Mexico for the safety of their revenues and great landed estates, and they began to preach rebellion to the people. The people interpreted their selfish zeal into a love of liberty, and were roused as only that sentiment can arouse a suffering people. They were devout, and felt that God had called them to arm for liberty. And so their zeal for religion was united with their hopes of freedom, and they became frantic in their desire to make sacrifices on the altar of their country. For a short time the banners of the Church led the columns of the patriots to war.

The first impulse of the revolution came from the refusal of

the Mexican people to change their allegiance from the Spanish dynasty to the French usurper. This was sanctioned by the Church in Mexico. The restoration soon came, and the Mexican people were, in fact, ready to return to their allegiance, notwithstanding their solemn declaration of independence; but the fatal madness of imperial pride demanded that they should be punished for treason to the monarchic principle. The Spanish monarchy remembered the recent example of the British colonies, and determined to crush out every thought and hope of independence from the minds of the Mexicans. Their revolt against the usurper was translated into rebellion and treason against the Crown of Spain, and for that crime they were to be beaten with many stripes, and degraded and forced into uncomplaining submission to despotism. The Church saw its advantage, and deserted the cause of the people to gain the shelter of the monarchy.

In their extremity the Mexican people also remembered the example of the British colonies. So, too, they recalled their sufferings of two hundred and fifty years, and were desperate with anxiety for their release from that cruel bondage. And when, after they had enjoyed a moment of liberty under the banners of Hidalgo, they again felt the cruel goad of Spanish despotism, and saw that their last estate was to be worse than their first, they renewed their vows to liberty, took heart from our example, and became determined and steadfast in their resolve to be a free and independent nation. Some of the priesthood remained true to the people, but the Church, as a body, threw the weight of its immense influence against the independence of Mexico.

We cannot realize the significance of this fact in our own experience. To appreciate its true weight upon the Mexican mind, we must remember that their entire civilization had been drawn from the Church. It was to them both Divinity and State. It had taught a new language to the Indians, and with it a new religion. It had gained their affections by acts of personal kindness, and had amused their superstitious minds with the tinsel and glitter of pompous processions, and awed them by mysterious rites and ceremonies, while it levied tithes of all they had, and sold dispensations for every known crime, except heresy and blasphemy. The Mexicans were contending for the freedom of their country, but the Church was to them the soul of the country.

It is not strange, then, that the fires of liberty that melted the

chains of their civil bondage should have left the fetters which bound them to the Church unscathed. Nor is it strange that the recognition of the power of the Church was as much a necessary condition to the inauguration of the republic, after their independence had been gained, as was the recognition of slavery an indispensable condition to the formation of our federal government after we had gained our independence.

In the first Mexican constitution of 1824 it was ordained that "The religion of the Mexican nation is, and will be perpetually, the Roman Catholic Apostolic. The nation will protect it by wise and just laws, and prohibit the exercise of any other whatever." This evidence of the demand of the Church for supremacy over the civil power of the republic is enough to account for the greater part of the troubles experienced by Mexico in gaining her independence, and in establishing, afterward, a free democratic government. It is painful to recall the events which have marked the efforts of Mexico to eliminate from her constitution this fatal root of evil. An account of them would include the history of far the greater number of the revolutions that have so disturbed the peace of that country, and have so nearly resulted in convincing the world that Mexicans are incapable of self-government. We can understand something of the difficulty of Mexico's great task, now completed, of reforming the constitution by dropping from its text the article above quoted, when we reflect that it has cost the United States enormously in life, treasure, and property, and still costs us near $100,000,000 a year in pensions, to strike from our constitution a similar guarantee of slavery.

To gain its independence of Spain, Mexico had to fight through fourteen years of bloody and inhuman warfare. And during nearly all of that time, and for thirty-three years since, it has had to battle with the Church party in Congress, in the council-chamber, in foreign courts, and in domestic and foreign wars, before it could finally establish the republic on safe and enduring foundations. The Church party, intrenched in the constitution, and invested with civil power which, added to its ecclesiastical influence, made it paramount over the Government, has always preferred monarchy, either under a foreign or native ruler, to the republic, because royalty is its strongest ally the world over. Mexico has, therefore, been confronted since 1824, and until 1866, with a question planted incautiously in her own

constitution, which has all the time threatened the overthrow of the republic. No people have ever been more constant to their principles, nor has there ever been an exhibition of more heroic sacrifice than they have made to secure self-government under a democratic republic, based on a written constitution.

These sister republics can afford to draw very near to each other in honest sympathy, leaving pride, jealousy, and resentments behind, when their people remember what it has cost each of them to reform its constitution so as to remove from each a guarantee that must have been fatal to the government. It is a startling reflection that the United States guaranteed slavery and made religion free, while Mexico abolished slavery and limited the right of worship to a single sect, and that both governments have been nearly destroyed by these restrictions upon liberty. It is the fixed belief of vast majorities of the people in both countries that neither government was, either in form or substance, a free democratic republic while those restrictions on liberty were in force. Under such circumstances we owe to Mexico more of sympathy than of censure, for her fortitude and persistence in harmonizing her organic law with the spirit of liberty.

In Mexico this duty has been more difficult than it was in the United States, because the Church had its home in every household, and it was difficult for the people to decide between the true interests of religion and the pretensions of divine authority set up by those who abused it for personal gain. The Church party went abroad for support. Some of the most powerful monarchs of Europe came to their assistance. The French emperor made the reformation of the constitution of Mexico in 1857 a pretext, if it was not the real motive of the French invasion. Louis Napoleon gave in charge to Maximilian the restoration of the Catholic Church, and its revenues and property, as one of the most important of his duties in Mexico. Forgetting that the same purpose had animated the Church party for a third of a century in creating strife and revolt in Mexico, he asserted, in vindication of his invasion, that the chronic state of revolution in that country justified the great powers in assuming its government by force, so as to secure peace to its people and its rich productions to the commerce of the world.

The Mexican people had to create their states while the war

of independence was flagrant. In this their task was harder than ours, but they so far succeeded that those states will remain through all coming time, whatever shall be the fate of the national government. The construction of the republic of Mexico was not completed until the people, led by Benito Juarez and Porfirio Diaz and their compatriots, had driven the French and Austrians from its territory; and the people of the United States were not content with their own government until it had abolished slavery. These events were almost contemporaneous, and they are regarded by the people of both countries as being vital and indispensable to the maintenance of free government. In this, their second birth, the two republics are brought into entire harmony in all their essential principles. In their efforts to secure perfect liberty to all classes of people, their sufferings were alike, and their success is equally honorable to both. They enter alike upon the achievement of a new and greater destiny without a disturbing apprehension of danger, with mutual confidence and respect, and in the closest natural alliance.

The races in the two countries differ in origin and language; but, if such differences make political or international comity undesirable, what shall we have to hope for when we consider the powers and privileges secured to the African race under our own constitution? The great body of the Mexican people are Indians. That the Indians should have been capable of restoring liberty to Mexico, after the lapse of centuries during which it was not heard of in that country, and that they should have succeeded in giving to it free constitutional government in defiance of the Spanish, French, and Austrian monarchies, and in spite of the Church party nesting and breeding discord in the heart of its constitution, are achievements that Mexicans may well be proud of, and that all Americans may admire.

There are some coincidences in the history of Mexican independence that are not the results of accident, which have a marked significance in the present condition of that country. French usurpation in Spain, in 1810, gave the first impulse to Mexican independence, and, fifty years later, French invasion united the Mexican people, for the first time, in one powerful and compact body, to assert and defend, and to finally establish, their right to rule in their own country, free from all foreign surveillance.

In 1810 the native Indians opened the struggle of the war of independence in Mexico by acts of the most desperate devotion to the cause of liberty, and they renewed their sacrifices on every occasion that offered during the sixty years of civil commotion that followed. The work which they thus inaugurated and sustained was not completed until Benito Juarez, a native Indian, led the people with extraordinary ability and courage, and drove the French invaders from Mexico. It was then, and not until then, that Mexico was liberated from the toils of conspiracy and the grasp of foreign rule. That was the natal day of Mexico.

Those who would disparage the capacity of Mexicans to perform the highest functions of free government, forget their history and ignore their success in founding and defending a great republic. They did that for Mexico which the French and Spanish governments exerted their whole power to prevent; and now they are a permanent and powerful republic, while France and Spain are still oscillating between self-government and monarchical rule, unable to determine which form of government is best adapted to the genius of their people.

These general views of the condition of Mexico, and of the attitude of the two republics toward each other, sufficiently present the natural and just basis of confidence, sincerity, and fidelity upon which they should proceed, by treaties and legislation, to increase the friendly intercourse of their people.

Both countries are setting out upon a new course of development, and their railway systems are bringing them into the most intimate trade relations. Much that must be done to facilitate this new movement can only be wisely accomplished through treaties and conventions. By such means the wants of the people of each country can be authentically stated to the other, as well as the concessions that can be mutually agreed to as a guide to the legislative tribunals in providing laws to meet the necessities of commerce in both governments. Without some such agreement there would be a degree of uncertainty of action in the legislatures that would lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Our existing policy, which has grown up without the assistance of proper treaties, has left the frontiers open to raiders, smugglers, and depredators; the actual boundaries are still in dispute; there is no efficient quarantine of the lower Rio Grande; the *Zona Libre* has caused serious complaint as an encouragement of smuggling; and the exclusion of

foreigners from the right to own land in Mexico, within sixty miles of the frontier, has led to free criticism and unfavorable comment. Legislation is more likely to become retaliatory than friendly and harmonious, when there is no preliminary understanding as to the measures through which reciprocal advantages would be granted by each government to the other.

There is enough in the sisterhood of the two great republics that lead the Latin and the English-speaking races in the practical course of free government, to remove every cause that might interrupt their most cordial friendship, even if an ocean lay between them. But they are the nearest of neighbors, without so much as a natural landmark to designate the line that divides them along a frontier of five hundred miles.

Both countries possess extraordinary wealth of commercial resources. They are in actual competition in only a few of their native productions, while the great bulk of what each country produces is needed in the other. Our frontiers are coterminous on the north and east of Mexico, and on the west and south our coast-lines are unbroken prolongations of the borders of the two great oceans, which approach each other within the distance of one hundred and thirty miles at Tehuantepec. Mexico's great peninsula of Yucatan projects boldly into the sea, and commands the southern entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, and our peninsula of Florida leads out far to the south and commands the eastern mouth of the Gulf.

The distance between Cape Sable and Cape Catoche is about four hundred and fifty miles, of which more than one-half is occupied by Cuba and other islands; so that the two republics have virtually the military and commercial command of the Gulf of Mexico, with its 700,000 square miles of deep and quiet waters, abounding in valuable fisheries, and receiving the commerce of rivers draining the largest and most fertile areas in the world.

When Key West is connected with the main-land by railroad or ship-channel, and Cape Catoche is connected by railway with the Mexican system and with the interoceanic canals, a sea will be practically inclosed within the lines of the two republics that will add more to the civilization and wealth of the Western Hemisphere than the Mediterranean has contributed to the advancement and elevation of the human family in Europe, Asia, and Africa, which inclose its waters.

If, in contemplating this mere outline of our natural and political relations with Mexico, there should linger in the mind of any citizen of either country a prejudice, resentment, or jealousy that would cause him to hesitate in giving welcome to the most sincere and faithful friendship with the other, it seems that a mere glance at the great possibilities of the future that opens before us would compel him to yield to the manifest good of his country. We are now entering upon a new epoch, and beginning a new and greater career, hand in hand with Mexico. Let it not be said of us that we failed to appreciate the opportunity of adding to our greatness and wealth by assisting Mexico to add to hers, through such treaty relations with that government, and such honest friendship toward her people, as will give them a perfect assurance of their independence and autonomy against all the powers of the earth, and will establish the greatest reciprocal advantages of trade and navigation between both countries.

The peace and tranquillity of our sister republic, and her increasing strength and influence, will be the strongest proof we can give to the world that Mexico and the United States have demonstrated the power of free, democratic, and republican government to give security to liberty and happiness to mankind.

JOHN T. MORGAN.

# THE DISINTEGRATION OF ROMANISM.

AN article appeared in the February number of this REVIEW, by Bishop B. J. McQuaid, the very title of which was little less than the death-warrant of modern civilization. It was entitled "The Decay of Protestantism," and it assures us that Protestantism "is dying." Now, whether Protestantism, as a religion, be true or false, it is unquestionably the dominant religion of all the progressive nations. And if religion, in some form or other, is "the salt of the earth," "the decay of Protestantism," and its approaching death, can mean nothing less than this: that modern civilization will soon become a putrid carcass, at once dead itself and death-dealing far and wide. But perhaps Bishop McQuaid may be mistaken; his wish may be father of his thought. For obviously he believes that, if Protestantism would only die, Romanism would come to life again. It would be the last and only refuge for all who are frightened of hell, and who "do not care to make a mistake in what concerns eternity." The only alternative then remaining would be infidelity or Romanism; and, Protestantism being dead, who would accept Infidelity?

But what is Protestantism? Before a coroner's inquest can investigate the causes of a death, there must be an actual dead body for their inspection. Before a physician can offer a prognosis, there must be an actual patient whose chance of recovery he endeavors to estimate. We cannot tell whether Protestantism "is dying" unless we can really examine it, feel its pulse, ascertain its temperature, and all that sort of thing. But, unfortunately, Bishop McQuaid gives us no definition of Protestantism; or, rather, he implies and employs two different and mutually exclusive definitions. First, Protestantism is a temper of mind, a way of regarding religion, the assertion of the right of private judgment; then it is a definite system, or a number of

definite systems, of religious doctrine and discipline — a number of concrete societies (for we may not call them "churches"), such as the Episcopalians, the Presbyterians, the Methodists, and the like. Now, if Protestantism in this latter sense is decaying, it can only be because Protestantism, in the former sense, is flourishing. The terrific solvent is melting the very vessel in which it is contained. Indeed, it is the very object of Bishop McQuaid's article to prove this.

We must assume, then, that he means by Protestantism the various concrete societies of persons professing to be Christians, which have broken away from the authority, lawful or usurped, of the Bishop of Rome. And he tries to prove that they are decaying by tendering what seems to him conclusive evidence that their creeds, their church government and ministry, and their church membership, are decaying. Let us, then, first inquire what is meant by the decay of a creed. Here, again, Bishop McQuaid is hopelessly inexact; for by the decay of a creed he does not mean that the creed itself has been altered, but that a considerable number of persons have ceased, in a greater or less degree, to believe it. The creed, for instance, of the Anglican Church, and of its daughter, the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States, has undergone no change whatever since the accession of Elizabeth. No doubt there may have been considerable change in popular religious opinion; but it may very reasonably be doubted whether this does not consist in an enlargement as much as in a relaxation of the authorized standards. The popular opinion, for instance, as to the inspiration of the writers of Holy Scripture, is very far indeed in excess of any dogmatic statement in the Thirty-nine Articles and the Homilies. And even what may be considered Latitudinarianism, or Liberalism, consists not in the denial of the creeds, but in a freer exposition of them. Similarly, no Presbyterian or Methodist would acknowledge that he had departed from the standards of his church, but would claim that he was more reasonably and correctly interpreting them.

In like manner we can perceive no decay in the government or ministry of the different Protestant bodies. Such a decay could only possibly have taken place in the Episcopal Churches, all of which claim to possess an Apostolical succession, and the three orders of bishops, priests, and deacons. But these orders, also, like the creeds, are exactly what they were in the

reign of Henry the Eighth. Individual clergymen, indeed, may under-estimate or over-estimate the authority which has been conferred upon them; but that authority is perfectly definite, whether they understand it or not. Nor is there any real decay in the discipline of Protestant societies. They have the power to exclude from their communion both heretics and evil-livers, and they probably exercise that power quite as frequently as do the Roman Catholic clergy. They cannot do more than this, and fortunately, throughout almost the whole of the civilized world at the present day, the power of the Roman clergy is equally limited. The fact is, that the apparent decay of discipline, whether within or beyond the Roman obedience, is to be explained by the fact that both heretics and evil-doers excommunicate themselves. It is idle to waste bell, book, and candle upon a man who is equally indifferent to your curse and your benediction. As to the "membership" of the various Protestant bodies, nothing is more easily demonstrable than that their numbers are rapidly increasing.

But I am very little concerned either with the accuracy, or inaccuracy, of Bishop McQuaid's statements. For the sake of argument, I will admit them; and I think I can easily show that the Bishop has entirely failed to perceive their true significance. He argues that Protestantism is a God-forsaken delusion, because it is continually splitting up into new sects; removing its ancient landmarks, if anything Protestant can be ancient; and changing, to suit the spirit of the age, the very foundations of its faith. And it altogether escapes his attention, not only that a similar disintegration is in progress within the Roman Church itself, but that that church is as really responsible for the whole of Protestantism as the Anglican Church is for nonconformity, or the various Christian sects for infidelity and agnosticism. Bishop McQuaid, of course, believes that the Roman Church is the only true church; that it has existed from the time of the Apostles, and also—for this is implied in the very structure of his argument—that one sure proof of its being the true church is the fact that it does not split into sects, that its creed remains unchanged, and that its ministry and government are unaltered. Of course, it is perfectly obvious that, in one sense, no Christian body whatever breaks up into sects; the sects break off from it; and though its numbers may be thus diminished, it claims to be the original body still. But this is by

no means what Bishop McQuaid means by the decay of Protestantism. He argues that Protestantism has decayed because, from the original bodies, such as Anglicanism and Lutheranism, sects have been continually breaking off. And he seems to forget that this is exactly what has been happening to the Christian Church from the very beginning; and that it is this which happened, on the largest possible scale, to the Roman Church itself at the time of the Reformation. He tells us, with the grossest possible exaggeration, that about three hundred years ago men had definite beliefs with regard to God and eternity. "They then believed in supernatural truths and in mysteries. They also believed in a divinely established authority to guide men in all questions of faith and morals." Just as if in the course of the Church's history there had been no Arians or Pelagians, no Montanists or Donatists, no great schism between the East and West. But let us also shut our eyes to these significant facts, alike undeniable and undenied. Let us admit that in the sixteenth century there was only one church, one creed, one divinely constituted and universally recognized guiding authority.

We may go very much farther. This one church was at that time in possession, not only of all the spiritual forces which belong to a spiritual body, but also of all the physical force which belonged to all the states of Europe. Not only was this physical force at its command, but the Church habitually made use of it with the most unrelenting cruelty. She had the absolute monopoly of education; the censorship of books; control, not only over the speculative opinions, but over the practical morality, of the whole population of Europe. She had her learned doctors, her parish priests, her religious orders, her confessors in every household; she had every possible facility for maintaining her authority by instruction and persuasion; and if, in spite of this, any of her children stumbled into error, even in the labyrinth of the darkest mysteries, she could burn them to a cinder, and never hesitated to do it. She had the field all to herself; and in those days heresy was regarded as a more revolting crime than murder or adultery. And what, as an undisputed fact of history, was the outcome of all this? It was that Romanism "decayed" into the innumerable sects of Protestants with which, at this very hour, the world is either cursed

or blessed. Her truth, if she possessed the truth, became inoperative; her discipline, though enforced by the secular arm, became powerless. And if infidelity and agnosticism are the legitimate children of Protestantism, then Protestantism itself, with all its children, legitimate and bastards, is the child of Rome. It is idle to pretend that she had disinherited and disowned them. So does Anglicanism disown the Methodists, and the Methodists the infidels. The fact remains that at the time of the Reformation she lost, and has never since regained, by far the largest part of the population of all the most progressive and most civilized nations of Europe. And even where she retains a nominal supremacy, it is a supremacy more disgraceful than honorable. That country in Europe which most nearly corresponds to the whole of Europe at the time of the Reformation, is Spain. The national church of Spain is Roman Catholic, and the whole population, with the exception of sixty thousand persons, adhere to the Roman Catholic faith. Any Protestant worship must be strictly in private, and every public announcement of Protestantism is strictly forbidden. The population of Spain is rather more than sixteen and a half millions; and out of this number, at the last general census, there were 11,800,000 persons who could neither read nor write. France, again, is nominally Catholic; is she truly religious? Does she love the Church? Does she encourage "religious" orders, or the accumulation of church property? Does she tolerate the Jesuits, or trust the education of the young to the Roman priesthood? And if infidelity be spreading, whether as the result of Protestantism or of Romish superstition, what is the Roman Church for, if it be not to repress infidelity and win unbelievers to the truth? What, then, is her contribution to the defence of Christianity or of Theism? By way of commending the truth to puzzled intellects and bewildered consciences, she has invented, within the memory of all of us, the most grotesque caricature of Christianity which human ingenuity could devise; and required men to believe, on peril of damnation, what every student of history knows to be demonstrably false. She does not "with meekness instruct those who oppose themselves," try to lessen their difficulties, and convince their reason; but she tells them that, as they will not believe in the Christianity of the Apostles, they must accept in addition the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary and the

Infallibility of the Pope, or go to the devil. Alas! the pity of it is that, on these terms, the great majority of educated men would rather go to the devil than to the Church!

But this brings me to notice that not only has Romanism "decayed in its membership,"—by the great loss she sustained at the Reformation, by the recent secession of the Old Catholics, and by the growing indifference and infidelity of her nominal adherents throughout the continent of Europe,—but she is "decaying" more fatally still from within, by altering her "creeds," and her "government and discipline." And by altering her creeds I do not mean—which is all that Bishop McQuaid can charge against Protestants—that multitudes of her members hold large portions of her creeds in abeyance, or explain them away; but that she has made positive and very serious additions to the creeds themselves; so that the very conditions of salvation within the Roman Church are no longer what they were fifty years ago. And not only has the substance of the creeds been altered,—as, *e. g.*, by the addition of the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary and the Infallibility of the Pope,—but the change has been made in such a manner, and on such grounds, that the whole foundation of the faith has been changed. In a word, the whole historical continuity of the Roman Church has been broken. Her doctrine and discipline no longer rest either on scripture or on tradition, or on both of them put together, but on the personal, official infallibility of the Bishop of Rome. It is assumed, indeed, that he will be protected by the divine *Assistentia* from contradicting the Scriptures or the already defined dogmas of the Church. But this is a bare assumption; and in every case he is his own judge, and can infallibly determine either that a new definition does not in fact contradict, but only develops or modifies existing doctrines; or that there was some defect in their definition; or that, in spite of formal regularity, they are nevertheless untrue. Indeed, the dogma of Papal Infallibility as against the Infallibillity of the Church was demanded for this very purpose: that the Church might be saved the appeal to history, or the long and doubtful discussions of an Œcumenical Synod, and be enabled to decide offhand, by an ever-available oracle, even upon the most mysterious and difficult subjects. In view of the ever-increasing infidelity which characterizes this age, and against which the Church of Rome is utterly powerless, it was hoped and expected that her

real weakness could be concealed by a bolder assertion of strength; that doctrines which are no longer believed or believable would somehow become credible and acceptable, if they were repeated in a mysterious jargon from some sacred oracle; that the mere claim of infallibility would, by its sheer audacity, compel conviction. But in order that this might be accomplished it was necessary to assume the Papal infallibilty, and to act upon it, before its formal definition, and for the purpose of securing that definition. For this purpose the Vatican Synod was convoked, coerced, enslaved, and stultified. The Vatican Synod is the suicide of the Roman Church.

The true and complete history of that spurious council has yet to be written; and when it appears it will be widely different from the dull fiction composed by that restless Cardinal to whom the definition of Infallibility is mainly due. But enough is known already to prove the enormous change that has taken place both in the doctrine and discipline of the Roman Church. Most instructive, for instance, as coming from within the council, and written by one who himself voted for the Infallibility, and cannot be even accused of heresy, is "Eight Months at Rome during the Vatican Council"—a work known, in spite of partial disclaimers, to have been written by Cardinal Nobili-Vitelleschi, Bishop of Osimo, "raised to the Archbishopric of Seleucia, and to the purple, after the Vatican Council, by Pius IX." * This impartial and orthodox chronicler of events which occurred under his own most careful observation, giving evidence, agreeing with, and confirming a mass of similar evidence from other and various sources, has produced a work of singular value. He exposes the hollow sham from every side and in every way. Of whom was the council composed? Who were those hundreds of bishops who there revolutionized the doctrine and discipline of the Church? Were they bishops of real dioceses; or did they represent, even when they had real dioceses, whole cities or provinces of genuine Catholics? Does the Bishop of Chicago represent a Roman Catholic Chicago, or the restless Manning a Roman Catholic Westminster? To say nothing of bishops *in partibus*, as many as three hundred were the guests of the Pope, and so put under a strong pressure not to go against his wishes. But every kind of pressure was put upon

* See an admirable account of this work in "The Contemporary Review," January, 1877, by Dr. Littledale.

the council. There was no freedom of discussion, nor fullness of debate. In his review of Vitelleschi's book, and on Vitelleschi's authority, Dr. Littledale says:

"That the Pope was ready and willing to proceed to personal violence against the opposition is established by the arrest and imprisonment of an Armenian vicar-general for blaming two other prelates for undue servility toward Rome, and it was only the prompt interference of the Turkish Minister which secured his release. 'Quirinus' gives an additional circumstance or two here,—first, that the French embassy refused its aid, and next, that the Cardinal Secretary of State replied to the first Turkish remonstrance, that all Catholic priests, when at Rome, lost their national rights, became simply subjects of the Pope, and were under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition alone. It is most important to bear this fact in mind when passing judgment on the timorous flight of opposition bishops a little later, when the Infallibilist victory was assured, since they had private warning from well-wishers of Vitelleschi's stamp that punitive measures were being prepared for them, and perhaps not imprisonment only, but a more extreme penalty for disobedience, such as overtook Cardinal Andrea."

Not only was the Vatican Synod "managed," with utter disregard of the most ancient precedents, in such a way as to deprive its canons and decrees of all general validity, but those decrees, when they were produced, wholly revolutionized the "government and ministry" of the Roman Church. Bishop McQuaid makes himself merry with the timid uncertainty as to the nature and extent of their authority, expressed by some of the clergy of the Protestant Episcopal Church, at a recent congress in Richmond, Va.; and he argues from this a "decay" in the ministry of that church. But the decay, such as it was, was not in the ministry, but in the private opinion of a few individuals as to the nature of that ministry. But the Vatican synod has annihilated—except in name—the whole Episcopate of the Roman Church. Not a single bihsop of that church any longer resembles in the least degree St. Cyprian or St. Augustine. Every one of them is the mere creation and curate and slave of the Pope. What bishop now would dare to write to Leo XIII. as St. Cyprian wrote to the then Bishop of Rome, or would escape excommunication if he did?

So much for organic changes, introduced by recognized authority—change of "creed," by new dogmas, declared to be necessary to salvation; changes in "government and ministry," by the enslavement and virtual abolition of the Episcopate. There is nothing in the slightest degree corresponding to this in

the history of Protestantism. Bishop McQuaid knows that, and he therefore adduces varieties of private opinion—the High Church, Low Church, Broad Church—as evidence of a decaying creed. Is there then nothing of that kind in Romanism? Are there no "minimizers" there?

The Romish revival in England is due, at bottom, almost exclusively to two individuals, Newman and Manning; both cardinals, both entitled to speak with high authority, but both, also, so far private individuals that they cannot commit the Roman Church to any opinion or confident belief that they may think proper to express. They are to the Roman Church what, for instance, Maurice and Pusey are—or alas! were—to the Anglican Church. Their differences of opinions, if they do differ, all prove a "decay of creed," exactly in the same way as such "decay" is proved by the co-existence of our High and Broad Church parties or schools in the Episcopal churches of England and America. Everybody knows that Cardinal Manning is a Papist of the Papists, the very type of an Ultramontane, the great patron and promoter of those very extravagances of Mariolatry and Infallibility which have rendered all hopes of re-union with the Roman Church monstrous and impossible. He outherods Herod. Here is the testimony of Cardinal Vitelleschi:

"The persistence of the Archbishop of Westminster was, perhaps, the logical result of his own antecedents. Having been a priest and a Protestant at the outset of his career, he knew his own religion from within and not from without, and the Catholic religion from without and not from within. He was well acquainted with the many divisions and subdivisions of Protestantism, and admired the majestic unity of Catholicism. He did not appreciate the good effects of allowing a moderate degree of liberty and the constant exercise of the conscience and reasoning powers; neither did he understand the dangers arising from the excessive authority exercised by united Catholicism. In fact, he was enamored of the principle of authority as the slave adores the idea of liberty; and the want of discrimination and of real Catholic perceptions in his dealings with the council was a matter of reproach to him even by the most faithful and devout clergy at Rome."

And again:

"History is bound to award to the author and originator of every work the praise or blame which is due to him. All must remember the part taken by the Fathers of the 'Civiltà Cattolica' and Monsignor Manning, Archbishop of Westminster, in promoting the dogma of the personal infallibility of the Pope, and all know it was their mind and their will that carried it."

Now Newman is to Manning what the "Imitation of Christ" is to the "Glories of Mary." Let us see, then, what "decay of creed" there is — according to Bishop McQuaid's test — in the Church of Rome, as proved in such well-known and conspicuous examples as the two English cardinals. Manning we know; let us hear Newman.

And first as to the *cultus* of the Virgin Mary. Of course Cardinal Newman justifies that *cultus*. But as Mr. Maurice was accused of "explaining away" the doctrine of the Atonement, or of Eternal Punishment, so Newman is accused of *minimizing*. Indeed, he is so little in sympathy with the hideous extravagances of blasphemy which are the delight of Cardinal Manning, that, until he read some specimens of them in Pusey's "Eirenicon," he did not know of their existence. Pusey's specimens were all duly authenticated; and, in fact, the worst of all these idolatrous extravagances are not only permitted, but largely *indulgenced*. Here is Dr. Newman's reply to Dr. Pusey ("Difficulties of Anglicanism," ii., 113–114):

"After such explanation, and with such authorities to clear my path, I put away from me, as you would wish, without any hesitation, as matters in which my heart and reason have no part (when taken in their literal and absolute sense, as any Protestant would naturally take them, and as the writers doubtless did not use them), such sentences and phrases as these: That the mercy of Mary is infinite; that God has resigned into her hands His omnipotence; that it is safer to seek her than to seek her Son; that the Blessed Virgin is superior to God; that our Lord is subject to her command; that His present disposition toward sinners, as well as His Father's, is to reject them, while the Blessed Mary takes His place as an advocate with Father and Son; that the saints are more ready to intercede with Jesus than Jesus with the Father; that Mary is the only refuge of those with whom God is angry; that Mary alone can obtain a Protestant's conversion; that it would have sufficed for the salvation of men if our Lord had died, not in order to obey His Father, but to defer to the decree of His Mother; that she rivals our Lord in being God's daughter, not by adoption, but by a kind of nature; that Christ fulfilled the office of Saviour by imitating her virtues; that as the Incarnate God bore the image of His Father, so he bore the image of His Mother; that redemption derived from Christ indeed its sufficiency, but from Mary its beauty and loveliness; that, as we are clothed with the merits of Christ, so we are clothed with the merits of Mary; that as He is Priest, in a like sense is she priestess; that His body and blood in the Eucharist are truly hers and appertain to her; that, as He is present and received therein, so is she present and received therein; that priests are ministers as of Christ, so of Mary; that elect souls are born of God and Mary; that the Holy Ghost brings into fruitfulness His action by her, producing in her and by her Jesus Christ in His members; that the kingdom of God in our souls, as our Lord

speaks, is really the kingdom of Mary in the soul; that she and the Holy Ghost produce in the soul extraordinary things; and that when the Holy Ghost finds Mary in a soul He flies there.

"Sentiments such as these I freely surrender to your animadversion; I never knew of them till I read your book, nor, as I think, do the vast majority of English Catholics know them. They seem to me like a bad dream. I could not have conceived them to be said. I know not to what authority to go for them,—to Scripture, or to the Fathers, or to the decrees of councils, or to the consent of schools, or to the tradition of the faithful, or to the Holy See, or to Reason."

We all know the part taken by Cardinal Manning in the Vatican Synod. That restless, conceited, haughty prelate was so far from waiting either for the guidance of Providence or of the "infallible" Head of the Church, that he "forced the hand" of the Holy Father himself; and was the chief agent in imposing upon the Roman Church a revolutionary dogma which her most learned bishops repudiated as, at the very least, inopportune, if not actually false. At the time of the secession of Dr. Döllinger and his party, it was foolishly and falsely rumored that Dr. Newman would join them. And here are his own words ("Difficulties of Anglicanism," ii., 298, 299):

"But the explanation of such reports about me is easy. They arise from forgetfulness on the part of those who spread them, that there are two sides to ecclesiastical acts, that right ends are often prosecuted by very unworthy means, and that, in consequence, those who, like myself, oppose a line of action are not necessarily opposed to the issue for which it has been adopted. Jacob gained by wrong means his destined blessing. 'All are not Israelites who are of Israel,' and there are partisans of Rome who have not the sanctity and wisdom of Rome herself.

"I am not referring to anything which took place within the walls of the council chambers; of that, of course, we know nothing; but, even though things occurred there which it is not pleasant to dwell upon, that would not at all affect, not by a hair's breadth, the validity of the resulting definition, as I shall presently show. What I felt deeply, and ever shall feel while life lasts, is the violence and cruelty of journals and other publications, which, taking, as they professed to do, the Catholic side, employed themselves by their rash language (though, of course, they did not mean it so) in unsettling the weak in faith, throwing back inquirers, and shocking the Protestant mind. Nor do I speak of publications only; a feeling was too prevalent in many places that no one could be true to God and His Church who had any pity on troubled souls, or any scruple of 'scandalizing those little ones who believe in' Christ, and of 'despising and destroying him for whom He died.'

"It was this most keen feeling which made me say, as I did continually, 'I will not believe that the Pope's infallibility will be defined, till defined it is.'"

Again he writes, after the definition of the dogma (Ibid. 325):

"Another ground for receiving the dogma, still not upon the direct authority of the council, or with acceptance of the validity of its act *per se*, is the consideration that our merciful Lord would not care so little for His elect people, the multitude of the faithful, as to allow their visible head, and such a large number of bishops, to lead them into error, and an error so serious, if an error. This consideration leads me to accept the doctrine as a dogma, indirectly indeed from the council, but not so much from a council as from the Pope and a very large number of bishops. The question is not whether they had a right to impose, or even were right in imposing, the dogma on the faithful; but whether, having done so, I have not an obligation to accept it, according to the maxim, 'Fieri non debuit, factum valet.'"

And then he proceeds to show how little was accomplished by the new definition.

But it is enough. If Protestantism is "decaying" because of a diminution of "its membership,"—which, as a matter of fact, can be entirely disproved,—*a fortiori*, must Romanism be "decaying," which has lost all Protestantism to begin with, and is honeycombed with infidelity and groveling superstition. If a change of "creed" be a sure token of coming death, what must be the moribund condition of that church which has not only added, within the memory of all of us, new articles of necessary belief, but has shifted the very foundation upon which all her doctrine and discipline rests? If vague private opinions about the nature of the ministry in the Protestant Episcopal churches prove "decay," what shall we say of the absorption of the whole Episcopate in a single See? If it is impossible for a church to live which embraces high and low and broad, a Pusey and a Maurice, what shall we say of a church which includes a Newman and a Manning? What Bishop McQuaid has proved, if he has proved anything, is the "decay," not of Protestantism, but of the Christian religion. For my own part, I am not in the least alarmed. Protestantism or no Protestantism, "God is over all, blessed for ever."

WILLIAM KIRKUS.

# EMERSON AND CARLYLE.*

BACON says of private letters, that "such as are written from wise men, are, of all the words of men, in my judgment, the best; for they are more natural than orations, public speeches, and more advised than conferences or present speeches."

This remark, frequently quoted by Emerson, is evidently true of the letters which passed between him and Carlyle from 1834 to 1872. They are natural, in the sense of expressing the inmost natures of the correspondents, and are thus thoroughly sincere. But the sincerity of Emerson was that of a sweet, serene, hopeful, tolerant, wholesome, and aspiring nature; the sincerity of Carlyle was that of a nature harsh, unquiet, despondent, intolerant, despairing, and unhealthy. Both of the correspondents were eminently strong men; it was impossible that either could be swayed from his predetermined course by fear or flattery, by social ostracism or social favor, by the apprehension of poverty or the seduction of wealth; but the strength of Emerson was ever calm, while that of Carlyle was oftentimes spasmodic. Emerson, relying on his intuitions, was sublimely indifferent to the received opinions and accredited reputations which Carlyle savagely assailed.

The difference between the two was not merely a difference of character and experience, but a difference in respect to physical health. Brought up to receive, as absolute truth, the austerest doctrines of Scotch Presbyterianism, professed by a father whom he held to be the best of men, Carlyle was "destined" for the ministry. There can be little doubt that, had his reason accepted the dogmas he was to preach, he would have been a preacher greater than Chalmers. The trouble was that his culture made him doubt the truth of the dogmas he was expected to

* The correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson. 1834-1872. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 2 vols. 16mo.

expound. In a great many instances the young students of theology glide over what offends them at first sight, in the rigid articles of their creed, and become clergymen by relative superficiality of mind and character, without imagination enough to realize the terrible consequences of the articles to which they subscribe in the laudable desire to "make a living." They wish to be married; they wish to do good in practising their profession; and, happy in a wife and family devoted to them, they preach in the morning the doctrine of divine wrath to the children of men, and then, in the evening, mingle cheerfully with their flock, and are the most genial, entertaining, instructive, helpful, and humane of the company they call together. Their humanity triumphs over their theology; they insensibly modify the harsh elements of their theoretical creed when they are in actual contact with the practical needs of their congregations; and no fair-minded person, who has a large acquaintance with our towns and villages, could think of the abolition of our Christian churches and pastors without a shudder of apprehension for the prospects of our civilization. Whatever may be the special creeds which the clergymen profess, they resolutely stand for absolute principles of ethics in practical life, and for larger ideas in philosophy than obtain in their respective parishes.

But Carlyle, after endeavoring to realize to his reason, heart, and imagination, the dogmas of the religious creed in which he had been brought up, came to the conclusion that he could not accept it, and became a man of letters in despair of submitting his intelligence to the stern doctrines of the Church of Scotland. The struggle, in a mind so vigorous and a character so strong as his, between what he wished to believe and what he found he could not believe, was accompanied by agonies of spiritual experience, similar to the experience through which Luther and Bunyan passed: but Carlyle came out of his spiritual struggle an incurable dyspeptic; while, in the case of Luther and Bunyan, we are not informed that the disturbances in their souls left any permanent derangements in their digestion. Carlyle became dyspeptic, not only in his stomach, but in his brain and heart; and his whole view of life, here and hereafter, of history and of contemporary annals, was discolored and distorted, from the fact that his indigestion extended to the very center of his spiritual being. Existence was to him a questionable blessing; for his will, his genius, his conscience, and his poverty exacted

from him the duty of constant labor; and labor brought him, according to his own account, none of the sweet compensations of labor. He had in him a certain barbaric force,— a force compared with which all civilized energy appears comparatively weak; but he was an invalid barbarian, on whom the culture of Europe had been lavished; and the sick giant wailed, and mourned, and growled, and sometimes almost blasphemed, during the whole period in which he resolutely toiled. He preached the gospel of work, and acted up to its severest requirements; but the gospel gave no joy to the workman. In his utmost stress of poverty, he wrote to Emerson: "Me Mammon will pay or not, as he finds convenient; buy me, he will not." One is reminded of Dr. South's statement that "it is hard to maintain truth, but still harder to be maintained by it."

Emerson, on the contrary, had no experiences in his early life at all resembling those of Carlyle. He was born in a family where the fear of God was absorbed in the love of God. His soul was infused with cheer from his infancy. He entered and passed through college without a blemish on his name. He became by "natural selection" a Unitarian minister, and did his appointed work to the entire satisfaction of his parish. No clergyman was ever more heartily loved than he by those who listened to his discourses, and were favored with his Christian companionship. He brought cheer and hope into every household where he appeared. There are many unpublished memorials celebrating the effect which the sweet and unaffected sanctity of his character produced in towns remote from Boston, when he "exchanged" services with his brother clergymen. One letter, written by the most cultivated and self-sacrificing woman then living in Massachusetts, testified that the Unitarian Association had sent, for one Sunday, to the Northampton Unitarians, an angel when the latter only asked for a preacher. But Emerson found in the Unitarian body some rule which he considered to limit his entire independence, and he quietly abandoned his connection with the denomination, and retired to his country home to think and to study freely, without any association qualified to call him to account for heresy even with respect to the doctrines of Unitarianism. All this was done without any shock either to his soul or to his digestion. He never lost his physical health; and remained to the last perfectly serene in all spiritual as well as in all practical matters. No man loved and

reverenced God more than he, or feared him less. He is an extraordinary instance of a man of religious genius, passing through religious changes, without being submitted to any stress and storm of religious passion.

This was the Emerson who, at the age of thirty, visited, for one day, Carlyle at his lonely residence of Craigenputtock. He staid but for a day; but the impression he made, both on Carlyle and his wife, was permanent, and led to a life-long friendship. Years afterward, Mrs. Carlyle wrote that she could never forget the visitor who had descended "out of the clouds, as it were," into their desert, "and made one day there look like enchantment for us, and left me weeping that it was only one day." Carlyle himself reckoned only three "happinesses" that had occurred to him in the year 1833—the first two of which were trivial, but the third of memorable importance; for the third happiness was the visit of Emerson, who appeared both to Jane and himself as "one of the most lovable creatures they had ever looked on."

On Emerson's return to the United States, the correspondence between the two began by a letter from Emerson, dated May, 1834, in which he welcomes "Sartor Resartus," glories in the brave stand that the author has made for Spiritualism, but is repelled by the oddity of the vehicle chosen to convey "this treasure," and looks forward to the time "when the word will be as simple, and so as resistless, as the thought." Indeed, Emerson was, for many years, dissatisfied with the strange liberties which his friend took with the English language. He wrote, in 1835, that he cherished a "salutary horror of the German style of 'Sartor Resartus.'" It was only long after this letter that, in recommending Carlyle's "Cromwell" to a friend, he was met by the ordinary objection to the writer's style. "Read him for his style," was Emerson's emphatic rejoinder; and indeed, if the excellence of a style be judged according to the felicity with which it expresses and embodies a peculiar individual nature, the style of Carlyle is unobjectionable. It is only when his imitators write in *Carlylese*, that we perceive how pernicious that dialect of the English tongue is as a model, and how ridiculous it becomes in other hands than his own. It would be difficult to select a sentence of Emerson in which its peculiarities appear. Yet, while Emerson protests against the "grotesque Teutonic apocalyptic strain" of the book, he admits that it may be inevitable that the strange

jargon, as it seems to him, is Carlyle's most natural method of utterance; "for," he declares, "are not all our little circlets of will as so many little eddies rounded in by the great Circle of Necessity? and could the Truth-speaker, perhaps now the best thinker of the Saxon race, have written otherwise? And must we not say that Drunkenness is a virtue rather than that Cato has erred?" Is it possible to conceive that recognition and reproof could be more genially and gracefully combined?

This letter led to a correspondence between the two friends which was continued, with intervals of silence, for forty years. In richness and fullness of matter, there is nothing superior, nothing — one is prompted to say — equal to it in literary annals. The sentences which a reviewer would be inclined to quote are so numerous that, if he indulged his inclination, he would be in danger of infringing the law of copyright. There will, of course, be a wide immediate demand for the book from that large portion of cultivated readers who are stimulated by mere intellectual curiosity; but the volumes so swarm with striking thoughts, and, in old Ben Jonson's vernacular, are so "rammed with life," that we can confidently predict they will be read a century hence with delight. They are specially interesting as recording the intimate communion of two of the most original minds, and two of the most contrasted individualities, which our century has produced. It would seem, at the first glance, that it was impossible for two such men to be bound together in a vital friendship,—a friendship which the lapse of time and frequent disagreement in opinion and action only rendered more close and indissoluble.

The difference, indeed, between the two men impresses the reader on almost every page. Emerson was the champion of the Ideal; Carlyle asserted the absolute dominion of Fact. Emerson declared that Truth is mighty and will prevail; Carlyle retorted that Truth is mighty, and has prevailed. Emerson looked serenely at the ugly aspect of contemporary life, because, as an optimist, he was a herald of the Future; Carlyle, as a pessimist, denounced the Present, and threw all the energy of his vivid dramatic genius into vitalizing the Past. Emerson was a prophet; Carlyle, a resurrectionist. Emerson gloried in what was to be; Carlyle exulted in what had been. Emerson declared, even when current events appeared ugliest to the philanthropist, that "the highest thought and the deepest love is born with Victory on

his head," and must triumph in the end; Carlyle, gloomily surveying the present, insisted that high thought and deep love must be sought and found in generations long past, which Dr. Dryasdust had so covered up with his mountains of mud, that it was only by immense toil he (Carlyle) had been able to reproduce them as they actually existed. Look up, says Emerson, cheerily; "hitch your wagon to a star"; "look down," growls Carlyle, "and see that your wagon is an honest one, safe and strong in passing over miry roads, before you have the impudence to look up to the smallest star in the rebuking heavens."

The practical value of Emerson's friendship was proved by his strenuous efforts to disseminate Carlyle's works in the United States, and by pledging his own credit to pay the expenses of their republication. In this way all the profits of the volumes, less the publisher's commission for selling them, were sent to Carlyle. That magnificent prose epic, "The French Revolution," fell almost dead on the English public; while in the United States it was so warmly welcomed that the author obtained the remuneration for writing it principally from his admirers in this country, inspired by Emerson's enthusiasm for the lone, unappreciated creator of an immortal work. But there is something comical in the business relations between the two friends. Neither understands book-keeping, or has penetrated into the mysteries of an account current. Emerson is always doubtful as to the question whether he has got his money's worth from the publishers, but still sends scores of pounds sterling to the famishing author; Carlyle gladly pockets the coin, but is more helpless than Emerson himself in understanding whether he has been cheated or not. To Carlyle, all publishers are "hideous;" but he thinks that Fraser (of "the sand magazine") is less hideous than the others, because he has become more accustomed to him. At last Emerson, by calling into the conference one of the ablest of Boston merchants, together with the American representative of Baring Brothers, and the cashier of a Boston bank, finds that the publishers are about right. But it is ludicrous to think of such great experts in accounts brought in to decide upon a matter of a few pounds and shillings.

Meanwhile, Carlyle had "become a name." A New York book-selling and publishing firm, dissatisfied with the terms on which they could purchase Carlyle's books, and finding that it would pay to reprint them, began or threatened to issue

them in cheaper editions. This they had a perfect legal right to do, whatever may be said of the "courtesy" title, which was afterward, by the leading publishing firms, accorded to the first American reprinter of a foreign author's works. If any English writer had a right to complain of the absence of international copyright, it was Dickens; for his popularity in this country was so immense that if an American friend had undertaken to do for him what Emerson did for Carlyle, and his claim had been admitted by the book-sellers, the gains of Dickens would have been scores of thousands of dollars from the United States alone. Emerson, however, seems to have considered Carlyle an exception. No decent publisher, though he made but a few hundred dollars by the transaction, should dare to touch his special rights by unauthorized reprints. The result was a number of indignant letters between the friends, in which all the resources of ingenious invective were lavished on the unhappy "pirate." When "Past and Present" was on the eve of publication, Emerson suggested an arrangement with his irascible friend, to have the volume issued simultaneously in England and in this country. Carlyle replies: "The practical business is: How to cut out that New York scoundrel, who fancies that, because there is no gallows, it is permitted to steal? I have a distinct desire to do that, altogether apart from the money to be gained thereby. A friend's goodness ought not to be frustrated by a scoundrel destitute of gallows." Then follows a letter in which he prophesies that "the gibbetless thief in New York will beat us after all"; and Emerson despairingly answers, "you are no longer secure of any respect to your property in our free-booting America." Now all this "Much Ado About Little" came from the simple fact that one prominent bookseller quarreled with another on a question of the proper discount to be made from the retail price of one or two books of necessarily limited circulation. Emerson made the mistake of insisting that the retail dealer in Carlyle's works should have the most beggarly commission on the volumes he displayed on his counters. He thus checked the sale of the writings he most desired to circulate. Who would venture to order twenty copies of a book, without being pretty sure that he would not lose by the bargain, in case he sold only twelve?

It is well known that Emerson's appreciation of the fine genius and beautiful character of A. B. Alcott was as true as

it was intense. He considered him the most inspired converser in the country; but he also affirmed that what he wrote and published gave but the slightest indication of his powers,—that, with him, the tongue was a more potent instrument of expression than the pen. Indeed, Mr. Alcott was a born idealist, unflinchingly applying the principles of his philosophy to the ordinary practical concerns of life. There is a story current of a certain sturdy politician, who remained faithful to his party and sect until his death in extreme old age. It was alleged that, in a minute after his birth, he exclaimed, "Now, I want all you people fooling round here to understand that I am born a Jeffirsonian Dimmicrat in politics, and a Univarsalist in religion; and don't you forgit it." The legend goes on to say that he would not take a sip of mother's milk until the rigid conditions on which he condescended to accept existence were complied with. One can imagine that the infant Alcott might have announced as peremptorily that he was to be brought up as a Pythagorean in diet and a Platonist in philosophy. At any rate, he was the sweetest, the most serene, the most humane of human beings; and even when he carried his ideas to extremes in conduct, all who knew and loved him had the widest toleration for his eccentricities.

When Mr. Alcott went to Europe, in 1842, Emerson commended him to Carlyle in a characteristic fashion:

> "Let the stranger, when he arrives at your gate, make a new and primary impression. Be sure to forget what you have heard of him; and if you have ever read anything to which his name is attached, be sure to forget that. You may love him, or hate him, or apathetically pass by him, as your genius shall dictate; only I entreat this, that you do not let him go quite out of your reach until you are sure that you have seen him, and know for certain the nature of the man."

And, in his next letter, he adds: "My friend Alcott must have visited you before this, and you have seen whether any relation could subsist between men so differently excellent." Indeed, that was the exact relation between Carlyle and Emerson.

Emerson must have feared the impression which the optimistic Alcott would make on the somewhat cynical pessimist, the literary Diogenes of the Despotism of Letters, as contrasted with the old time "Republic" of the same name. Carlyle tried "to be good,"—the phrase which his wife used when his irritable temper was softened by friendship, or by a dinner which

oppressed his stomach less than usual,—and he wrote back to Emerson, that his friend was found to be "a genial, innocent, simple-hearted man, of much natural intelligence and goodness, with an air of rusticity, veracity, and dignity withal, which in many ways appeals to me. The good Alcott,—with his long, lean face and figure, with his gray, worn temples and mild, radiant eyes, all bent on saving the world by a return to acorns and the Golden Age,—he comes before one like a venerable Don Quixote, whom nobody can even laugh at without loving." Emerson replied: "As you do not seem to have seen in him his pure and noble intellect, I fear that it lies under some new and denser clouds." Alcott was evidently disappointed with his reception. It was rumored, at the time, that he wrote to Emerson in these words: "I accuse T. Carlyle of inhospitality to my thought." At any rate, he must have felt, to employ one of his own phrases, that Carlyle "was not *ins*-pirate, but *des*-perate." He brought back to New England a follower or two, whom Carlyle styled Alcott's "English Tail"; and he implored Emerson to avoid it. "Bottomless imbeciles," he wrote, "ought not to be seen in company with Ralph Waldo Emerson, who has already *men* listening to him on this side of the water. The 'Tail' has an individual or two of that genus, and the rest is mainly undecided. For example, I know old ——— myself; and can testify, if you will believe me, that few greater blockheads (if 'blockhead may mean exasperated imbecile,' and the ninth part of a thinker) broke the world's bread in his day. Have a care of such!" It must be admitted that the "Tail" of the returning philosopher did him no honor, and led him into some absurdities; but such mistakes were merely chance incidents in a life which has been devoted to all noble and honorable ends. Emerson's shrewdness and good sense saved him from any participation in the follies of the "Tail."

Thomas Carlyle had a wonderful power of sketching, in a few words, physical and mental portraits of the men he met, somewhat resembling the skill of Thomas Nast in the grotesque caricatures he has contributed to "Harper's Weekly." The two Thomases had this in common, that every peculiarity of face, feature, shape of the head, color of the hair, movement of the body, or any other merely physical characteristic, was made significant of mental or moral qualities in the person delineated. Nast contributed, more than anybody else, to the overthrow of

"the Tweed Ring" which ruled, robbed, and might have ruined New York, and he did it by his marvelous appeals to the eye of the ordinary honest voter, who was perhaps incompetent to form a rational opinion of rascalities through words addressed to his reason and imagination. "Oh, them picters!" groaned Tweed; "that was what wrecked us!" Carlyle's portraits by the pen are similar to those of Nast by the pencil, inasmuch as they agree in connecting physiology with psychology, and making a man's inward nature correspond to the exaggerated traits of his bodily organization.

Carlyle could not restrain this tendency of his mind, even in characterizing his friends. Much as he delighted in Emerson's books, he complained that his thoughts, though full of soul, lacked body. His own thinking, even on the highest themes, tended to embody itself in palpable forms; and, except in the vague background of his word-pictures, where the Eternal came in, his imagination really "bodied forth" that which his spiritual eye discerned. In the moods in which he appeared as a humorist and satirist,—as distinguished from his loftiest moods in which he appeared as a thinker and seer,—his wit and humor rushed by instinct into forms truly Rabelaisian. In particular, he cannot help letting his mind run riot in picturing individuals. Thus he speaks, in 1837, of his friend, Miss Martineau, as "a genuine little poetess, buckramed, swathed like a mummy into socinian and political-economy formulas; and yet verily alive in the inside of that!" In a letter, dated November, 1838, he invites Emerson to visit England, and after mentioning several men who will welcome him, he adds that "old Rogers, with his pale head, —white, bare, and cold as snow,—will work on you with those large, blue eyes, cruel, sorrowful, and that sardonic shelf-chin." He met Webster in England, in 1839, and he writes to his friend: "Not many days ago, I saw at breakfast the notablest of all your notabilities, Daniel Webster. He is a magnificent specimen; you might say to all the world, 'This is your Yankee Englishman; such limbs we make in Yankeeland.' As a logic-fencer, advocate, or parliamentary Hercules, one would be inclined to back him at first sight against all the extant world. The tanned complexion, that amorphous, crag-like face; the dull, black eyes, under their precipice of brows, like dull anthracite furnaces, needing only to be blown; the mastiff-mouth, accurately closed,—I have not traced as much of silent Bersekir-rage, that I remember of, in any other

man." After this comes a portrait of Walter Savage Landor: "A tall, broad, burly man, with gray hair, and large, fierce-rolling eyes; of the most restless, impetuous vivacity, not to be held in by the most perfect breeding,—expressing itself in high-colored superlatives, indeed, in reckless exaggeration, now and then in a short, dry laugh, not of sport, but of mockery; a wild man, whom no extent of culture had been able to tame." Landor was the original of Dickens's Boythorn, in "Bleak House"; but is there not much of Boythorn in Carlyle's own wild diatribes against things and persons? Milnes, one of the English friends who most appreciated him, he describes as "a pretty, little robin-redbreast of a man." How cruel this is! Sumner told the present writer that, about the time when Carlyle wrote this to Emerson, he was a guest at one of Rogers's breakfasts, and had occasion to mention, with great warmth, the merits of Carlyle as a writer and thinker. He found not the slightest response from the many eminent men present; and Milnes, who sat near him, whispered in his ear that he perfectly agreed with him, but that he was the only Englishman present who sympathized with Sumner's admiration of the great man.

Tennyson was another friend of Carlyle. The latter liked him as a companion, but often lectured and hectored him on the folly of writing in verse. He is described in these volumes (1844) "as one of the finest-looking men in the world. A great shock of rough, dusty-dark hair; bright, laughing hazel eyes; massive, aquiline face—most massive, yet most delicate; of sallow-brown complexion, almost Indian-looking; clothes cynically loose, free-and-easy; smokes infinite tobacco. His voice is musically metallic, fit for loud laughter and piercing wail, and all that may lie between; speech and speculation free and plenteous: I do not meet, in these late decades, such company over a pipe." Tennyson, if he chose, could tell strange stories of the many controversies in which the two smokers engaged, which the soothing influence of tobacco could not prevent from occasionally assuming an irritating and almost furious form of disagreement. A friend of both was once present at a conversation between the two, in which Carlyle apologized for the horrible cruelties inflicted by William the Conqueror on his Saxon subjects, as minutely narrated by Tennyson. The discussion waxed warm between the accuser and the defender of the accused; Carlyle becoming all the more exasperating from the pitying

way in which he condescended to inform Tennyson that he did not know how savage populations should be governed, when their government was intrusted to a firm hand, utterly regardless of Exeter Hall philanthropy and the sentimentality of writers of verses. In 1867, Carlyle writes to Emerson that he and a lady friend had read Tennyson's "Idyls of the King" "with profound recognition of the finely elaborated execution, and also of the inward perfection of vacancy, and, to say truth, with considerable impatience at being treated so very like infants, though the lollipops were so superlative. We gladly changed for one of Emerson's 'English Traits,' and read that, with increasing and ever increasing satisfaction every evening, blessing Heaven that there were still books for grown-up people too." There is really something subtle in this criticism, exaggerated as its tone of condemnation is; and most readers of the "Idyls" must feel its force, however much they may like the poems. Amid all the clash of arms, and the heroic deeds of Tennyson's heroes, they must have a feeling of that "inward vacancy" of the true knightly spirit. It would be difficult to define in what this inward vacancy consists; but it is not felt by the reader of Scott's heroic romances, or of Carlyle's "Heroes and the Heroic in History."

Nothing injured Carlyle more, in the opinion of those Americans who most admired and appreciated his genius, than the position he took in regard to negro slavery. Before our civil war broke out, he had declared his conviction that "Quashee" must be compelled to work even by the stimulus of the lash. He always raved whenever he spoke of the lazy African; and he always spelt negro with two g's. He appeared absolutely insane, or inhuman, whenever the "nigger" question came before his judgment for settlement. Some thirty years ago, a radical club was established in Boston, composed of members representing every variety of political, religious, and philosophical dissent. The walls of the room where the members assembled were lined with photographs of the most prominent foreign and domestic champions of things as they "ought to be." On one evening, Emerson made some remarks on a purely intellectual topic, having no possible relation to slavery, except the slavery of even the educated mind of the country to routine, and Carlyle was referred to as one of its most earnest opponents. Then Garrison rose from his seat, glared through his spectacles at the portrait of Carlyle, and said that no club

of humane and hopeful men could look at that face without horror and disgust, and he trusted that the moral sentiment of those present would demand, not that the portrait should be taken down, but that it should be turned to the wall, so that the hateful lineaments of that enemy of freedom might not affront the eyes of any honest reformer. Of course the advice was not followed; but it showed the intensity of hatred which the great leader of the abolitionists felt for the cynical defender of the policy which would scourge the negro to his daily task, if he would not go to it willingly. The truth is that Carlyle was himself whipped on by his sense of duty to undertake work in which he found little enjoyment and much pain; and he considered that others should be made to do by outward compulsion what he did, against the grain, by inward strength of will. One of the most striking epistles in this correspondence, is the letter to Emerson, in August, 1849, in which he furiously inveighs against the pauperism of Ireland. Nearly one half of the whole population, he says, receives "Poor-Law rations," while the land is uncultivated, and the landlords are hiding from bailiffs. "Such a state of things was never heard of under this sky before. . . . 'What is to be done?' asks every one. . . . 'Blacklead these two million idle beggars,' I sometimes advised, 'and sell them in Brazil as niggers,—perhaps Parliament, on sweet constraint, will allow you to advance them to be niggers!'" Of course, this burst of wrath, if taken as an expression of opinion, would rather befit the King of Dahomey, after he had imbibed a more than usual amount of "fire-water," than a civilized human being; but through all this grotesque exaggeration there runs this principle, that all persons who will not work for a living should be either forced to work for it, or should cease to live. He detested all philanthropy which saved lazy people from the consequences of their laziness. "Let them work or die," seems to have been his austere motto; "and the sooner they die, the better. Clean the earth of these unclean things who have the impudence to declare their right to *ex*-ist, while they depend on the charity of real laborers to *sub*-sist."

When he applied this principle, that pauperism was the worst of crimes, to our civil war, he was met by the obvious objection that about all the work done at the South was done by "niggers"; that the owners of these niggers devoted most of their time to that constitutional palaver which he held in special

abhorrence; and that, as "captains of industry," they did little or nothing to promote, advance, or increase the remuneration of Labor. A New Englander invented the cotton-gin; they stole the invention, starved the inventor, and then were careless of almost all other improvements by which one machine does the work of a hundred men. They necessarily made the South poor; and then went to war because they conceived that the poverty of the South was owing to the encroachments of the North on their constitutional rights. During the war, Carlyle was on the side of the Confederates; and the warm feeling with which Emerson regarded his friend palpably cooled. Meanwhile Carlyle's fiercest libels on the North were not contained in letters to Emerson. Some were published in organs of English opinion; some were uttered to Americans who called upon him at his Chelsea home; and there is a rumor that he condensed his opinion on the whole matter to the accomplished editor of these volumes in the following words, delivered in his broadest Scotch accent: "And as for your war, it seems to me simply this: that the South said to the nigger, 'God bless you, and be a slave'; and the North said, 'G—— d—— you, and be a freeman!'" After the war was closed, Emerson tells him, in 1870, "Every reading person in America holds you in exceptional regard. . . They have forgotten your scarlet sins before or during the war. I have long ceased to apologize for or explain your savage sayings about America or other republics, or publics, and am willing that anointed men bearing with them authentic charters shall be laws to themselves, as Plato willed." Indeed, it would seem that the American mind has a very feeble memory: a few years roll on, and benefactors and traducers are alike forgotten; and the animosities of the past slip out of the public heart and brain, intently engaged as both are in the Present and the Future.

As almost every letter of this unique correspondence suggests topics on which a reviewer is tempted to comment, it is difficult to stay the hand while writing about it. The letters of Carlyle represent him both at his best and his worst; the letters of Emerson throng with thoughts and experiences, and the style is as compact and brilliant as that of his published essays. These friends write to each other because they have something to say; and they say it with all the care and labor in composition which they would have exerted in works directly written for the public

eye. The perfect sincerity of each is preserved; every reflection and sentiment is genuine and true to character; yet the form of expression displays none of the diffuseness and slovenliness common to the familiar correspondence of even eminent men. Perhaps this brief notice of a book which is destined to last for a century or two, at least, cannot be more appropriately brought to an end than by referring to a single incident which brought the hearts of the two strong men into close and pathetic communion. Emerson lost "the hyacinthine boy," the subject of his "Threnody." He had, he writes to Carlyle, other children, "but a promise like that boy's I shall never see. How often I have pleased myself that one day I should send to you this Morning Star of mine, and stay at home so gladly behind such a representative. I dare not fathom the Invisible and Untold to inquire what relations to my Departed ones I yet sustain. Lydian, the poor Lydian, moans at home by day and night. You, too, will grieve for us, afar." This letter reached Carlyle when he was in Dumfries, called thither by the intelligence of the death of his wife's mother. "It is many years," he replies, "since I have stood so in close contact face to face with the reality of Earth, with its haggard ugliness, its divine beauty, its depths of Death and of Life. Yesterday, one of the stillest Sundays, I sat long by the side of the swift river Nith; sauntered among woods all vocal only with rooks and pairing birds. The hills are often white with snow-powder; black, brief spring-tempests rush fiercely down from them, and then again the sky looks forth with a pale, pure brightness,—like Eternity from behind Time. The sky, when one thinks of it, is always blue, pure, changeless azure; rains and tempests are only for the little dwellings where men abide. Let us think of this, too. Think of this, thou sorrowing mother! Thy boy has escaped many showers."

EDWIN P. WHIPPLE.

# A SECULAR VIEW OF MORAL TRAINING.

THE hold of dogmatic religion upon the minds of men appears to be growing feebler from day to day, and even Churchmen are found who call in question doctrines that have ever been held to be the essence of religious truth, as the inspiration of the Bible, the personal immortality of the soul, and the personality of the Divine Being. Are we from this to infer that religion itself is dying out? On the contrary, I maintain that its ethical element, its truly vitalizing force, remains intact, to become the starting-point for a new and higher religious development. To this end there is need, in the first place, that religion be grounded on a basis of intellectual truth; on righteousness, in contradistinction to the inverse proceeding which bases righteousness on religion.

It is the ethical element of religion which lends such sublime majesty to the language of the prophets. It is this which gives so sweet and fascinating a power to the loving words of Jesus. It is this which became a mighty lever in Luther's hands, wherewith he lifted the Mediæval Church off its foundations. Has this ethical element become less important in the modern age? Is there a less imperative need of developing it? Men follow the pursuits of science and art, as if these could replace the direct study of ethics, the direct tutoring of the will. Men labor for wealth and creature comforts as if ethical considerations did not exist. But does science, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, indeed suffice for the building up of our humanity? Does the cultus of the beautiful satisfy all our spiritual needs? Does the tremendous progress of the industrial arts tend to exalt, or does it not often lower the true standard of manhood among those who are engaged in the race for wealth? Is not righteousness as important as knowledge and beauty? Does not morality, apart from science and

art, apart from mythological religion, require to be cultivated for its own sake and by its own methods? Is there no need of a special ethical culture at the present day?

Look at the disorders and the miseries by which society is afflicted, and answer whether there is any such need or not. Walk up Fifth avenue, in New York, on some fine day, and see the palatial residences with which it is being adorned; residences which recalled to Mr. Spencer the example of the Italian republics, whose liberties perished in consequence of the enervating luxury of the citizens. Look at those residences: palace by the side of palace; and then consider that in a city where so much wealth is stored up, there is not, on the other hand, wealth enough to supply adequate hospital accommodations for the poor and sick; that many of the chronic sick—those who are most deserving of help, those whose condition is most pitiful and painful—are turned away from the doors of hospitals because there is not room for such as they, and are but too often left to die in garrets and cellars. Look at that city, the richest on the continent, whose private citizens have such lavish means to expend upon themselves, and yet it is left without an adequate public library, which much poorer and smaller cities are supplied with. Look at that city into which the whole land pours its treasure, where one citizen will build himself a house large enough to accommodate a dozen families; and on the other hand, down town, in the lower wards, a dozen families will be crowded into a house hardly capable of decently accommodating one. Consider these contrasts; consider the half-million of the population shut up in tenement houses without sufficient light, without pure air, without comfort, without the ordinary decencies that make life desirable, and what a story do these contrasts tell—what a need of moral culture do they reveal!

And is it only of New York that we are forced to complain? Are we to be told that our land is young—compelled to devote its energies to the building up of a great material civilization, and that hence flow the evils which we deplore? Turn, then, your eyes toward Europe, the seat of an ancient and highly developed civilization, and ask yourself how fares the moral culture of men there. Turn your eyes toward Europe, and see a whole continent one vast military camp, each nation expending its best energy and vitality in the endeavor to weaken

and impair the energy and vitality of its neighbors. See the spreading power of anarchists, the misery of the masses, their discontent, their ominous murmurs, their suppressed unrest; and, on the other hand, the stubborn arrogance of the powerful. Look, if you would have one glaring instance of the moral defects of our civilization, at the Jew-baiting that recently occurred in the very heart of Europe, in Germany the Greece of the modern world, in Berlin the Athens of that Greece, and consider of what a low and undeveloped morality, in the midst of art, science, and refinement, the fact that such scenes were possible is the shocking evidence. The civilizing influences of modern times have reached the intellect and the taste; they have by no means affected morality as deeply as is requisite. Indeed, morality has always until now been crowded out of the place of importance which is its due. Its influence, it has been supposed, would flow incidentally from other influences; it has never been singled out to be promoted in an independent manner. Hitherto attention has been chiefly given to the teaching of religious dogmas, and it has been believed that morality would follow, as a matter of course, from faith. To-day, when in the estimation of many, science and art have taken the place of religion, the same mistake is made of taking it for granted that from the pursuit of science and art morality will incidentally follow. But theology and science, even in connection with art, are alike inadequate to build up character and to perfect conduct.

And if you would estimate how much an independent movement is needed to establish clear ideas on the subject of morality, consider the uncertainty that exists in regard to the very fundamental topics of morality even at the present day. Take, for an instance, the institution of the family. How many persons are there who at all adequately realize the moral principle on which the sacredness of the family relation rests? There has been recently published a digest of the marriage and divorce laws of the States. What glaring discrepancies of opinion does this little book reveal. The question within what limits of consanguinity marriage should be permissible is all unsettled. In one State, at least up to 1878, marriage between an uncle and a niece was valid; in another State such marriage is void, and parties entering into it are liable to be punished in the penitentiary. In some States the husband is allowed a privilege of transgression which is not permitted to the wife, and the chief

offense against the marriage relation is differently defined in his case than in hers. In one State divorce is not granted at all, the sacramental idea of marriage prevailing; in another, it can be obtained with comparative facility. In one State imprisonment for life is a ground for divorce; in another State imprisonment for any term longer than a year is deemed sufficient. What evidence of looseness of moral ideas is given in these oscillations of legislation. What testimony to the chaotic notions that prevail have we in the fact that such contradictory laws are enacted within the radius of a few hundred miles; that a marriage which is perfectly valid in one State is punishable by imprisonment in another, and, as may be added, the children who are regarded as legitimate in one State are refused legitimation in another.

In regard to the institution of government, too, the same confusion prevails, as appears in the debate now proceeding concerning the proper limits of the functions of government; in the discussion of such questions as whether the State shall assume the control of railroads and telegraphs; and in how far it may interfere with the rights of corporations. What clashing and contradictory opinions are put forward in connection with these subjects; how little has the conception of the moral functions of human government yet penetrated into the popular consciousness.

And even in regard to the abstract principles of ethics, how little agreement is there, how little clearness. Here is one school of philosophy that says sympathy is the root of morality, and that seeks to found the whole scheme of duties upon mere impulse. There is another school that tells us utility is everything and would have us believe that all morality is nothing better than a refined egotism. There is a third that takes for its fundamental principle the theory of evolution, and asserts that the development of life is the aim of man, and that all conduct is moral which looks to that end. And these philosophers, as a rule, argue in their closets concerning the general theory of ethics, without taking greatly into account, as they ought to do, the special problems of ethics; without rising, as scientists do in every other department, from a detailed consideration of particular cases to a principle of explanation which shall cover those cases.

And thus we are prepared to state the second reason why an

independent movement for ethical culture is necessary, and why ethical societies are needed to incorporate such a movement. It is that we need to give men a clearer understanding of applied ethics, a better insight into the specific duties of life, a finer and more comprehensive scheme of moral practice. The Church is an institution intended to save souls for the hereafter. The ethical society is an institution for perfecting the moral life here. The emphasis laid by the Church on questions touching the hereafter has tended to the neglect of matters essential to the nobler ordering of our earthly life. Conversely, the prominence which must be given to simply moral problems by a society avowedly organized for the purpose of ethical culture, will tend eventually to secure greater attention to these problems and will promote their ultimate solution. The teachers or leaders of an ethical society will naturally address themselves to a discussion of such matters as the ethics of the relations of the sexes, the ethics of service, the ethics of the relations between capital and labor, the ethics of government, the ethics of business, the ethics of sickness, the ethics of bereavement. They will propose to themselves the consideration of the difficult and sometimes agonizing cases in which duties seem to conflict with one another, and will seek a light for themselves, as well as for others, in the obscure passages of inward experience. Thus, being compelled by their position as ethical teachers to ponder unceasingly the special cases into which moral obligation differentiates itself, they will, it is hoped, help in making clear the fundamental principle that covers these cases; they will aid in establishing a veritable science of morality as contradistinguished from the natural and historical sciences; and they will guide their fellow-men to act in their moral perplexities according to principle, instead of as now according to a vague empiricism, the impulse of the moment, or the drift of popular opinion.

But it is not enough that we should know what the right is. Men may know a thousand times over what is demanded of them, and yet lack the resolution to do it. And this leads me to speak of the third reason why an ethical movement and ethical societies are needed. They are needed to supply that stimulus and energy to the will which is so indispensable. This may be accomplished in two ways: First, by the mere fact of association. The mere fact of associating with others for the purposes of

moral reform lifts the individual out of his helplessness and equips him with a power which he would never possess when left to his own devices. The momentum of a mass in motion is greater than that of any atom which composes it, and sweeps each individual atom along with a degree of force which it could never acquire in its isolation. Secondly, the needful stimulus of the will is to be communicated by the contagion of the leader's example. The leader of an ethical society must, like every religious teacher, be earnest in his convictions, deeply imbued with the importance of his work, zealous in the cause of the world's betterment; a disciple of the ancient Isaiah, whose words were firebrands from a burning soul that kindled where they fell. The influence of such personalities cannot yet be spared. The human race is not yet so far advanced that we can dispense with the impulses that come from men of more than average intensity of moral energy.*

Fourthly. Ethical societies are needed for the sake of the children. It is time that men of advanced opinions should have the courage to teach their children what they themselves believe to be true. It is a great mistake that many parents who have left the churches make when they assert that the example of a pure home-life is sufficient for forming the character of children. There are many problems that oppress the minds of the young as they enter manhood and womanhood, for which they can find no solution in the example of their parents. There are many grave questions for whose settlement the kindly but vague advice of fathers and mothers affords no adequate guidance.

* There is a higher aspect of association, however, than that which is mentioned in the text. The very nature of an Ethical Religion prescribes the necessity of association. The form of a religion has ever been an attempted copy of its ideal. The Christian Church is an attempted copy of the Communion of Saints, under the lordship of Jesus in Heaven. A society for ethical religion will be an attempted copy of that community of reasonable beings absolutely obedient to the law of reason, which is — the moral ideal! They will attempt to be a community within the community, illustrating a higher righteousness among themselves, adopting laws and modes of social living for which the community at large is not yet ripe. They will thus attempt to build a refuge for the ideal in the midst of surrounding realism; to become forerunners in the present of a better time; to lead men by a pure example in the journey toward the perfect. The members of such a society will never be slack in their efforts for the reform of others, but the principle of complete and radical self-reform in and by association will be their distinctive watchword.

The young require, and should receive, direct moral instruction. They should be led to discuss in detail the specific duties of life, the self-regarding duties, and the duties which man owes to others. Their moral judgment should be sharpened, their sensibility to the finer distinctions of right and wrong should be quickened, and a casuistical treatment of ethics, such as the philosopher Kant has indicated, should be attempted for their benefit. They should be taught the history of religion, at least of the great ethical religions, so that they may learn to distinguish what is worthless from what is valuable in the Bible and other sacred scriptures, and may discriminate between what is temporary and what is lasting in the manifestations of the religious spirit in the past. They should finally be led to construct for themselves, when they are of sufficient age, a philosophy of life, based upon ethical considerations, such as may serve for their guidance, their support, and their solace in later years. All this should be attempted, but it has not as yet been attempted, except here and there in the rarest instances. And, if for no other reason ethical societies were proposed, it were a sufficient reason to form them for the sake of the children, for the sake of building up in them a better and nobler life, for the sake of giving them a fairer start on the road to virtue than their parents often had. I am well aware that there are those who think differently, that there are persons of the most radical convictions who yet send their children to orthodox Sunday-schools, saying, at least they will receive moral influence there. Yet, I would ask, do they receive nothing besides? Do they not also learn the old scheme of dogmas which the modern mind is struggling to shake off, the old cruel notions of a hell, the old pitiful motive of doing good for the sake of future reward or from fear of future punishment? To me it seems that the supreme duty which parents owe to their children is to help them to rise, if possible, higher in the scale of humanity than they themselves have risen. And the unpardonable sin is the sin against the purity and freedom of a child's development.

And lastly, the purpose of an ethical movement is that out of it may spring an ethical belief with regard to the world, a moral optimism, a belief that the universe is making for righteousness, that there is a good tendency in things. Such a belief we need. It is not enough that we wrong no one, and seek to help our fellow-mortals as much as is in our

power. When we look abroad over life, when we see how cruel fate often is; how Nature, in the shape of floods, conflagrations, and disease, strikes into our wisest plans, and wrests from us the most cherished objects of our affection; when we see in society around us vice often exalted to honor and virtue trodden under foot, then we need to rise in spirit above the present pain to a future good, above the present wrong to a future right, above the present incompleteness to a future perfection. Then we need to feel that at the deep central heart of the world there abides an eternal purpose, for whose accomplishment we, by our sufferings, are helping to pay the price. We need to feel that no effort is ever wasted, that no honest reaching out for the good is ever lost, that the great all is pressing forward toward a high, a glorious goal. But, how shall we obtain this conviction that there is a good tendency in things? In the old religion it is based on revelation; but how shall those who cannot accept revelation build it up in themselves? We cannot logically demonstrate it. It is in vain we go to science for help. All science seizes only a fragment of the whole. It can never hope to prove the certainty of the triumph of the good.

There is only one way to obtain this conviction. It is not possible to enter into the nature of the good by standing aloof from it — by merely speculating on it. Act the good, and then you will believe in it. Throw yourself into the stream of the world's good tendency, then you will feel the set of the current that comes from the fountain-head. Become familiar through practice with the nature of goodness, then you will be filled with trust in its excellent and triumphant power. For you cannot be constantly engaged in working the good without becoming assured that the forces of the universe are on your side, that all evil exists only to be bound and subjected and denied; for you cannot stand in the light without feeling the glory of the light; and the conviction that the world is moving toward great ends of progress will come swiftly and surely to those who are themselves engaged in the work of progress.

FELIX ADLER.

# COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE wide, and sometimes painful, contrasts in the social conditions of men must inevitably suggest a suspicion that the purposes of Nature have been thwarted. It should occasion no surprise that sufferers from social inequality sometimes demand a more equal share in the world's possessions, or even declare the right of the whole to confiscate the acquirements of individuals, and make a new distribution of the products of human industry.

On the contrary, we are bound by an instinctive impulse to respect the right of property in acquisitions made through personal effort; and we universally recognize the validity of a transfer of such right by gift or inheritance. This being the case, it is inevitable that possessions shall accumulate in certain hands, and thus a state of inequality result, at which the spirit of communism manifests discontent. As long as men are not born equal and identical, some will exercise greater sagacity than others in discerning the opportunities for self-advantage, greater industry and energy in seizing on them, greater economy and self-denial in retaining the results. Some will be industrious, others idle; some will be self-indulgent, others abstinent. Thus, with equal possessions, degrees of personal excellence will vary; and with equal personal excellence, personal possessions will vary, and with them opportunities for comfort, refinement, and luxury.

If the right of property is founded in Nature, there can be no communism in civilized society without violation of a natural law. The only natural basis of communism would be an absolute equality of natural gifts among men. This does not exist; and even greater inequalities are superinduced through indulgence in idleness and vice. The error in all the communistic

systems of the past is disregard of these indestructible constitutive factors of human society.

This deeply seated and indefeasible ground of social inequality as existing among us may be viewed as a result of the high differentiation of the Mediterranean race. Man's intelligence invents diversified modes of life which are never pursued by organic beings living under the simple instincts of Nature. The varied exercise and evolution of bodily and mental faculties, accompanying varied modes of life, result in divergences, which are transmitted and augmented. These relate to intelligence, virtue, courage, strength, health. The more complete the evolution of a race, therefore, the higher its differentiation, and the narrower the basis for any system of communism. With differentiation of powers comes necessarily a differentiation of industries. Simultaneously, the rarer gifts, by the law of supply and demand, receive the higher compensation. Thus the existing constitution of society is the result of no premeditated organization, but a natural and irrepressible growth, conditioned by the intellectual and moral factors in man, and directed by his free spontaneity. The farther that evolution advances whose fruits we witness in our high civilization, the farther we recede from the possibility of any just and natural communistic organization in society. The state of savagery, in which differentiative tendencies have made little progress, approaches to a righteous and rational basis for communism. A tribe of native Ashantees or Australians dwells inevitably in a social condition more or less approaching communism. In mental and physical characteristics, different individuals among them resemble each other much like the individuals in a communistic colony of ants or flock of blackbirds. Every attempt, in civilized society, to establish a reign of communism, or to approximate such a reign, is an attempt to stifle the growth of civilization, and force society back to the condition found among herding Africans or gregarious wolves.

It is proposed to show that the communistic spirit is gaining a firm foot-hold in the United States, and that it threatens to introduce chaos into the social fabric. This spirit, which so many real evils and so many real wrongs conspire to generate and foster, has sometimes sought expression and embodiment in America, as in other countries and other times, in thoughtfully considered schemes which have been put in operation by voluntary

and peaceful methods. Such are the communities of the United Brethren, Shakers, Fourierites, New Harmony Brethren, and Oneida Perfectionists. But these peaceful and systematized organizations are almost lost in the social mass which continues to evolve under natural laws. They utter no threats against the peace of society, and the monotonous mediocrity which has sustained them has not been able to arouse into action any natural law capable of preserving them from threatened or accomplished extinction. It is the unorganized and unlocalized spirit of communism among us which forebodes calamity to our institutions.

The wide-spread sentiment of communism in America is as yet without system, without unity. A crude and irrational sort of organization has at times crystallized around prominent central questions, as we shall see; but for the present it reveals itself chiefly as a sullen jealousy of the prosperous; a malignant hatred of monopolies and large industrial corporations; an obstinate blindness to the mutuality of the interests of capital and labor; a determination to seek the nearest material advantage by the most direct means, heedless of ulterior losses; a method of seeking its crude and often destructive ends by brute numerical majorities at the polls, or even by acts of mob violence and law-breaking; a madness which would destroy everything which symbolizes social inequality among men. Capital has no rights which it feels bound to respect, and it looks on the man of means as the Turk regards the infidel—one with whom plighted faith is void. This is the spirit of American communism in its essential nature. Happily, the larger proportion of our industrial classes would earnestly repudiate communism presented distinctly in such a guise; but, unfortunately, there exists a small and noisy body of discontented idlers, who would gladly enforce a new distribution of goods, even if it swept the last traces of civilization from the land; and a little acquaintance with the classes who pay no direct taxes reveals a leaven of radical communism rapidly spreading. This is propagated by frequent fresh importations of foreign—largely German—representatives of the International Society, who insult our hospitality by proclaiming counsels too atrocious to be tolerated in a monarchy, and all the more atrocious in a land so free that a majority may soon decide to adopt and enforce them. Can American authority remain unmoved and hear these tramping incendiaries call upon

their agents to apply the torch to the edifice of American society, and cut the throats of all who resist?

The evidences of the spread of this spirit have forced themselves upon the attention of every observer, though few have fully realized the threatening significance of the facts. We notice, for instance, a destructive hostility toward moneyed corporations. For a dozen years, the national banks have been an object of constant denunciation, though our banking system has secured us a currency unsurpassed in convenience, stability, and safety, and the profits of banking have not been so excessive as to offer larger temptations to capital than are afforded by the generality of investments. Should indignation be directed toward a certain class of money-lenders, mortgagees and buyers of tax-titles, a case possessing a good deal of strength might be presented; but it is specifically the corporation, and the Government's recognition, which arouse the unreasoning jealousy of a class but lightly burdened by any direct taxation. Reasoning takes no hold on them. Bony-scaled as the alligator-gar, they are vulnerable to no argument. They do not know that banks are indispensable in our business economy, and that the American system has received the support of the best students of commercial and monetary science. The companion heresy is fiatism in the circulating medium. For the devotee of this delusion the logic of finance has no meaning. For him the experience of the world has no lessons. Demonstrate the danger, the impracticability of an excessive paper circulation, either on the basis of reason or public experience, and he stands unmoved. As well demonstrate the *Binomial Theorem* to a mule. Yet such lunatics cast ballots, and labor by every means to secure a numerical majority and force their hare-brained, thrice-exploded projects on the intelligence and the business interests of the nation. The underlying motive is communistic. The method of giving it effect by the uplifted cudgel of a majority is communistic. Hostility to banks is prompted largely by jealousy of a class who live on the interest of their money. Fiatism is the substitute for banks and an expedient for emptying the nation's coffers in debt-paying, and thus diminishing incidental taxation of individuals for the national debt. And yet, with characteristic want of logic, most of the same deluded herd are glad to see millions of bastard silver dollars lie absolutely useless in the nation's vaults.



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Railroad corporations, though strictly industrial in their functions, receive a large share of the prejudice against income-earning by accumulated means. Undoubtedly these, like many other powerful corporations, have numerous sins to answer for; but our communistic fellow-citizens, most of whom have brought to America only the one ruling idea that all men are equal here, seem unable to understand that accumulated capital cannot afford to conduct its operations at a loss, nor at a much less profit than is earned by capital in general. They demand always a more exorbitant compensation, simply because they would like to have it, not because the corporation can afford to pay it. They grasp for all which it seems possible to gain. They complain of inability to make living wages, but generally have money to spare for brutalizing whisky and filthy tobacco. The operators of our coal-mines have a like communistic spirit to contend with, though there is a rumor current that they have a way of converting strikes into business strokes. Though receiving twice the wages of a school-teacher, whose occupation demands years of preparation, the miner, when he finds the mine-owner in a pinch, will give the screw of extortion another turn, and, unless the demand is granted, will sullenly throw down his pick. He hopes to paralyze business and coerce the owner to pay allowances which the best business judgment does not approve. The same things must be said of our iron and steel workers, as well as the laborers in most other large branches of industry. To some extent, and in particular cases, these demands may be the just cry of oppressed labor for relief; but too generally they reveal a mere purpose to plunder the rich under the pretense that they control more than their share of goods, and that whatever can be seized goes so far toward a fairer adjustment of possessions. That no cool, unselfish, and rational conviction underlies these ever-growing demands of labor is manifest from their generally unreasonable and inadmissible character, and the calamitous consequences which often fall on those who make them, as well as on the interests of capital.

This communistic discontent finds its favorite expedient in "strikes." By forcing on capital the alternative of two evils, it often compels capital to yield to its demand. Then capital seeks to reimburse itself by higher taxes on the consumer. So the quiet citizen indirectly advances the money which the striker uses, not always in better support of his family, but in enlarged

allowances of whisky and idleness. These statements are not sweepingly made, but in sorrow that there exists so much occasion for them. Having used the weapon of financial coercion, it seems to the striker an allowable step further to seek his ends by physical violence. By bludgeon force he beats back the better-reasoning laborer who deems it wiser to work for fair wages than to risk all in a violent strike for exorbitant wages. He is not content to leave his fellow-laborer to act freely on his own judgment, but, having an aim of his own and a method of his own, he forces all to unite in promoting it, no matter whether they favor it or abhor it. One step farther carries him to incendiarism. If his aim is just, if property has no rights, if violence is a good argument,—then all the violence necessary to gain his end is the best argument. What this finality may reveal this country learned in July, 1877. Something of the value of "citizens" who maliciously destroy property has been learned by those communities whose municipal taxes have been swollen to make good the destruction wrought by those strikes. Some opportunity for reflection has been afforded to that fraction of the strikers whose humble homes have been taxed to aid in paying for the wanton mischief.

The American communistic spirit has attempted crude organizations in "trade-unions" and "grangerism"; and the International Society has gained some foothold among us. The organization of labor for the purpose of enhancing its efficiency, and thence its value, would be an enterprise in the direct interest of the laborer. It would deserve commendation and aid. Organization for intellectual and social improvement, or for increasing the happiness of families, would be entirely praiseworthy, and directly promotive of the only true ends of labor. Probably the participants in the organizations which exist flatter themselves that these are the ends which they propose. It is not necessary to deny that organizations exist which wisely propose and wisely work for these ends. These it would be an unfeeling act to include in the general denunciation. They are not communistic. But any one who has examined the rules of the trade-unions has at once discovered that they are largely studies how to get the advantage of employers. They are not schemes to improve the value of labor, but to depreciate it. Every device is employed to get as much as possible from the employer, and return as little as possible. The rules prescribe not only the

number of hours which shall constitute a day's work, but also forbid working faster than a prescribed rate. A hod-man is allowed to carry only a certain number of bricks; and, to make the job as long and costly as possible, the use of wheelbarrows is sometimes prohibited. Every effort on the part of the laborer to demonstrate his superior strength, dexterity, or intelligence, is forbidden. Dead uniformity must run through the herd. The employment of women has been bitterly opposed, both because it would tend to increase the supply of labor, and because women are more susceptible to flattery and the incentive of ambition to excel. For similar reasons the rules forbid apprenticeship, and prohibit the trade-unionist from working in an establishment which employs apprentices. Every one who goes through the motions must receive equal pay. No discriminations of excellence, in work of the same grade, are recognized. If an employer insist on exercising his own judgment in these matters, a strike ensues; the employer is "boycotted." As to labor in penal institutions, this is stoutly denounced, and the political candidate has to be catechised on this point. Reason pronounces it wise public economy to compel the criminal to repay the expense which he causes the State; but communism says this diminishes the demand for free labor. Capital would have to pay the chief cost of the criminal's idle maintenance, and therefore the criminal should be kept in idleness.

Grangerism is mild trade-unionism on the farm. It has its fancied wrongs to right, and its crude methods for righting them. Its leading effort has been, through gross weight of numbers, to force legislation in its own interests. It seeks to impose burdens on railroads, banks, and manufacturing corporations. It establishes so-called agricultural colleges, conceiving such institutions to be simply high schools for the education of farmers' boys as a class. It guards with jealous eye all expenditures for higher learning, for science, art, and public enterprises. Fear of its numerical strength overawes public officers, and whips into subserviency the aggregate wisdom of our legislatures. It has the hue of communism. It is unwilling to leave business to spontaneous adjustment through the operation of its own laws. It demands more than the laws of nature bring it. It frames its demands under the promptings of greed, and not on the basis of economical science. It is deaf to the wisdom of philosophers and statesmen, and enforces its will by the accident of

a majority. This is the spirit of American communism. These assuredly are not the controlling motives of most of our farmers; but they are the motives which prompt the granger spirit in the class.

American communism may be traced in other ramifications. There are still milder and less organic symptoms of a leveling tendency. As it seeks for uniformity of wages in the ranks of a trade, so it seeks uniformity through the range of trades and professions. It cannot discern the ground of discriminations in wages which shall bear the same ratio as differences between skilled and unskilled labor. Its own standard of measure for the value of service is a certain number of hours' work. It cannot perceive that a day's work which required a day for preparation is worth, even on the basis of time spent, twice as much as a day's work not demanding such preparation. It revolts at the proposition that a year's service accomplished through the preparation of ten laborious and unpaid years should receive tenfold the compensation of a year's work requiring no preparation preventing the worker from earning regular pay during the ten previous years. It is horrified at the further suggestion that the trained worker has sought his training, generally, because he possessed gifts which are not ordinary, and for this reason should expect, under the laws of nature, still further consideration. It loses all patience when told, still again, that time is not a measure of the value of brain-work, but that in equal time disciplined brain earns many fold more than muscle. There are ten thousand pairs of hands which can swing an ax or drive a team to one well-trained and outfitted brain worthy to frame laws for a state, or assume an active place in the ranks of science; but any claims resting on this ground communism votes down. There is no shadow of equity, not a ghost of reasonableness, in the relative compensations of professional and unprofessional service in America. A commercial traveler, with a good front and a minimum of intellectual culture, with only certain qualities and prices and tricks of trade well learned by rote, receives a larger income than the judge on the bench. The circuit judges in Michigan received, under the constitution, salaries less than that commanded by the head clerk of a first-class soap-maker. Three separate times the question was proposed to the voters of the State: "Shall the circuit judges receive such salaries as will repay the services of suitable judicial talent?" Twice the voters

replied emphatically, "No." I refer here, of course, to professional compensation as determined by the popular verdict. Great private corporations, controlled by adequate knowledge, testify daily to their estimate of skilled service. But when a popular verdict fixes professional salaries, it is done on the principle of a time-gauge. Our State universities are governed by regents who, as political aspirants, for the greater part, are in a position to study respectfully the views of those from whom preferment must come. Any veteran professor in one of these institutions may see graduate after graduate departing to earn in some business calling a salary which beggars the slender stipends of those who sharpened his wits. And we have blatant demagogues, earning in business annually the income of ten professors, who blazon periodically the announcement that the hard-working yeomanry are getting jealous of the fat salaries paid in the State University. These friends of the people have, of course, large favors to ask. This is the unrighteous leveling tendency which is the tap-root of communism. Every salaried professional man in America whose stipend is not beyond reach of the awing influence of the popular majority, is a victim of incipient communism.

The country, as is painfully visible, is falling under the control of incompetency. At least, the exceptional gifts in science, invention, and technology, which have achieved for our nation so many shining excellences, find exercise only in isolated and conspicuous situations. The country at large is pervaded by a reign of mediocrity which is as greedy as it is stolid and inept. In the professions, the equal rights principle installs the pretender with the same cheefulness as the qualified claimant; and "brass" finds itself publicly invited to a race with culture and skill. In the trades, where the system of apprenticeship has been pronounced dangerous to the interests of labor, the workman gets little technical education before he begins his crude experiments on the property of some employer. With no method of guaranteeing to the employer the competency of the boss who assumes his job, the common experience is waste, unskillfulness, disappointment, and disgust. In the founding, location, and management of schools and colleges, the rough hand of incompetency is very generally thrust foremost to fix and mold to a destiny as ill-advised as irrevocable. In public life, the man who holds the largest and longest caucus-levees and practices

the sharpest managerial tactics generally succeeds in holding the scepter of power. Alas, what qualifications for statesmanship are these!

The leveling tendency at work among us might be traced, also, in a lack of popular appreciation and encouragement of high scientific culture, original investigation, advanced education, and all public enterprises based on the applications of science. True, great successes are obtained in America in nearly all the avenues of intellectual effort. True, we have some munificent endowments for science and learning. But these are mostly private, not public benefactions. The work done by the state, under governments not controlled by the popular will, is, with us, left undone until the want cries aloud, and individual munificence for the country's sake responds. I have heard it said: "This is the American system, and is superior to the Old World system" of state endowments. It is the American system, emphatically, but it is a national disgrace to leave public duties neglected till private wealth, for shame of its country, takes them up. It is instructive to note the hundreds of thousands appropriated annually by our State legislatures for the maintenance of prisons for the criminal classes, asylums for the insane, and retreats and schools for the deaf, dumb, blind, and idiotic, and then compare with these sums the lean and thin munificence doled out for universities and scientific enterprises. It would seem as if the public guardians were deeply interested in the classes incapable of rendering useful service to the state, and felt comparatively indifferent toward those who, in a few years, will be in positions of high public responsibility, with need of all the equipment which public care can provide. While public philanthropies are the high duty of a civilized state, this glaring discrimination against brains is prompted by the motive which panders, perhaps unconsciously, as in our enormous military pensions, to the claims of a class specially commended by nothing but their immense voting ability. All honor to those legislatures which have shown a better appreciation of the public needs that lie above the horizon of communistic mediocrity.

It will not be necessary, in connection with this condensed discussion, to point out the relation of the communistic spirit to the visible decay of country schools and the steady progress of illiteracy; or to the disappearance of the feeling of rever-

ence toward superiors and toward sacred things, until we have reached the point where the writer or speaker who inflicts the greatest shock on conventional sentiments becomes the public favorite, and religious beliefs which have been sanctioned and consolidated by the consensus of all nations and all ages, have become the playthings of clowns. Nor will it be necessary to cite further evidences of the pervasive working of that deadly spirit which hates excellence, which tramples on superiority, which burns what it cannot appropriate; which studies, and works, and fights to level all the bright saliences of human civilization to the dead materialistic plane of a common herd.

Why these marked and ominous tendencies to communism in America, where the people determine for themselves the ends which shall be sought? Because the basal concept of American institutions is communistic; and because the distribution of political power as determined by that concept is communistic. Because America is governed by the average sentiment of the mass, and not by the best sentiment. Because the ends and means of civilization are above the comprehension of those who are allowed to determine American destiny. Because communism theoretically is only the voluntary equalization of all, and becomes practically the enforced equalization of all. But the germs of communism, it may be said, have been nursed among the monarchies of Europe, and violent communistic movements have again and again provoked into action the strong military arm. Yet, it must be replied that, before the Declaration of American Independence, communism was nearly unknown in Europe, save in the ideal states of Plato, Sir Thomas More, Campanella, and a few other imitators of Plato. It was the enunciation in the American "Declaration" of the new and paradoxical principle of equal rights in government, which kindled the fires of discontent across the Atlantic. The anarchy of the French Revolution of 1790, and the contemporary disturbances now felt all over Europe in French communism, German socialism, Irish agrarianism and Russian nihilism, as well as the more peaceful phenomena of Saint-Simonism, Fourierism, Robert-Owenism, and the like—these all must be regarded as the reaction of the New World upon the Old.

The indications thus pointed out cannot be passed by as momentary phenomena in a social life of intense and peculiar activity. They are outgrowths from the deep roots of the social

fabric. They will not disappear nor grow less. They cannot be remedied by a simple repressive action at the surface. No legislation can reach the source of these evils. There must be constitutional reconstruction. The crisis may be postponed, but it cannot be averted. While the nature of the average man remains what it is, the leveling, barbarizing and anarchic tendency will continue. With the progress of events such as a half-century has witnessed, a low order of political sagacity ought to be able to divine the future.

It is not pretended that all these movements of the masses are without provocation or partial justification. It is held that all government exists by consent of the governed, and that all political rights are vested in the people. It is admitted that monarchs are often ambitious and extortionate, and that wealth inclines to arrogance, to greed, and oppression of the poor. My present thesis is only this: That communism is growing up in America; that our fundamental political axiom generates and fosters it; and that the communistic tendency is, and must naturally be, progressive, until probably some great changes are made in the basis of political power.

It does not, for these reasons, cease to be the duty of American citizens to remove, as far as practicable, all real grounds for communistic aspirations, and, by the dissemination of education, to enlighten the masses on the mutual functions of capital and labor, on that coöperation which works out mutual advantage, and on the futility and suicidal consequences of attempting by violence to crush the natural laws of industry into artificial modes of action. In this living and momentous question of peace and coöperation between capital and labor, it is imperatively demanded of statesmanship to inquire whether there are not some equitable and needed limitations to be imposed on the acquisition and use of wealth. The accumulation of personal wealth proceeds in geometrical ratio. Individuals, under favoring circumstances, acquire means vastly beyond their power of use or enjoyment. The possession of vast estates confers vast means of influence, both political and social. It may be used wisely and beneficently; it may be made the means of extortion and iniquity. A railroad president or silver-miner controlling fifty or one hundred millions in his own right is a king. He wields the influence of a crowned head, over subjects enough to constitute a state. The great republic of America holds within itself several king-

doms—not constitutional monarchies, but absolute autocracies. Is this best? Is this necessary? Does the fiction of free government ameliorate the tyranny which its very freedom tolerates? May not the unlimited accumulation of wealth be one of those personal liberties which the state finds it necessary to restrain? If the forcible seizure of the common domain and the common goods is at variance with the public weal, how much less so are the acquisition and cumulation of the common goods through the weight and momentum of vast wealth? Not unlikely, when such questions shall have been wisely considered and decided, many of the provocatives to communism will have disappeared.

Simultaneously, it may be assumed, the number of small holdings will be greatly increased. Wise economists well understand the quieting influence of a small stake in the material prosperity of the country. The spirit of communism will be visibly soothed by an arrest of development in plethoric fortunes, and a determination of some of the nutritive currents toward the emaciated and anæmic members of the body politic. In these suggestions, it seems to me, lie the most practicable means, unless a re-adjustment of the basis of political power is practicable, for alleviating the evils of American communism.

ALEXANDER WINCHELL.

# AFFINITIES OF BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

It has long been known that many analogies exist between Buddhism and Christianity. The ceremonies, ritual and rites of the Buddhists strikingly resemble those of the Roman Catholic Church. The Buddhist priests are monks. They take the same three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, which are binding on those of the Roman Church. They are mendicants, like the mendicant orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic. They are tonsured; use strings of beads, like the rosary, with which to count their prayers; have incense and candles in their worship; use fasts, processions, litanies, and holy water. They have something akin to the adoration of saints; repeat prayers in an unknown tongue; have a chanted psalmody with a double choir; and suspend the censer from five chains. In China, some Buddhists worship the image of a virgin, called the Queen of Heaven, having an infant in her arms, and holding a cross. In Thibet the Grand Lamas wear a miter, dalmatica, and cope, and pronounce a benediction on the laity by extending the right hand over their heads. The Dalai-Lama resembles the Pope, and is regarded as the head of the Church. The worship of relics is very ancient among the Buddhists, and so are pilgrimages to sacred places.

Besides these resemblances in outward ceremonies, more important ones appear in the inner life and history of the two religions. Both belong to those systems which derive their character from a human founder, and not from a national tendency; to the class which contains the religions of Moses, Zoroaster, Confucius, and Mohammed, and not to that in which the Brahmanical, Egyptian, Scandinavian, Greek and Roman religions are found. Both Buddhism and Christianity are catholic, and not ethnic; that is, not confined to a single race or nation, but, by their missionary spirit, passing beyond these

boundaries, and making converts among many races. Christianity began among the Jews as a Semitic religion, but, being rejected by the Jewish nation, established itself among the Aryan races of Europe. In the same way Buddhism, beginning among an Aryan people—the Hindus—was expelled from Hindostan, and established itself among the Mongol races of Eastern Asia. Besides its resemblances to the Roman Catholic side of Christendom, Buddhism has still closer analogies with the Protestant Church. Like Protestantism, it is a reform, which rejects a hierarchal system and does away with a priestly caste. Like Protestantism, it has emphasized the purely humane side of life, and is a religion of humanity rather than of piety. Both the Christian and Buddhist Churches teach a divine incarnation, and they worship a God-man.

Are these remarkable analogies only casual resemblances, or are they real affinities? By affinity, we here mean genetic relationship. Are Buddhism and Christianity related as mother and child, one being derived from the other; or are they related by both being derived from some common ancestor? Is either derived from the other, as Christianity from Judaism, or Protestantism from the Papal Church? That there can be no such affinity as this, seems evident from history. History shows no trace of the contact which would be required for such influence. If Christianity had taken its customs from Buddhism, or Buddhism from Christianity, there must have been ample historic evidence of the fact. But, instead of this, history shows that each has grown up by its own natural development, and has unfolded its qualities separately and alone. The law of evolution also teaches that such great systems do not come from imitation, but as growths from a primal germ.

Nor does history give the least evidence of a common ancestry from which both took their common traits. We know that Buddhism was derived from Brahmanism, and that Christianity was derived from Judaism. Now, Judaism and Brahmanism have few analogies; they could not, therefore, have transmitted to their offspring what they did not themselves possess. Brahmanism came from an Aryan stock, in Central Asia; Judaism from a Semitic stem, thousands of miles to the west. If Buddhism and Christianity came from a common source, that source must have antedated both the Mosaic and Brahmanical systems. Even then it would be a case of atavism in which the

original type disappeared in the children to reappear in the later descendants.

Are, then, these striking resemblances, and others which are still to be mentioned, only accidental analogies? This does not necessarily follow; for there is a third alternative. They may be what are called in science homologies; that is, the same law working out similar results under the same conditions, though under different circumstances. The whale lives under different circumstances from other mammalia; but, being a mammal, he has a like osseous structure. What seems to be a fin, being dissected, turns out to be an arm, with hand and fingers. There are like homologies in history. Take the instance of the English and French revolutions. In each case the legitimate king was tried, condemned, and executed. A republic followed. The republic gave way before a strong-handed usurper. Then the original race of kings was restored; but, having learned nothing and forgotten nothing, they were displaced a second time, and a constitutional monarch placed on the throne, who, though not the legitimate king, still belonged to the same race. Here the same laws of human nature have worked out similar results; for no one would suggest that France had copied its revolutions from England. And, in religion, human nature reproduces similar customs and ceremonies under like conditions. When, for instance, you have a mechanical system of prayer, in which the number of prayers is of chief importance, there must be some way of counting them, and so the rosary has been invented independently in different religions. We have no room to point out how this law has worked in other instances; but it is enough to refer to the principle.

Besides these resemblances between Buddhism and Christianity, there are also some equally remarkable differences, which should be noticed.

The first of these is the striking fact that Buddhism has been unable to recognize the existence of the Infinite Being. It has been called atheism by the majority of the best authorities. Even Arthur Lillie, who defends this system from the charge of agnosticism, says: * "An agnostic school of Buddhism without doubt exists. It professes plain atheism, and holds that every mortal, when he escapes from re-births, and the causation of Karma by the awakenment of the Bodhi or gnosis, will be anni-

* "Buddha and Early Buddhism." Trübner & Co., 1881.

hilated. This Buddhism, by Eugène Burnouf, Saint-Hilaire, Max Müller, Csoma de Körös, and, I believe, almost every writer of note, is pronounced the original Buddhism—the Buddhism of the South." Almost every writer of note, therefore, who has studied Buddhism in the Pali, Singhalese, Chinese, and other languages, and has had direct access to its original sources, has pronounced it a system of atheism. But this opinion is opposed to the fact that Buddhists have everywhere worshiped unseen and superhuman powers, erected magnificent temples, maintained an elaborate ritual, and adored Buddha as the supreme ruler of the worlds. How shall we explain this paradox? All depends on the definition we give to the word "atheism." If a system is atheistic which sees only the temporal, and not the eternal; which knows no God as the author, creator, and ruler of Nature; which ascribes the origin of the universe to natural causes, to which only the finite is knowable, and the infinite unknowable—then Buddhism is atheism. But, in that case, much of the polytheism of the world must be regarded as atheism; for polytheism has largely worshiped finite gods. The whole race of Olympian deities were finite beings. Above them ruled the everlasting necessity of things. But who calls the Greek worshipers atheists? The Buddha, to most Buddhists, is a finite being, one who has passed through numerous births, has reached Nirvana, and will one day be superseded by another Buddha. Yet, for the time, he is the Supreme Being, Ruler of all the Worlds. He is the object of worship, and really divine, if in a subordinate sense.

I would not, therefore, call this religion atheism. No religion which worships superhuman powers can justly be called atheistic on account of its meager metaphysics. How many Christians there are who do not fully realize the infinite and eternal nature of the Deity! To many he is no more than the Buddha is to his worshipers—a supreme being, a mighty ruler, governing all things by his will. How few see God everywhere in nature, as Jesus saw him, letting his sun shine on the evil and good, and sending his rain on the just and unjust. How few see him in all of life, so that not a sparrow dies, or a single hair of the head falls, without the Father. Most Christians only recognize the Deity as occasionally interfering by special providences, particular judgments, and the like.

But in Christianity this ignorance of the eternal nature of God is the exception, while in Buddhism it is the rule. In the reaction against Brahmanism, the Brahmanic faith in the infinite was wholly lost. In the fully developed system of the ancient Hindoo religion the infinite overpowered the finite, the temporal world was regarded as an illusion, and only the eternal was real. The reaction from this extreme was so complete as to carry the Buddhists to the exact opposite. If to the Brahman all the finite visible world was only *maya*—illusion, to the Buddhists all the infinite unseen world was unknowable, and practically nothing.

Perhaps the most original feature of Christianity is the fact that it has combined in a living synthesis that which in other systems was divided. Jesus regarded love to God and love to man as identical,—positing a harmonious whole of time and eternity, piety and humanity, faith and works,—and thus laid the foundation of a larger system than either Brahmanism or Buddhism. He did not invent piety, nor discover humanity. Long before he came the Brahmanic literature had sounded the deepest depths of spiritual life, and the Buddhist missionaries had preached universal benevolence to mankind. But the angelic hymn which foretold the new religion as bringing at once "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, goodwill to men," indicated the essence of the faith which was at the same time a heavenly love and an earthly blessing. This difference of result in the two systems came probably from the different methods of their authors. With Jesus life was the source of knowledge; the life was the light of men. With the Buddha, reflection, meditation, thought was the source of knowledge. In this, however, he included intuition no less than reflection. Sakya-muni understood perfectly that a mere intellectual judgment possessed little motive power; therefore he was not satisfied till he had obtained an intuitive perception of truth. That alone gave at once rest and power. But as the pure intellect, even in its highest act, is unable to grasp the infinite, the Buddha was an agnostic on this side of his creed by the very success of his method. Who, by searching, can find out God? The infinite can only be known by the process of living experience. This was the method of Jesus, and has been that of his religion. For what is faith but that receptive state of mind which

waits on the Lord to receive the illumination which it cannot create by its own processes? However this may be, it is probable that the fatal defect in Buddhism which has neutralized its generous philanthropy and its noble humanities has been the absence of the inspiration which comes from the belief in an eternal world. Man is too great to be satisfied with time alone, or eternity alone; he needs to live from and for both. Hence, Buddhism is an arrested religion, while Christianity is progressive. Christianity has shown the capacity of outgrowing its own defects and correcting its own mistakes. For example, it has largely outgrown its habit of persecuting infidels and heretics. No one is now put to death for heresy. It has also passed out of the stage in which religion was considered to consist in leaving the world and entering a monastery. The anchorites of the early centuries are no longer to be found in Christendom. Even in Catholic countries the purpose of monastic life is no longer to save the soul by ascetic tortures, but to attain some practical end. The Protestant Reformation, which broke the yoke of priestly power and set free the mind of Europe, was a movement originating in Christianity itself, like other developments of a similar kind. No such signs of progress exist in the system of Buddhism. It has lost the missionary ardor of its early years; it has ceased from creating a vast literature such as grew up in its younger days; it no longer produces any wonders of architecture. It even lags behind the active life of the countries where it has its greatest power.

It is a curious analogy between the two systems that, while neither the Christ nor the Buddha practiced or taught asceticism, their followers soon made the essence of religion to consist in some form of monastic life. Both Jesus and Sakya-muni went about doing good. Both sent their followers into the world to preach a gospel. Jesus, after thirty years of a retired life, came among men "eating and drinking," and associating with "publicans and sinners." Sakya-muni, after spending some years as an anchorite, deliberately renounced that mode of religion as unsatisfactory, and associated with all men, as Jesus afterward did. Within a few centuries after their death, their followers relapsed into ascetic and monastic practices; but with this difference, that while in Christendom there have always been both a regular and a secular clergy, in the Buddhist countries the whole priesthood live in monasteries. They have no parish

priests, unless as an exception. While in Christian countries the clergy has become more and more a practical body, in sympathy with the common life, in Buddhist lands they live apart and exercise little influence on the civil condition of the people.

Nor must we pass by the important fact that the word Christendom is synonymous with a progressive civilization, while Buddhism is everywhere connected with one which is arrested and stationary. The boundaries of the Christian religion are exactly coëxtensive with the advance of science, art, literature; and with the continued accumulation of knowledge, power, wealth, and the comforts of human life. According to Kuenen,* one of the most recent students of these questions, this difference is due to the principle of hope which exists in Christianity, but is absent in Buddhism. The one has always believed in a kingdom of God here and a blessed Immortality hereafter. Buddhism has not this hope; and this, says Kuenen, "is a blank which nothing can fill." So large a thinker as Albert Réville has expressed his belief that even the intolerance of Christianity indicated a passionate love of truth which has created modern science. He says that, "if Europe had not passed through those ages of intolerance, it is doubtful whether the science of our day would have ever arrived."† It is only within the boundaries of nations professing the Christian faith that we must go to-day to learn the latest discoveries in science, the best works of art, the most flourishing literature. Only within the same circle of Christian states is there a government by law, and not by will. Only within these boundaries have the rights of the individual been secured, while the power of the state has been increased. Government by law, joined with personal freedom, is only to be found where the faith exists which teaches that God not only supports the universal order of natural things, but is also the friend of the individual soul; and in just that circle of states in which the doctrine is taught that there is no individual soul for God to love and no Divine presence in the order of nature, human life has subsided into apathy, progress has ceased, and it has been found impossible to construct national unity. Saint-Hilaire affirms‡ that "in politics and legislation the dogma of

* Hibbert Lectures, 1882, page 291.

† A. Réville: "Prolégomènes de l'histoire des religions."

‡ "Le Bouddha et sa religion. Par J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Paris." Page 149.

Buddhism has remained inferior even to that of Brahmanism," and "has been able to do nothing to constitute states or to govern them by equitable rules." These Buddhist nations are really six: Siam, Burmah, Nepaul, Thibet, Tartary, and Ceylon. The activity and social progress in China and Japan are no exceptions to this rule; for in neither country has Buddhism any appreciable influence on the character of the people.

To those who deny that the theology of a people influences its character, it may be instructive to see how exactly the good and evil influences of Buddhism correspond to the positive and negative traits of its doctrine. Its merits, says Saint-Hilaire, are its practical character, its abnegation of vulgar gratifications, its benevolence, mildness, sentiment of human equality, austerity of manners, dislike of falsehood, and respect for the family. Its defects are want of social power, egotistical aims, ignorance of the ideal good, of the sense of human right and human freedom, skepticism, incurable despair, contempt of life. All its human qualities correspond to its doctrinal teaching from the beginning. It has always taught benevolence, patience, self-denial, charity, and toleration. Its defects arise inevitably from its negative aim—to get rid of sorrow and evil by sinking into apathy, instead of seeking for the triumph of good and the coming of a reign of God here on the earth.

As regards the Buddha himself, modern students differ widely. Some, of course, deny his very existence, and reduce him to a solar myth. M. Emile Senart, as quoted by Oldenberg,* following the Lalita Vistara as his authority, makes of him a solar hero, born of the morning cloud, contending by the power of light with the demons of darkness, rising in triumph to the zenith of heavenly glory, then passing into the night of Nirvana and disappearing from the scene.

The difficulty about this solar myth theory is that it proves too much; it is too powerful a solvent; it would dissolve all history. How easy it would be, in a few centuries, to turn General Washington and the American Revolution into a solar myth! Great Britain, a region of clouds and rain, represents the Kingdom of Darkness; America, with more sunshine, is the Day. Great Britain, as Darkness, wishes to devour the Young Day, or dawn of light, which America is about to diffuse over the earth. But Washington, the solar hero, arrives. He is from Virginia, that is, born of a virgin. He was born in Feb-

* Senart: "Essai sur la légende du Buddha." Paris, 1875.

ruary, in the sign of Aquarius and the Fishes,—plainly referring to the birth of the sun from the ocean. As the sun surveys the earth, so Washington was said to be a surveyor of many regions. The story of the fruitless attempts of the Indians to shoot him at Braddock's defeat is evidently legendary; and, in fact, this battle itself must be a myth, for how can we suppose two English and French armies to have crossed the Atlantic, and then gone into a wilderness west of the mountains, to fight a battle? So easy is it to turn history into a solar myth.

The character of Sakya-muni must be learned from his religion and from authentic tradition. In many respects his character and influence resembled that of Jesus. He opposed priestly assumptions, taught the equality and brotherhood of man, sent out disciples to teach his doctrine, was a reformer who relied on the power of truth and love. Many of his reported sayings resemble those of Jesus. He was opposed by the Brahmans as Jesus by the Pharisees. He compared the Brahmans who followed their traditions to a chain of blind men, who move on, not seeing where they go.* Like Jesus, he taught that mercy was better than sacrifices. Like Jesus, he taught orally, and left no writing. Jesus did not teach in Hebrew, but in the Aramaic, which was the popular dialect, and so the Buddha did not speak to the people in Sanskrit, but in their own tongue, which was Pâli. Like Jesus, he seems to have instructed his hearers by parables or stories. He was one of the greatest reformers the world has ever seen; and his influence, after that of the Christ, has probably exceeded that of any one who ever lived.

But, beside such real resemblances between these two masters, we are told of others still more striking, which would certainly be hard to explain unless one of the systems had borrowed from the other. These are said to be the preëxistence of Buddha in heaven; his birth of a virgin; salutation by angels; presentation in the temple; baptism by fire and water; dispute with the doctors; temptation in the wilderness; transfiguration; descent into hell; ascension into heaven.† If these legends could be traced back to the time before Christ, then it might be argued that the Gospels have borrowed from Buddhism. Such, however, is not the fact. These stories are taken from the Lalita

* Oldenberg: "Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde. Berlin, 1881." This is one of the latest and best books on our subject.

† Romantic Legend of Buddha. By Samuel Beal. London, 1875. Eitel. Three Lectures on Buddhism.

Vistara, which, according to Rhys Davids,* was probably composed between six hundred and a thousand years after the time of Buddha, by some Buddhist poet in Nepaul. Rhys Davids, one of our best authorities, says of this poem: "As evidence of what early Buddhism actually was, it is of about the same value as some mediæval poem would be of the real facts of the Gospel history."† M. Ernest de Bunsen, in his work on the "Angel Messiah," has given a very exhaustive statement, says Mr. Davids, of all the possible channels through which Christians can be supposed to have borrowed from the Buddhists. But Mr. Davids's conclusion is that he finds no evidence of any such communications of ideas from the East to the West.† The difference between the wild stories of the Lalita Vistara, and the sober narratives of the Gospels is quite apparent. Another writer, Professor Seydel,‡ thinks, after a full and careful examination, that only five facts in the Gospels may have been borrowed from Buddhism. These are: (1) The fast of Jesus before his work; (2) The question in regard to the blind man—"Who did sin, this man, or his parents?"; (3) The preëxistence of Christ; (4) The presentation in the Temple; (5) Nathaniel sitting under a fig tree, compared with Buddha under a Bo tree. But Kuenen has examined these parallels, and considers them merely accidental coincidences. And, in truth, it is very hard to conceive of one religion borrowing its facts or legends from another, if that other stands in no historic relation to it. That Buddhism should have taken much from Brahmanism is natural; for Brahmanism was its mother. That Christianity should have borrowed many of its methods from Judaism is equally natural; for Judaism was its cradle. Modern travelers in Burma and Tartary have found that the Buddhists hold a kind of camp-meeting in the open air, where they pray and sing. Suppose that some critic, noticing this, should assert that, when Wesley and his followers established similar customs, they must have borrowed them from the Buddhists. The absurdity would be evident. New religions grow, they are not imitations.

It has been thought, however, that Christianity was derived from the Essenes, because of certain resemblances, and it is argued that the Essenes must have obtained their monastic habits from the Therapeutæ in Egypt, and that the Therapeutæ got them from the Buddhists, because they could not have got

* Hibbert Lectures. Origin and Growth of Buddhism. By T. W. Rhys Davids. 1881. † Ibid., page 143. ‡ "Buddhistisch-Christliche Harmonie."

them elsewhere. This theory, however, has been dismissed from the scene by a young German scholar,* who has proved that the essay on the Therapeutæ ascribed to Philo was really written by a Christian anchorite in the third or fourth century.

The result, then, of our investigation, is this: There is no probability that the analogies between Christianity and Buddhism have been derived the one from the other. They have come from the common and universal needs and nature of man, which repeat themselves again and again in like positions and like circumstances. That Jesus and Buddha should both have retired into the wilderness before undertaking their great work is probable, for it has been the habit of other reformers to let a period of meditation precede their coming before the world. That both should have been tempted to renounce their enterprise is also in accordance with human nature. That, in after times, the simple narratives should be overlaid with additions, and a whole mass of supernatural wonders added — as we find in the Apocryphal Gospels and the Lalita Vistara — is also in accordance with the working of the human mind.

Laying aside all such unsatisfactory resemblances, we must regard the Buddha as having been one of the noblest of men, and one whom Jesus would have readily welcomed as a fellow-worker and a friend. He opposed a dominant priesthood, maintained the equal religious rights of all mankind, overthrew caste, encouraged woman to take her place as man's equal, forbade all bloody sacrifices, and preached a religion of peace and good will, seeking to triumph only in the fair conflict of reason with reason. If he was defective in the loftiest instincts of the soul; if he knew nothing of the infinite and eternal; if he saw nothing permanent in the soul of man; if his highest purpose was negative — to get rid of pain, sorrow, anxiety, toil, — let us still be grateful for the influence which has done so much to tame the savage Mongols, and to introduce hospitality and humanity into the homes of Lassa and Siam. If Edwin Arnold, a poet, idealizes him too highly, it is the better fault, and should be easily forgiven. Hero-worshipers are becoming scarce in our time; let us make the most of those we have.

JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

* P. E. Lucius: "Die Therapeuten und ihre Stellung, &c. Strassburg, 1880."

# WOMAN AS AN INVENTOR.

No ASSERTION in reference to woman is more common than that she possesses no inventive or mechanical genius, even the United States census failing to enumerate her among the inventors of the country. But, while such statements are carelessly or ignorantly made, tradition, history, and experience alike prove her possession of these faculties in the highest degree. Although woman's scientific education has been grossly neglected, yet some of the most important inventions of the world are due to her. Hon. Samuel Fisher, while Commissioner of Patents, said: "Any sketch of American inventions would be imperfect which failed to do justice to the part taken by woman." The New York "Times," in an editorial upon woman's inventive genius, says: "The feminine mind is, as a rule, quicker than the masculine mind; takes hints and sees defects which would escape the average man's attention. Women frequently carry the germs of patents in their head, and cause some rude machine to be constructed which serves their purpose. If women would fix their minds on inventions, it is entirely probable that they would distinguish themselves in this line far more than they have done hitherto." The "Scientific American" testifies of the inventions of women for which they solicit patents, that "in their practical character and in their adaptation of means to effect a definite purpose, they fully equal the same number of inventions made by men."

Ancient tradition accords to woman the invention of those arts most necessary to comfort, most conducive to wealth, most promotive of civilization. Man's first needs are food, clothing, and shelter, and to woman tradition assigns their present practical forms. Isis in Egypt, Minerva in Greece, Surawatí in India, the mother of the Incas in Peru, and several empresses of China,

have alike been worshiped because of their inventive genius. Diodorus, speaking of the worship paid to olden gods and goddesses, says: "The inventors of things useful and profitable to man's well-being were as a reward of their deserts thus honored by all men with everlasting remembrance." He adds, that the gods of Egypt were of two characters: first, the supernatural, or purely spiritual gods; second, "most beloved and most worshiped," those human beings who had been of especial benefit to the world, and who after death were enrolled among the gods. Foremost among these secondary gods he places Isis. To her was attributed the invention of bread-making, and the foundation of agriculture; previous to her time the Egyptians lived upon uncooked roots and herbs. She also taught the art of healing and the manufacture of flax, and laid the foundations of Egyptian literature. Down to the time of Galen many medicines bore the name of Isis. So famed were the medicines of Egypt that the prophet Jeremiah mentions them, and Homer sang their praises. The potion Nepenthes, which lulled sorrow, given by Helen to Telemachus, was obtained in Egypt by the wife of a Trojan hero. Isis also invented the art of embalming; through its means the Israelites were enabled to keep their oath to Jacob, and take his body with them when they fled from Egypt, nearly four hundred years afterward.

Athens, a name synonymous with all that is beautiful in art or generous in culture, a city that still holds power over men's hearts, was under the special protection and guidance of the feminine inventor and goddess Minerva, who, as Pallas Athene, was one of the most ancient religious conceptions of the Greeks. Regarded as the inventor of every kind of work usually done by woman, she was equally deemed the originator of agriculture and mechanics; the inventor of all tools of man's handicraft; of musical instruments, and of the arts; of war chariots; of ship-building, and the breaking of horses. Ceres not only gave corn to the Greeks, but, under the name of Thesmophoros, was revered as the first law-giver. Letters, attributed to the Muses, look back to a feminine source for their invention. Divination, that art which ruled the actions of heroes and turned the fate of empires, with its sibyls, priestesses, oracles, and books, has come down through history as originating with woman. To the Amazons the javelin, shield, and battle-ax were attributed; even the toils and nets of the hunter are also ascribed to woman.

But, leaving the realm of tradition and half-mythical history, we still find woman accredited with some of the earliest and most useful inventions. That she was the primitive artist is quite universally conceded. To her, as the one to prepare the food, the invention and ornamentation of pottery is ascribed. Among savage races it is still easy to trace the inception and growth of this art in woman's hands. The most ancient Chinese writers accord the invention of spinning to Yao, wife of the fourth emperor, and the discovery of silk to Si-ling-chi, wife of the Emperor Hoang-ti, four thousand years before Christ. This country was long known as Ser, or Serica—the land of silk. Its later name of China originated from Sien Tshan, under which appellation, as goddess of silk-worms, Si-ling-chi is still worshiped. When the word China is spoken, it is in perpetual honor and remembrance of this woman inventor. The unparalleled duration of Chinese civilization and the prosperity of that country are largely due to silk, the secret of which was for ages kept from other nations; and which formed an export of extraordinary value, its weight in gold being paid by Roman emperors for a garment. The culture of the mulberry, the rearing of silk-worms, and the manufacture of silk in various forms, are still the great staple domestic industries of this people, to whom cotton was unknown until within the last eight hundred years.

Aristotle was the first European writer to mention silk, yet it was not until a thousand years after his time that the secret of its manufacture became known to the West. It is now, however, an article of great commercial value to many nations. The worth of its raw material produced in France alone is computed at $32,000,000 yearly, and the profits upon its manufacture at $12,000,000. Gauze was the invention of Pamphile, a woman of Cos, who, shortly after the introduction of silk into Europe, Penelope-like, unraveled its web, re-manufacturing it into a transparent fabric known to Roman ladies as "Coa vestis," and to moderns as coan or gauze. One of the most diaphanous fabrics of the ancient world, familiarly designated as "The Woven Wind," it was yet possessed of sufficient strength to take colors, and bear embroidery of silk and gold thread.

Under the forms of velvet, crape, gauze, satin, foulard, pongee, plush, and lace, silk, largely contributing to the wealth of the world, has shaped the policy of states. As lace, its use

dates only from the middle of the eighteenth century. No other fabric requires such delicate manipulation. Upon the white varieties not even every woman can work, as the breath itself must possess exquisite purity. Those who have what is locally termed the *haleine grasse*, i. e., greasy breath, are compelled to confine themselves to the manufacture of the black varieties.

Silk is possessed of the qualities most sought by manufacturers: delicacy, luster, strength, and a capability of taking any color desired. It is the strongest of all fibers, exceeding that of hemp or flax. By a law of eternal fitness, spinners strive for a thread like a woman's hair, "long, fine, strong, and vibrant." As a source of wealth, lace, equally with silk, has largely influenced state policy. The value of the finest thread lace when wrought in points is enormous, far exceeding that of precious stones. No other art, it is said, is capable of bringing about such an extraordinary increase in value from a material worth as little as flax in the unwrought state. The early records of this art are lost in the mists of antiquity, but there is no doubt that woman was its originator. At the exposition of woman's work in Florence, a few years since, visitors were greatly interested in a specimen of the magnificent lace known as "Puleto di Venezia" (Venetian Point). Its stitch, lost since the thirteenth century, has recently been rediscovered by Madame Bessani, a humble workwoman, to whom the Italian Minister of Commerce accorded letters patent, with exclusive control of her discovery for fifteen years. The importance of Madame Bessani's invention to Italy is incalculable, opening to that country an immense source of revenue and political power.

Pillow-lace making, which brought this elegant addition to the toilet within the reach of all, was the invention of Barbara Uttmann, of Saxony, at a period when that country was on the verge of financial ruin. The art spread with great rapidity, and Belgium soon derived an immense revenue from it; and although three hundred years have since elapsed, lace still continues to be its great source of wealth. Nor has its influence upon other countries been less beneficial: not only did wealth accrue to England through its introduction there, but a great moral change for the better soon appeared as one of its effects.

To Mheural Nisa, best known to English-speaking peoples through Moore's "Light of the Harem" as Nourmahal, is the world indebted for its priceless Cashmere shawls, the manufacture of which gives employment to thousands of men and women,

and forms one of the principal sources of revenue in India. To her, also, we owe that most exquisite and costly perfume, Attar, or more properly, Atyr of Roses. Her husband, the great conqueror Jerunzebe, most passionately attached to her, through his love, and for the benefits she had conferred upon her country, caused her name and the title "Light of the World" to be struck on the coins of India. He built to her memory that fairy temple on the banks of the Jumna known as the Taj Mahal, which travelers vie in describing as all that is most light, graceful, exquisite, and picturesque in architecture. With Kamejo, a woman worker in bronze, the decorations in relief, so much used by Japanese artists, originated. Wood-engraving, the pioneer of all other forms of engraving, was the invention of the Cunio children, twin sister and brother, at Ravenna, Italy, in the thirteenth century. The discovery of cotton as a textile fiber, ascribed in the East to Semiramis, was in America attributed to the mother of the Incas, who taught the Peruvians its manufacture. The Caftan, or Eastern robe of honor, also known as "Semiramis's Gown," was ascribed to that Eastern heroine,— an invention for the purpose of concealing her sex when journeying to meet her husband. The right to wear this garment has for ages belonged only to potentates. It was one of the emblems of exalted rank chosen by Haman, when consulted by Ahasuerus as to the marks of distinction to be shown "the man whom the king delighted to honor."

The straw industry of the United States owes its origin to Miss Betsy Metcalf, who, in 1798, made the first straw bonnet* ever manufactured in this country. Within twelve years thereafter the State of Massachusetts alone produced half a million dollars' worth of straw goods. That State now produces six million hats and bonnets annually; a great deal of straw is also manufactured in other States.

The most remarkable invention of the age, in its industrial, social, and political influence, — the cotton-gin,— owes its origin to a woman, Catharine Littlefield Greene, widow of General Greene, of Revolutionary memory, with whom the idea originated. The cotton-gin heads the list of sixteen remarkable American inventions that have been adopted by the world.

After the close of the war General Greene settled in Georgia,

* The Rhode Island Society for the Encouragement of Domestic Industry possesses a *fac-simile* of Miss Metcalf's original bonnet. It was woven of seven straws.

where he soon died. The great difficulty of separating the seed from the cotton was at that time the staple subject of conversation among planters. To separate a pound of the black seed from the lint was a day's task for a negro. The white variety, much more valuable, from its greater tenacity, was scarcely at all cultivated. It was the regular custom of the planter's family to unite in this work every evening, and a fortune was prophesied for the person who should construct a machine capable of doing the work. After a conversation of this character between some guests at her house, Mrs. Greene conceived the idea of such a machine, and intrusted its construction to the hands of Eli Whitney, then boarding with her, who possessed the usual New England facility in the use of tools. The wooden teeth at first tried not doing their work well, Mr. Whitney wished to abandon the machine altogether; but Mrs. Greene, whose faith in ultimate success never wavered, would not consent; she suggested the substitution of wire. Within ten days from the first conception of Mrs. Greene's ideas, a small model was completed, so perfect in its construction that all succeeding gins have been based upon it.

This invention produced an extraordinary increase in the culture of cotton. Instead of the single pound cleaned by hand, three hundred pounds were now daily separated from the lint at the same cost. Not only did the languishing industries of the South receive a sudden and stable impetus, but every part of the world felt the influence of this woman's idea. It may be asked why Mrs. Greene, then a widow, did not take out the patent in her own name; but to have done so would have exposed her to the ridicule and contumely of her friends and a loss of position in society, which frowned upon any attempt at outside industry for woman. Through her second husband, Mr. Miller, she afterward assumed a subordinate interest in it.

A very slight investigation proves that patents taken out in some man's name are, in many instances, due to women. A recent noted instance of this kind is Miss Louise McLaughlin's invention of underglaze painting on pottery. Miss McLaughlin, desiring that all artists should share in its benefits, explained her process to every person who asked her, and even wrote a book giving this information. But a certain man, seeing its value, took out a patent upon it, thus prohibiting even its in-

ventor from using the fruit of her own brains. The Burden horse-shoe machine, turning out a complete shoe every three seconds, was a woman's invention. At a renewal of the patent, in 1871, it was claimed that thirty-two million dollars had been saved to the public during the fourteen years of its use.

A third great American invention, the mower and reaper, owes its early perfection to Mrs. Ann Harned Manning,* of Plainfield, New Jersey, who, in 1817–18, perfected a system for the combined action of teeth and cutters, patented by her husband, William Henry Manning, as "a device for the combined action of teeth and cutters, whether in a transverse or revolving direction." Mrs. Manning also made other improvements, of which, not having been patented, she was robbed after her husband's death by a neighbor whose name appears in the list of patentees upon this machine. Mrs. Manning also invented a clover cleaner, which proved very lucrative to her husband, who took out the patent. Nor was she the only woman whose thought has been turned toward agricultural machines. The name of Elizabeth Smith, also of New Jersey, appears in 1861 among the list of patentees upon an improvement to the mower and reaper, whereby the knives could be adjusted while the machine was in motion.

The smallest inventions sometimes prove the most lucrative. A San Francisco lady, inventor of a baby carriage, received fourteen thousand dollars for her patent. The paper pail, the invention of a Chicago lady, yields a large income. The gimlet-pointed screw, the idea of a little girl, has realized millions of dollars to its patentee.

Among recent inventions of importance by women, are a spinning machine, capable of running from twelve to forty threads; a rotary loom, doing three times the work of an ordinary loom; a volcanic furnace for smelting ore; an improved wood-sawing machine; a space-saving clothes-mangle; a chain elevator; screw-crank for steamships; a fire-escape; a device for correct pen-holding, invaluable in schools; a wool feeder and weigher, one of the most delicate machines ever invented, and of incalculable benefit to every woolen manufacturer; a self-fastening button; a portable reservoir for use in case of fires; a process for burning petroleum in place of wood and coal for steam

* Sister of Mrs. Clemence S. Lozier, M. D., Dean of the Women's Homeopathic College in New York.

generating purposes; an improvement in spark-arresters, to be applied to locomotives; a danger-signal for street-crossings on railways; a plan for heating cars without fire; a lubricating felt for subduing friction* (the last five all bearing upon railroad travel); a rapid change box, a marvel of simplicity and convenience, invaluable at railway stations and ferries, the invention of a girl of sixteen; syllable type with adjustable cases and apparatus; machine for trimming pamphlets; writing-machine; signal rocket, used in the navy; deep-sea telescope; method of deadening sound on elevated railways; smoke-burner; satchel-bottom bags; bag-folding machine, etc., etc. Many improvements in sewing machines have been made by women; as a device for sewing sails and heavy cloth; quilting attachments: the magic ruffler; threading a machine when upon a full run (an idea scouted by male machinists); an adaptation of machines for sewing leather, etc. This last was the invention of a practical woman machinist, who for many years carried on a large harness manufactory in New York City.

Systems for improved drainage; for better ventilation; for forcing water to great heights and distances; a thousand household appliances, etc., are the fruits of woman's inventive genius; but they must be passed by, as this paper is designed simply to attract public attention toward a subject upon which much ignorance and misapprehension exist.

The deep-sea telescope, invented by Mrs. Mather, and improved by her daughter, is a unique and important invention, bringing the bottom of the largest ships to view without the expense of raising them into a dry-dock. By its means wrecks can be inspected, obstructions to navigation removed, torpedoes successfully sought for, and immense sums annually saved to the marine service.

A machine which, for its complicated mechanism and extraordinary ingenuity, has attracted much attention both in this country and Europe, is that for the manufacture of satchel-bottom paper bags. Many men of mechanical genius long directed their attention to this problem without success. Miss Maggie Knight, to whose genius this machine is due, received a compliment from the Commissioner of Patents upon its entire originality. Most inventions are but an improvement upon some preceding one. She refused fifty thousand dollars for it shortly

* Took the first prize at the fair of the American Institute.

after taking out her patent. Miss Knight has since invented a machine doing the work of thirty persons in folding bags, and herself superintended the erection of the machinery at Amherst, Mass. The Eureka street-sweeper, the invention of a Hoboken lady, owes its origin to the fact of this lady's dress having been spattered with mud by a clumsy machine one day in New York. Possessed of a mechanical genius, she determined to try her hand upon a sweeper that should do its work more perfectly. Her success was great, and her invention a vast improvement upon all its predecessors.

The remarkable invention of Mrs. Mary E. Walton, for deadening the noise of elevated railroads, has occasioned much comment. Edison and other inventors had for six months unsuccessfully striven to accomplish this end, when Mrs. Walton brought forward a device which was at once adopted by the Metropolitan and other elevated railways. The benefit to human health and life likely to accrue from this invention can scarcely be realized. The evil effects of persistent noise upon the human system are very great, and an invention tending to lessen its force confers a benefit upon mankind. A prominent New York physician says: "We see very little of the gentle decline of old age in New York City. The constant din of travel and traffic, borne for a time without evidence of injury, suddenly shows itself in a shattered nervous system and imminence of dissolution." Since her noise-deadener, Mrs. Walton has taken out, both in this country and England, a patent for a smoke-burner, that she considers much more valuable. By this device all smoke from a fire, furnace, or locomotive is consumed, as also the dust caused by railway trains, and the offensive, unhealthful odors emitted from factories, gas-works, etc. When in England, Mrs. Walton received the congratulations of British officials for it, as one of the greatest inventions of the age.

While passing by woman's discovery in science, where the names of Hypatia, Maria Agnesi, and Caroline Herschel shine, mention must still be made of the aquarium, the invention of Madam Jeanette Power, one of the most eminent naturalists of the century. It was used by her in making curious scientific discoveries. The value of the aquarium to marine zoölogy is incalculable. Not only can rare species from the Indian, Arctic, and Pacific oceans be brought into close comparison, but the subject

of embryology can be studied, and the great Darwinian problems of evolution and permanence of type are likely to be solved by its instrumentality.

Medicine, even in modern times, owes much to woman. It was to her knowledge of this art that woman's persecution for witchcraft in the middle ages was largely due. Through Madame de Coudray's invention of the manikin, a knowledge of physiology has been much more widely diffused than would otherwise have been possible. Many delicate and important surgical instruments owe their origin to woman, as also the adaptation of wax for recording medical observations Dr. Hunter was indebted for the illustrations of his greatest work to the observations of a woman preserved in wax. *

Chemistry offers an infinite resource to the inventor in a field whose exploration has scarcely begun. A Prussian governess recently invented a new fulminate for needle-gun cartridges, and the Government is experimenting with it with a view to its purchase. From this lucrative field woman is largely debarred through that prejudice and injustice which still deprives her of full opportunities for scientific education.†

But among woman inventors the name of the celebrated sculptor, Harriet Hosmer, must not be passed by. Miss Hosmer has succeeded in producing marble from limestone, closely simulating the finest antique varieties. This process had long been unsuccessfully sought by the Italian Government. But her most valuable invention is that of the permanent magnet as a motive power. Scientific men and practical machinists deem this one of the most important inventions of the century, and its influence upon the world as likely to be far-reaching and extraordinary. No such power was known to inhere in the permanent magnet until Miss Hosmer's discovery, to which she gave fifteen years of study and experiment.

The national value of patents, and the relation of invention to civilization, are subjects that receive marked attention both in England and the United States. A paper upon the latter topic, read in London, in 1881, before the Society of Engineers, forcibly represented the loss sustained by the nation through the obstacles placed in the way of inventors, upon whose genius, this paper

* Mademoiselle Biheron.

† A lady who won the chemical prize at the University of Edinburgh, over 240 competitors, was not permitted to receive it on account of her sex.

claimed, England was dependent for holding her place among the nations.

The inventions of a nation are closely connected with the freedom of its people. During the reign of George III. the average yearly number of patents taken out in Great Britain was but fourteen. At present the average is five thousand, while in the United States it is eighteen thousand. This difference is directly traceable to the progress of freedom and education. While, as has been shown, many of the world's most important inventions are due to woman, the proportion of feminine inventors is much less than of masculine, which arises from the fact that woman does not possess the same amount of freedom as man. Restricted in education, industrial opportunities, and political power, this is one of many instances where her degradation reacts injuriously upon the race. The majority of inventions are the result of much consideration and self-reliant thought. Inventors must not only possess full freedom to exercise their powers, but there must also be a certain welcome and protection to their ideas. Deprived, as woman is, of political power, she has to face contempt of her sex, open and covert scorn of womanhood, depreciatory allusions to her intellectual powers, —all tending to hamper the expression of her inventive genius.

Nor is woman by law recognized as possessing full right to the use and control of her own powers. In not a single State of the Union is a married woman held to possess a right to her earnings within the family; and in not one-half of them has she a right to their control in business entered upon outside of the household. Should such a woman be successful in obtaining a patent, what then? Would she be free to do as she pleased with it? Not at all. She would hold no right, title, or power over this work of her own brain. She would possess no legal right to contract, or to license any one to use her invention. Neither, should her right be infringed, could she sue the offender. Her husband could take out the patent in his own name, sell her invention for his own sole benefit, give it away if he so chose, or refrain from using it, and for all this she would have no remedy.

It is scarcely thirty years since the first State protected a married woman in the use of her own brain property. Under these conditions, legally incapable of holding property, and trained, as she has been, to seclusion, dependence, and abeyance

of thought, that woman has not been an inventor to an equal extent with man is not so much a subject of surprise as that she should have invented at all.

While every invention, however small, develops new industries, provides work for a multitude of people, increases commercial activity, adds to the revenues of the world, and renders life more desirable, great inventions broaden the boundaries of human thought, bring about social, religious, and political changes, hurrying mankind on to a new civilization. Lecky forcibly shows the loss to the world from the celibacy and martyrdom of the best human element in the past. No less is the darkness of the world kept more dense, and its civilization retarded, by all forms of thought, customs of society, or systems of law which prevent the full development and exercise of woman's inventive powers.

MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE.

# COLLEGE ENDOWMENTS.

It is a common remark, seldom challenged, that the establishment of small and weak colleges all over the country has been a great mistake; that we should have two or three centers of learning, like Oxford and Cambridge in England, and let all American youth who want more than a common-school education gather there. This thoughtless declaration entirely overlooks the central purpose of our educational institutions. That purpose is, not to impart a high scholarly finish to the accomplishments of a privileged class, or furnish cloisters where a few life-long students may search out the very rootlets of written knowledge; but to diffuse the greatest possible amount of learning and intelligence through the entire mass of American citizenship. It is of comparatively little importance whether our country shall ever produce a scholar capable of deciphering the inscriptions at Palenque and Copan, or an astronomer who can discover useless comets on demand, or a mathematician who can invent an algebraic engine between which and the multiplication table quaternions shall be but a mean proportional. But it is of the highest importance that our three million square miles should be sprinkled all over with men and women who have a decent knowledge of the classics, with journalists who have read some history and can write good English, with parishioners who can detect logical fallacies even when offered to them from the pulpit, with youth who know the difference between genuine and spurious literature, with people in all sorts of worldly conditions who are alike in being pretty nearly abreast of current opinion and discussion, and able to receive new revelations without waiting for them to be filtered down through critics and authorities.

The United States have now, on an average, a college for every piece of territory a hundred miles square; and though many of these institutions are pitiably weak, they are none too numerous. A glance at their catalogues reveals the fact that the greater part

of the students in each are drawn from its own vicinity. Many of these boys would never have attempted to acquire a college education at all, had there not been a college within a day's ride of their homes. Plant one in a far Western State, and in a little while it will have a hundred students, not more than one or two of whom would ever have found their way to Cambridge or New Haven. That the hundred should be tolerably well educated is of infinitely more advantage to the republic than that the one or two should have the facilities necessary for the highest scholarship. Incidentally, too, these small institutions are of service in breaking down sectarian prejudice. Nearly every one of our colleges is under the control of some religious denomination. If it drew its students only or mainly from that denomination throughout the country, both it and they might become bigotedly sectarian to any extent; but, when it draws them from families of all denominations within a radius of a hundred miles, it is powerfully driven toward liberalism in all its teachings, and the boys themselves acquire a breadth of mind which they would never get if they were assorted according to the catechisms. The authorities of most of the colleges are conscious of this. Experience shows that if a letter be addressed to them, asking, among other things, what is their religious bias, three out of four will answer half-apologetically that, though the institution nominally belongs to such a denomination, it is practically non-sectarian, and several denominations are represented in its faculty. The process of educating together youth who come from families holding different religious doctrines, begun in our district schools, cannot be carried too far. In some future day it may prove the salvation of the commonwealth.

One of the best features of college attendance to-day is the fact that so many students devote the four years to the mere purpose of general cultivation, broadening and strengthening their minds and characters for whatever calling they may ultimately choose. It used to be assumed that, if a boy was sent to college, he must be destined for a learned profession; and out of many families, one son was selected for this career, while the others were left to plod along on the farm, with only so much education as had been obtained in the little school-house at the cross-roads. This state of things has gradually passed away, and every college class now contains a large number of young

men who have no designs whatever on the learned professions, but receive their diplomas and go directly into mercantile, mechanical, or agricultural pursuits. The multiplicity of small colleges all over the country is largely to be credited with this state of affairs, which cannot but have the happiest effect upon the character of the community. As the intelligence and scholarship of clients, parishioners, patients, and readers are increased, the lawyers, clergymen, physicians, and writers are necessarily driven to a higher standard of honesty and ability.

In the past five years we have enjoyed an epidemic of private liberality toward colleges. Hardly a newspaper can be taken up that does not contain a paragraph to the effect that Mr. or Mrs. Somebody has given money to this or that college, to endow a professorship, or build an observatory or a memorial chapel, or to create a library fund, or establish scholarships. The number and rapidity of these announcements have been marvelous, and the sums make an enormous aggregate.

It is a pity that the donors could not have been judicious, as well as liberal. Nearly all their gifts have the same vicious quality that has hampered the endowments of our colleges from the beginning: they are specific, instead of general. A struggling institution is hardly assisted in its struggle when a new chair is created, adding another to its half-dozen poorly paid professors; or when the wealthy Mrs. Smith builds for it the J. H. Smith memorial chapel in honor of her deceased husband, with his medallion cut in limestone over the door. These things are all good in themselves; but what our colleges stand in urgent need of is funds for general purposes—money which the trustees can apply wherever it is most needed. This they find it exceedingly difficult to get. Brown, Jones, and Robinson, who have amassed wealth as merchants, manufacturers, or speculators, will give money to help on the noble cause of education; but they always want an imperishable receipt in the form of a building, a library, or a professor's chair, that shall bear their name and carry it down the ages. They are ready to endow the Brown chair of philosophy, or the Jones gymnasium, or to erect a Robinson hall for lectures or dormitories; but show them that the six or eight professors, who are the real strength of the institution, are spending their lives and their brains for a fraction of the pay given to a skillful salesman of dry goods or hardware, and suggest that, instead of erecting some futile

memorial of themselves, they give the money for a general fund, the income to be used for increasing the salaries of the professors; they would quietly button their pockets and turn away. "Poor professor" has long been a proverbial expression, until it seems to be assumed that, somehow, from the nature of things, it is necessary that the instructors of our young men shall be underpaid. But how greatly they are underpaid the public probably does not know. To give the idea a tangible shape, I have obtained the figures from two dozen colleges, situated in various States and controlled by various denominations. Most of them are well known, and some are among our oldest. On the one hand, I have taken no account of presidents' salaries, which are often augmented by the use of a house and grounds; and, on the other, I have excluded assistant professors. The table shows only average salaries paid to full professors:

| | *Average Salary.* |
|---|---|
| Amherst, Mass., College (Congregationalist) | $2,500 |
| Antioch College, Yellow Springs, O. (Unitarian) | 1,100 |
| Bates College, Lewiston, Me. (Baptist) | 1,200 |
| Beloit, Wis., College (Congregationalist) | 1,500 |
| Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me. (Unitarian) | 1,800 |
| Brown University, Providence, R. I. (Baptist) | 2,750 |
| Butler University, Irvington, Ind. (Disciples) | 1,250 |
| Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. | 2,750 |
| Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H. (Congregationalist) | 2,000 |
| Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y. (Presbyterian) | 1,600 |
| Iowa University, Iowa City | 1,800 |
| Kenyon College, Gambier, O. (Protestant Episcopal) | 1,700 |
| McKendree College, Lebanon, Ill. (Methodist Episcopal) | 900 |
| Milton, Wis., College (Seventh Day Baptist) | 800 |
| Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pa. (Lutheran) | 1,100 |
| Oberlin, O., College (Congregationalist) | 1,500 |
| Rochester, N. Y., University (Baptist) | 2,000 |
| Rutgers College, New Brunswick, N. J. (Reformed) | 2,400 |
| Syracuse, N. Y., University (Methodist Episcopal) | 2,150 |
| Union College, Schenectady, N. Y. | 2,000 |
| University of Michigan, Ann Arbor | 2,200 |
| University of Vermont, Burlington | 1,750 |
| University of Virginia, Charlottesville | 3,000 |
| Wheaton, Ill., College (Congregationalist) | 850 |
| General average | $1,775 |

Full professors in Columbia College, New York City, receive seven thousand five hundred dollars; in Johns Hopkins Univer-

sity, Baltimore, two-thirds as much; while perhaps two or three other institutions pay almost respectably. But an average cast from all the colleges in the country would show a considerably smaller figure than that above. How a professor on such a salary can support a family, entertain as he must, buy the books and instruments that he needs, maintain the serenity of mind necessary to keep up his studies, and lay by something for his old age—each reader may compute for himself.

We are not even selfishly wise in this matter, and might take a useful hint from the progress in naval armament. We have no more seventy-four-gun ships, with their long rows of carronades throwing balls not much larger than a man's fist; a modern war-vessel is armed with a few guns of enormous caliber and long range. Instead of multiplying chairs, why not magnify professors? Would it not be better for an institution to have six or eight instructors, with pay enough to secure them such libraries as they need, with opportunities for travel and freedom from care, that they might make the most and the best of themselves, than to give it twice that number and have them all crippled in their resources and dwarfed in their development?

There are many pitiful stories that might be told, to show how this state of things enforces economy upon the families of professors and meanness upon boards of trustees. Let one suffice. A certain professor gave the best years of his life, for a low salary, to one of our most reputable colleges. He was noted for his faithfulness, was as punctual as the sun, and was never known to be absent from his place. At the end of seventeen years of service, he fell ill, and the trustees voted him one year's leave of absence, with continuance of salary. In six months he died, and within a week the widow received official notification that payment of the salary would be stopped at once.

While I am writing, comes the news that a legacy left to the library of Cornell University proves to be worth more than two million dollars. As it was bequeathed to the library (which is already large and valuable), of course not a penny of the income from it can be used to increase salaries—except, possibly, the librarian's. The income of two million dollars would buy a library as large as the Astor every ten years.

From another flourishing institution comes the news that a kind friend is about to build it a chapel (presumably to be named

for himself), of which it has not the slightest need, the main building containing a handsome room that has always been sufficient for chapel purposes, while the salaries of the instructors might be increased with great advantage and propriety. Still, it will ornament the campus; and as this is the same institution where the professor's widow received the pleasant little note just mentioned, the new chapel may not be erected in vain if the trustees will gather once a year within its sacred walls, and beseech the Almighty to give them some little sense of decency and justice. For still another institution an equally generous man has offered to erect a handsome gymnasium for the proper physical development of the students, while the professors can find bodily exercise enough in sawing their own wood and running on their own errands.

In truth, as an eminent college president not long since remarked to me, it is becoming the fashion to endow the students instead of the professors. The scholarships, monitorships, and indigent funds have increased rapidly; and, so far as I know, it has not occurred to anybody to raise a protest. One result is that every year hundreds of letters are sent about the country, written by boys who are ready to enter college, or who have completed their freshman year, inquiring what institution will do the best by them. They do not seek to know where they can find the best facilities for the special line of study they are about to pursue, but simply what college will offer the most money to place their names on its catalogue. Another result is that the officers of certain old and popular institutions, finding they have an overplus of rich young men and a dearth of studious young men, are on the lookout for promising students who can coach the wealthy young fellows and raise the grade of scholarship, and actually pursue them with their tempting offers to the very doors of other institutions.

In view of such facts, it may almost be said that it would be better if all the scholarships and funds for the aid of indigent students were swept out of existence. The indigent funds are provided mainly for ministerial students. Now, the Christian ministry is, as it should be, not only a sacred trust, but a means of livelihood, and clergymen are quite as well paid as journalists or college professors. Why the young men who intend to become preachers should be so bountifully assisted, while those who are destined for the other professions are left to work their

way, unless by hard study they can gain a scholarship, I have never heard anybody attempt to give the reason. If we want superior stuff in the pulpit, it would be better to withhold all assistance, and take none but those who have pluck and energy enough to earn their own education. If we want mediocrity or worse, the present system is well calculated to secure it. Any young man who is studying for the ministry can have all his college expenses paid, if he chooses to ask it. And the regular funds are frequently supplemented by the efforts of wealthy old ladies, who think they are doing the Lord a service by supplying money to some fine young fellow with clerical intentions. Good old souls! they mean well, but their eyes would be rudely opened if they could know how often the college-boys laugh at their choice of beneficiaries.

The best and most appropriate prize to set before a student who really loves study and is ambitious to become a ripe scholar, would be, not a gold medal, nor a little money, but the hope of a college professorship with a comfortable salary. Then let us set before the professors in each institution the possibility of becoming its president, and the system of external inducements will be complete. As matters now stand, to accept a professorship is to shut one's self off from all promotion. As the President of the United States, when the chief-justiceship becomes vacant, instead of promoting one of the associate justices, takes a lantern and goes hunting up and down the frontier for an obscure lawyer to fill the place; so a board of trustees, instead of promoting a professor to the presidency of a college, generally consider it a smart trick, to avoid the responsibility of discriminating and the possibility of creating jealousy, to call in some worthy clergyman, whose chief merit lies in his ignorance of the institution and its peculiar needs. I know of nothing that can be so unjust or so cowardly, at times, as a board of trustees. Perhaps the wisest course would be, to have some man of executive ability in every faculty, and keep him in a sort of training for succession to the presidency. At all events, it may safely be assumed that promotion in his own line is the most legitimate incentive to place before any man, whatever his calling; while denial of merited advancement is the most palpable injustice and unwisdom.

ROSSITER JOHNSON.

# EXTRADITION.

SINCE the termination, some six years ago, of the correspondence between Mr. Fish and Lord Derby on the subject of the extradition of Winslow, the questions left unsettled by them have attracted little general attention. It is not generally understood, however, that they have been transferred, in this country, at least, from the diplomatic to the legal forum, and that a new light has been thrown upon them by one or two judicial decisions of the highest importance.

Our agreement with England on the subject of extradition is an extremely brief document, contained in Article 10 of the Ashburton Treaty of 1842, as follows:

"It is agreed that the United States and her Britannic Majesty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found within the territories of the other: *Provided*, That this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offense had been there committed; and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two governments shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition and receives the fugitive."

The difficulty which this treaty has produced has arisen in part from the extremely meager list of crimes which it covers.

As an illustration of this, and of the unsatisfactory condition of the relations between the two countries, we may refer to the accounts given in the newspapers last winter of the "Miller Extradition Case." Whether the facts are given with entire accuracy, we do not know; but they might all be true, and, as given, they illustrate the matter in a striking way.

In the early part of 1881, it is said, three men broke into a farm-house not far from Pittsburg, in the State of Pennsylvania, attacked the inmates, and committed a robbery. A large amount of booty was carried off, and one of the burglars, Miller by name, described as a notorious and skillful criminal, was captured. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to the Western Penitentiary for eight years. After serving nearly two years he escaped, but was traced to Toronto, and steps were taken to secure his extradition. Eminent counsel were retained, and they argued a motion before the Canadian Courts that Miller should be surrendered to serve out his unexpired term. To this it was replied that the crime of burglary was not covered by the extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain. To meet this difficulty, recourse was had to the assault committed by Miller in the course of the burglary. Assault with intent to commit murder is a crime for which, under the treaty, the surrender of a criminal may be demanded. Miller had never been indicted for this assault, and the charge was merely made for the purpose of getting him back to serve out his term of imprisonment. The Canadian authorities finally surrendered him, he was taken back to the penitentiary, and there he is to this day. No proceedings were taken to punish him for the crime for which he was extradited, and after some months the matter was brought up in the Canadian Parliament, and the United States charged with a violation of good faith in the matter, on the ground that Miller is not punished for the offense for which he was surrendered, but is undergoing punishment for an offense for which he was not extradited.

The questions raised in the correspondence with regard to the extradition of Winslow are these: Can a fugitive from justice, expressly surrendered on a charge of one crime, be tried for another and a totally different crime? If not, how is such a violation of the treaty to be prevented? Can the courts before which the fugitive is brought release him? And if not, how can there be any redress? Besides this, another question arose, as

to the effect of what is known as the English Extradition Act of 1870, which provides that fugitives shall not be surrendered at all by England unless it appears that the country to which they are surrendered has provided by law, or by arrangement, that he shall be tried only for the offense for which he is surrendered.

Without going anew into the merits of the diplomatic controversy on these points as conducted by Mr. Fish and Lord Derby, we wish to direct the reader's attention to the two latest judicial discussions of the whole subject by our own judges, the first of them by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in 1878; the second, by Judge Hoffman, in the United States District Court in California, last November,—both carefully considered decisions by courts of high repute. The Kentucky decision being substantially the same as that of Judge Hoffman, we need refer in detail only to his opinion, which is the more important, as it was rendered by a court of the United States, and is so recent.*

Watts, the prisoner arraigned before Judge Hoffman, was called upon to plead to three indictments. Instead of pleading to the merits, he interposed a plea to the jurisdiction, to the effect that he had been extradited from Great Britain; that the offenses charged in the requisition, and on which he had been surrendered, were other and different offenses from those alleged in the indictments, and that these were not offenses included in the treaty with Great Britain at all. To this plea the United States demurred, thus raising the question: First, What is the true construction of the tenth article of the Treaty of 1842 with Great Britain? Second, How far can or must the courts give it effect?

The answer of the court to these questions is briefly as follows: Whatever speculative views may be taken by theoretical writers as to the duty of States to surrender fugitives in the absence of treaty, with us extradition has long been a matter solely of treaty regulation. By our constitution an extradition treaty, like any other, is part of the "supreme law of the land," and, as such, binding upon all judges, and if it contains expressly or by necessary implication limitations and restrictions, these cannot be overriden by the courts. Now, proceeding to the construction of the Treaty of 1842, there is a common consensus of jurists with regard to treaties of extradition in general, that the person surrendered cannot be prosecuted or condemned ex-

* U. S. *v.* Watts, 14 Fed. Rep. 130; Com. *v.* Hawes, 13 Ken. 697.

cept for the crime in respect to which his extradition has been obtained. As to the treaty itself, it enumerates seven crimes for which the surrender of fugitives may be demanded. This enumeration is exclusive, and no one pretends that the fugitive can be demanded for any but the enumerated crimes. Not only this, but the language of Mr. Tyler in sending the treaty to Congress shows that "in this careful and specific enumeration of crimes the object has been to exclude all political offenses." But if, notwithstanding this, a fugitive could be extradited for a treaty crime, and then tried for a totally different offense, it is obvious that this safeguard would be entirely gone; he might be tried for treason just as well as for burglary. The surrendering government is made by the treaty the sole judge, not only as to the adequacy of the proofs submitted, but of the question whether the facts proved constitute an offense under its laws, and especially whether under those laws the offense is political in character. This right would be entirely destroyed if a fugitive could be tried for a totally different offense from that for which he was given up to be tried. The legislation of both countries confirms these views. The act of Parliament of 1843 directs that the fugitive shall be surrendered "to be tried for the crime of which such person shall be so accused," and the language of our act of 1848 is identically the same.

There is no doubt that some of the earlier decisions, in which this question has been considered, took a different view. In the case of Adriance *v.* Lagrave,* the defendant, after being extradited for a treaty crime, was arrested on civil process. The Supreme Court of New York discharged him, but the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, declaring that the courts could not interfere in such a case. The point, however, is widely different from that under discussion in the Watts case, and the decision can hardly be regarded as an authority with respect to it.

The case of Caldwell,† decided in 1871 by Judge Benedict in the Southern District of New York, is undoubtedly in conflict with the California case, as well as the subsequent case of Lawrence, decided by the same judge, on the authority of the earlier decision. Caldwell was indicted for bribing an officer of the United States. He pleaded that he was brought into the jurisdiction of the court on a charge of forgery under an extradition treaty. The Government demurred to the plea, and the court

* 1 Hun, 689; 59 N. Y., 110. † 8 Bl., 131.

held that the prisoner could not avail himself of the defense, chiefly on the ground that "to hold otherwise" would "permit a person accused of crime to put the Government on trial for its dealings with a foreign power." It is hard to see how this meets the difficulty of jurisdiction. The bearing of the provisions of the treaty on the question do not seem to have been considered. The question of the right of the prisoner to raise the objection is disposed of by Judge Hoffman, in the following conclusive way:

"It remains to be determined whether the immunity from prosecution for crimes other than that for which the fugitive has been surrendered can be enforced by the Court, or only by the intervention of the political hand of the Government. This point has already been incidentally discussed. If I am right in supposing with the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, that the treaty, by necessary implication, prohibits the trial of the offender for any offense but that for which he has been extradited, the question is answered. The treaty is 'the supreme law of the land,' and as binding on the Courts as a statutory enactment. If it contained an express prohibition the Court would, beyond doubt, be deprived of its jurisdiction. If, by a just and reasonable interpretation the prohibition must be implied, the same result follows. It may be added that, assuming that the receiving power has no right to try the fugitive except for the offense for which he has been surrendered, the immunity so guaranteed is a right of the prisoner, and can be far more surely and conveniently asserted before the Courts than by diplomatic intervention. The wealthy and influential criminal might generally be able to secure the interposition of the surrendering government for his protection. But the poor and obscure offender might have no means of drawing the attention of that government to his case. It would be inconvenient, if not impossible, for the ambassador of the surrendering power to keep his eye on every case of an extradited fugitive with a view of interposing in case he should be put to trial for any other crime than that for which he was surrendered. If the protection of the fugitive be left solely to the political or executive power, the attempt to afford it would, in the United States, be attended by peculiar difficulties. In cases where the extradition has been obtained for an offense against the laws of the United States, the President could easily interfere, by directing the District Attorney to abandon the prosecution. But when the criminal has been surrendered for an offense against the laws of a State (as most frequently happens), neither he nor the Governor of the State has any such power. The latter may pardon, but he cannot control the District Attorney or the Court. If, therefore, the immunity of the fugitive cannot be enforced by the Courts, it can, in the United States, be effectually secured only by an amendment to the treaty or by an act of Congress."

It is obvious that this judicial view of the matter disposes of the chief unsettled questions with regard to extradition, so far as this country is concerned. Of course, other judges may

reach different conclusions; but it seems fair to say that the weight of judicial authority is now in favor of the position that a fugitive from justice, expressly surrendered for one crime, cannot be tried for another and totally different crime, and that the prisoner may have redress, as in any other case where the Court has no jurisdiction over him.

With regard to the English extradition act of 1870, that statute would in a great measure lose its importance if the judicial view above stated were generally acted upon. At the same time, our objection to the English extradition act of 1870 as an attempt by means of municipal regulations to impose a condition upon the surrender of criminals not to be found in the treaty, is perfectly valid. The international law of extradition is to be found in the treaty, and nowhere else. If we violate it, the remedy is not by act of Parliament, which cannot alter or affect treaty obligations. Our Government, it seems to us, was perfectly right in refusing to give the pledge required by the English extradition act, simply because the treaty requires no pledge. We have always maintained that an international obligation cannot be enlarged or diminished by municipal legislation; and the point was expressly raised and debated in the Alabama controversy, when the English Government maintained that its obligation as a neutral was to be found in its foreign enlistment act, while we insisted that it was independent of that or any act of Parliament, and rested upon the law of nations. In the same way the international obligations with regard to the extradition of criminals are to be found in the Ashburton Treaty and nowhere else, and we can never for a moment admit that a subsequent act of Parliament can impose restrictions not to be found in the treaty.

But, meantime, what possible interest has either country in keeping alive the dispute? It is not apparent why there should be any further trouble between England and the United States on the subject. The criminal law of both countries is substantially the same, and their interest in the suppression of crime identical. England can desire nothing more seriously than not to be used as an asylum for the malefactors of this country, and it cannot possibly be for our interest to harbor or protect English criminals here. Owing to the community of language, laws, and institutions, there are no two countries in the world between which the extradition of criminals ought to be more certain and

easy. There are only two cases in which there is any room for making an exception to this rule: that of offenses which the two countries regard and punish in a different way, or with a different degree of severity, and political offenses. Crimes against the revenue are in the United States punished with great severity, and, owing to the international difference of policy on this subject, we can hardly expect Great Britain to be very zealous about sending home criminals who have violated our customs laws. With regard to political offenses, there is no room for any difference of opinion or dispute. Neither nation has ever tolerated the idea of the surrender of political refugees for trial in their own country. This is all that is generally meant by the "right of asylum."

Notwithstanding all this, our treaty with England, which has been in force for forty years, covers only seven specified crimes: murder, assault with intent to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, and the utterance of forged paper. If we review the general progress of our extradition policy as exhibited in our treaties with other powers, we shall see that there has been a steady tendency to enlarge the list, and also to provide against all possible trouble such as has arisen with England. From the year 1842 to the present time, the United States has been continually engaged in making extradition treaties with foreign powers, and in each new treaty new crimes have been provided for. In 1843, in the treaty with France, rape was added, and in an additional article adopted in 1845, burglary; in 1858, we agreed with the same country to extend the provisions of the treaty to counterfeiting, and circulating counterfeit coin, and embezzlement by employees or servants. The treaty of 1850 with the Swiss Confederation covers "intimidation or forcible entry of an inhabited house," and embezzlement by public officers. By the treaty of 1861 with Mexico, larceny of goods to the value of twenty-five dollars was added. This process has continued down to the present day, the policy of Government in extradition negotiations being to cover the common dangerous offenses against life and property. Of course, the addition of new offenses is made piecemeal, as each new treaty comes up for negotiation, but there is no reason to believe that if we were now making a convention with England it would not embrace at least as many crimes as that made with Spain in 1877, in which fourteen different classes of offenses, with many subdivisions, are provided for.

But, besides a great increase in the list of extraditable offenses, our recent treaties show that it is the general policy of our Government to exclude by express provision from the operations of the treaty all offenses of a political character. The third article of the treaty with Spain provides that "this convention shall not import claim of extradition for any crime or offense of a political character, nor for acts connected with such crimes or offenses; and no person surrendered by or to either of the contracting parties in virtue of this convention shall be tried or punished for any political crime or offense, nor for any act connected therewith, committed previously to the extradition." Similar provisions are to be found in our treaty with Turkey, made in 1874; with Belgium in the same year; with Ecuador in 1872; with Orange Free State, made in 1871; with Peru, made in 1870; with Nicaragua, made in 1870; with San Salvador, in the same year; with Italy, made in 1868; with the Dominican Republic, made in 1867; with Hayti, made in 1864; with Mexico, made in 1861; with Venezuela, made in 1860; with Sweden and Norway in the same year; with Baden in 1857; with Austria in 1856; and even in a treaty as old as that made with France in 1843.

These facts show, if any one were disposed to doubt it, that our extradition policy, as exhibited in our treaties with foreign powers, steadily tends in the direction of an enlargement of the list of extraditable crimes, and an express exclusion of political offenses. Precisely the same thing is true of the point on which all our difficulties with England as to extradition have hitherto turned—the question whether a criminal surrendered for a crime specified in a treaty of extradition can be tried for another and a totally different crime. If we look into our existing treaties, we shall see at a glance what is the present policy of the country with regard to this when the matter has been actually provided for by negotiation. The subject seems first to have attracted attention in the course of the negotiations with Italy, and the treaty of 1868 with that country provides that "the person or persons delivered up for the crimes enumerated in the preceding article shall, in no case, be tried for any ordinary crime committed previously to that for which his or their surrender is asked." This provision seems to prevent the trial of the criminal for any crime except the ones enumerated in the article. A similar provision was inserted in the treaty with San Salvador of 1870, and with Nicaragua of the same year.

The matter is more explicitly provided for in the treaty with Ecuador of 1872, which provides that extradited criminals "shall not be prosecuted for any crime committed previously to that for which his or their extradition may be asked." The treaty with Belgium of 1874 contains a similar provision; but the most distinct and explicit provision to be found is that contained in the Spanish treaty already referred to, made in 1877: "No person shall be tried for any crime or offense other than that for which he was surrendered, unless such crime be one of those enumerated in Article II.," *i. e.*, a treaty crime.

All these facts point in one direction, that there is nothing in our general extradition policy hostile to enlarging the meager list of offenses contained in the Ashburton treaty; nor to providing by treaty against trial for a different offense from that for which the surrender is made; nor against an express exclusion of political offenses. The Winslow correspondence is now deprived of most of its importance by such judicial decisions as that of the Kentucky Court of Appeals and Judge Hoffman. What is needed is a new treaty which will dispose of the matter in the same way that we have disposed of it with a dozen other foreign countries.

A. G. SEDGWICK.

THE

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

JUNE, 1883.

**No. 319.**

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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1883.

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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

## JUNE, 1883.


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SOUTH END.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXIX.

JUNE, 1883.

# AMERICAN MANUFACTURING INTERESTS.

THE interest awakened in regard to the manufacturing industries of the United States by the recent tariff discussions in Congress suggests the propriety of considering some of the more important circumstances attending the genesis and development of American manufactures.

The establishment of manufactures on the shores of the western world was contemporaneous with its earliest settlement. The artisan came with the trader, the agriculturist, the schoolmaster, and the preacher. Up to the time of the Revolution, a large proportion of the colonial manufactures was the product of household industries. These industries gave employment to both the male and the female members of families. Alexander Hamilton said, as late as the year 1792: "It is computed, in a number of districts, that two-thirds, three-fourths, and even four-fifths of all the clothing of the inhabitants is made by themselves." But the increasing population and wealth of the colonies early gave rise to manufactories devoted to special industries. Furnaces and forges were constructed for the manufacture of iron and steel, and manufactories of vehicles, household furniture, farm implements, hats and caps, glass, woolen and cotton goods, silk goods, linen goods, leather, gunpowder, paper, books, sugar, and other articles, were

established in several of the colonies, but chiefly in New York and New England. From the very beginning, the colonists exhibited a marked aptitude for mechanical pursuits. The exigencies of their social, industrial, and commercial life excited the quest for discoveries, and stimulated genius to new inventions and adaptations. The fact that they were so far removed from the methods which characterized European mechanical industries gave a stamp of originality to American manufactures, which, in later days, has manifested itself in the peculiarities of a thousand mechanic arts. The success of the industrial enterprises of the colonists was based upon faculty and wholesome lives. Through the tuition of self-culture, from generation to generation, inventive genius became an inherited instinct.

From an early date the mother country bitterly opposed the establishment of manufactures in the American colonies, her avowed policy being to confine their external commerce to the exportation of products of agriculture, of the forest, and of the fisheries, to England alone and in British ships, and in return to supply them with the products of her own manufactories. But this policy served only to illustrate the irony of events. In the end, it proved to be protective and stimulating, and not repressive of the colonial industries. The restraints imposed by the British Government in connection with the duties laid upon colonial produce when imported into Great Britain, and the great cost of transporting the crude products of the colonies across the Atlantic Ocean, left little to them for their labor. In order, therefore, to supply their needs, they were forced to create a market for their products by becoming their own artificers. Household mechanical industry increased, and hundreds of manufactories were established in the several colonies. The sales of goods of colonial manufacture were at first confined to the towns or neighborhoods in which they were produced, but soon were extended to greater distances. An intercolonial trade thus sprang up which was the beginning of the enormous internal commerce of the United States of the present day. After awhile, the colonies were enabled to export their manufactured products to foreign countries, and they did so to a considerable extent, in defiance of the edicts of the mother country.

The laws of Parliament and the orders of the British Board of Trade, for the suppression of American manufactures, were, from the beginning, almost entirely inoperative, owing to the

impracticability of administering them. It was found to be impossible to distinguish between household manufactures and manufactures for sale, or between the products of flouring-mills, fulling-mills, and the like, erected for the purpose of supplying the demands of neighborhoods, and those established with a view to trade between the colonies and with foreign countries. The impracticability of enforcing the repressive measures in regard to American manufactures was clearly recognized by the colonial governors. About the year 1715, Lord Cornbury, Governor of the Colony of New York, said, in an official report: "I myself have seen serge made upon Long Island that any man may wear. Now, if they begin to make serge, they will, in time, make coarse cloth, and then fine cloth." He adds some dolorous remarks in regard to the insubordinate attitude assumed by the colonists even at that early date. In 1754, the British Board of Trade rebuked the amiable Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, for having incorporated "A society for setting up rival manufactories, as the passing of such laws in the colonies has always been restrained."

The persistent and open violation of the edicts of the British Board of Trade, regarding manufacturing enterprises, begat a feeling of confidence on the part of the colonists in their ability to resist British oppression. The vigorous growth attained by American manufactures during the colonial period is evidenced by the fact that the colonists were able to meet all their home needs, and besides to clothe their army and to supply its commissariat during the terrible struggle of the seven years' war. Not the remotest allusion is made in the Declaration of Independence to the repressive measures of Great Britain in regard to colonial manufactures, and it is believed that such mention would have been more likely to provoke a smile than to excite indignation. Besides, a charge of this nature, even if sustained, was not one upon which the colonists themselves could have united.

The predominant public sentiment in the United States regarding American manufactures, at the time of the organization of the Federal Government, is clearly formulated in the following preamble to the Act of August 10, 1790, the second Act of the first Congress:

"Whereas, it is necessary for the support of the Government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported," etc.

In his message to Congress, dated January 8, 1790, President Washington invited the attention of that body to the importance of promoting manufactures. On the 15th of January, the House of Representatives, by resolution, referred this portion of the President's message to Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, "to prepare and report a proper plan, or plans, conformably to the recommendation of the President."

Hamilton's memorable report in reply to this resolution was submitted to the next Congress. It has perhaps justly been regarded as the ablest of all his State papers. He devoted to it nearly two years. It was the result of extensive inquiries and investigations in the United States and in foreign countries, and of patient study and reflection. If it had been the only public act of his life, it would have stamped him as a statesman of transcendent ability. He recommended a vigorous system of protection and encouragement of American industries by means of duties on imports, bounties, and premiums. It must be remembered that these measures were, in a high degree, retaliatory, similar measures being at that time enforced by other commercial nations. It should also be observed that he did not announce the measures which he advocated as being applicable to all countries and at all times.

Even in Hamilton's day objections were strenuously made to any form of legislation having in view the direct object of protecting American manufactures as against the competition of foreign manufactures. It was urged that the country ought to devote its chief attention to agriculture, and that any assistance extended to manufactures by means of duties on imports was, in effect, a tax upon the agricultural interests of the country. It was even held that agriculture was not only the most productive, but the only productive industry. Hamilton, in his report, felt himself called upon to consider this and other objections. He did so patiently and seriously, but between the lines it is not difficult to read his keen apprehension of the absurdity of these objections. He had not at his command the requisite statistics which would enable him to prove conclusively the correctness of his views,—a fact which he frankly admitted; but, by the intuitions of his transcendent genius as a statesman, he clearly foresaw and ably maintained that which has since become a matter of demonstration, namely, that labor in manufactures is equal, if, indeed, not superior in its productiveness of indi-

vidual and national wealth, to labor in agriculture, and that manufacturing industries are not only in the highest degree promotive of the interests of agriculture, of mining, and of commerce, but that they are absolutely essential to the prosperity of those interests.

Hamilton also urged the importance of aiding manufactures, upon the ground that the division of labor and the use of machinery in manufactures involve a great variety of employments, "thereby furnishing a greater scope of usefulness for the diversity of talents and disposition which discriminate men from each other, and a more ample field for enterprise." Besides, he maintained that the home market for the surplus products of the soil which would be created by the promotion of manufactures would be far more steady and reliable than foreign markets.

Notwithstanding the earnest utterances of Washington and the cogent reasonings of Hamilton, the principles which they enunciated regarding American manufactures have ever since been hotly contested. During the last fifty years there has been taught, in a large proportion of the schools and colleges of this country, a political economy as cold toward American manufactures as though they were a fungoid parasite upon American enterprise, instead of being, as they are, the best product of its vital forces. It is proposed here to consider how far the postulates and the predictions of Hamilton have been sustained by clearly ascertained and recorded facts expressive of the commercial and industrial experiences of the country. Attention will also be invited to the relations now existing between the manufacturing industries and the other great business interests of the country.

The conditions under which manufactures are carried on have, since the days of Hamilton, undergone radical changes, as the result of the increase and expansion of population, the introduction and extension of railroads, and the greatly increased facilities for transportation which we now enjoy, and as the result also of important discoveries, inventions, and adaptations. The variety of manufactured articles has been almost infinitely increased, and their ministration to the needs, tastes, and habits of the people has been multiplied a thousand fold. For more than half a century after Hamilton wrote his grand essay, the highest guarantee of the quality of many articles of merchan-

dise was to say that they were imported; but during the last twenty-five years the best assurance of the superiority of similar articles is to say that they are of American manufacture. When John Randolph felt like going out of his way to kick a sheep, he had to send his pamphlets across the Atlantic ocean, in a slow sailing vessel, in order to get them neatly bound, and he was happy if they came back to him within a year. But all that is changed. Hundreds of manufactured articles, formerly imported, are now supplied in our own markets exclusively by American artisans. With respect to certain other articles, the American manufacturer is able to compete in foreign markets with the manufacturers of other countries. The value of the exports of products of manufacture from the United States increased from $45,658,873 in 1860 to $103,132,481 in 1882, exceeding in the latter year the total value of imports into the United States during the year 1840.

It is not of course practicable here to trace the history of the struggle between the advocates and the opponents of governmental protection of manufactures from the time of Hamilton to the present day. Suffice it to say, that while neither policy has ever been fully adopted, the preponderance of public sentiment has been sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. Attention will here be confined to the growth of the manufacturing industries of the United States since the year 1850, but especially since the year 1860.

According to the census, the value of the products of manufactures in the United States was, in 1850, $1,019,106,616; in 1860, $1,885,861,676; in 1870, $3,432,415,933; * and in 1880, $5,369,579,-191. During the period from 1860 to 1880 the manufacturing industries of the United States were more highly protected than during any previous period in the history of the country. The average *ad valorem* rate on imported merchandise was increased from fourteen per cent. in 1861 to forty-two per cent. in 1865. It is an historical fact, however, that this large increase of duties was prompted by the needs of national defense and not by any prevailing sentiment in favor of the protection of American enterprise. As the result of the large increase of duties on imports, the customs revenues increased from $39,038,269 in 1861 to $177,056,523 in 1866. Although the duties on tea and coffee

*Reduced to specie values.

were reduced in 1870 and abolished in 1872, and other reductions of duties were subsequently made, the aggregate duties on imports during the year ending June 30, 1882, had increased to $216,138,916.

At the same time the foreign commerce of the United States grew more rapidly than ever before. The total value of exports increased from $333,576,057 in 1860 to $835,638,658 in 1880, and the value of imports increased from $353,616,119 in 1860 to $667,954,746 in 1880. During the same period agriculture, mining, internal commerce, and all the other great businees interests of the country advanced more rapidly than ever before. The railroad mileage of the country increased from 30,635 miles in 1860 to 93,671 miles in 1880. Inventive genius, also, was stimulated as never before in the history of the country, the number of patents issued having increased from 4,819 in 1860 to 13,947 in 1880.

We have next to consider the concurrent development and present condition of the manufacturing, commercial, transportation, and banking interests of the United States from 1860 to 1880, and, in so far as may be practicable, to trace the influence exerted by the growth of our manufacturing industries upon the development of the other great business interests of the country.

*Agriculture.*—The relative value of the products of manufactures and of agriculture can only be stated approximately. It is estimated that the total value of the products of agriculture during the census year, 1880, amounted to $3,600,000,000.*

The value of the products of manufactures is stated by the census at $5,369,579,191. If from this we subtract the value of materials used in the processes of manufacture, viz., $3,396,823,549, it leaves in round numbers $2,000,000,000. The census, however, takes no account of any establishment the value of the products of which during the census year was less than $500. It also omits all products of manufactures carried on by railroad

* This is an estimate made by Mr. J. R. Dodge, Statistician of the Department of Agriculture, and Special Agent of the Census for the Collection of Statistics in regard to Agriculture. The census gives $2,213,402,564 as the estimated value of farm productions. This, however, does not include the increased value of live stock, nor the value of the products of pasturage on the public lands. It also omits to a very large extent products of horticulture.

companies, products of quartz milling, petroleum refining, gas works, and newspaper establishments. The question also arises, in attempting to make a comparison between the value of the products of agriculture and of manufactures, as to whether, if the value of materials is subtracted from the value of products of manufacture, the value of fertilizers and other materials should not also be subtracted from the gross value of products of agriculture. Besides all this, it is known that there is considerable duplication in the total census valuation of products of manufacture. From the best information which can be obtained, it is estimated that the value of products of manufacture in the United States is from eighty to ninety per cent. of the value of the products of agriculture.

Contemporaneously with the increase in the value of products of manufacture, from $1,885,861,676 in 1860 to $5,369,579,191* in 1880, there was an increase in the acreage of land in farms from 407,000,000 acres in 1860 to 536,000,000 acres in 1880,—an increase of thirty-two per cent., and an increase in the value of farms of from $6,645,045,007 in 1860 to $10,197,096,776 in 1880, or fifty-three per cent.

The importance of manufactures to agriculture is indicated by the following facts in regard to the value of products of agriculture consumed in this country and exported to foreign countries: The total value of the products of agriculture in 1880, as before stated, amounted to about $3,600,000,000, this being the value on the farm. The farm value of the exports of products of agriculture during the year ending June 30, 1880, amounted, however, to only about $500,000,000, showing that eighty-six per cent. of the total value of products of agriculture was consumed in the United States, and that only fourteen per cent. was exported to foreign countries. In other words, the quantity consumed at home was six times that sent abroad.

The extent to which the home market for agricultural products is sustained by manufacturing industries may be inferred from the following facts in regard to occupations: According to the census of 1880 there were in the United States 17,392,099 persons having occupations, of whom about 3,600,000, or twenty-one per cent., were employed in manufacturing and mechanical industries. Presumably, the earnings of these persons supplied

*Census valuation, the values of materials being included in both cases.

the means of support to at least 10,000,000 persons, including all workers and those directly dependent upon them for the means of living. Besides this, the manufacturing industries of the country were an essential condition to the employment of a large proportion of the 234,228 persons engaged in mining, the 4,074,238 persons rendering personal and professional services, and the 1,810,256 persons employed in trade and transportation. It must be remembered, also, that manufactures give rise not only to a very large and constant demand for products of agriculture as food, but also for such products as materials in the mechanic arts. It is, of course, impossible, even approximately, to estimate the total number of persons actually employed in agriculture, in mining, in trade, or in transportation, or rendering personal or professional services who, together with their families, in a greater or less degree, indirectly owe their means of support to manufactures. The foregoing facts in regard to the number of persons engaged in the various occupations also serve, in a striking manner, to illustrate the importance of manufactures to the interests of labor.

The relations of agriculture to home markets are, perhaps, more clearly indicated by the following fact: The total value of the products of agriculture exported during the year ending June 30, 1882, amounted to $552,219,819, of which $512,867,989, or ninety-three per cent., consisted of cotton, breadstuffs, provisions, and live animals, leaving only $39,351,830, or seven per cent., as the value of all other agricultural products exported. But, from the best information which can be obtained, it appears that about ninety-five per cent. of the total value of the exports of breadstuffs, live animals, and provisions was the product of our great surplus-producing Western States. The area within which cotton is exclusively produced is well known. These facts, therefore, clearly show that the agricultural interests of the New England States, and of the other Atlantic seaboard States north of the cotton belt, depend almost entirely upon home markets, *i. e.*, markets mainly sustained by manufacturing industries. Besides, it is evident from what has just been stated that the farmers of the Western States depend almost entirely upon home markets for the sale of all their products other than grain, provisions, and live animals, and that the farmers of the Southern States depend almost entirely upon home markets for the sale of all their productions other than cotton. It is a cheer-

ing sign of progress that the people of the Southern States are beginning to appreciate, more highly than ever before, the importance of developing their own home markets by encouraging manufactures.

The immediate relations sustained by manufactures to the several sections of the country are indicated by the following facts in regard to the distribution of manufacturing and mechanical industries: According to the census of 1880 the products of manufacture in the United States were distributed thus: twenty-one per cent. in the New England States; forty-one per cent. in the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and the District of Columbia; twenty-nine and a half per cent. in the Western and North-western States; two and a half per cent. in the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida; three and a half per cent. in the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas; and two and a half per cent. in the States of California, Oregon, and Nevada. These facts show the extent to which the manufacturing industries of the United States have become nationalized.

Within the memory of men of middle age, the great West was dependent almost entirely upon the East and upon foreign countries for manufactured products. But the value of the manufactures of that section increased from $346,675,290 in 1860 to $1,583,235,706 in 1880. During the latter year, the value of the products of manufacture of the Western and North-western States was fifty per cent. greater than the total value of the products of manufacture in the United States in 1850, and almost equal to the total value of the manufactures of the country in 1860. The very fact of the movement of manufactures toward the great surplus-producing agricultural area of the West clearly proves the mutuality of interest existing between those two great branches of industry.

Through the improvement and extension of the facilities for transportation, and the growing tendency on the part of local traders to purchase "at first hand," the manufacturer has, to a great extent, become a merchant, and local points of manufacture have thus become centers of trade. The products of the manufactures of the West are now shipped not only to all points in the Western States, but also extensively to the Southern States, and to the Eastern States, and certain articles are even

exported to foreign countries. In view of the present rate of increase of manufactures in the Western States, the rapid growth and improvement in the facilities for transportation by rail, and the constant tendency of population westward, it appears safe to predict that, if nothing shall occur to repress the present prosperity of the manufacturing industries of those States during the remaining years of the century, there will be developed between the agricultural and the manufacturing industries of those States a commerce equal in magnitude to the foreign commerce of the United States at the present time. Experience has proved that the domestic commerce thus created will be much more steady and reliable, and, in all probability, in the end more productive of individual and national wealth than trade with foreign countries.

The answer to the old question—more speculative, perhaps, than practical—as to the relative productiveness of agricultural and manufacturing enterprises is, to a certain extent, indicated by the census. The capital employed in the manufactories enumerated in the census amounted to $2,790,272,606, and the value given to materials in the processes of manufacture, as before stated, amounted approximately to $2,000,000,000, or 71 per cent. of the capital employed. The value of farms, including land, fences, and buildings, was $10,197,096,776, and the value of all agricultural productions during the census year is estimated at $3,600,000,000, or about 35 per cent. of the value of property in farms. From this it would appear that the relative productiveness of capital in manufacturing and in agriculture is as 71 to 35, or two to one. This is, of course, merely a special view of the subject.

Although the average wages paid and the average profits realized in manufacturing industries are greater than the average wages and profits in agricultural pursuits, yet this is offset by the fact that the risks and uncertainties attending the former are greater than those attending the latter. It is impracticable to institute accurate comparisons between the wages, the modes of living, and the expenses of living of persons employed in manufactures and of persons employed in agriculture, or to compare the comforts or the social advantages enjoyed by persons engaged in, or dependent upon, these two very unlike branches of industry. Nor would it be very profitable to attempt to institute such comparisons.

*Mining.*—The total coal product of the United States amounted during the year 1880 to 71,067,576 tons, of which about one-third was used as a generator of power in the manufacturing industries of the country. The population of the United States increased from 31,443,321 in 1860 to 50,155,783 in 1880, an increase of 59 per cent.; but the coal product of the country increased from 15,173,409 tons in 1860 to 71,067,576 tons in 1880, an increase of 368 per cent. As the demands for household purposes probably did not increase very much faster than the population, and the exports of coal amounted to only 187,059 tons in 1860 and to only 615,260 tons in 1880, the increased product was undoubtedly chiefly due to the increased demand for coal as a source of motive power in manufactures and in internal transportation.

The mining of all metalic ores, other than those of the precious metals, is not only intimately connected with, but almost entirely dependent upon manufactures. The increased production of pig iron, from 884,474 tons in 1860 to 4,623,323 in 1882, was almost entirely the result of the growth of the iron and steel manufactures of the United States. This is shown by the fact that only 6,346 tons of pig iron were exported during the year ending June 30, 1882.

*Transportation.*—The advantages realized by the transportation interests of the country from manufactures cannot be stated with precision. About ten per cent. of the east bound, and ninety per cent. of the west bound traffic of the great East and West trunk lines, consist of products of manufactures. From the best information which can be procured, it is estimated that manufactured articles, together with materials and the coal required for supplying motive power in manufacturing industries, constitute about one-half of the freight tonnage of the railroads of the United States. It is probable that considerably more than one-half of the freight receipts of railroads is derived from the transportation of manufactured articles and of material and coal required in their production. This is evident from the fact that the higher and better paying classes of freight consist chiefly of manufactured articles.*

* The rates per hundred pounds prevailing at the present time on railroad freight between New York and Chicago are as follows: West bound, first-class, seventy-five cents; second-class, sixty cents; third-class, forty-five cents; fourth-class, thirty-five cents. East bound, first-class, one dollar; second-class, eighty-five cents; ninth-class, forty cents; tenth-class, thirty-five cents.

It may be observed here that a very considerable proportion of the products of agriculture is consumed upon the farm, or in the immediate neighborhood where they are produced, and does not require transportation by rail or on water lines, whereas almost all the products of manufacture, being articles of commerce, do involve such transportation services.

The establishment of manufactures in the large towns and cities of the country has given rise to a most salutary regulating influence over transportation charges on railroads. During the last twenty years competition has arisen between the different manufacturing centers of the West, and also between those points and the manufacturing towns and cities of the Atlantic seaboard. As railroads depend very largely for traffic upon the industrial interests of the manufacturing towns and cities situated upon their lines, railroad managers find it necessary so to adjust rates as to enable those towns and cities to compete with rival manufacturing centers situated on other roads. By this means rail rates have, to a very considerable extent, become indirectly subject to the influence of the law of supply and demand in its operation upon prices. This involves important considerations having a direct bearing upon the railroad problem of the country.

*Internal Commerce.*—The importance of the relations sustained by manufactures to the internal commerce of the United States is indicated by the fact, that the value of the latter is estimated to be at least twenty times as great as the value of the foreign commerce of the country. The facts already presented as to the relations of manufactures to agriculture, to mining, and to transportation, serve also to illustrate the importance of the relations sustained by manufactures to internal commerce.

The total value of the products of manufactures, according to the census of 1880, was $5,369,579,191,* of which only about $100,000,000, or two per cent. was exported, ninety-eight per cent. having been consumed at home, or, in other words, become the subject of internal commerce.

The increased value of manufactures from $1,885,861,676 in 1860 to $5,369,579,191 in 1880, of course gave rise to an enormous increase in the internal commerce of the country. Manufactures now constitute the most important element of the commerce of

* This is subject to considerable reduction on account of unavoidable duplications of products of manufacture. There are, also, as before stated, large amounts of products of manufacture not embraced in this sum. It is, however, impossible to make any closer analysis at the present time.

large towns and cities. The prosperity even of New York City, the great commercial *entrepôt* of the country, at which port seventy-seven per cent. of our foreign commerce is carried on, is, in a much higher degree, dependent upon manufacturing industries than upon foreign commerce. During the year ending June 30, 1880, the value of the total foreign commerce at that city amounted to $852,497,243, the value of exports amounting to $392,560,090, and that of imports to $459,937,153. The total value of the manufactures of the city, however, during the census year, amounted to $472,926,437, and those of Brooklyn to $177,223,142. The total value of the manufactures of the two cities — commercially one city — amounting, therefore, to $650,149,579. But the manufacture and sale of every dollar's worth of products of manufacture probably contributed ten times as much toward the employment of labor and the sustenance of people in these cities as did every dollar's worth of foreign goods imported. The manufacturing industries of the two cities involved not only wages paid for the manufacture of goods, but also wages paid for transporting and receiving materials and coal, and delivering finished products. They also required the use of, and paid rental upon, a large amount of property in the manufacture and storage of merchandise. Besides, the manufactures of the two cities gave rise to a very large business in the purchase and sale of raw materials, and of finished products.

On the other hand, a large part of the foreign exports of New York City consisted of direct shipments from interior points to foreign countries, and another considerable portion paid little more than transfer and warehouse charges. A large portion of the imports of merchandise also passed directly through the city without paying to it any commercial tribute, excepting the incidental expenses of trans-shipment. Other imports paid little more than the expenses of trans-shipment and warehousing.

Besides the trade in the products of the manufactories of New York and Brooklyn, the city of New York also controls the trade, in an enormous amount, of the manufactured products of the New England States, New Jersey, and the State of New York, outside of the two cities mentioned. It is believed that if any person were to take the time to ascertain the value of the trade of wholesale houses in New York City dealing exclusively

in products of American manufacture to an amount equal in the aggregate to the value of the entire foreign commerce carried on, at, or through that city, he would be surprised to find how small a proportion of the business operations of the city his inquiries had covered.

It has already been shown that the products of agriculture in the United States which are exported consist almost entirely of products of the Western and North-western, and of the Southern States, and that the agriculturists of the Atlantic seaboard States depend almost entirely upon markets created by domestic industries and occupations. These facts, in connection with those just stated in relation to the magnitude of the manufactures of New York and Brooklyn and of the commerce carried on in those cities in the manufactures of the surrounding country, indicate to how much greater an extent the agricultural interests of the territory within a radius of two hundred miles of New York City depend upon home industries and home commerce than upon foreign commerce.

When the city of Baltimore reached the age of one hundred and fifty years, she celebrated the event by a procession in which were represented all her manufacturing and mechanical industries. The residents of that city were themselves even more astonished than were strangers by the evidences thus revealed to them of their own industrial resources. A similar exhibition of the industries of New York and Brooklyn, each establishment displaying upon a banner above its exhibit the value of annual product and number of hands employed, would be a much greater surprise, not only to the people of those two cities, but to the whole country. The relations of the agricultural industries of the surrounding country to the manufacturing industries of those two cities might also be forcibly illustrated in the procession by a line of Long Island farm-wagons, loaded with products of market gardening sufficient to supply merely for one day the requirements of all the people in the two cities who are either directly or indirectly dependent for the means of support upon manufacturing enterprises and domestic commerce. The entire exhibition would be an object lesson worth far more for practical instruction in the realities of living than volumes upon political economy.

It is a matter of interest here to advert to the fact that the city of Baltimore, by an ordinance approved February 8, 1881,

authorized the abatement of all taxes upon tools, machinery, engines, etc., constituting the plant of manufacturing establishments in that city. It is stated that this protective measure, in spite of the plausible, though flimsy, sophism as to "Taxing the many for the benefit of the few," met in an especial degree the approval of tax-payers, whose taxes were thereby increased.

The importance of manufactures to the internal commerce of the country is also illustrated in the commercial and industrial experiences of a thousand towns and cities throughout the country. Twenty-five years ago, the cities of Mobile, New Orleans, and Galveston largely dominated the trade of the States situated south of the Ohio River and south of the State of Missouri, but now that trade is mainly controlled by the cities of Cincinnati, Louisville, and St. Louis, and consists largely in the sale of products of the industries of those cities. It was estimated by the Superintendent of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce that the total value of the sales of merchandise at that city amounted in 1881 to $254,000,000, of which the value of goods manufactured in Cincinnati, and there sold, amounted to $150,000,000, and the value of goods purchased abroad and sold in the course of a purely distributive commerce amounted to $104,000,000.

The people of the Western towns and cities generally have, within the last fifteen years, been brought to realize the fact that the trade in the products of their own industries is much more reliable and profitable than their jobbing or wholesale trade. Besides, they have seen that manufactures retain in a city a most desirable class. The social advantages afforded by manufacturing industries, whereby the various members of families can be held together in a single community, is a consideration of very great importance. This suggests the humanities which attach to the encouragement of American manufactures,—a view which Hamilton clearly had in mind, and which appeals to human sympathy. A pleasing instance of the active manifestation of this spirit is presented in the work of the Society of Decorative Art of New York City, a society conducted by ladies. These ladies appear to be moved, not only by a noble and discreet philanthropy, but also by the awakened æsthetic sense of our people, a sense which, separated from all silly sentimentality and foolishness which would degrade it, is opening up new avenues of useful employment, and new sources of enjoyment in living. One of the aims of the society is "to induce art

workers to master thoroughly the details of some one kind of decoration in order to attain skill, and make for themselves a reputation of commercial value."

*Banking.* The important relations sustained by manufactures to banking and the finance of commerce are clearly understood by every banker and business man in the country. It is impossible to state the amount of bank capital held by manufacturers, or the proportion of bank credits which is based upon manufactured articles. It is believed, however, that the total amount of such credits is greater than the total amount of credits based upon products of agriculture.

From the foregoing statements it appears that manufactures, and commerce, and agriculture, and mining, and transportation, and banking, and the other great business interests of the country, take hold on each other in innumerable ways, and that, as elements of national prosperity, they are one and inseparable. The depression of one or more of the great manufacturing or mechanical industries of the country would injuriously affect all other business interests, and might result in serious disaster.

As a rule, it is not possible to trace the chain of causation through complex and involved issues, but the dependence of great material interests is sometimes so obvious as clearly to reveal the relation of cause and effect. It is believed that the facts here presented indicate that in a true sense and in a high degree this relation is sustained by our manufacturing industries to the other great business interests of the country. From these facts it appears evident that the protection which has been accorded to American manufacturers has wrought beneficially, and that it is abundantly justified by its results. It would be an idle impeachment of the intelligence and enterprise of our countrymen to assert that home competition in almost all branches of industry is not adequate to the regulation of prices within the limits of fair commercial profits. Exceptional industries, which usually run to monopoly, should, of course, be held amenable to special treatment.

We can only glance at the complex and difficult question as to the adjustment of the tariff to the special needs of different industries which, in varying degrees, require protection through the imposition of duties upon imports. American manufactures may, with respect to such aid, be classified as follows: First, the large and exceedingly important class of industries which need

protection. Second, industries which, from the force of circumstances especially favorable to production in this country, need little, if any, protection in our own markets; and, Third, a much smaller class of industries, which not only need no protection in our own markets, but which, on account of circumstances even more favorable than those pertaining to the class just referred to, are able to meet foreign competition in the markets of other countries. Certain of these industries once stood in need of protection.

So long as the wages paid for labor are from 50 to 150 per cent. greater in the United States than in competing foreign countries, there will be a large class of important industries in this country, one of the conditions to the success of which will be protection, through discriminating duties, against foreign competition in our own markets. The practical question to be considered is the equitable adjustment of duties so as to place such industries under as favorable circumstances as are enjoyed by other of our industries which need no protection. Protection of the sort referred to is not now, and never has been, confined to manufactures. It extends also to agriculture and to mining. The amount of duties collected on imports into the United States during the year ending June 30, 1882, was $216,138,916; of which $71,945,900, or thirty-three and a third per cent., was collected on products of agriculture, and $1,116,000, or half of one per cent., on products of mining.

Formerly, the cost of transportation, both upon the ocean and on railroads, in this country operated in a much higher degree than at the present time as a protection to American manufactures. This has had an important bearing upon the manufactures of the Western and North-western States. The rail rates between Chicago and New York are, at the present time, only about one-half as great as the rates which prevailed between those cities in 1872.

The failure of the National Government to create a department charged with the duty of collecting and furnishing information in regard to manufactures appears strange in view of the fact that there is at Washington a Department of Agriculture, a Bureau of Mining, a Bureau of Education, and a bureau charged with the duty of supplying information in regard to commerce and transportation. This omission appears the more strange in view of the fact that, from the time of the opening of the first Congress, the tariff question — a question having a

direct and exceedingly important bearing upon the prosperity of the manufacturing industries of the country—has been almost constantly the subject of public debate, and has commanded a larger share of the attention of Congress than agriculture, and education, and commerce, and transportation, and mining all together.

It is a matter of deep interest, in conclusion, to advert to the fact that, in his memorable report already referred to, Alexander Hamilton maintained that the promotion of American manufactures would tend to develop both the internal and the foreign commerce of the country, and to advance the interests of agriculture, of mining, of transportation, of banking, and generally of credit in trade. He also clearly showed that the variety of employments afforded by manufactures would, in many ways, be conducive to the general welfare. The correctness of these views has been proved by the logic of events. That which Hamilton saw by faith, is now, in the light of experience, a matter of demonstration. It has been the principal object of this paper to present facts in regard to the industrial interests of the country which prove the wisdom of his policy and evidence the fulfillment of his predictions. History records the names of few other statesmen whose title to immortal fame has been so clearly vindicated by the results of policies which they have conspicuously announced and advocated.

The services rendered to his country by the first Secretary of the Treasury, in his advocacy of the interests of American manufactures, are believed to have been no less important, though at the time, and for many years afterward, they were less conspicuous than were his achievements as a financier in the establishment of the nation's credit; achievements which won for him Daniel Webster's splendid encomium,—"He smote the rock of the national resources, and abundant streams of revenue gushed forth. He touched the dead corpse of Public Credit, and it sprung upon its feet."

The advancement of manufactures to the front rank as a branch of the industrial interests of the United States,—largely the result of the line of policy which he proclaimed and earnestly commended to his countrymen,—the fulfillment of his grand predictions, and the consummation of his best hopes regarding the prosperity of the industries of his country, add increasing radiance to the glory of his illustrious name.

JOSEPH NIMMO, JR.

# PRESENT ASPECTS OF COLLEGE TRAINING.

THE American college is a well-defined institution. It may be large or small, rich or poor, good or bad, old or new, for men or for women, but it has characteristic features which are as familiar to the general public as they are to teachers and scholars. It is often compared with the gymnasium in Germany, the lycée in France, and the public school in England; but it differs from them all as they differ from one another. Its historical development, which can be traced, step by step, during two centuries and a half, has produced a national type, differing from the German, the French, and the English. Like the Constitution, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the public school system, and other civil institutions of the United States, it is here, and here to stay. For better or worse, it is our own. The offshoot of an English root, it bears the marks of that strong stock from which it came, modified, however, like the vine in California, by peculiarities of climate and of soil; and it deserves to be nurtured and pruned, according to the circumstances in which it is placed, without regard to the preservation of its likeness to ancestry or kindred. By its fruits it must be judged. Great changes have taken place in its organization, some of them so long ago that their advantages and disadvantages have been tested by experience, and others so recently that it is still a question whether the good effects surpass the bad. Discussion on college management, always rife in educated circles, has lately been more than ever outspoken. While it has touched on a number of details in which none but professional teachers or actual pupils can take part, it has also involved those general principles in which everybody is interested.

To understand what is going on, the reader must remember that the earliest American colleges were based upon the notion of a liberal education as it prevailed in England during the early

part of the seventeenth century,—a period by no means the best in university annals; a period antecedent to the writings of the principal authorities in English literature and science; a period when Protestantism was in the ascendant, but was still fettered by the usage of mediæval ecclesiasticism; a period when books were costly and when the instruments of scientific precision, which are the glory of these days, were utterly unknown; when the vocations of educated men were but few, and when "research," as we would use that word, was inadequately appreciated, except here and there by a man of genius who was superior to his age.

The early American college was planted in poverty, and in poverty it has thriven. That tenacity of purpose with which a few settlers in the wilderness held on to the idea of a liberal education, in spite of their scanty crops and scantier libraries, their wide separation from the old-world seats of learning, and their lack of professional teachers, is one of the noblest of many noble traits possessed by our forefathers, who were never so weary or so poor that they could not keep alive the altar-fires in the temples of religion and of learning. Their primitive foundations did not depend on royal bounty or on feudal liens; they were supported by free-will offerings from men and women in moderate circumstances, by the minister's savings and the widow's portion. It is only within the present generation that large donations have reached their coffers. The good and the bad we inherit in our collegiate systems were alike developed in the straitened school of necessity.

The founders of the original colleges were not only high-minded and self-sacrificing, but they were devoted to an ideal. They believed in the doctrine that intellectual power is worth more than intellectual acquisitions; that an education of all the mental faculties is better for the happiness of individual scholars and for the advancement of the community than a narrow training for a special pursuit. Accordingly, their educational system did not begin with professional seminaries, for the special training of any one class, but with schools of general culture, colleges of the liberal arts, as good as could be made with their resources and in that age. Instead of an academic staff made up of those who professed to teach some special branch of knowledge, these colleges had a master and fellows (or tutors), men who were fit to teach others those rudiments of higher learning in which they had themselves been taught. Moreover,

as years rolled on, instead of concentrating personal and pecuniary support upon a few of the oldest and most promising foundations, far-sighted men built up in every portion of the land colleges corresponding in their principal features with the original foundations, and depending for maintenance on the beneficence of individuals.

The history of the colonial foundations abounds in examples of the wisdom and self-sacrifice with which they were conducted under circumstances which called for devotion to a lofty ideal. No one can study the biography of their graduates without discovering that they were the men who molded the institutions of this country. It is easy to point out deficiencies in these academic organizations, as it is to criticise the defects of the emigrants' cabins and the foresters' paths; it is easy to lament that a deeper impression was not made upon the scholarship of the world; easy to mention influential men who never passed a day within college walls; easy to provoke a smile, a sneer, or a censure by the record of some narrow-minded custom or proceeding. But, nevertheless, the fact cannot be shaken that the old American colleges have been admirable places for the training of men. Let the roll of graduates of any leading institution be scrutinized, or even the record of a single class selected at random, and it will be seen that the number of life failures is very small, and the number of useful, intelligent, high-minded, and upright careers very large. It may, therefore, be said that the traditional college, though commonly hampered by ancient conditions and by the lack of funds with which to attain its own ideal, has remained the firm and valiant supporter of liberal culture, and that any revolutionary or rapid changes in its organization or methods should be carefully watched. Nevertheless, as we proceed, it will be evident that changes are inevitable and that most desirable improvements are in progress. The child is becoming a man.

One other fact deserves notice. As the English prototypes were religious foundations, so their American descendants were ecclesiastical organizations. It is no disparagement to the colonies or to the colonial colleges, but it is rather to their lasting credit, that the Christian ministry among the early settlers was so generally, decidedly, intelligently, and persistently devoted to the idea of liberal education, not for clergymen only, nor for laymen only, but for all who would enter the service of the Church or State.

It may be positively asserted that under all the restrictive and all the favorable conditions which have governed the growth of American colleges, they have perpetuated this idea of thorough intellectual training, antecedent to or independent of professional study. To secure it they have insisted that there must be good teachers and an orderly plan; that the average wants of a considerable number of scholars, and not the special needs of an exceptional genius, must be chiefly considered; that such studies must be encouraged as have been found most useful in the discipline of the mind; that the various faculties of the intellect must be developed, and that the scholar must not be allowed to neglect what is difficult, because he "does not like it." These are the points on which reliance has been wisely placed.

I. First of three causes assignable for the modifications which are in progress in American colleges, is the increase of wealth in the community, and the consequent increase in educational funds.

If any one will make an educational tour, he will soon discover what an amount of money has been spent in college buildings since 1860. Let him go to Cambridge, New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, Princeton, Ithaca, Ann Arbor, and so on through the Western States to California; let him not fail to look at Amherst, Williamstown, Hartford, Easton, Haverford, Bethlehem, Cleveland, Oberlin, Urbana, and at a dozen other college towns upon his route, and he will see that the primitive simplicity is giving place to stately architecture. Observatories and laboratories have been built and equipped; library buildings, which are unfortunately, in some places, more costly than the books which they contain, have arisen; dormitories, museums, art galleries, memorial halls, and chapels have been erected as monuments of generous benefactors. Obviously, in this new growth of collegiate architecture there is a survival of the beautiful quadrangles, the gothic chapels, and the castellated residences of Oxford and Cambridge. In short, the material acquisitions have been very great, not only in old and renowned institutions, but in new foundations. If a liberal education is dependent upon such auxiliaries, the better colleges are now well prepared for work, and most of them may urge their benefactors to direct more attention in the future to less showy but not less serviceable objects.

Thus far, with all the gifts which have been made to the older colleges, comparatively small additions have been made to

the funds which are devoted to the maintenance of the academic staff. But the cost of living has increased, and the moderate salary which contented college professors before the war is no longer an adequate support, even in the modest style to which their good sense and the traditions of their office have accustomed them. In consequence of this, many professors have been forced to rely for their support on preaching, lecturing, magazine writing, the preparation of school-books, or on other extraneous resources. One result of this is that young men of talent are deterred from entering upon the academic careers which are on other accounts attractive to them, and for which they are fitted. I met, for example, not long ago, a recent graduate who, by talents, acquisitions, hereditary tendency, and opportunities, was predestined to the life of a scholar. In reply to my inquiry as to what he would study after taking his baccalaureate degree, he surprised me first by saying that his student-life was over; and next, by assigning this reason, that he had noticed how the world rewarded life-long service in a college, and that he did not want the inadequate stipend of a professor. That young man was sagacious. He was right in thinking that a college professor has ordinarily but little satisfaction in looking forward to his financial future. If his expenses are augmented, if his health breaks down, if he lives to old age, unable to lecture longer, no enlargement of salary, no retiring pension, no provision for his family is to be expected. Many a teacher grows sad with this prospect.

Is it not time for all who are interested in college foundations to call for large donations for the increase of "the wages fund?" Ought not the college authorities to keep in the background their desire for better buildings, and insist that adequate means must first be provided for the maintenance of instruction? It will be suicidal if a prosperous country like this suffers its institutions of learning to be manned by men of second-rate abilities because they are cheaper, and because the men of first-rate powers are turned away from the work of higher education to the professions of law and medicine, to the ministry and to business pursuits, as giving more hope, more comfort, and more freedom, with equally good opportunities of usefulness and with prospects of higher honor. It will be a shame if the hoary head in a college, instead of being a crown of glory, is a sign of poverty and neglect. A college professorship should be liberally

paid, and with an augmenting salary, so that, in this respect, it may be at least as attractive as other careers which are open to intellectual men. If the very best men are not secured for the work of instruction, and if they are not made so easy in their pecuniary circumstances as to be free from care on that account, farewell to intellectual advancement, farewell to literary progress, farewell to scientific discovery, farewell to sound statesmanship, farewell to enlightened Christianity; the reign of bigotry and dullness is at hand. But we have no fear that this is to be the future of American education. There are already indications that salary funds are to be increased, and every friend of liberal education should promote such tendencies and encourage such gifts.

The increase of wealth is also manifest in the increase of luxury in daily surroundings, in the love of costly athletic sports, and in the growth of those microcosmic, cryptogramic "societies" which lead a curious life within the college circles. It is useless to argue or legislate against these manifestations of wealth. They cannot be uprooted, but they can be guided and directed by wise and sympathetic counsel. At the moment, it is not an imaginary but a real danger, that parents in moderate circumstances will choose for their sons, and that self-supporting young men will choose for themselves, that college which will cost the least, instead of that which will teach the most. Many a student goes not where he would but where he must. The bills for tuition—though commonly higher than they were a few years ago, are a moderate item in the budget of a student, but miscellaneous outlays have become extravagant, and yet so imperative that the youth who declines to do his part is in danger of feeling that he belongs to "the awkward squad." Although sumptuary laws are of no more value in an institution of learning than in society at large, the pressure of public opinion may certainly be exerted, and should be directed to the suppression of the evil.

There is a partial remedy for this state of things which ought to be tried on a generous scale,—the establishment of purses and scholarships for under-graduate students, to be won exclusively by intellectual merit. Hitherto, with a few exceptions, under-graduate scholarships have been usually offered to the needy, and among them to those who had the ministry in view. In other cases they have been restricted to the family of the founder or

to the person whom he or his successor nominated. It is time for something better. Intellectual superiority is to be found both among the rich and among the poor. The colleges, like the State, depend on the support of the great middle class who are neither rich nor poor — who cannot afford luxury and will not accept charity. To develop scholars in all these classes, honors, carrying with them generous pecuniary support, should be freely instituted. Such prizes may be given for success in specific attainments, but the wealth or poverty of the recipient should have no influence on the award. College honors should have the same value as those which excite emulation in after-life, and which come to poor and rich alike.

If, then, the wealth which is turning to our colleges, after supplying the requisite buildings, books, and apparatus, can be directed to providing salary funds and prize scholarships, the influence will be instantaneous and serviceable. Responsibility in this matter does not rest with the college authorities alone on the one hand, nor with rich men on the other; but it depends upon all who talk and write on liberal education,—on the lawyer, the minister, the banker, the physician, the friend, the adviser, whoever he may be, that undertakes to suggest or guide the future benefactions.

II. Science, like wealth, is exerting its influence upon the American college. So many subjects call for recognition that new and special courses are established; every knowing professor inclines more and more to lock himself within the citadel of his own department, and to look out of the embrasure with suspicion on the inexperience of those who are willing to sally forth into unprotected positions. If the day has gone by, in the larger colleges, for establishing a professorship of natural and political history (such as still exists in a Scotch institution), or for expecting one man to teach all branches of natural science, as was once the way, or for assigning ancient and modern languages to the care of a single teacher, another danger has crept in — that the college professor will be narrow, one-sided in his own development, and one-sided in his influence. For the ordinary instruction of under-graduate students men of broad, generous, varied culture are needed; men who know the value of letters and of nature in a plan of study; men who understand their own views because they are watching the necessities and the transactions of to-day with the light of historical experience;

men who believe that character, intellectual and moral, is more important than knowledge, and who are determined that all the influences of college life shall be wholesome. Such teachers as these have hitherto constituted the faculties of American colleges; their names may not have been made renowned by any new discoveries or by the publication of any great treatises, but they have impressed themselves on generations of pupils who have in their turn helped to form the best institutions which maintain the nation. It will be a great misfortune to American education, if, in choosing specialists for collegiate professorships (as must be done in future), the authorities fail to make sure that these specialists are men of general cultivation, of sound morals, and of hearty sympathy with the youth they are to teach.

The progress of science has forced upon our colleges eclectic courses of study. No single person should think of studying all the departments of learning which an institution may rightly teach. All the better colleges now admit of some choice in the curriculum, and the point of dispute has advanced to the inquiry how far "options" may be allowed. There is a curious difference of opinion as to what studies are indispensable to a liberal education, and an equally remarkable divergence in respect to the methods by which a choice of studies may be allowed.

In all this divergence it is a fortunate circumstance that the colleges of this country have never been hostile to the modern physical sciences, and have favored instruction in these branches so far as the means at their command would permit. A recent historical writer has called attention to the curious fact that the first rector of Yale College wrote a text-book on Physics. From that time to ours, neither religious sentiment nor preference for the classics has been arrayed against scientific pursuits. On the other hand, the colleges have rarely, if ever, been willing to admit that an education chiefly scientific was as good as an education chiefly classical. The initiation of a scientific school at Cambridge, as an outside department of the college, had an extraordinary influence upon subsequent endeavors to foster the claims of science. Other scientific schools were founded. But these associated colleges have rarely been admitted into complete fellowship. They have been regarded as "members on probation,"—too strong to be despised, too young to be encouraged very heartily. They have not the birthright. Not infrequently do we hear the original foundation called the college

proper, as if the new establishment were the college improper. As a rule, the old prestige and the old degree, *Artium Baccalaureus*, have not been extended to attendants upon the scientific courses. Yet changes, even in this respect, are close at hand, and the new nobility of science will not wait long before it has equal rank with the most ancient gentry.

The experience of American colleges has shown that the most available, as well as efficacious studies in a liberal course of training are these: *(a)* Mathematics, leading to *(b)* Physical and Natural Science; and *(c)* Language, leading to *(d)* Political and Moral Science.

It is not easy to see how a good education can be obtained, nowadays, without these four elements. They are like the food, air, exercise, and rest of physical growth. The difficult point to decide is the relative proportion of each element, or, in other words, the amount of attainment to be exacted in each branch. It is my own belief that all the mathematics which is essential to general education may be secured by a student before he enters a college; that is to say, that arithmetic, algebra, plane geometry, and trigonometry, and even the elements of analytical geometry, may be readily acquired under competent teachers in high schools and academies. Boys who have no special love of mathematics acquire this knowledge in schools which I can name. Text-books in these branches are matured to a high degree of perfection, and the methods of training are perfectly understood; but the mathematical teaching must be given by a master who is a master of mathematics. If the teacher has not carried his own studies beyond the elementary subjects, or if he dislikes mathematics, he will not succeed in this department, however good he may be in others. The distaste for mathematics exhibited by many minds is due chiefly to bad instruction at the outset. Beyond what is learned in the high school, a college should offer higher courses of mathematics, pure and applied, and should require these branches to be studied as antecedent to thorough courses in physics, astronomy, and certain other scientific studies. So in respect to Latin and Greek. That knowledge of these subjects which is indispensable to a liberal education, may, in many parts of the country, be acquired by a youth before he enters college, or certainly before he leaves the freshman class. The boy well taught for three or four years after reaching his teens ought to

read readily the easier classical authors at sight, and to understand the fundamental principles of grammar. This is secured in other countries, and may be in this. He may still study Latin and Greek after he enters college, but it should be on a different plane; harder writings may be read; a wider range of literature may be made familar; comparative grammar and philology may receive attention; ancient history, politics, archæology, and art may be studied; and a genuine love for all that is noble and permanent in the culture of Greece and Rome may thus be promoted. But here, as in mathematics, the difference in intellectual aptitude should be recognized, and if a mind makes no response to these classical themes, different means of culture ought certainly to be provided for it.

Three languages besides Latin and Greek are essential to a liberal education in this country — German, French, and English. The elements of French and German, and even more advanced knowledge, may in some cases be acquired by the school-boy; and fortunate will he be who begins his college course able to read these languages which next to his own are most essential to scientific and literary progress. He may then prosecute their study in higher historical, literary, and philological aspects, or he may devote his time to Italian, Spanish, Dutch, and other modern tongues. But he must not escape from the prolonged and critical study of English. He must learn the history and the spirit of his mother-tongue and become expert in its forms, and idioms. Constant practice in writing should be exacted by the college course, so that being a graduate would imply the possession of a power to speak and to write fitly, clearly, and forcibly.

The perplexity of our colleges as to what should be done with scientific studies is partly due to an erroneous estimate of their relation to a liberal education. They are commonly looked upon as valuable for the knowledge they bring, not for the discipline they impart. Consequently, a few lectures on each of several great subjects are commonly given to the more advanced student for his information, so that he may not go into the world ignorant of what has been ascertained in respect to natural phenomena and laws. This is better than nothing, but it is very inadequate, and, indeed, so inadequate as to be poor and unsatisfactory. An educated man does not need to be crammed with scientific facts: if he wishes to know them, he can procure great

cyclopædias full of the most advanced and exact statements. But all the knowledge of the "Encyclopædia Britannica" is of no value to the man who cannot use it. A liberal education requires an acquaintance with scientific methods, with the modes of inquiry, of observation, of comparison, of eliminating error and of ascertaining truth which are observed by modern investigators. Such an acquaintance may be better secured by prolonged and thorough attention to one great department of science, like chemistry, physics, biology, or geology, than by acquiring a smattering of twenty branches. If every college student would daily for one or two years devote a third of his study time to either of the great subjects we have named, or to others which might be named, he would exercise his faculties in a discipline very different from that afforded by his linguistic and mathematical work. He would not only find his observing powers sharpened; he would find his judgment improved by its exercise on the certainties of natural law. He would never afterward be prejudiced against the true workers in science nor afraid of the progress of modern learning. Whatever might be his future vocation, ecclesiastical, educational, or editorial, he would speak of science with no covert sneer and with no suppressed apprehension. The more religious his nature, the more reverent would he become. In public affairs which call for a knowledge of science, he would know how to discriminate between the quack and the authority, and he would be quick to perceive in how many departments of government the liberal use of scientific methods is now imperatively demanded.

A few words must be given to the group of studies which, for lack of a better name, we may designate by the French nomenclature as the "moral and political sciences." They have twofold value — their service to the individual and their service to the State. It is by the study of the history of opinion, by the scrutiny of mental phenomena, and by the discussion of ethical principles, that religious and moral character is to be developed. The hours of reflection are redeemed from barrenness and made fruitful, like sand-plains irrigated by mountain streams, when they are pervaded by the perennial currents which flow from the lofty heights of philosophy and religion. Above all other educational subjects in importance stands philosophy, the exercise of reason upon those manifold and perplexing problems of existence which are as old as humanity and as new

as the nineteenth century. For its place in a liberal education, no substitute need apply. What is true of the moral sciences in reference to individual character, may be said of the historical and political sciences in relation to the State. That nation is in danger of losing its liberties, and of entering upon a period of corruption and decay, which does not keep its eye steadily fixed on the experience of other nations, and does not apply to its own institutions and laws the lessons of the past. The evils we complain of, the burdens we carry, the dangers we fear, are to be met by the accumulated experience of other generations and of other climes.

If the views thus presented are correct,— that American colleges should tenaciously adhere to certain fundamental subjects as the basis of their training, and that each individual scholar should be allowed a considerable freedom of choice as to the combination which he will make for his own curriculum,— we must next consider a practical difficulty. Human nature, and especially young human nature, is such, that the easiest path is likely to be chosen without a strict regard to the point it leads to. Doubtless, in all the colleges where elective courses are permitted, the inexperienced student, thinking less of preparation for the future, than of enjoyment for the present, selects with unerring instinct the courses which are likely to be most pleasant. To a certain extent it is undoubtedly true that he should be allowed to follow the line of least resistance; but this principle must be qualified by another, that in education difficulties are to be overcome, not avoided, for discipline requires effort, and strength comes by exercise. The young scholar must not recline upon a bed of roses if he would make progress. He must have an orderly plan of study and be required to adhere to it. Two methods of limiting his proclivity to ease have been employed with good results. In some institutions, several courses are offered to a student's choice, but one he must select, and to that he must adhere. Divorce is rarely allowed to release him from the bond which has once been assumed. Elsewhere, every under-graduate is assigned to one of the teachers who acts as his adviser, and who has an influential control over his selection of studies. Some such devices as these are indispensable to the success of eclectic courses.

III. The progress of religious freedom, like the progress of wealth and of science, is also exerting its influence upon our

colleges. It is well known that the earliest foundations, both in New England and in Virginia, were ecclesiastical societies, controlled by ministers. The colonists wisely believed in an educated clergy, and were determined to secure themselves against ignorance in the pulpit. They were also firm in their maintenance of a Christian education, and had no hesitation whatsoever in inculcating the positive doctrines of the dominant theology. The scholars of the first immigration were almost all ministers, and it is safe to say that without their earnest zeal and pious endeavors, the founding of the higher institutions of learning would have long been delayed. If now and then a college president was displaced because he dissented from the views of his associates on baptism or on ordination, the institutions never failed to set up for their students a high standard of religious and moral conduct. If they seem to us narrow, they also seem reverent and earnest. Gradually great changes came about. The catechism and the body of divinity disappeared from among their text-books; laymen were admitted to a participation in the responsibilities of the corporation; professors and teachers were appointed from widely different religious communions; the number of required religious services was diminished, and the students found it more and more easy to escape the ministrations of the college chapel upon the Lord's day. The same progress in religious freedom has led to the extraordinary multiplication of colleges, so that students may not only be free from restraints which are distasteful, but may be provided with such religious services as they or their parents may prefer. Every important Christian denomination has therefore come to have its distinctive college, and many an argument has been framed to prove that sectarian colleges are better than those which seek to promote the union of several religious bodies. It has not been thought sufficient that a college should be pervaded by an enlightened Christianity, nor even that it should be the stronghold of a simple evangelical life and doctrine, nor that it should be orthodox as to the fundamental teachings of the Church; but sectarian influences must everywhere predominate, among the trustees or in the faculty, or in both the governing bodies. Hence we see all over the land feeble, ill-endowed, and poorly manned institutions, caring a little for sound learning but a great deal more for the defense of denominational tenets.

As a reaction against these innumerable denominational colleges, State universities and private foundations, not controlled by any religious denomination, have made rapid gain within the last quarter of a century. They are usually governed by good men, so that a student in any one of them perceives very little difference, if any, in the ethical and religious influences by which he is surrounded, from those which encompass his friend in a denominational college.

What is to be the outcome of all this confusion it is not easy to predict. Whether the churches, acting outside of the colleges, will endeavor to assume and guide the religious instruction of the students, or whether the community is going through a period of indifference in respect to positive religious instruction, or whether there will be a revival of positive and aggressive denominational zeal, is not yet discernible; but it is easy to see what is desirable in colleges which are maintained upon a non-denominational basis. Never was there a time when it was more important to uphold the essentials of religion, and to encourage the formation of right moral habits, for the temptation to forget "the things which are unseen" is very strong. If those who hold these views,—and they are probably the dominant influences in almost every college,—would agree in the maintenance of religious services upon a simple and catholic basis, to which all should be invited and to which none should be compelled, and if to this were added positive instruction in Christian morals, and their application to daily life and still more particularly to the dangers and opportunities of educated men,—then theological training and the enforcement of special ecclesiastical usages might be left to institutions which are designed exclusively or chiefly for the training of ministers. Doubtless, churches in the neighborhood of colleges will be more and more called upon, each in its own way, to undertake the religious guidance of such young men as can be brought within their influence; while college faculties will be held responsible by the public for the influence they exert upon the moral lives of those whose intellectual training they have undertaken to direct. Already, enlightened men in different parts of the country have independently come to the conclusion that in the neighborhood of a State university, or of any other nonsectarian institution, halls of residence may be founded by religious bodies, and instruction may there be given in positive religious doctrines to those who resort to the

central establishment for secular learning. The Bishop of Michigan, for example, Dr. Harris, having seen the vigor and prospects of the great foundation at Ann Arbor, has wisely directed his zeal to the building up of a collegiate hall, which shall not be in rivalry with the State university, but in cordial though informal coöperation with it, supplementing its instructions by positive religious teachings among those who are admitted to the privileges of the church home. Years ago, a similar project for surrounding the University of California with halls of residence, to be provided by different churches, was very nearly perfected. By some such method, the new unsectarian colleges may be well supplied with positive religious instruction, while the non-denominational character of the foundation remains unimpaired. Certainly, if Bishop Harris succeeds in the plan which he has commended to his diocese, and which is understood to be favored by President Angell, all the country will contemplate with great interest the actual work of so promising a scheme.

The idea of the American college, therefore; the idea of orderly training in fundamental branches of learning, partly for the sake of storing the mind with useful information, and partly for the development of physical, mental, and moral training, seems to stand as firm as ever, strengthened and not weakened by all that may be said of university foundations. The increase of wealth, the progress of science, and the advancement of religious freedom, though temporary disturbing agencies, are likely to be factors of permanent good.

DANIEL C. GILMAN.

# THE ABUSE OF CITIZENSHIP.

IMMIGRATION in large numbers to the United States is a fixed fact. That it is fraught with great advantages has been shown in a former number of this REVIEW. It is also undeniable that it is fraught with evils more or less dangerous to our national character. Our present purpose is to traverse and call attention to one of these evils, believing that if the general public can be imbued with a clear idea of its true character, the patriotism of the people will not be long in applying remedial measures and appropriate checks.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, the people generally were of a high order, morally and religiously,—intelligent, enterprising, and industrious. Many Europeans of culture had been drawn hither by sympathy with the new political institutions, and it was expected by Madison, Hamilton, and their contemporaries that the future "emigrations" would be largely of persons of wealth and education. The names of Robert Morris, John Witherspoon, Albert Gallatin, and Joseph Priestley readily suggest themselves among those of men whose services shed luster upon the home of their adoption. The new, thinly-settled country was in need of immigration, and the people welcomed into the body politic all Europeans who came and would "support" the new Constitution against the assaults of monarchist or revolutionist. Ever since the establishment of our Government, it has been our policy to invite immigration, and the terms have never been materially changed.

The number of persons of foreign birth in the United States in June, 1880, was 6,679,943, the nationalities being represented as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| German Empire | 1,966,742 | Wales | 83,302 |
| Ireland | 1,854,571 | Mexico | 68,399 |
| British America | 717,084 | Denmark | 64,196 |
| England | 662,676 | Holland | 58,090 |
| Sweden | 194,337 | Poland | 48,557 |
| Norway | 181,729 | Italy | 44,230 |
| Scotland | 170,136 | Austria | 38,663 |
| France | 106,971 | Russia | 35,722 |
| China | 104,541 | Belgium | 15,535 |
| Switzerland | 88,621 | Luxemburg | 12,836 |
| Bohemia | 85,361 | Hungary | 11,526 |

and so on down to 129 from Greenland. In passing, it is worthy of note that the Irish number 1,854,571, the British (English, Scotch, and Welsh), 916,114, and the British Americans, 717,084, in all, 3,487,769 — hence, more than half of our foreign-born population speak English, and come to us accustomed to Anglo-Saxon rule. The Germans number 1,966,742; all the other nationalities, 1,225,432.

European governments are seldom called upon to confer citizenship upon aliens. With us, the wholesale method of granting citizenship has developed an abuse which is peculiarly American. Here, the applicant is endued with all the privileges of full citizenship after having lived in the country a specified time as a person of good character, upon simply renouncing his former allegiance, and taking an oath to "support the Constitution of the United States"; the petty cost of the transaction, about a dollar, often being paid for him. It is held by our Government that this renunciation absolutely frees him from all obligation to his former Government, and that the formal oath to support a Constitution he cannot interpret and has not even read suffices to entitle him to a new nationality. The recipient evidently does not renounce his ancient loves or hates, feuds or enmities. Thus it has become common for some adopted citizens, even while ignoring any identification with American comity and American friendship, to claim all the privileges accorded them by law, and to demand protection, after they have returned to their native land and are engaged in aiding and abetting movements, often violent, in opposition to the lawful authorities.

The oath itself is too often administered in a perfunctory manner and without the deliberation which should characterize judicial action. The application for naturalization must be

made in open court, and is subject to the rules of judicial procedure. The judge is to be satisfied, by oral testimony, that the applicant has resided here the time required; that he is a person of good moral character; that he is attached to the principles of the Constitution, and "well disposed to the good order and happiness" of the United States. Said Judge Benedict to a United States Grand Jury in New York, in 1868: "The acts (in naturalizations) are solemn judicial acts, and every time a judge of any court admits an alien to be a citizen of the United States, he declares in the presence of his fellow-men, and under his oath of office, that he is satisfied, from evidence produced before him, that the person so admitted to citizenship is entitled by law to be a citizen."

In Louisiana, during the presidential canvass in 1844, Judge Elliott issued "nearly four hundred certificates of naturalization in one day!" . . . "Twelve hundred oaths administered, and eight hundred witnesses examined as to the age, qualifications, residence, and moral character of the different persons naturalized in open court by the judge," in one day! For this Elliott was impeached, convicted, and removed from office. Again, in 1866, one judge in the city of New-York made eight hundred voters in a single day, and was not even impeached. In the same city, in 1868, 8468 certificates were issued upon the testimony of ten witnesses, one of whom swore that he personally knew 2162 of the applicants to be of good moral character. Another witness, in the presence of one judge, answered, on October 9th, for three hundred and twenty-five; October 10th, for three hundred and ninety-one; and October 12th, for three hundred and fifty-seven different persons. In view of such a burlesque as this, it seems as though judicial discretion is considered a useless hinderance,—we simply want more voters, and don't care how we get them!

"Thus bad begins, and worse remains behind."

Just before important elections, the great parties naturally and rightfully endeavor to secure voters among aliens entitled to citizenship; too commonly, however, the petty leaders get the votes whether or no. The indifference or stupidity of the new voter, and the shameful willingness of political managers, of all parties, to degrade American citizenship to secure votes for the

exigency, are exemplified by the fact that, in some instances, the certificate has been retained by the party agent, in order to control the new voter at subsequent elections. How elevating this jugglery, this audacious travesty of law, must be to the ideas of the nascent citizen! How it must impress him with the dignity and purity of the American ballot!

When large numbers of foreigners are thus transformed into American citizens, it is not to be wondered at if they have very crude ideas of their new relations. Accustomed to connect the idea of loyalty and allegiance with a ruler or a dynasty, and finding here no personification of government, they are at a loss to know where to place their loyalty, and to whom, or to what, it is due. The new citizen sees the people divided into contending political hosts; some incidental circumstance, it may be of neighborhood or acquaintance, inclines him to one of the parties. To him, American nationality is an abstraction, a political idea, not a visible power; on the other hand, the party consists of tangible friends, and is, perhaps, the exponent of a cherished principle. Hence, the mass of our aliens enthrone the party of their preference, and too frequently yield it the unquestioning allegiance they should render to the United States. If voters of Irish birth and parentage were as faithful to the traditions and underlying principles of the Government of the United States as they are to the promptings of their Irish traditions and to their party, it would put a new face on our foreign relations. Voters so destitute of the proper conception of loyalty to their adopted country cannot be expected to show that they are "well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same." On the contrary, it is clear that many of them do, and are beginning to claim the right to, jeopard the peace and quiet of the United States by aiding and abetting felonies intended to keep up national feuds in their former home. So far, this abuse is confined to the naturalized from Ireland. If adopted citizens of other nationalities were equally aggressive, as they already are equally numerous,—at least, in the case of the Germans,—we should have trouble enough on our hands. Legally citizens, these men deport themselves as refugees and conspirators, who have come upon neutral ground to carry on intrigues, to raise money, and to promote crime in the land from whence they came. If this particular use made of our citizenship by a certain class of Irishmen is lawful and allowable, it is equally law-

ful and allowable to men of other nationalities, and we are in danger of permitting our soil to become a political Alsatia. If an organization of Americans, whose ancestors colonized Massachusetts Bay, should avow its purpose to harass Mexico or Cuba, and collect money for that purpose, openly declaring their intention to carry on warlike operations, even without riotous accompaniments, in the territory of those friendly countries, our Government would stop their proceedings without loss of time. Whether it is that Irish-born citizens actually have rights that Americans have not, or that Americans have no rights that the Irish are bound to respect, or whether a general confidence exists in the forbearance of those whom Irish orators style the "plunderers of the world," which is not expected of other, even feeble, peoples, it looks as though the alien is encouraged in doing that from which the native is estopped and for which he is punished. Are we prepared to submit to this assumption that aliens, who are Americans only by grace and adoption, have greater privilege than those whose nationality is natural and inherent?

Whether the Irish in Ireland have or have not ground of complaint against their landlords or against their Government is a question with which the Irish in America, as American citizens, have nothing to do. They have no right to embroil themselves or our Government in foreign contentions. To attempt it, is, to say the least, a most ungracious return to the American people for the privilege of citizenship. When adopted citizens publicly and ostentatiously declare their purpose to inflict death and destruction upon persons and property belonging to a country with which we are in profound peace,—announcing their intention to destroy ships at sea, together with their inoffensive passengers and crews,—we have such a glaring defiance of American sentiment, and if not an actual violation of American law, so near an approach to it, as to make it worth while to consider whither we are drifting.

Notwithstanding the disgust created by the long catalogue of agrarian crimes in Ireland, and the well-known fact that the criminals derive encouragement as well as pecuniary support from their fellow-countrymen here, little or no public expression of disapproval or condemnation has been heard from any of our adopted Irish citizens, except, perhaps, in respect to the murders of Cavendish and Burke. That class of our public speakers who

are so prompt to fire the Irish heart have kept a most significant silence upon this topic, not because they really approve of the outrages, nor because the immense majority of the Irish-born voters approve of them, but because they dare not oppose the blatant men whose identification with desperate rascality abroad has made them a power in the slums here at home. Of the 1,854,571 natives of Ireland in this country, only a small percentage can be justly charged with abetting the crimes we allude to. It is their misfortune that they have been so shamefully misrepresented by self-appointed leaders; it will be their fault if they do not find a way to resent it. Unless they do repudiate these perversions of the privileges of citizenship, and insist upon the observance of the restraint which common sense dictates as an adjunct of naturalization, the question will suggest itself to the public mind: Should citizenship be conferred on those who show themselves unworthy of it? If a class or a nationality is prone to agrarian crimes, here or abroad, should that class or nationality be clothed with political power, to be exercised to the detriment of the whole people? Why should we confer political power upon men of a country with which we have but little to do, if that power is used to embarrass our relations with the very country whose commerce is to us of by far the first importance, and to which we are united more than to any other by common laws, common religious ideas, and common speech?

If the reckless Irish leaders and their willing followers are, in truth, so enamored of murder and rapine, they are unfit for citizenship in a civilized country; if they are but common swindlers, it is about time the law stopped them. For years, it has from time to time been announced that certain mysterious plans for the "liberation" of Ireland have been perfected; then, that "British gold" has seduced the "patriot"; and this game has been played again and again on American soil and by legalized American citizens. It would be difficult to conceive of anything more foolish and wicked than the "Fenian" raid upon Canada a few years ago. What had Canada ever done to injure Irishmen, or how could the Canadian Government redress grievances in Ireland? People who tolerate such impulsive, misguided, and demagogical leadership in America, as well as in Ireland, are incapable of self-government.

Obviously there exists a general supineness among Ameri-

cans in respect to the use made by aliens of the privileges of citizenship. If the American people were as jealous of their national reputation as European nations are, public opinion would be quickly aroused and end an abominable abuse. Even now, if the reflecting portion of the community would assert itself, and demand that American citizenship shall not be prostituted by the adopted citizen, nor by those who pander to him, the truckling political aspirants who play with fire could very soon be taught that promotion does not come that way. The fact that a candidate holds a low estimate of the duties, restraints, and obligations of American citizenship and of American honor should doom him to certain defeat. The surest way to stop pandering is to make it unprofitable.

As we write, an occurrence of the day supplies an illustration of the bellicose oratory so much in vogue at Irish meetings in this country. The orator was once a member of the Senate of the State of New York, elected as an American citizen, not as an Irish subject or refugee. He spoke as one having knowledge of what he affirmed, and declared that:

"There is an organization working for Ireland's deliverance, and all the gold of the British Empire cannot corrupt it nor obtain its secrets. Notwithstanding the powerful resources of England, she has been able to find but a few poor traitors who have acted the part of suborned witnesses. (Hisses and prolonged applause.) What have these men done to hurt us? Nothing. All their testimony does not disclose a hint of the vast power that is to overwhelm the proud empire of England, and the day is speedily coming when it will not be a crime to be a patriot in Ireland. We shall continue to instil venom in every land against these plunderers of the world. It is the duty of all Irishmen in this country to bring about war between the United States and Great Britain. (Cheers.) Put Irishmen in high places — into the State Legislature, into national offices, into the Cabinet of the United States — and they will do their work well."

Such frothy utterances bring votes to the men who pronounce them, consequently there is a constant temptation to politicians of a certain sort to indulge in such idiocy. But the effect upon the illiterate and undiscriminating hearer is to lead him to suppose that agrarian crimes in Ireland are commendable, and that the ferocity of a handful of Irish assassins and their sympathizers is of more political consequence than the peace and well-being of fifty millions of Americans.

Contrast the spirit of this vaporing orator with the solid wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in the Federal Conven-

tion of 1787. No one in that assembly expected that men would import to this country the feuds and animosities of Europe. The opinion prevailed that the foreigners who would come would belong to the well-to-do and intellectual classes, and that many of them would be "called" to serve the public in Congress. During the discussion respecting the length of time an alien must be a citizen before being eligible to the United States Senate, Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to insert fourteen years instead of four years, urging the danger of admitting strangers into the public councils. Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Madison were opposed to the motion as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this country. Mr. Pinckney said there was peculiar danger and impropriety in opening the Senate's doors to those who have foreign attachments. Mr. Pierce Butler, of South Carolina (an Irishman), "was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the country. He acknowledged that if he had been called into public life within a short time after his coming to America his foreign habits, opinions, and attachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs." Mr. Randolph would agree to seven years. Mr. Wilson mentioned the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possibility of his being incapacitated from holding a place under the Constitution he aided to make.

In regard to the term of residence required of an alien-born Representative in Congress, "Colonel Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants, but did not choose to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us and govern us." He moved that seven years instead of three be inserted. Mr. Williamson was against naming any period, saying: "New residents, if elected, will be most zealous to conform to the will of their constituents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous eye." Mr. Gerry wished eligibility to be confined to natives. Mr. Williamson said: "Wealthy emigrants do more harm, by their luxurious examples, than good by the money they bring with them." Mr. Madison concurred; he wished to invite foreigners of merit and republican principles. Mr. Wilson cited Pennsylvania as a proof of the advantages of encouraging "emigrations." Three of her deputies to this Convention were not natives—Mr. Robert Morris, Mr. Fitzsimons, and himself.

How amazed would these ancient worthies be if they could hear such harangues as are common now! Happily for them, they could not foresee that we no longer "call" meritorious aliens, or natives either, into the public councils. We have bravely outgrown the decorum and sincerity of the Fathers, and the orator we have quoted is a specimen of a class that can always be depended upon to accept seats in high places, in the State Legislature, in national offices, and even in the Cabinet of the United States. Of political offices among us, it may be said, in the language of Scripture, they suffer violence, and the violent take them by force, whether "called" or not.

Butler, the Irishman, as well as his colleagues, was honestly seeking the best interests of his adopted country. His patriotism was devoid of malice and allied to his intelligence, while both were devoted to the great work of constructing a Constitution for a new and undeveloped country. Yet it does not appear in the Madison papers that he ever insisted that it was the duty of Scotchmen to bring about war between the United States and Great Britain, nor to put Irishmen into the Cabinet of the United States. A patriot of prudence and sagacity, he disdained that sort of talk, and left it for the exclusive use of "gentlemen" seeking Irish votes in 1883.

How much or how little self-respect and conscience is to be found in men who noisily present themselves as advocates of violence abroad, and thus sow the seeds of violence at home, is not for us to say. Such appeals are not made to the most intelligent classes, but to the least so; nevertheless, the observing public usually credits demagogues with a considerable share of discernment in their pursuit of place—that greatest good which comes from the greatest number. To these gentlemen, who so easily accommodate their views to circumstances, the following table, giving the number, nationality, and percentage of foreign-born inhabitants of the United States in four census years, may be of interest:

| | *Irish.* | | *British.* | | *British Am.* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *No.* | *Per cent.* | *No.* | *Per cent.* | *No.* | *Per cent.* |
| 1850... | 961,719 | 43.5 | 379,093 | 17.1 | 147,711 | 6.7 |
| 1860... | 1,611,304 | 38.9 | 587,775 | 14.2 | 249,970 | 6.0 |
| 1870... | 1,855,827 | 33.3 | 770,414 | 13.8 | 493,464 | 8.7 |
| 1880... | 1,854,571 | 27.7 | 916,114 | 13. | 717,084 | 10.7 |

| | German. | | All others. | | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | Per cent. | No. | Per cent. | No. |
| 1850... | 583,774 | 26.4 | 138,542 | 6.3 | 2,210,839 |
| 1860... | 1,301,136 | 31.2 | 385,990 | 9.3 | 4,136,175 |
| 1870... | 1,690,533 | 30.3 | 756,991 | 13.6 | 5,567,229 |
| 1880... | 1,966,742 | 29.4 | 1,225,432 | 18. | 6,679,943 |

The British and British Americans in 1880 aggregated 1,633,198—23.7 per cent.

Immigration from Ireland has culminated. It is scarcely possible that the Green Isle can continue to send such numbers as in former years. The Irish-born residing here in 1880 were actually less, by 1300, than ten years before. In 1880, the Germans exceeded them by 112,000, and the numerical ascendancy of the Irish vanished. The steadily increasing numbers of the other nationalities named are so striking as to make comment superfluous. When it is remembered that immigration from countries other than Ireland has already attained such dimensions, and that the population of

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ireland | (1881), is | 5,159,839 |
| Germany | (1880), " | 45,194,172 |
| Great Britain | (1881), " | 30,086,723 |
| British America | (1881), " | 4,352,080 |

it is seen to be almost certain that the percentage of the Irish must decline, even more rapidly than it has during the last thirty years. This is verified by the following figures, taken from official reports: During eleven years, ending June 30, 1882, 3,949,264 immigrants arrived from all parts of the world. Of the nationalities considered, the arrivals were as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| English | 528,747 | |
| Irish | 528,206 | |
| Scotch | 109,685 | |
| Welsh | 8,517 | |
| | | 1,175,155 |
| German | | 1,096,743 |
| American (mainly British American) | | 582,782 |

If we add to the British, say 525,000 for British Americans, the total will, without the Irish, exceed the Germans; while the English alone outnumber the Irish. Again, in eight months, ending March 31st, the arrivals were, from

| | 1882. | Per cent. | 1883. | Per cent. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| England and Wales | 54,318 | 12.3 | 46,230 | 13.6 |
| Ireland | 34,507 | 7.8 | 25,014 | 7.3 |
| Scotland | 10,773 | 2.4 | 7,611 | 2.2 |
| Canada | 62,397 | 14. | 45,119 | 13.3 |
| Germany | 148,481 | 33.7 | 116,056 | 34.2 |
| All others | 129,851 | 29.5 | 99,184 | 29.2 |
| | 440,327 | 99.7 | 339,214 | 99.8 |

These tables are also kindly commended to the attention of young, pushing politicians, who are shrewd enough to anticipate the inevitable. The decay of Irish influence in this country is certain, and will be the political destruction of those preachers of sedition who build their hopes upon a bad foundation. In politics, it is said that "a blunder is worse than a crime." We are not so bold as to say these men would hesitate at the crime; they may hesitate at the blunder.

Popular discontent has usually manifested itself in Ireland, under the machinations of secret organizations of an agrarian character. Such societies, under the names of United Irishmen, White-boys, Peep-o'-day-boys, Ribbonmen, Rockites, Fenians, Land Leagues, and Invincibles, and under the lead of desperadoes, have controlled large numbers of people, and in some sections have for awhile defied the Government itself.

All the Irish societies in this country profess benevolent and worthy objects, but some of them have used the garb of benevolence and religion to further malign and nefarious purposes. They perpetuate foreign feuds, and keep alive race distinctions, both of which are out of place here, and should be made to disappear in the broader life of America. Scheming men, to further their own ambition, flatter and applaud the prejudices of the members; thus the societies become important agents in elections, and, knowing their power, do not scruple to

"— deal damnation round the land
On each they judge their foe."

The murders and other atrocities committed by the Fenians in Ireland, and the Irish Mollie Maguires in Pennsylvania, stamp them with a strong family likeness. These secret societies arrogate to themselves the functions of prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner. From their mandate there is no appeal; the signal given, the victim is doomed. The same illogical and brutal

spirit exists in each. In quick sympathy for fugitive criminals, in the mystery of their movements, in contempt for the condemnation of their Church, and in reckless abandonment of restraint, human or divine, the two conspiracies are alike. In both, the object is not robbery, but revenge and murder; and this shocking intent, by some strange beguilement, is gloried in as a resource of patriotism. Should such mental and moral confusion ever attain the ascendancy, it would overturn civilization and bring back chaos and black night again.

If we had observed that, for a long time, violence, arson, and murder had been perpetrated without apparent motive and without detection, so that we were driven to suspect the existence of a secret organization for the purpose of directing the crimes and shielding the criminals, we should doubtless be able to sympathize with the law-abiding people in Ireland, and the difficult task of their protectors and rulers. If we should find that the law-breakers — claiming to be actuated by patriotic motives and to be jealous of their nation's name and religious belief, admitting to membership only inheritors of the one and believers in the other — are actually under the ban of excommunication, we should be still more impressed with the thoroughly Irish character of their pretensions. If the sense of fear and apprehension of a grim and gigantic conspiracy had hung like a pall over a large district which had been converted into a theater of revolting crimes, whose victims were sometimes prominent and sometimes obscure; if we felt assured that behind the meaner man who shot the pistol or drove home the knife there stood others in higher life, far more guilty; if we were cognizant of all these things, and saw the Government striving, but scarcely able to grant deliverance,— our hearts would ache with pity for that land. With the events of the past months in memory, we should suspect that this secret organization, criminal in its character, criminal even in its purpose, would have a political object in view. We should not be surprised to learn that its members were town councillors, or even in Parliament. If we heard that the leaders were pardoned, and in "treaty" with the Executive, we should still control our wonder, because the whole is so peculiarly and characteristically Irish. The suppositions are realities. Every day we read the story of these villainous outrages in unhappy Ireland, and are confronted by the fact that the money which supports them is drawn from so-called Ameri-

can pockets, and that the supply is greater after an outrage uncommonly wicked.

Will immigration bring to these shores such shocking depravity? Will not the universal school-house, the multiplication-table, reading, writing, and arithmetic sweetly subdue all such villainy? It has already come. The Ancient Order of Hibernians domesticated this progeny of evil in the Schuylkill County coal-fields of Pennsylvania years ago. The very words we have employed in our supposition are taken from the report of the trial of one of the indicted members of the society named, and known in the locality as Molly Maguires. The story is substantially true, whether we read it Schuylkill County or Ireland, commissioner of the county or town councillor. Mr. Franklin B. Gowen, counsel for the Commonwealth, said:

"When these assassins speak of being Catholics, I desire to say that they have been denounced by their Church, and excommunicated by their prelates, and that I have the direct personal authority of Archbishop Wood himself to say that he denounces them all. . . . . You will find the leaders prominent men in the townships. . . . . One of the commissioners of this county is a member. A former commissioner of this county was a member of this order, convicted of a high offense, and pardoned by the Governor. High constables, chiefs of police, candidates for associate judges, were guilty of murder. When the time comes that all may be told to the world, it will be such a history as will make every American citizen hang his head with shame. I have seen a society of murderers and assassins having its members in the highest place of this county. I have seen them elected to fill the positions of constables and police officers. I have seen a trusted member of that band of murderers a commissioner of the county. I have seen this organization wield a political power in the State, which has controlled the election of a great Commonwealth. I have received the information of meetings between some of the highest officers of the State and the chief of the murderers, at which large sums of money were paid to secure the votes of this infernal association, to turn the tide of a State election."

In Pennsylvania, the criminals were hunted down, and the crimes stopped. The Irish in Ireland did not send aid and comfort to criminals here, nor in any way interfere with the process of our courts. In Ireland, the difficulties are far greater; therefore, the people, as well as their Government, have a right to expect of us, at least, the friendship of a silent sympathy, instead of an embarrassing interference, prompted by a desire to propitiate the turbulent, not the peaceable Irish element here. There was no pretense of inequality before the law in Pennsylvania, nor of extortionate rents, nor of undue governmental restraints.

Neither, on the other hand, did the State adjust or scale down rents to suit the necessities of tenants. But in the coal regions, a reign of terror existed of precisely the same in kind as has so often reigned in parts of Ireland. As the victims in Ireland represented a political power obnoxious to their murderers, or else private persons who had incurred their hostility — so, in Pennsylvania, the victims represented, in some capacity, the corporations controlling the mining business, or were persons who had offended the ruffians. Here, as in Ireland, the plots were unraveled, and men in higher station were implicated as ringleaders. At this point the resemblance stops. It is due to the Mollie Maguires to admit that they did not run to Ireland or France for shelter, nor even to take up a collection. Few of the mad revolutionists here, who pretend to be anxious to drive the British out of Ireland, evince any great desire to engage in the work themselves. If a hundred or two of them would only go to Ireland at once, they would at least seem consistent, and gratify Americans as well as the British people. But they will not go; they know that here they may "live long and prosper." The sum of their Irish patriotism is expressed in the old formula: "We are opposed to the cholera, and in favor of the next war with England." They also know that if that patriotism, which Johnson defined as "the last refuge of scoundrels," should fail to render them an ample support, they can, as a last resort, open bar-rooms, become aldermen, get rich, and hope to die in the odor of sanctity.

And the sting of it all is that it is true. As a people, we have debased our citizenship so low, that when we know it is abused we make no sign. Neither of the great political parties dares to raise the standard of duty and obligation, or to oppose the mischievous clap-trap of the day. If the Chinese had been voters, and even one-third as numerous as the Irish, they would have been welcomed—not excluded. The power to remedy the abuse of American citizenship lies in the assertion of American patriotism. When a candidate is known to be in sympathy with men who are in name, not at heart, American, their support should be sufficient cause to insure his overwhelming defeat. We want no divided allegiance, no tools of foreigners, to "make laws for us and govern us," or to force the United States into one policy or another. All Americans, native or naturalized, owe it to themselves and their country to take a high stand upon this

matter. The quick defeat of a few candidates for obscure as well as conspicuous places would be a salutary lesson to politicians who generally respect the teachings of adversity.

There is no danger now that immigration will bring hither advocates of monarchy or nobility; consequently, it is not so important that aliens should swear to support the Constitution as it is that they should emphasize their accession to the rights of citizenship, by a solemn pledge to obey the laws, and to utterly renounce their former national and race antipathies. If they object to these conditions, they should not be trusted with the privileges citizenship confers; their naturalization would be only a sham, and themselves unnecessary additions to the number of irresponsible and inconsiderate voters.

Naturalized citizens should not be entitled to vote until they have resided in the State at least a year after their admission to citizenship. In this respect, they should be placed upon an equality with natives,—citizens from birth,—who are required in New York and other States to be residents for twelve months before they can vote. If this change were made, it would put an end to the corruption attending wholesale naturalizations in the heat of elections, and the courts could consider the applications according to the intent of the law.

Incorporation is a privilege granted to associations on the ground of public utility. It follows, logically, that it is an abuse and a fiction to incorporate a secret society of any kind. This abuse becomes intensely pernicious when such a society is formed of foreigners of one nationality and their immediate descendants, and must, of necessity, foster alien interests in the hearts of those who ought to be devoted to their adopted country. The objection may be raised that these restrictions are uncalled for; we have done without them so far, and they will tend to diminish the volume of immigration which is so valuable. In reply, we say, the abuses we have considered would not have existed, or would have been much less offensive, if such measures had been taken early. The experience of a century of virtually unrestricted citizenship for aliens has gradually developed these evils, and has plainly taught us that the accessions of foreigners are due to the prospect of material advantages, far more than to philosophical principles or political rights. Cheap land and cheap transportation will as effectively induce emigration to the United States in the future as in the past, and if no more aliens

should be granted the right to vote, it would probably not lessen the volume of immigration to any appreciable extent.

Notwithstanding the inducements offered by the British Colonies to British emigrants in the reduction of rates and otherwise, about three-fourths of all the native emigrants from the United Kingdom go to the United States. During the period 1853–1880, the emigrants from Great Britain and Ireland were distributed as follows:

| | *To the United States.* | *To British Nor. Amer.* | *To Australia and New Zealand.* | *All other Countries.* | *Total.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| English | 69,081 | 13,541 | 15,176 | 14,047 | 111,845 |
| Scotch | 14,471 | 3,221 | 3,059 | 1,305 | 22,056 |
| Irish | 83,018 | 4,140 | 5,949 | 534 | 93,641 |
| Foreign | 88,801 | 8,434 | 1,253 | 1,881 | 100,369 |
| Unknown | 1,903 | 4 | 1 | 2,475 | 4,383 |
| | 257,274 | 29,340 | 25,438 | 20,242 | 332,294 |

The German emigration is almost entirely to this country.

It may be proper to add, what no right-minded person would question, that there is not, and never has been, any unwillingness here to aid suffering humanity in Ireland or elsewhere. The Irish-Americans have been profuse in their contributions to their kindred in Ireland, and have been respected for it. When the Bennett Fund was raised for the starving in Ireland, and when our Germans sent money the other day for the benefit of the sufferers by the Rhine inundations, every one knew those large sums would be applied to those purposes exclusively. But when any of our people—native or naturalized, high or low—collect money under the guise of charity, and use it to aid treason and felony on the territory of a friendly power, they deserve the rebuke General Butler administered to a New York mob in 1868: "You are not fit for the exercise of the elective franchise, and in no better way could you demonstrate the fact."

EDWARD SELF.

# HERBERT SPENCER'S FACTS AND INFERENCES.

In reviewing Mr. Herbert Spencer's work in the domain of social science, two methods of criticism are open to me. I may attempt to cover the whole of the vast field which he traverses, and confine myself to general statements more or less vague, or I may restrict myself to special points. As I prefer to be precise, I select the latter method, and shall endeavor so to choose the points, that the reader may be able to form an opinion concerning the trustworthiness of Mr. Spencer's data and the value of his inductions; and to judge whether the social theories, based largely on these data and inductions on the one hand, and on dogmatic assertions on the other, are or are not tainted with fallacies.

*First.* Some data and inductions.

As Mr. Spencer's system is mainly inductive, and as he is compelled to rely on other writers for his information, it is important to note, at the outset, that he does not always correctly apprehend the authors to whom he refers. A notable instance of this is found in his essay on "The Social Organism," wherein he claims to give Plato's idea of the State: *

> "The central idea of Plato's model Republic is the correspondence between the parts of a society and the faculties of the human mind. Classifying these faculties under the head of Reason, Will, and Passion, he classifies the members of his ideal society under what he regards as three analogous heads: — councilors, who are to exercise government; military, or executive, who are to fulfill their behests; and the commonalty, bent on gain and selfish gratification. In other words, the ruler, the warrior, and the craftsman are, according to him, the analogues of our reflective, volitional, and emotional powers."

* "Illustrations of Universal Progress," Appleton's edition, 1883, pp. 376–7.

Mr. Spencer criticises this analogy, and his criticism would be just if Plato had ever claimed that such an analogy existed. But the ancient philosopher never said anything so absurd as that the military, who are to fulfill the behests of the councilors, represent the volitional faculty of the body politic. He logically predicates volition of all classes of society; and warns, moreover, emphatically against the dangers arising to the State if the will of the military or the industrial classes predominate over that of the scientific, or regulative class, and shows that such a predominance is as productive of evil to the State, as the predominance of the will of the impulses and desires over that of reason is to the individual.*

In the "Data of Ethics" † occurs another and even more startling misapprehension of Plato's theory. There he puts into the mouth of the philosopher, whose great aim is to teach the absolute being of Truth and Justice, the monstrous statement that "State enactments" are "the sources of right and wrong." Words to this effect may, indeed, be found in the "Republic,"‡ but they are uttered by Thrasymachus, the sophist, and then exposed in all their bareness, and castigated by the unpitying irony of Socrates, the philosopher.

The name of Plato calls to mind an art which forms an essential factor in the Platonic state; and so, at this juncture, an inquiry into Mr. Spencer's views concerning the evolution of music suggests itself.

In order to show how music was developed from the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, Mr. Spencer begins thus: §

"As argued by Dr. Burney, and as implied by the customs of still extant barbarous races, the first musical instruments were, without doubt, percussive sticks, calabashes, tom-toms, and were used simply to mark the time of the dance; and, in this constant repetition of the same sound, we see music in its most homogeneous form. The Eygptians had a lyre of three strings."

* In another part of his works,—"The Principles of Sociology," p. 611,—Mr. Spencer asserts that Plato, in his Republic, compares "the reason, passion, and desire," in the individual, to "the counsellors, auxiliaries, and traders" in the State. Now, either passion and "the will" (not to speak of "desire and passion") are synonymous terms, or our author contradicts himself. I am surprised to find that in the note, pp. 613–4, while referring to essay quoted above, Mr. Spencer makes no attempt to reconcile his conflicting statements.

† "Data of Ethics," Appleton's edition, p. 51.

‡ Jowett's "Plato," second edition, Vol. III., p. 207.

§ "First Principles," fourth edition, p. 356.

In this fashion Mr. Spencer continues tracing the history of music among the Greeks and during the Middle Ages in very remarkable outlines. He concludes: "And from the fugue to concerted music in two, three, four, and more parts, the transition was easy."* Now, in the first place, Dr. Burney, a writer of the last century, is no authority in the matter of ancient music. In the second place, a mere speculative argument is no datum on which an induction can properly be based. Thirdly. The two instruments for which he claims the remotest antiquity in the historical portion of his work are stringed instruments; the first, indeed, being "furnished with a neck," by means of which "simple and commodious" expedient the number of tones its two strings produced was considerable;† and the second, an elegant harp of thirteen strings.‡ Fourthly. The barbarous races "still extant" not only rival our grand orchestras in the possession of sticks and tom-toms, but also in that of horns, flutes, and stringed instruments.‖ Fifthly. Though the early Egyptians had a lyre of three strings, an induction regarding the state of Egyptian music based on this fact alone is as fallacious as would be one concerning modern music based on the sole testimony of the accordeon. The original sources of our information, the monuments, attest that a great variety of stringed instruments, not to mention horns, flutes, and other wind instruments, were contemporaneous with and of even greater antiquity than the three-stringed lyre. It were heaping Pelion on Ossa to add that Dr. Ambros, a recent and distinguished author, maintains that, as far as we know, the most ancient lyre known to the Egyptians is one of eight strings.§

Lastly, as to Mr. Spencer's opinion concerning the transition from the fugue to music in two and more parts, it partakes rather of the character of American humor than of scientific investigation. It is as though one should say that the development of the isosceles triangle into a figure of three sides was not attended by difficulties.

I have no doubt that many of my readers will be inclined to think lightly of the fact that Mr. Spencer, occupied as he is with the history of the world and all contained therein, is not at home

* "First Principles," fourth edition, p. 357.
† Burney's "History of Music," ed. 1789, Vol. I., p. 197.
‡ Ib., p. 214.
‖ A. W. Ambros's "Geschichte der Musik," Vol. I., p. 12.
§ Ib., Vol. I., p. 151.

in such comparatively trifling matters as the technical terms of music, notwithstanding that he may find it necessary to write about them. Unfortunately, however, he misconceives terms of a more important nature, and thus is led into glaring fallacies arising from the use of the same word in two different senses. For instance, in his "Political Institutions," he bases one of his most important generalizations—the progress of society from "Militancy" to "Industrialism"—among other facts, on this one, that, in contradistinction to the Middle Ages, war is no longer the business of all freemen.*

Leaving aside all other criticisms, it is sufficient to point out that while in the Middle Ages the word "freemen" was predicated of a class, and often of a very small class, to-day it is predicated of the entire population.

An equally remarkable instance of Mr. Spencer's confusion of different meanings of the same word, and also an instance of his want of historical accuracy,—two defects fatal to inductive reasoning, depending as it does on the correctness of all particulars,—may be found in the essay, "Manners and Fashion." †

He attempts there to prove that the numerous titles of rank are the result of the "continual degradation of all names of honor," and of the necessity of introducing new ones having that distinguishing effect which the originals had lost by generality of use. Among the many so-called historical data on which he relies, I select the following:

"Again, Knighthood, the oldest kind of dignity, is also the lowest, and Knight Bachelor, which is the lowest order of Knighthood, is more ancient than any other of the orders. Similarly, too, with the Peerage; Baron is alike the earliest and least elevated of its divisions."

Here it is to be remarked, in the first place, that the word "Knighthood" has at least three distinct meanings, and that, consequently, the sentence in which it occurs has too little scientific exactness for a datum on which an induction may be based. In the second place, in whatever sense the word be considered, Mr. Spencer's history is incorrect.

* "Political Institutions," p. 619.

† "Illustrations of Universal Progress," pp. 75–6. This essay being so full of errors, I half imagined that Mr. Spencer must have repudiated it, until I found it referred to, in the last edition of the "First Principles," as furnishing the "detailed proof" of his "assertions" there made, p. 344.

Knighthood is not the oldest kind of dignity, and the Knights of the most Noble Order of the Garter, at least, must have been astonished to learn that their dignity is the lowest. Knight Bachelor, contrary to the requirements of Mr. Spencer's theory, is of a more recent date than the higher grade of Knight Banneret. The name Baron, in its present signification, as a title of nobility, dates from the year 1387, and is, consequently, more recent than the title of Earl, which was first conferred independently of office in 1328; more recent than the title of Duke, conferred in 1337; and of Marquis, dating from 1385; while in its older signification, it was not a title of nobility, but the general designation of all crown tenants. And it is curious to note, that if we follow to their sources both the terms instanced by Mr. Spencer, no less than others equally high sounding, such as Prime Minister or Field Marshal, we find them originally applied to servants and slaves; and thus the witnesses cited by Mr. Spencer, to testify that titles are the result of degradation of names of honor, tend rather to prove the contrary.

But I have given as many illustrations of Mr. Spencer's misapprehension of historical data as space permits, and must pass on to the consideration of the half-truths which he derives from imperfect, partial, and one-sided observation. A striking illustration of these may be found in his so-called "Law of Evolution."

Mr. Spencer claims that the evolution of society (as well as that of the organic and the inorganic world) consists in a change from the less coherent to the more coherent, accompanied by a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.

Now, I do not deny that in some particular epochs, or viewed from some particular aspects, evolution manifests itself by such a change. I maintain, however, that in other epochs, or viewed from other aspects, it is manifested by a change in the opposite direction. Considering, for example, the evolution of Germanic society, we find that the families are constantly entering into closer relations with the tribe, and the tribes coming gradually into the closer coherence of the State. So far, Mr. Spencer is right. But, then, the greater coherence of the tribe is obtained at the expense of the coherence of the family, and the greater coherence of the State by a diminution of coherence in the tribe and the province. So that, viewed from the aspect of the nation, the tendency has been toward integration; viewed from

the aspect of the family and tribe, it has been toward disintegration. Likewise, if we consider social movements by epochs, we find progress at one time taking the form of an increase of coherence; at another time, of a decrease of coherence. The rise of the Roman Empire manifests the former phenomenon, the invasion of the barbarians furnishes us with an example of the latter; the Papal supremacy shows progress by means of aggregation and integration; the Reformation, by means of segregation and disintegration. Our own times show a simultaneous tendency toward less coherence in subordinate political corporations, toward greater coherence in the State, and toward a separation into distinct nationalities, with political independence and industrial segregation.

Mr. Spencer, in order to cramp evolution into the artificial boundaries he has set for it, resorts to artificial breaks in progress, invokes dissolution or involution; in order to support his half-truth, he voluntarily reduces himself to a semi-evolutionist. It need, however, hardly be pointed out that if evolution be a truth, there can be no break in it; that no particular phase of history, or of the social movement, can claim for itself a monopoly of the principle; that the Papacy and the aggregation of the tribes into an European empire are links in the same chain of which the Reformation and the segregation of the empire into distinct nationalities are others; that the tendencies toward the less coherent in the family, the tribe, the caste, and the province, are the necessary concomitants of those toward the more coherent in the State. Nor can these strictures be in part eluded by the argument that the Reformation and the nationalities instance the secondary form of evolution as interpreted by Mr. Spencer; namely, the change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. For the very essence of his doctrine is that the greater heterogeneity is the essential concomitant of the greater coherence; that the two forms are, in reality, identical, and cannot exist without each other.

But that social progress does not always take the form of a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous has already been pointed out by Mr. Cliffe Leslie,* who has shown that the movement of "language, law, and political and civil unions is, for the most part, in an opposite direction." Mr. Spencer at-

* "Fortnightly Review," January, 1879

tempts to diminish the force of this criticism by contending that what Mr. Leslie had in mind is a "progressing unification,"* a tendency toward greater coherence and not toward greater homogeneity. But I cannot consider his argument a valid one. Taking, for example, the France of Louis XIV., we find a unified State with very heterogeneous elements; and it appears to me that whatever progress it may have made has been toward the homogeneity of these elements. However, I need hardly enlarge on this point, as Mr. Spencer himself asserts that the population of Great Britain is approximately homogeneous in character.† Certainly, he could not say this of the British population in the Middle Ages, with its Normans, Saxons, Welshmen, Lowlanders, Highlanders, and other heterogeneous elements too numerous to mention. And so, even if we admit all the testimony with which Mr. Spencer seeks to prove his proposition, we find that it is only a half-truth, and requires to be complemented by the other half, its exact opposite.

Thus we have found that the much-quoted "law of evolution" is no law whatever; that it is not even a tendency subordinate to the human will;‡ nor, indeed, an induction; nor in any sense a scientific proposition. In short, that it is not the formulation of objective observation, but simply a subjective fancy.§

Yet, a still more striking example of Mr. Spencer's one-sidedness is furnished by what I consider his most wide-reaching and important generalization in the field of social science, and one most likely to entail practical consequences. It is that, with the advance of civilization, "status passes into contract."‖ But this half-truth, at the present juncture of social questions, is so full of danger to society, that I must hasten to complete it by adding to it the other and better half: "and contract passes into

* "First Principles," p. 572. † "Study of Sociology," p. 350.

‡ "Study of Sociology," p. 401.

§ The reader may miss any reference to the portion of Mr. Spencer's law according to which evolution proceeds, also from the indefinite to the definite. ("First Principles," 361–380.) I have not considered it, because it is not so much an illustration of Mr. Spencer's imperfect observation of society as of his confounding subjective impression with objective reality. I need hardly suggest that objects are all necessarily equally and completely definite, and that the indefiniteness can exist only in our conceptions of them.

‖ "Data of Ethics," p. 239. For a full elaboration of what Mr. Spencer calls the passing from the *régime* of status into the *régime* of contract, see "Political Institutions," particularly chap. xviii.

status." Expressing the whole truth in a less oracular form, we have: progress in civilization is partly caused and partly attended by an increase of the freedom of contracting in some directions; but this increase is merely the result of a diminution of the freedom of contracting in other directions.

I shall adduce only a few instances to substantiate my assertion.

Among the ancient Germans, crimes were considered private injuries, and the retribution was allowed to be settled by a contract between the offended party or his family and the offender. To-day, the commission of a crime confers a status on the offender from which no private contract can free him. Indeed, the offended party becomes himself a criminal as a compounder of felony, if he attempts by contract to aid the criminal in eluding punishment by the public authorities.

But it is hardly necessary to cite special cases, when the modern State is itself an evolution from the condition of a society resting on the basis of contract into one resting on the basis of status. In the Middle Ages, all government was of a private character, founded on the relations of landlord and tenant, with the condition of protection on the one side and service on the other, the breach of the condition by either party relieving the other. All constitutions were contracts between king and people, based on mutual assent and considerations, and differed in no manner from private charters. The modern State, on the other hand, repudiates all notion of contract in the relations of the citizen to the State, and its constitutions are utterly inconsistent with the notion of contracting parties. In short, contrary to Mr. Spencer's doctrine, the *régime* of contract has, with advancing civilization, been superseded by the *régime* of status.*

*Second.* Mr. Spencer's dogmas.

Of these, the most pertinent to our discussion are the following:

(1) In the social organism, "the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. (2) The society exists for the benefit of its members; and not its members for the benefit of the society. (3) It has ever to be remembered that great as may be the efforts

* For a more detailed view of the evolution of the State and of civil liberty in the State by a progressive restriction of the right of contracting, I refer to my article, "A Definition of Liberty," in the January number of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, 1883.

made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals." *

Fortunately for the cause of social progress, it is not difficult to demonstrate the falsity of these dogmas, for they disprove themselves.

By the words "units," "members," and "component individuals," Mr. Spencer must intend to designate either all the "units," all the "members," all the "component individuals," or a part of the "units," a part of the "members," a part of the "component individuals." In the former case, the welfare of the "aggregate" and that of the "units," the "benefit of society" and that of "its members," the claims of the "body politic" and those of "its component individuals" are identical and cannot be contrasted with each other. In the latter case, we have the absurd statement that the welfare of all is not an end to be sought, that the whole exists for the benefit of a part, and that the claims of the whole are nothing, while those of a fraction are everything.

*Third.* Mr. Spencer's political theories.

Relying principally on the dogmas thus instanced, and inductions of the kind criticised in this article, Mr. Spencer formulates his political theories:

The State is an establishment existing mainly for two purposes: First, to enforce private contracts; second, to act as policeman and police justice: and it has no right whatever to interfere with the individual excepting to the extent necessitated by these functions. † It has no right to establish free public education; for this is taxing one individual in order to educate the children of another. ‡ It has no right to establish a free public library; for this is taxing the "more worthy" who save in order to enable the "less worthy" who do not save to get free reading. § It has no right to establish hospitals and asylums; for this is robbing individuals of "money which otherwise would have furthered their private ends." ‖ It has no right to make laws regulating public health, ¶ preventing the adulteration of

* "Principles of Sociology," pp. 479, 480.

† "Data of Ethics," pp. 146 and 138. See, also, "Political Institutions," pp. 530, 608, 610, 612; "Study of Sociology," pp. 286, 288.

‡ "Study of Sociology," p. 370, ; "Political Institutions," p. 612.

§ "Principles of Sociology," p. 605; "Political Institutions," p. 612; "Study of Sociology," p. 286.

‖ "Political Institutions, p. 612; "Study of Sociology," pp. 367-370.

¶ "Study of Sociology," pp. 287-8; "Principles of Sociology," p. 604.

food,* prescribing rules of building,† establishing inspection of factories and mines,‡ or in any manner interfering with individuals so as to prevent them from conducting their businesses according to their own pleasure. In short, it has no right to prevent the unlimited exploitation of the weaker by the stronger, and it must allow the former to be crushed and destroyed in the struggle for existence, so that the latter may have full opportunity to survive. §

On the basis of false inductions and self-contradictory dogmas, he exalts private interests above public needs, and subordinates the most sacred rights of all to the supposed advantages of a few. Nor does he perceive that he is merely preaching the doctrine of the Middle Ages, which made freedom consist in the defiance of the sovereign and oppression of the serf. As little is he aware that his teaching is destructive of the public spirit, still so faintly developed, and, above all things, needing encouragement. In fine, while devoting many pages || to the discussion of various kinds of bias, he forgets a bias far more dangerous than any of those which he instances—unfortunately, his own peculiar bias—individualism. He forgets that in the modern State the individual is not only a citizen or subject, but also has an undivided share in the sovereignty, and that as far as he is a part of the sovereignty, he is higher and greater, enjoys higher and greater rights, and accepts higher and greater duties than those of a subject. And forgetting this, in the one-sidedness so characteristic of his political speculations, he is not sufficiently impressed with the fact that the Government is the agent of the sovereignty; and that the end of political teaching ought to be the establishment of harmony between the sovereign and its agent in order that the will of the former may be well executed, and not to increase the discord between the Government and the individual, and thus lame the only arm by which the sovereignty may protect all against aggression from without and within. Nor can the altruism which he invokes take the place of the public spirit which he kills, for he himself has shown that when carried to its correct logical conclusion, it becomes an absurdity.¶

In conclusion, a definition of the term "public spirit" may

* "Study of Sociology," p.605. † Ib., pp. 287–8.
‡ "Political Institutions," p.612; "Principles of Sociology," p. 605.
§ "Political Institutions," pp. 610–613.
|| Chapters VIII–XII., "Study of Sociology."
¶ "Data of Ethics," pp. 228, 229, 233, 235.

not be out of place, for it will, perhaps, furnish the best answer to the doctrines of the author with whom we have occupied ourselves.

Just as in the joint ownership of an object, each of the proprietors has an undivided share in the whole and every part, so in the State each citizen has an undivided share in the sovereignty, an interest in the whole State and every part of it. In other words, to the extent of his share every citizen contains the whole State within himself; and as he rises in the scale of political consciousness, he subordinates his individualistic ego to this greater ego, in which the all is contained. And it is this consciousness which is the public spirit. It is this which makes the possessor of it feel that every co-member of the State is a part of himself, though it be the tramp infesting the highway, or the criminal serving a term in the State's prison. It is by this consciousness that he perceives the folly of those doctrines which teach him that if the inferior part of himself is left to destruction, the superior part will survive;* that if the diseases of the body politic are permitted to run on without check, they will, by killing the diseased portions, impart a blooming health to the whole. And it is by this consciousness that he perceives that it is the imperative duty of the State to raise the degraded, to educate the ignorant, to relieve the oppressed; and that if it fail to fulfill this duty, it will enevitably suffer all the ills resulting from ignorance, degradation, and oppression.

And the developing of the public spirit, of the appreciation that the sovereign within ourselves ought to rule over the subject within ourselves, must, if we wish to be preserved, form the foundation of our education, as well in the school as in the press, in the rostrum as in the pulpit. And in the measure that this is accomplished, our legislature and judiciary and civil service will become purer; for the private and lower interests of our governmental officers will then subordinate themselves to their higher and public interests. Thus, and only thus, the brutal struggle for a bare subsistence on the one side, and endless accumulation on the other, with its attendant class hatred, monopolies, and corruption, now threatening to ingulf us in a vortex of ruin, will gradually give way to a healthful, honest, and hearty coöperation of all for the benefit of all.

ISAAC L. RICE.

* "Political Institutions," p. 610; "Study of Sociology," pp. 339–346, 353.

# A FEW WORDS ABOUT PUBLIC SINGING.

To THE public singer, more perhaps than to any other artist, sympathetic appreciation, quickly and naturally manifested by the audience, is everything. The painter and the poet, if they have the courage that comes from a complete consciousness of their peculiar gifts, may work on in the solitude of their studies, confident that what one generation refuses to consider another may give a rightful place among the immortal achievements of human genius and skill. The composer may be misunderstood, misinterpreted, neglected; but his score survives him, and may yet be rendered to an admiring world by some musician who had not begun the first music of the cradle when its author became silent in the grave. Even the actor, though his success depends largely upon sympathy in his audience, is not under so great obligations to it as the singer, by as much as the dramatist and the scene-painter play a more important and observable part than the composer. Words may express an idea, however clumsily or coldly spoken; but the expression of the more delicate and fleeting emotions and suggestions of song must be created almost entirely by the singer, who is all the while conscious that unless they fall upon sensitive and sympathetic ears, they pass forever out of existence with their own brief echoes. A great English poet tells us that:

"Music, when soft voices die, vibrates in the memory."

But it is only in the memory of such souls as have some responsive music of their own.

The audience that exhibits the most sympathetic appreciation gets the best music. There is no power in mechanical singing, and the hearers will always feel its lifelessness, whether they understand its cause or not. Singing may be said to find its level. It cannot stir the nature of the hearer to any deeper

depth, or exalt his enthusiasm to any higher height, than the depth and height of the singer's own heart and soul.

From the nature of the case, there must be a certain amount of tediousness or weariness in singing the same piece many times over. Yet a song which gives fitting expression to any genuine emotion of the human heart, which in any way arrives at that touch of nature that makes the whole world kin, is one of the most durable of all things in art or literature. And it must be remembered that each public rendering is an experience more or less peculiar to itself. Different audiences, different auspices, different stage companionship, different arrangements for sound and light and ventilation,— above all, the ever-varying experiences of one's own private life, which may be vividly present to the singer, while hidden from the audience,— all these things have their effect upon the performance. Sometimes a singer is able, for no apparently adequate reason, to outdo, in a marked degree, her efforts at other times. At the least unexpected event, especially if it be anything of the nature of a disappointment, she may become hoarse, and her vocal organs refuse to respond. It has been found absolutely impossible to train the voice sufficiently to enable it to overcome such causes of depression. Any measure of sadness immediately makes itself felt in the effort, and mars the execution.

In my judgment, the American people, during the past twelve years, have made wonderful progress in the power to appreciate good music. They no longer accept a foreign artist, without question, solely on the strength of a European reputation. It is true they will go once to see or hear a person who has made a noise abroad; because they have money, and probably quite as much curiosity as other people. But they will not continue to patronize that which does not suit their taste or commend itself to their judgment. So far as my observation goes, the appreciation of good music in the principal cities of the United States is fully equal to that of the European capitals. It is evinced by a deep sympathy which is felt at the very beginning of a performance. In the Eastern and Middle States, the audiences appear to have a more deliberate judgment, a disposition to consider and compare, before committing themselves to full approval; but the response is hearty and cheering when it comes. In the West and South, it is quicker in its expression. The musical cultivation and judgment of the Americans are shown

in a prompt recognition of the best passages; they appear to realize what is generally fine in the art. Mozart, Beethoven, Meyerbeer, and Wagner are as thoroughly understood here as in European cities, and the expression of appreciation is stronger. Even in small places I have been agreeably surprised at the manifestations of an intelligent enjoyment of classical music.

This state of things is probably owing to the fact that, in one sense, there is so little provincialism in America. The Americans are great travelers, and have unequaled facilities for travel. They think nothing of going from one end of the country to the other, whenever business, health, or pleasure demands it. And they remove their homes from one section to another with almost equal ease. They are at home everywhere. Brothers and sisters live in the most distant parts of the land, and scarcely realize that they are not near neighbors. The consequence is, that one finds substantially the same society, the same institutions, the same education, and the same degree of refinement in Chicago or St. Louis or San Francisco, as in New York, Philadelphia, or Boston. It may almost be said that there is no intellectual metropolis; and those differences in dialect, which make sharp distinctions between people of neighboring counties and provinces in Europe, are here entirely wanting.

The abundance of wealth in the United States, and the spirit of enterprise that does not fear to invest it on a large scale in any worthy undertaking, may be seen in the great number of excellent halls and opera houses, where musical performances may be rendered to the best advantage. I have been as well satisfied with the acoustic effects of the rooms in which I have sung in America, as with those of European cities. It was a surprise and delight to find a perfect gem of an opera house so far west as Denver. The Academy of Music in Philadelphia, I consider second only, in acoustic properties, to the Grand Opera House at Vienna, which is the finest in the world.

God has intrusted to me the gift of melody, and endowed me also with an enthusiam for its exercise. I love to sing, and can not help it; it is my life and my enjoyment. But if my auditors in America have received any genuine pleasure from it, I can assure them it is in a great degree due to their own responsive sympathy, which has made the benefit and the obligation mutual.

CHRISTINE NILSSON.

# INCIDENTAL TAXATION.

THE incidental taxes to which attention is directed are levied whenever the cost of domestic commodities is increased by reason of duties laid on imported articles of like character. Political economists have usually classified taxes as either direct or indirect. Direct taxes are those which fall upon the citizen or subject, and are levied from him; indirect taxes are levied on property, merchandise, commodities, and are, in the last resort, paid by the consumer in the form of an enhanced price. Adam Smith, the father of the science of political economy, laid down four maxims in regard to taxation, which have generally been concurred in, and which, as remarked by John Stuart Mill, have become classical. These maxims are in substance as follows:

*First.* The subjects of every State ought to contribute to the support of the Government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State.

*Second.* The tax should be certain, and not arbitrary; the time and manner of payment, and the amount to be paid, should be definite and understood by all persons.

*Third.* Every tax should be levied at the time and in the manner most convenient for payment.

*Fourth.* Every tax ought to be so contrived as to take from the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury.

These propositions seem to be self-evident; that they are correct in principle is not denied by any one. Yet, strange as it may seem, the system of taxation upon which the Government of the United States relies for its revenues violates nearly every one of these maxims. The first maxim is violated in this: that under our federal system every person contributes to the sup-

port of the Government, not in proportion to the revenue which he enjoys under its protection, but in proportion to the amount of commodities which he consumes. A millionaire may not pay a greater amount of taxes to the National Government than a person of very limited means. In both cases the amount contributed to the support of the Government depends upon the articles consumed. The second maxim is violated in this: that no person knows how much he pays or when he pays it. The fourth maxim is violated in a most striking manner. The federal system of taxation takes from the people as great an amount as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury. By the imposition of discriminating duties, the consumer is required to pay two distinct taxes, only one of which is paid to the Government; the other goes to the producer or manufacturer of the article, or is lost on unprofitable industries. The first of these we will denominate revenue taxes, the second incidental taxes.

A discriminating duty is one which is imposed upon the importation of commodities of foreign production, unaccompanied by an equivalent tax upon the home product of like character. The imported article can only be sold in this country after payment of the Government duty. "A tax on any one article," says Mr. Mill, "will, as a general rule, raise the value and price of the commodity by at least the amount of the tax." This, of course, relates to the price of the commodity upon which the tax is actually laid and collected; but the rule as to the increased cost of other commodities not taxed, but incidentally affected by the tax, varies according to circumstances. If the home product of a given article is not equal to the home demand for consumption, and imports of like character come in to supply the deficiency, the whole amount of the tax on the imported article will be added to the price of the home product. For example, Bessemer pig iron, which was imported during the last year to the amount of five hundred thousand tons, was worth in England in January last about $13.38 per ton. The duty was then $7.00 per ton, and that, with freights and other charges, would raise the cost in this country to about $22.00 per ton. At the same time, the selling price of the home product in this country was $22.00 to $22.50 per ton. Upon this article, at that time, the whole domestic product was increased in value to the full amount of the duty.

If the home product is equal to or exceeds the home demand, but cannot be exported without loss to the producer or manufacturer, the increased cost of the home product will be measured by the cost of production, with such profits as may be permitted by domestic competition, and will always be less than the tax upon the foreign product. For example, English steel rails can be laid down in New York for about $25.00 per ton. Prior to the passage of the new tariff law the duty was $28.00 per ton. This would make the selling price of English rails in New York $53.00 per ton. But the home product was selling at the same time at $40.00 per ton, showing that the cost of American rails was only $15.00 per ton in excess of foreign rails, instead of $28.00, which was the amount of the duty. Hence, upon this article at that time the price of the home product of steel rails was enhanced only $15.00 per ton, and not to the extent of the duty. But this low price of the home product was the result of domestic competition, and has only been recently realized. During the years 1880 and 1881, for instance, prices were such that the whole amount of the duty was added to the cost of the domestic article.

If home products exceed the home demand for consumption, and can be exported at a profit to the producer or manufacturer, the imposition of a duty on imported articles of like character will not affect the price of the home product. For example: there is a nominal duty of ten cents a bushel on imported Indian corn, but the imports of that article for the last fiscal year were only 69,641 bushels, while the exports for the same year were 43,000,000 bushels, and for the preceding year 91,000,000 bushels. The same may be said generally of all breadstuffs and farm products. Although duties are levied upon the importation of similar articles, yet these are merely nominal, and do not increase the price of the domestic products to consumers, except in a few cases. The exceptions are rice, sugar, oranges and lemons, barley, malt, potatoes at markets near the Eastern seaboard, and a few other articles which it is unnecessary to mention.

In these observations I do not wish to be understood as departing from the principle that prices are governed by the law of supply and demand. The Government, by the imposition of duties on imported articles, limits the supply of such articles in all cases where the home product is not equal to the demand for

home consumption, and thus, by limiting the supply, increases the price of the product on hand. But if articles are produced in excess of the demand for home consumption, the price at which the surplus product can be sold in foreign markets determines the price of the home product. In like manner, the price of domestic products which do not equal the home demand is determined by the price at which imported articles of like character can be sold in this country after paying the duty.

The federal system of taxation violates the fourth maxim laid down by Adam Smith in other respects. All imported commodities which have actually paid the tax, and domestic products which have been increased in value by reason of the duty, constitute the stock on hand and to be carried by the merchants of the country; and the capital which they are required to invest and keep in their business is much greater by reason of the incidental and revenue taxes which the articles bear. Thus a greater amount of capital is required to carry on a given amount of business; and the larger the capital required the more limited will be the number of persons engaging in a particular business. This produces the double injury of limiting the capital of the country in the transaction of legitimate business, and of creating and fostering monopolies by limiting the number of persons who may be engaged in any particular pursuit.

The value of taxed commodities represents two distinct advances,—one in the real value of the article and the other in the tax. The wholesale dealer advances both sums; he sells to the retail dealer and charges a profit on the whole amount advanced. The retail dealer sells to the consumer and charges a commission on all he paid to the wholesale dealer. Thus the taxes which the consumer must pay at last are vastly in excess of what the Government really gets.

Incidental taxes, as well as those received by the Government, have vastly increased the cost of railroads. This additional cost is represented now by bonds and stock, and constitutes permanent indebtedness, upon which interest and dividends must be paid from year to year. In order to meet these demands, higher rates must be charged for carrying freights; this reduces the price of grain and of farm products, and increases the price of articles which farmers are compelled to buy.

The cost of the construction of houses is largely increased by incidental taxes. The materials are taxed from 20 to 80 per

centum. Instead of a real value of $1000 there is a real and tax value of perhaps $1500. Upon this latter sum the landlord must estimate in order to obtain his remuneration in rents. The poor tenant must at last pay the taxes on the materials of construction, with interest, insurance, and commissions of middle-men added.

The National Government is constructing many public buildings in Washington and elsewhere. The States are engaged in building State-houses, charitable institutions, and prisons. Counties are building court-houses, jails, and bridges. Cities and towns are constructing public halls, school-houses, and water-works. The materials for all these public works are heavily burdened with incidental and revenue taxes. Other taxes must, therefore, be levied and collected to meet those previously imposed. What were at first incidental and indirect taxes must, when borne by States and municipalities, be reimbursed by direct taxation under the State systems.

"Taxes which are imposed upon the necessaries of life," as observed by Sir Matthew Decker, "are sometimes repeated and accumulate four or five times. In the price of leather, for example, you must pay not only for the tax on the leather in your own shoes, but for part of that in the shoes of the shoemaker and the tanner." Thus a much larger amount of taxes is taken from the people by the federal system of taxation than is received by the Government.

Another objection to this system of taxation is this: The imposition of duties upon consumable commodities, by increasing their cost, limits the amount of consumption; and by limiting consumption the demand is diminished, and thus all kinds of industries are injuriously affected.

The burden of incidental taxation is greater than the sum exacted by the increased cost of consumable commodities. The taxes which the Government must have for its own purposes have been, since the war, very great. Every increase of tax burden above a reasonable limit is felt more severely than would a like sum within such limit. It is like loading a ship to the extent of her capacity and then imposing a still greater burden, which may result, however light, in disaster. Taxation within a reasonable limit may be borne without serious inconvenience; but exceed this limit, and embarrassment, restricted enjoyments, and frequently financial ruin ensue.

The chemist can, by analysis, ascertain the component parts

of a piece of ore; can determine the percentage of gold, silver, copper, and iron. But it would tax the ingenuity of the political economist, or the Treasury expert, or even the actuary of a life insurance company, to ascertain with perfect accuracy just how much real value and how much tax cost are represented in the price of any commodity when it finally reaches the hands of the consumer. While perfect accuracy is not possible, yet we may estimate, with reasonable certainty, the amount of incidental taxes which the people pay by reason of discriminating duties on imported articles. I have carefully examined the reports of the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Department, for the purpose of ascertaining the value of imports for home consumption, the duty received thereon, and the average rate of duty on each class of articles. I have also carefully examined the reports of the census of 1880, for the purpose of ascertaining the value of home products affected by the tariff, the total amount of wages paid in the creation of such products, and the estimated rate of increase of such products, *ad valorem*, and the incidental taxes which such home products bear, or, in other words, their increased cost by reason of the duties imposed on imported articles of like character.

The most important schedule in the tariff law is that on metal, which embraces iron and steel and the manufactures thereof, also copper, brass, tin, zinc, and other metals. It is claimed that a reduction of rates upon this schedule has been made by the new law; but the statisticians of the Treasury Department are unable as yet to determine what reduction, if any, will result from the changes which have been made. The Tariff Commission, in their report, page 16, submit a statement of the aggregate product of articles embraced in the metal schedule, which I have adopted. But, after a careful examination of the metal industries whose products are materially affected by the tariff, I was unable to produce so large an aggregate. However, by reducing the amount of increased cost to twenty per centum, which is a very low estimate, substantially the same result is reached, so far as the incidental taxes are concerned.

The Tariff Commission estimated the home product of lumber and the several branches of wood manufactures at $509,000,000; but this includes many industries, the products of which are not materially increased in value by reason of the duty. I have endeavored to eliminate all such industries from

my statement, and present only the products of such as are affected by the tariff. There was no material reduction by the new Act of the duties on articles of this kind. There were special reasons, other than the amount of the incidental taxes, why lumber should have been placed on the free list. The duty operates as an encouragement to the destruction of our forests, and that may result in important climatic changes, in the course of time, unless the present rate of destruction is arrested.

The product of sugar refineries does not represent the home product of the raw material, for the refiners use the imported low grade sugars, as well as the home growth, in the manufacture of their product. The sugar produced by the planters in the census year amounted to 196,759,200 pounds, and the molasses to 16,573,273 gallons. Under the old tariff law the sugar duty was about 2½ cents a pound; under the new Act it is about two cents. The molasses tax was reduced from 6½ to 5½ cents per gallon, according to the Treasury estimates. Under the new law, assuming the imports and the home product of raw material to remain the same, the increased cost to consumers for the next fiscal year, on account of the duty on sugar and molasses, will be $4,846,714. Under the old law this increase amounted to about $6,000,000, the benefit of which was divided between the refiners and the planters, with the probability that the former obtained the lion's share. However, sugar affords a fair illustration of a tariff for revenue with incidental protection. The Government gets a revenue of nearly $50,000,000, while the incidental taxes amounted to about $6,000,000 a year under the old law, and will amount to less than $5,000,000 a year under the new law.

Tobacco is peculiarly affected by the tariff. The principal imports are of unmanufactured leaf tobacco. Foreign manufactured tobacco is practically excluded by a duty of 50 cents a pound, which is equivalent to 225.41 per centum, *ad valorem*. The new Act reduces this duty to 40 cents a pound, and the internal revenue tax from 16 cents to 8 cents a pound on manufactured tobacco, and from $6 to $3 per thousand on cigars. The internal revenue received by the Government on account of the tobacco tax amounted to $47,000,000 for the last fiscal year. It is fair to estimate the increased cost of the home product of manufactured tobacco, by reason of the tariff, at 25 per centum.

# STATEMENT

SHOWING THE AMOUNT OF INCIDENTAL TAXES ANNUALLY IMPOSED ON THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE INCREASED COST OF HOME PRODUCTS, BY REASON OF DISCRIMINATING DUTIES ON IMPORTED ARTICLES OF LIKE CHARACTER, TOGETHER WITH THE VALUE OF SUCH HOME PRODUCTS, THE AMOUNT OF WAGES PAID AND NUMBER OF HANDS EMPLOYED, AND THE IMPORTS AND DUTIES RECEIVED THEREON, FOR THE YEAR 1882.

| ARTICLES AFFECTED BY THE TARIFF. | MERCHANDISE IMPORTED DURING THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1882. | | | *Value of home products, census year, 1880.* | *Average number of hands employed. Boys under 16 and girls under 15 counted as one-half a hand.* | *Total amount in wages during the year.* | *Estimated rate of increase, ad valorem.* | *Incidental taxes being the increased cost of home products by reason of the tariff.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Values.* | *Duty received.* | *Average ad valorem rate.* | | | | | |
| Chemical products | $21,517,169 | $6,718,561 | 31.32 pr. ct. | $117,377,324 | 28,895 | $11,840,704 | 20 pr. ct. | $23,475,464 |
| Earthenware and glassware. | 13,822,043 | 6,693,257 | 48.42 " " | 31,632,309 | 30,674 | 13,130,403 | 45 " " | 14,234,539 |
| Metals—Iron and steel, and all metal manufactures | 74,427,988 | 30,358,936 | 40.79 " " | 604,553,460 | 290,000 | 122,648,191 | 20 " " | 120,910,692 |
| Wood and wooden wares | 8,654,327 | 1,589,851 | 18.37 " " | 311,928,884 | 185,426 | 47,817,199 | 15 " " | 46,789,332 |
| Sugar and molasses | 94,540,269 | 49,210,573 | 52.05 " " | See note below. | | | 40 " " | 4,846,714 |
| Tobacco | 8,216,132 | 6,000,961 | 73.03 " " | 118,665,366 | 81,809 | 25,041,257 | 25 " " | 29,666,341 |
| Cotton and cotton goods | 34,868,044 | 13,482,167 | 38.67 " " | 210,950,383 | 170,363 | 45,614,419 | 20 " " | 42,190,076 |
| Hemp, jute and flax goods | 33,578,076 | 9,844,652 | 29.32 " " | 5,518,866 | 4,329 | 1,238,149 | 20 " " | 1,103,773 |
| Wool and woolens | 47,679,502 | 29,254,234 | 61.36 " " | 267,182,914 | 145,341 | 47,351,628 | 40 " " | 106,873,165 |
| Silk and silk goods | 38,535,475 | 22,632,490 | 58.73 " " | 41,033,045 | 28,554 | 9,146,705 | 50 " " | 20,516,522 |
| Books, paper, etc. | 4,923,620 | 1,406,787 | 28.57 " " | 65,960,405 | 25,274 | 9,895,995 | 20 " " | 13,192,081 |
| Sundries | 62,410,690 | 17,272,269 | 27.68 " " | 665,699,693 | 337,216 | 129,881,399 | 20 " " | 133,139,938 |
| Total | $433,173,335 | $194,464,758 | | $2,440,502,649 | 1,327,881 | $463,606,049 | | $556,938,637 |

NOTE.—Planters' product for 1880 was: Sugar, 196,759,200 pounds; molasses, 16,573,273 gallons. Number and wages of laborers not stated.

I have carefully compiled, from the reports of the Census Bureau and the tables of the Treasury experts, the data, in the accompanying statement, in reference to the various commodities mentioned therein. It will be seen, from an examination of the statement, that the rate of increase in the cost of the home product by reason of the tariff has been estimated in each case at much below the duty itself. This is due to the fact that many of the articles are increased in price only to a limited extent, by reason of the tariff. The statement embraces nearly all the industries of the United States which are materially affected by the tariff, and gives also the number of employés in such industries, the amount of wages paid to them, and the total value of the home product. The item of sundries embraces all protected industries not otherwise enumerated, except such as are mentioned below.

I am unable to obtain a reliable estimate of the amount of provisions and liquors which are increased in price by reason of the tariff. Very few provisions are increased in price. Rice is an exception. The total product of the United States for the census year was 110,131,373 pounds. The amount imported was nearly 64,000,000 pounds, and the duty was 2½ cents per pound, or 111 per centum, *ad valorem*. The price of the home product is doubtless increased to consumers to the extent of at least 2 cents a pound by reason of the tax, which would amount to an incidental tax burden of $2,200,000.

There are many other articles affected by the tariff which are not included in my statement, such as barley, malt, lemons, oranges, domestic wines, etc. But the amount of incidental taxes upon the chief articles of consumption is quite large enough to arrest public attention. I have based my estimates upon the rates of duty imposed by the Tariff Law of March 3rd, 1883. If I have erred in any way, it is in placing the amount of incidental taxes too low. The people of the United States have been subjected to a burden of at least $556,000,000 every year for the past twenty years, making an aggregate of over eleven billions of dollars, not one dollar of which went into the National Treasury. Since the war began, we have paid more by incidental taxation to protect our "infant industries" than it cost to put down the rebellion, and pay all the claims, bonded debt, interest, and damages, incident thereto.

The number of persons employed in protected industries,

even if the working-men enjoyed the benefit of the bounty, which is disputed, hardly justifies the enormous burden which they and all other citizens must bear. The number shown in the statement is 1,327,881. This does not include the laborers employed in raising sugar-cane and rice, and those in some other protected industries. But all estimates on this account would not increase the number to more than a million and a half. All the persons engaged in manufacturing, mechanical, and mining industries, according to the census of 1880, numbered 3,837,112; those in agriculture, 7,670,493; those in trade and transportation, 1,810,256; and those in professional occupations, 4,074,238. Total, 17,392,099. Of the grand total of the toilers of the country, 15,900,000 manage to "live, move, and have their being," without receiving a farthing of bounty or exacting a penny of protection from the rest of the community. The other million and a half of laborers derive no benefit whatever from the vast sum of incidental taxes demanded in their behalf. The bounty is obtained under false pretences, and is either wasted on unprofitable industries or lavished on rich monopolists.

WILLIAM M. SPRINGER.

# THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE DRAMA.

REV. DR. BUCKLEY.

THE theater is an ancient institution, and it has been earnestly, not to say fiercely, debated during its entire history. I know no reason why any one having convictions should decline to state them, with the principles, facts, and reasonings upon which they rest.

In estimating the effect of the theater upon morals, the fact that the majority of its patrons consists of persons under middle age must be kept in view. Liberty and license are peculiarly charming to youth, and especially to young men. Bitter are the lessons which they must learn before they can forego present gratification for future good. A horror of vice, arising from a sense of its wickedness and consequences, is the best safeguard for youth. In youth, evil habits are very quickly formed, and when formed it is very difficult to break them.

The success of a theatrical entertainment depends chiefly upon its power to excite attention and kindle emotion. Costume, the voice, and the living person make a deep impression, deeper and more exciting than reading or study. Truth, honesty, temperance, industry, frugality, chastity, religion, are not capable of being represented in the theater, either in matter or manner, so as to cause such intense excitement as intrigue, drunkenness, dueling, conspiracy, adultery, divorce, treason, robbery, forgery, the altering of wills, murder, incest, and the passions which prompt these crimes, namely, lust, revenge, covetousness, and ambition.

Accordingly, in the theater, Christian principles are not accepted as the standard of morals. True religion—that of the conscientious, self-denying, world-renouncing, God-fearing Christian—is never praised, but often ridiculed; and when Religion comes upon the stage, it is generally in the person of a sporting parson, or an Aminadab Sleek, or the hypocrite. Generosity is

usually credited to some "hail-fellow," and penuriousness connected with some "sanctimonious" professor. Of the few plays which justly commend and illustrate conscientious piety, none have ever become popular upon the stage. Lying, drunkenness, adultery, and other vices and crimes are made to furnish amusement; and "crimes that would call down the wrath of God on their perpetrators are systematically made to provoke laughter."

On the stage, one character is introduced "who incessantly lies"; another who steals; another who is always drinking and reveling; another who is conspiring; another who attempts intrigue; another who poisons; another who commits adultery or murder; and oaths and profane expressions frequently occur.

Witticisms whose point is in an indecent allusion or implication are common, and a special charm is supposed to attach to the turns of expression which run along the confines of impropriety, always apparently about to cross, but just refraining. If there be a "moral," it is hastily disposed of in the fifth act. The attempt is sometimes made to bolster up the filthy allusions in plays by citing expressions found in the Bible; but this is shown to be as absurd as it is profane by the fact, that, in the sixty-six different books of which the Bible is composed, not one passage can be found in which a word is introduced for the sake of its obscenity, nor one instance of a joke founded on licentiousness or sin; while its uniform declaration is that neither "drunkards," nor "thieves," nor "fornicators," nor "adulterers," nor "liars," nor "profane swearers," nor "murderers," "shall inherit the kingdom of God."

When plays are put upon the stage, it is upon the theory that the greater the sympathetic excitement the more exquisite the emotion. The spectator must laugh with him that laughs, rave with him that raves, and weep with him that weeps; or, if the play be such as to require sympathy with one character and antipathy to another, this feeling must be maintained all the way through. The appearance, dress, expression, language, and attitude of actors must and do correspond, so far as possible, to the characters assumed. The woman of easy virtue, the young woman being led astray, the libertine, the gambler, the reveler, the traducer,— must all dress and act in character. If the most terrible moral strain imposed on youth is to be pure in thought, feeling, and act; if the imagination is the ally and procuress of the passions,— is it possible that the spectacle of women, painted,

dressed as they are, with heaving bosoms, languishing glances, voluptuous attitudes, falling into the arms of men with whom they are on the verge, according to the plot, of committing adultery, should make any other than the worst impressions? Men as austere as Samuel Johnson have found such spectacles to "tempt them to immorality"; to expect the young to see them without their imaginations being polluted, is to defy reason and experience.

It is often alleged that those who do not attend the theater are mere theorizers, and do not know what they are talking about. If the evils of gambling may be sufficiently ascertained without gambling, and of drunkenness without becoming a drunkard, to justify opposition to these vices, then the study of the effect of the theater upon the character and conduct of the young may enable one who has never attended the theater to judge of its moral tendency. We have the advertisements, programmes, and the criticisms in the great daily papers. We know what the theater promises to be, and what the critics affirm that it is.

The writer in the most susceptible period of this life was fascinated by the theater. The time was short, but the fever ran high, and during his attendance he saw some of the most noted actors who have appeared during the last thirty years, a few of whom are still in the front rank of their profession. The sneers at religion and "strait-laced bigots," which certain comedies contained, embittered him toward a life of piety. The excitement of the evening unfitted him for the serious pursuit of his business. He lost relish for lectures and solid reading; a semi-tragical extravagance, with an infusion of comical slang, affected his action and expression; while the company he found there was such as to destroy all interest in the society of steady persons.

The result of an examination of more than sixty of the plays which have been performed in the principal theaters of New York within recent years—copies prepared for the use of the actors being used—shows that if language and sentiments which would not be tolerated among respectable people in private intercourse, and would excite indignation if addressed to the most uncultivated and coarse servant-girl, not openly vicious, by an ordinary young man, and profaneness which would brand him who uttered it as irreligious, are improper in amusements for the

young and for Christians of every age, at least fifty of the sixty plays above referred to must be condemned. Not all are as bad as the worst, but many are so corrupting that one of the chief illustrations of their evil tendency and of the demoralizing influence of the theater is the moral "color-blindness" which enables any one to defend them. I will refer as specimens to some which have long been popular, and are so at the present time:

"East Lynne" consists of infidelity, adultery, murder, re-marriage, and the subsequent re-appearance of the first wife to die in the house of her former husband. "Money" is a succession of hypocrisy, covetousness, drinking, gambling, jealousy, and infidelity, tending to impart a view of life to the young which, if taken as true, would lead to distrust, misanthropy, and personal recklessness.

The "School for Scandal" is a play, the whole of which no woman could read to any but her husband, or some other near relative, without giving ground for a presumption of impurity; and there are in it many sentences which no gentleman could use, even among men, without incurring the charge of lewdness in his talk. When this play was remodeled for use in one of the principal theaters in New York, its editor felt constrained to apologize for its moral tendencies. The apology closes as follows: "Sir Peter Teazle is the least objectionable character in the piece, morally considered; and even he is disposed to make light of the supposed peccadillo of Joseph in the fourth act, until he finds that the lady behind the screen is his own wife." The apologist calls an assignation and the attempted debauching of a married woman, the success of which was prevented by an accident, a "peccadillo," or even less than that,—a "supposed peccadillo." But the "School for Scandal" has more than a score of filthy allusions. Nor can the oft-quoted reply, "evil to him who evil thinks," be urged against this criticism; for that is applicable only when a sentence is capable of two interpretations,— one pure, the other impure, and there is no reason to suppose that the impure is the sense intended by the author. In such a case, he who insists on the impure interpretation deserves the rebuke; but the allusions in the "School for Scandal" are capable of but one interpretation, and are undeniably introduced for their impurity. In "Masks and Faces," the spice of the character of Peg Woffington is that she did not act as she always had acted, and might reasonably

be expected to act. The introduction of a "town rake," an attempted seduction, the infatuation of Vane, and all the sentiments of the piece, except the benevolent relief of Triplet and the sympathy of Woffington with the heart-broken wife whose husband she had allured, are elements of a plot which "travels on the verge of open wickedness."

"Led Astray" was commended to a pious woman as suitable for her children to hear. In less than half the first act there are many allusions to amorous intrigues; as the play progresses, indecent situations increase; while the whole of the plot runs along the verge of a double adultery,—that of the unappreciative husband and the sentimental wife. Even "She Stoops to Conquer" is based on a rake's going to a country house to woo the owner's daughter, mistaking the mansion for an inn, and attempting to persuade the daughter, who is taken for a barmaid, to licentiousness. Yet these are among the best in moral tone. Of the morals of the French plays I say nothing, because, though they are very popular, none defend them. Those who patronize them do so because they like them as they are. Comparatively few of the great plays of Shakespeare are put upon the stage—too few, if they were morally unexceptionable as acted, to modify the general charge of immorality against the theater.

Many who admit the truth of these allegations say: "The theater exists and will exist. It is a great power; why not reform it?" Is there any just reason to think that it can be reformed? Its history runs through many nations and stages of civilization. Have its characters, sentiments, expressions, attitudes, and accessories ever been such that he who proposed to live "soberly, righteously, and godly" could attend it consistently? "Unmitigated cant!" says some one. But where is the "cant" in the description of the Christian life, or the historic statements concerning the theater? What reason is there to hope for a reformation of that which has not, in so long a time and under such a variety of conditions, ever been in a state which did not need to be reformed? The "classics" of the drama are fixed; the demand will ever be for a kind of excitement which will require the delineation of vice and its entanglements. The financial conditions on which the success of the theater depends show that it cannot be reformed. The money of the most depraved attendant bears the same relation to the receipts as an equal amount paid

by the most refined. If, then, nine-tenths of the theater-going public call for the present order of plays, they will get what they call for, or the management must fail.

Garrick recognized this when, in opening Drury Lane Theater, in the city of London, he spoke the following epilogue, composed by Dr. Johnson:

> "Ah! let not censure term our fate our choice,
> The stage but echoes back the public voice;
> The drama's laws the drama's patrons give,
> For we that live to please must please to live."

During the long period of one hundred and thirty-six years since those words were spoken, the drama's laws have been given by the drama's patrons, and the theater is, in some respects, worse than it was then, and in none much better.

J. M. BUCKLEY.

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MR. GILBERT.

I BELIEVE the present condition of the drama, both from a moral and an artistic point of view, to be a subject for regret. A large number of our theaters are managed by speculators who have no love for true art, and who, in the production of "attractions," consider only the question of dollars and cents. With that class it seems to matter little whether a play has any literary merit; it is sufficient if it is "sensational" and full of "startling situations." Many of the plays that have been adapted from the French are open to the severest criticism on the ground of immorality. I say, as an actor, without hesitation, that such plays have a very bad influence on nearly all people, especially on the young. Some argue that, even in these productions, vice is punished in the end; but when a whole play is filled with amorous intrigue and fairly bristles with conjugal infidelity, when, in short, all the characters are infamous, there is no question in my mind but that its influence is bad.

One great fault of the modern drama is over-decoration. Far too much money is expended on the scenery, and too little attention paid to the acting. I do not mean to say that actors are underpaid; they were never rewarded so well as at present. I remember that thirty years ago a salary of sixty dollars a week for man and wife, as leading man and leading lady, was considered

very high, and its payment in a company with which I was connected created among some of the members intense jealousy and ill-feeling. At the present time such a couple would receive five times as much for the same services. The trouble is not, therefore, that actors are underpaid, but that managers have been educating the public so industriously in the matter of fine scenery that good acting is no longer keenly appreciated. The theater has become a picture gallery. The actor is thrust into the background. The aim of the manager is to please the eye, not to enchant the ear. This error I find justly censured in the following terms by an author who wrote some twenty-five years ago:

"That the passion for decoration has been burdensome, if not ruinous, to managers and injurious to actors, we admit; with a protest, however, against its being reckoned among the peculiar disadvantages of either at the present moment. This, like the complaint of the inefficiency of the elder drama, is of no recent origin. It dates as far back as the time of Dryden, some of whose plays were brought upon the stage with extreme gorgeousness; it is satirized by Pope; it was made a subject of reproach to Garrick, and accounted among the errors of John Kemble. But it is inconceivable that managers should have labored for so long a period under a common delusion — a delusion, too, which militated against their own interests. Their mistake appears to us to have consisted more in the indiscriminate employment of the decorative art than in the art itself. The necessity for ornament is generally in an inverted ratio to the merits of the piece on which it is expended, even as the most creative poets stand least in need of the painter's aid. Rarely are Homer, Shakespeare, or Dante successfully illustrated by artists, although the same amount of graphic skill would have been well employed upon the pages of Rogers, Moore, or Campbell. Passion, provided only it finds competent representatives, will make itself felt; wit and humor, meeting with fitting exponents, will excite mirthful responses. So long as Mr. Charles Kemble performed Benedick and Mercutio, it mattered little whether the scene behind him were an exact representation of a street or garden in Verona or Mantua, or whether his dress were after the fashion of France or Italy. The elder Kean attired Othello in a garb that no nation could claim for its own, yet no discreet adviser would have counseled him to exchange it for the cumbrous robes of a Venetian magnifico. We have seen 'The Rivals' performed in a sort of chance medley costume, a century intervening between the respective attires of Sir Anthony and Captain Absolute. We have seen the same comedy dressed with scrupulous attention to the date of the wigs and hoops; but we doubt whether, in any essential respect, that excellent play was a gainer by the increased care and expenditure of the manager.

"Excess of decoration has indeed been, in all ages and nations possessing a national drama, a symptom and accompaniment of decadence in the histrionic art. The dramas of Euripides required more sumptuous attire and

more complicated mechanism than the 'Antigone' or the 'Prometheus'; but the plays enacted at the Dionysiac festivals, when Demosthenes was a boy, surpassed in pomp the most gorgeous of the Euripidean repertory. The extravagance of the Alexandrian and Roman theaters is notorious; interminable processions, 'maniples of foot and turms of horse' swept across the stage, and the managerial wardrobe would have clad the 'Senate frequent and full.' The Pompeian games offended Cicero by their glare, and Cato by their profusion; but fifty years later Bathyllus and Pylades would have refused to act in the presence of scenery so common and sordid; and in the age of Claudius and his successor, the stars of pantomime — the 'regular drama' was extinct — played Agamemnon and Achilles in panoplies of solid gold. In the reign of Philip IV., the accouterments of the Theater Royal, at Madrid, were as sumptuous as those of the Viceroy of Arragon; and that, too, in an age when silver and gold plate were displayed upon the sideboards even of nobles of the third order. Louis XIV. was more economical in his theatrical pleasures; yet a thousand crowns were occasionally expended by him upon a single masque or pastoral at the Court Theater, at Versailles — with what advantage to the drama those inexpressibly tame and tedious productions will satisfactorily prove to any one enterprising and patient enough to read them." Essays on the Drama, by William Badham Donne (page 141–143). London, 1858.

If this was true a quarter of a century ago, how much more appropriate is it at the present time, when such undue attention is given to the mounting of plays. Our forefathers, I believe, were as keenly appreciative of good acting as the theater-goers of to-day, and yet I have myself seen a Roman play put upon the stage with the scene set for an act in "Tom and Jerry," representing a street in the slums of London. The people who attended the theater at that time were, I think, as a class, more intellectual than the audiences of the present time; yet such incongruities (I mention only one as an illustration) were not noticed nor commented upon; the people came to see the acting, and their whole attention was absorbed in that.

We seem not to have so much dramatic talent nowadays, and what we have is scattered over a greater area. In the old days the companies were composed of actors who, as a general rule, were men of considerable ability. Accustomed as they were to act with one another, year in and year out, their performances were more perfect than we see in these times. Our actors now fly from one line of personation to another, and are willing to play any character in which they can make "a hit," instead of concentrating their energies to perfect themselves in some particular branch of the profession.

But there have been some very noticeable improvements in the theater within the past forty years. At one time, a portion of the third tier in our respectable theaters was set apart for the occupation of women of loose character, who entered by a separate door, unattended by a male escort. The private boxes were connected with this gallery by a staircase. At the back of the gallery was a bar, at which men and women drank openly between the acts. The wonder is, not that such a shameful state of affairs should have existed so long, but that it should have existed at all. Of course, such things have been entirely done away with.

At that time actors, with a few notable exceptions, were shunned by society. It was looked upon as ruinous to enter the profession. When the old Tremont Theater in Boston was sold and re-opened as a church, the first sermon was preached from the stage, the scenery and private boxes having been left as they were originally. The first line of the opening hymn was:

"Lord! let these ransomed walls rejoice."

It is needless to say that the attitude of the Christian public generally is much more liberal toward the theater and theatrical people than it was in those days, and that actors, as such, are not now excluded from good society on account of their calling.

The object of the theater is to amuse and instruct. The moral and Christian virtues are illustrated on the stage, but goodness is taught (and of necessity it must be so) by comparison. The preacher urges his hearers to be virtuous, and speaks from a positive point of view; the dramatist presents pictorially, by the aid of actors and scenery, strong contrasts between virtue and vice, the former always being triumphant in the end. The reader may recall the Roman actor's reply before the Senate to the charge of having corrupted the youth of the city:

"—If to inflame
The noble youth with an ambitious heat
T' endure the frosts of danger, nay, of death;
To be thought worthy the triumphal wreath
By glorious undertakings, may deserve
Reward or favor from the Commonwealth,
Actors may put in for as large a share
As all the sects of the philosophers.
They, with cold precepts (perhaps seldom read),
Deliver, what an honorable thing

The active virtue is; but does that fire
The blood, or swell the veins with emulation,
To be both good and great, equal to that
Which is presented in our theaters?
Let a good actor, in a lofty scene,
Shew great Alcides, honor'd in the sweat
Of his twelve labors; or a bold Camillus,
Forbidding Rome to be redeem'd with gold
From the insulting Gauls; or Scipio,
After his victories, imposing tribute
On conquer'd Carthage: if done to the life,
As if they saw their dangers and their glories,
And did partake with them in their rewards,
All that have any spark of Roman in them,
The slothful arts laid by, contend to be
Like those they see presented.

. . . . . .

When do we bring a vice upon the stage
That does go off unpunish'd? Do we teach,
By the success of wicked undertakings,
Others to tread in their forbidden steps?
We show no arts of Lydian panderism,
Corinthian poisons, Persian flatteries,
But mulcted so in the conclusion, that
Even those spectators that were so inclined
Go home changed men."

Of course, crimes are committed on the stage; so they are in the Bible; so they are in novels. Goodness and badness are put in opposition in both books and plays; if they were not, there would be very little to interest us, and nothing to excite. Objection is made to the licentiousness of some of the old comedies, but they are very seldom placed upon the stage. In the "School for Scandal," Joseph Surface is a libertine, who attempts to seduce the wife of his friend; but there is nothing offensive in the language, nothing to make a person shudder, and that is much more than can be said of some of the modern adaptations from the French.

The charge that religion is scoffed at on the stage, and pious persons held up to ridicule, I deem to be very unjust. The hypocrites and charlatans who have crept into the Christian fold have occasionally furnished subjects for characterization. Any company of honest gentlemen, having rogues among them, would rejoice to see them discomfited; and so, it seems to me, honest and sincere Christians must deem it an advantage to

the cause of true religion when its spurious representatives are held up to contempt. The closing passage of an old play ("The Hypocrite"), containing such a character, would seem to be a sufficient answer to the charge I have just alluded to:

"Nay, now, my dear sir, I must take the liberty to tell you, you carry things too far, and go from one extreme to another. What! Because a worthless wretch has imposed upon you under the fallacious show of austere grimace, will you needs have it everybody is like him? Confound the good with the bad, and conclude there are no truly religious in the world? Leave, my dear sir, such rash conclusions to fools and libertines. Let us be careful to distinguish between virtue and the appearance of it. Guard, if possible, against doing honor to hypocrisy; but, at the same time, let us allow there is no character in life greater or more valuable than that of the truly devout; nor anything more noble, or more beautiful, than the fervor of a sincere piety."

I will add that I can call to mind no play, old or new, where either the worthy preacher of the Christian religion or the devout believer in its precious promises is held up to ridicule or treated with contempt.

JOHN GILBERT.

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MR. PALMER.

THE present condition of the drama is, except in the quality of its literature as such, healthier, higher, nobler than it has ever been before.

*First.* The theaters are better built, better ventilated, and more comfortably seated than they ever were before.

*Second.* The plays are presented in a more careful and elaborate manner. The spirit of modern criticism and of modern scholarship has invaded the theater, and archæology has become a necessary study to the manager. In fact, the best theaters of this country and of Europe have come to be, in this respect, admirable means of instruction through the accurate pictures which they present of the costumes and architecture of past times.

*Third.* The attendance is of a more refined class, and far larger than it ever was before.

*Fourth.* Upon the stage a higher tone of morals prevails to-day than at any previous time in its history; and this is especially manifested in the character of the plays written for it and which it produces.

Of these four propositions, it is safe to say that the first three are accepted as true by all well-informed men. The last, however, is vigorously contested by a class of men who have ever been the enemies of the stage, and who cannot now witness its progress even with tolerance.

While the moral and scholarly improvement taking place in the theater is visible to all unprejudiced thinkers, these men, who occupy some of the pulpits of America and the editorial chairs of some of the religious newspapers, shut their eyes to this fact, and go on, year after year, inveighing against plays and players with all the bitterness of ignorant prejudice and hate. I say that these men occupy *some* of the pulpits in America. Fortunately for the stage of to-day, it can count among its friends many devout and honest clergymen whose humility and godliness confine them to the legitimate work of their calling. Its most virulent enemies are the sensational or actor-preachers, who, eschewing the simple themes of the Gospel, seek to build up fame and fortune by discussing secular topics in a way that will startle and amuse their audiences. These men, for the most part, are "managed" upon methods which are purely theatrical. They are advertised in the daily newspapers, regular reports of what they say are furnished to the press, their sermons, acted rather than preached, are often greeted with unseemly laughter and applause, and their salaries are regulated by the success they achieve in "drawing" audiences. That much of their opposition to the stage springs from jealousy—a real, though perhaps an unconscious jealousy—has often been stated, and there is much to justify the statement. Jealousy breeds uncharitableness and untruthfulness, and it is certain that, when they speak of plays or actors, the men to whom I refer are neither charitable nor truthful.

That there is any necessary conflict between the church and the stage, I deny. The office of the stage and that of the pulpit are, from a moral point of view, the same, namely, to encourage men to lead noble and virtuous lives, and to deter them from vice. The stage aims, while it affords amusement, to reflect the heart of man struggling, rising, falling in the eternal battle with his eternal passions. It endeavors to show him his own likeness, the working of his own nature, its strength, and its weakness, so that, seeing what he is, he may with more knowledge try to be what he ought to be. Whether it be

a Magdalen or a St. Cecilia, a murderer like Bill Sykes or one like Napoleon III., it is equally indifferent to the dramatist. Such men and such women are, and he depicts them as they are. He shows the heart of man as he finds it and as the Bible defines it — a thing of diverse corners and desperately wicked. There he stops, and where he stops it is the true office of the pulpit to begin. It is, it seems to me, the office of the pulpit to take man up where the stage leaves off — to bring to him to whom the stage has revealed his inner self the assuaging balm of Christ's promises; to enforce upon him the possibilities that are in him, with heavenly aid, to subdue his passions, to control his appetites; to teach him the duty of self-abnegation and of a cleanly life.

But the pulpit, in its blind struggle for exclusive and absolute dominion over the lives and consciences of men, has generally failed to recognize the mighty influence for good there is in the stage, and has sought by every means in its power to thrust what should be its true helpmate into a position of obloquy and shame. It has vilified its professors,* attacked its works, denounced its temples as houses of hell, provoked its animosity, and sneered at its very charity! † Yet, even so treated,

* "There is an authentic tradition that the clergyman who read the burial service of the Church of England over the remains of Jefferson, knowing that he had been an actor, and stupidly disapproving of that circumstance, actually altered the text of the ritual, substituting the phrase 'this man' for 'our deceased brother,' in the solemn passage beginning, 'Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God, in His wise providence, to take out of this world the soul of *our deceased brother*, we therefore commit his body to the ground — earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust.' This proceeding, which was observed at the time, and which can only be viewed as a petty act of bigotry, done with deliberate intent to cast a sort of ecclesiastical indignity upon the dead, has been remembered by the descendants of the noble and blameless person whose dust was thus assailed. The present Joseph Jefferson, whose spotless character and beneficent life are their own sufficient praise, is not a member of the church. It is by acts like this, with which its history has often been sullied, that the church has suffered the alienation of thousands of as good and true hearts as ever lived."—"The Jeffersons" (p. 109), by William Winter. Boston, 1881.

† "The liberality of some actors is sometimes adduced to show the contrary of what is here asserted. But the charity of actors is usually lavish generosity,—a profusion fully in harmony with their general character and way of living. Most of them, by their own confession, regardless of pecuniary obligation, will either spend or give their money according to their changing impulses. How little does this, like the reckless gifts of Fisk or the politic

the stage, by its wonderful forbearance, has far outstripped, in the true charity of the Master, the pulpit itself. While the sins and scandals caused by many of the ordained ministers of Christ have offered the dramatist theme after theme, strictly within his province, he has, with rare exceptions, passed them by rather than run the risk of weakening the beneficial influence or power of the church, even though that church abuses him. The scandals of which I speak, involving the crimes of adultery, assault, seduction, theft, and the starving of innocent children, have been common talk in our land during the past quarter of a century, disgracing alike the American pulpit and the American name. Yet no satire upon them has ever appeared in any theater; no allusion to them in fact has ever been made upon any American stage. Of the many clergymen now serving their terms out in the various penitentiaries of the land, there is not one the record of whose life would not afford legitimate material for the stage; and, if the theme remains unused, it is because, and only because, the dramatist, the manager, and the actor have so deep a respect for the religion of Christ that they will not seek to weaken it by emphasizing the sins of any of his servants. This fact alone would seem to be sufficient to teach those who are not willfully ignorant how much better is the moral condition of the stage of to-day than it was in the days of Molière and Congreve, and how false is the assertion made by one of the most recent and violent of its slanderers, that, in the theater, "Christian principles are not accepted as the standard of morals."

The attacks of these critics upon the players—their habits of life, their moral characters, their lack of religious belief—do not seem to come within the scope of this inquiry, and I shall not notice them further than to say that men and women on the stage are much the same as men and women off it. The heart of man, we are told, is "deceitful above all things"; but it is the same under surplice or cassock as it is under harbeck or dress-coat, and a statistical comparison of the lives of the actors and actresses of to-day with an equal number of the

benefactions of a Tweed, resemble the regular, self-denying, and conscientious efforts of a liberal and well-balanced mind to diminish the griefs or promote the welfare of his fellow-men!"—"Christians and the Theater" (pp. 65-66), by J. M. Buckley. New York, 1875.

people who support and attend our churches would not be, I am sure, unfavorable to the former.

It is, however, the subject matter of modern and, indeed, of all stage plays that is the most frequent object of ministerial animadversion. We are told that "truth, honesty, temperance, industry, frugality, charity, religion, are not capable of being represented in the theater, either in manner or matter, so as to cause such intense excitement as intrigue, drunkenness, adultery, divorce, treason, robbery, forgery, murder, incest, and the passions which lead to these crimes, namely, lust, revenge, covetousness, and ambition." And the inference is placidly drawn that these subjects are generally handled in the theater in an indelicate way, and to the detriment of true morality, with no other purpose, in fact, except to cause such an intensity of interest and excitement among the auditors as will secure the success of the play. Nothing could be more untrue. It is safe to say that no play in which, when vice and virtue are contrasted, the latter did not triumph,—no play, indeed, in which direct and positive punishment did not follow those crimes which are prompted by lust, revenge, covetousness, and ambition, would ever be tolerated, much less succeed upon the modern stage. The chief themes of the theater are now, as they have ever been, the passions of men. Ambition leading to murder; jealousy leading to murder; lust leading to adultery and to death; anger leading to madness: the themes of Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton; the subjects for the chisel of Angelo, the brush of Guido, the burin of Doré, the burden of the sermon on the Mount itself.

The theater, in treating these great cardinal truths of our humanity, has its own methods. They are stronger, and calculated to make a deeper and more lasting impression upon the observer than the homilies of the pulpit or the tales of the novelist. But to say that they are indelicate or immoral is to deny the lessons taught by the story of the Magdalen and of Iscariot. What is good *is* good—it needs no warning exposure, no saving sermon; but it is only when it is brought into vivid contrast with that which is bad, as it is in real life or in the mimic life of the stage, that good becomes most attractive and vice most abhorrent.

Call the exposure of sin upon the stage an indecency, forbid it, and, to be consistent, you must burn the literature of Greece,

Rome, England, France, Germany; empty the Louvre and the Vatican, and place mankind back into the third century. Forbid the pictorial presentation of sin and its consequences which the stage makes, and even Goldsmith and Dickens must be committed to the flames. It has been said that the office of the stage closely resembles that of the novelist. They differ, chiefly, in this: the novelist tells the story, the stage acts it; what is necessary in one is necessary and right in the other. It has not been discovered by the clerical critics of the stage that the presentation of the crimes which are the consequences of lust, revenge, and ambition in works of fiction is indecent or reprehensible. Even their Sunday-school libraries are not exempt from works of this class, which, emanating from Christian presses, are put, without stint, into the hands of the young. Only the other day the writer took out of the hands of a little girl less than twelve years of age a Sunday-school book which was the history of a young woman who was led by the sin of vanity into wicked ways.* This history goes on to show that she fell in love with a fellow servant, who was a married man. She was seduced by him, she had a child by him, she committed a robbery with him, and finally perjured herself to save him from the doom of a felon. Yet this pleasing tale, and others like it, are put, without a question, into the hands of children by the very men who have the audacity to say that the "School for Scandal" cannot be read aloud by a woman without giving ground for a presumption against her purity. It is safe to say that this work, dramatized and put upon the boards with no line of its plot changed, would occupy a prominent place in the list of those plays which, it is declared by our ministerial critic, no one who is not afflicted with "moral color-blindess" can defend.

I pass over the charge of coarseness in the language of stage-plays with a word. Doubtless, there is some force in this charge if it is confined to a certain class of plays which we have inherited from the English stage, and which are known as the legitimate comedies. Those plays are largely the reflection of the language and manners of society in the days in which they were written. What might with propriety be spoken in public then could not with propriety be spoken now; but, as a rule, all allusions offensive to present notions are carefully expunged in

* "Helen Chapman; or, How Will it End?" Published by the Society for the Diffusion of Christian Knowledge.

the acting editions of the works in question. As to modern plays, the charge does not hold good, so far as my experience and observation go. Despite what is stated in regard to the depraved taste of those who now make "the drama's laws," by one who confessedly has not been in a theater for twenty years, it may be given, I think, as the experience of all those who *know* the modern stage from daily contact with it, that there is a general prejudice on the part of the vast majority of American theater-goers against anything like coarseness either in the situations or in the language of plays. Our current dramas are largely derived from the French, and it is the experience of every manager who has had to deal with them that, before they can be successfully presented here, the equivocal situations and the broad language which French audiences will yet tolerate must be carefully expunged. When this cannot be successfully done, the play has to be rejected. It is stated that "true religion — meaning the conscientious, God-fearing Christian — is never praised, but often ridiculed upon the stage." This, surely, is the language of ignorance. God-fearing Christians are not only often praised upon the stage, but they are often most beautifully and touchingly represented there. In the writer's own theater there was produced, two years ago, a play entitled "Daniel Rochat," the work of the greatest dramatist of our age, Victorien Sardou. No more powerful plea for the Christian religion was ever put forth, in my opinion, than is the story of that wonderful play. No more beautiful Christian character was ever drawn than that of its heroine, who, with the self-devotion of the early martyrs, crushes her love and sacrifices all the hopes of life, rather than give up her faith in God. This play has been produced by the writer, and with unvarying success, not only in New York, but in most of the principal cities in America. What is true of it is true also of many other modern dramas which might be mentioned. That pretense and hypocrisy in religious matters are sometimes ridiculed upon the stage is true, but I assert that it is, as a rule, at least, only done in a legitimate and proper way. No one will deny that there are "Aminidab Sleeks" in actual life, and no one who knows the facts will assert that the cause of true religion was ever injured by their being held up to scorn and ridicule on the stage, or that it was ever the purpose of the dramatist or player so to do.

I have said that the condition of the theater had improved in

all "save its literature as such." This, I think, it is fair to state. The French authors write the best plays. Yet the most competent critics pronounce the French of Dumas and Sardou as vastly inferior to that of Voltaire and the writers of the time of Louis XV. Dennery, whose "Two Orphans" has made him famous in America, constructs plays admirably, but is said to write them execrably. Certainly, the English dramatists of to-day cannot be favorably compared, for literary excellence, with the writers of the time of Charles II. or Queen Anne, nor can the latter bear comparison with the writers of the days of Elizabeth. For this decadence there must be a cause. Our scholarship is greater than was that of the sixteenth century. Our language is more copious—it is better formulated. Yet, somehow, when we take up one of the Elizabethan dramatists, and read awhile, the vast superiority of style and the wonderful verbal power strike us as being beyond the reach of the writers of our time. Perhaps the cause of this decadence is to be found in the public taste, which for the past century has seemed to be more exacting in its demands as to the action and the situations in plays, than as to their dialogue. But whatever the cause, it is certain that the style and verbal power of the poet-dramatists who so delighted our English forefathers with their works, and against whom Jeremy Collier, the illustrious predecessor of our American slanderers of the stage, so vigorously inveighed, have passed and passed forever. We can, however, regard this fact with some complacency, I think, when we reflect that, in all respects save its literature, the condition of the theater is unquestionably superior to what it has ever been, both morally and artistically —above all, morally.

A. M. PALMER.

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MR. WINTER.

THE assailants of the stage, who are mostly representatives of the church, seem really to believe that their fulminations are potent and effective. Yet the stage continues to grow in wealth, power, and public consideration. An impartial observer might well be amused at the fatuity with which these strenuous censors oppose the clamor of mere assertion to the inexorable logic of facts. If the stage were really an immoral institution it would not enjoy the favor of any save the depraved; whereas, in fact,

it has the approval of the majority—and the majority of the community is moral. Putting religion entirely out of the question, there is a power in the affections, in the bond of family, in reverence for the hearth-stone of home, which, by itself, insures the coherence of a virtuous society, and would make a radically corrupt stage impossible. The reason that the charge of immorality against the stage has failed is simply that the charge is false, and that the majority of right-thinking persons know it to be so.

Both stage and church have been used as cloaks for vice, but that is the fault of evil-doers, and not of the institutions themselves. There have been profligate actors, and there have been profligate clergymen; and there is reason for surprise at the forbearance of the stage toward the church, considering the animosity so often exhibited by the latter. Only a few weeks ago a minister of Christ publicly stigmatized an actress, by name, as being "as vile a hag as the sewers of Paris ever spewed into the state-room of an Atlantic steam-ship." This is the kind of provocation that the pulpit frequently gives, and this is the kind of language that clergymen too often use. It is needless to remark that no man who is not a clergyman would even dream of applying such words to a woman. No respectable actor would ever speak in that way of even the most vituperative assailant of his profession. The stage seldom or never strikes back. At long intervals, to be sure, an actor plays Aminidab Sleek, or Mr. Chadband; but even then the shaft of satire is directed against sanctimonious hypocrisy, which Christ himself rebuked. You will not find the stage attacking religion or virtue.

It is true that the stage does not aim to teach Christianity. But neither does it aim to teach the differential calculus. There is a place for everything. Christian ethics on the stage would be as inappropriate as Mr. Owens's Solon Shingle in the pulpit. The legitimate purpose of acting has been specified by Shakespeare in language that no writer can improve, and that no reader needs to see quoted. The worst mistake ever made by the stage, and the most offensive attitude ever assumed by it, are seen when—as in "Camille" and two or three similar plays—it tries to deal with what is really the function of the church, —the consequence of sin in the human soul. And here it makes a disastrous and mournful failure.

We need not discuss the state of the stage as it was in the

time of Charles II. and John Dryden. We all agree as to that. It was vile. The attack upon it, let us remember, began promptly. Jeremy Collier's onslaught was made in 1698, and it was made with good reason and great force; and a reform of the stage almost immediately ensued. Cibber, Dogget, and Wilks, when they obtained the Drury Lane patent [1714], at once effected many desirable improvements. Later still, Thomas Sheridan, in Dublin, and David Garrick, in London, were especially commended for their salutary and effective measures for the purification of the theater. It did not become a Sunday-school, but it was greatly improved; and it has kept pace with the moral tone of society ever since. There have, indeed, been several serious abuses — spurts of indelicate spectacle and of wanton French opera. But these are the excrescences of the stage, and not the institution itself — the expedients of speculators, temporary, evanescent, having their little day and going out of fashion. Davenant introduced such things in England in the seventeenth century, and they have cropped out, intermittently, ever since, with reënforcements from the French theater. Nobody questions the viciousness of such pieces as "La Grande Duchesse" and "La Belle Hélène;" but these are not types of the genuine, permanent literature which, in furnishing a vehicle for acting, has kept the stage alive. Plays like "Grandfather Whitehead," the "Willow Copse," and "The Chimney Corner" will always hold their own, when they are properly acted, against any rif-raff out of France. "The Hunchback," when Miss Anderson appears in it, always draws good houses. The theater is never either much better or much worse than the community in which it exists.

To estimate the actual influence of the stage of the present day we must consider who the people are that succeed, and what plays achieve the widest and most permanent success. Edwin Booth, John McCullough, Lawrence Barrett, Joseph Jefferson, Mary Anderson, Genevieve Ward, John L. Toole, Henry Irving,—these are chief among the leaders of the stage in our day. And there is not one of them who would not be astonished at being accused of producing an immoral piece. Wallack's Theater is the leading theater of New York, and the plays that have earned the most money in Wallack's Theater are Mr. Wallack's play of "Rosedale" and Mr. Boucicault's play of "The Shaughraun." Both of them are as innocent as milk. Of Shakespeare's plays, at least fourteen are in continual use, in a form beyond rational reproach.

Objection is specially made against the old comedies; but it appears to be forgotten that the old comedies do not constitute the staple of contemporary dramatic representations. In fact, only a few of them are ever acted, either in England or America. The number of English plays recorded as existing at the beginning of the present century is about six thousand. How many of these survive in actual use in the theatre? Not fifty, altogether. At long intervals we may, for a few nights, see "The School for Scandal," "She Stoops to Conquer," "Wine Works Wonders," "The Road to Ruin," "The Belle's Stratagem," "The Rivals," "The Poor Gentleman," "A Cure for the Heartache," "To Marry or not to Marry," "The Clandestine Marriage," "She Would and She Wouldn't," "The Busybody," "Wild Oats," and "The Wonder." But such performances are extremely infrequent and generally unpopular and unremunerative. Ben Jonson, Cartwright, Fletcher, Congreve, Murphy, Foote, Dibdin, Cherry, O'Keefe, Prince Hoare, Cumberland, Cibber,—all these and many more, and all of them writers of exceptional dramatic brilliancy, are, practically, as dead as if they never had existed. It is twenty years, at least, since "Love for Love" was last acted. "The Man of the World" died with Hackett, and "The Lyar" died with Charles Mathews. When the old comedies are acted, nowadays, they are acted chiefly as curiosities, and they are invariably given in edited, altered, and pruned versions. Mr. Jefferson — surely an authority in such matters, and never found anywhere but on the side of goodness, right, and true taste—uses three of them: "The Rivals," "The Poor Gentleman," and "The Heir-at-Law." But he expunges from them every coarse expression, and that has been his invariable custom ever since he acquired the authority to do as he liked in his profession. The few indelicate lines of "The School for Scandal" (and they are very few) are usually spoken. I think they are unnecessary, but that is a matter of opinion. It is to be said, however, for the text of this comedy, that not a single indelicate word or allusion is written in it for the mere sake of impropriety, or with the intention to corrupt. Sheridan portrays a company of scandal-mongers such as existed in his time, and he makes them talk as such; and then he rebukes and defeats them, and covers them with ridicule and contempt. He portrays the affectation of virtue, also,—which is one of the infallible signs of a [illegible] nature,—and he utterly overwhelms it with defeat and scorn. His morality, as to trifles, is seen to be careless and even indulgent. His color-

ing of the spendthrift is rosier than might be wished. Still, the teaching of the play is exemplary, and it exerts no hurtful influence. You cannot rebuke an evil, unless you state what the evil is that you wish to rebuke. You cannot, in a play, exemplify the triumph of a hero over a rascal, unless you depict both the rascal and the hero. Certain works of art, to be sure, are right in precept, while wrong in spirit—because their authors may, insidiously and adroitly, aim at diffusing impurity, while ostensibly inculcating moral excellence. The novels of Emile Zola, some of which have been turned into plays, have, practically, this effect. But such works are few, and "The School for Scandal" is not one of them. Its purpose was distinctly good; and all moral scientists will tell you that the moral quality of an action resides in the purpose with which the action is performed. The censor would be right in ascribing an evil purpose to Etherege and perhaps to Dryden, but not in imputing it to Sheridan.

The plays of the Restoration are often nasty; but those of the eighteenth century are not. Coarse, they may be, now and then; but as to filthy words the coarsest of them falls considerably short of the books of "Numbers," "Ezekiel," and "Jeremiah," in the Bible; and, coarse or refined, they are practically a dead letter to-day, the great bulk of old English comedy being unseen, unread, forgotten, and unknown. When John Gilbert, William Warren, Joseph Jefferson, Lester Wallack, Charles Fisher, and John S. Clarke shall have passed away, the old comedies, so far as the American stage is concerned, will have passed away with them. The traditional manner of acting them (the dash, the "gig," the sparkle, the lofty, superb demeanor) is fast dying out. There need be no solicitude, accordingly, as to the alleged iniquity of the old comedies. But, even if they were, to any considerable extent, in possession of the stage, if suitably edited and adequately acted, they would, at their best, prove not only inoffensive but, as to the elements of character, dialogue, equivoke, and humor, superior to many of the plays of to-day.

After "the spacious times of great Elizabeth" had declined, and prior to the reign of Charles II., the theaters in England were in a wretched condition. There was an inherited dramatic literature of superb and surpassing excellence in all the higher attributes of literary genius and art. But it lived in a hovel. At the Restoration, taste and luxury came in, and with them came

in licentiousness. A reaction followed, and the stage arose to a still better condition. Under Garrick's leadership it made a great advance. In later days it received additional impetus to noble improvement from the efforts of the Kemble family, Macready, and Charles Kean. Within the last ten years, in London, Henry Irving has administered its affairs in a thoroughly royal way, and—having ampler resources than they had with which to work, and a much larger and perhaps more attentive and sympathetic, certainly a more fastidious and helpful, public to address—has surpassed all his predecessors in the splendid task of developing and applying its beneficence, and keeping its intellectual standard high and its moral condition pure. Here in America, after an initiatory period of great hardship, the stage took excellent shape in such institutions as the old Chestnut Street Theater, in Philadelphia, the John Street house, and afterward the Park (it was at first called simply "The Theater"), in New York, and the Federal Street Theater, in Boston. The stock companies then were composed of actors, almost every one of whom would, in our day, be a star. Scholarship was the rule, thorough discipline prevailed, and perfect decorum was imperative. Through the growth of our country and the broadening of the theatrical field by the multiplication of theaters, the old stock system has been almost entirely destroyed, and opportunity has been provided for the inroad of many hybrid and distasteful, or downright offensive forms of amusement, all of which shelter themselves under the name of the stage. In this way the general dramatic tone has been lowered. America has as good actors now as she ever had; but their forces are not concentrated, and therefore do not seem as formidable as once they did. Nevertheless, the true dramatic spirit burns as brightly as ever in this land, and the practical success of such actors as Booth, Jefferson, McCullough, Barrett, Miss Mary Anderson, Miss Clara Morris, Miss Ward, Mme. Modjeska, Mme. Janauschek, Signor Salvini, and Maggie Mitchell is a substantial evidence of it. If a measure of success also attends divers unworthy exhibitions, that is the fault, not of the stage, but of the public. "Look elsewhere, sire!" These extraneous shows are not the American theater, any more than the thimble-riggers and gypsy fortune-tellers on Epsom downs are the race for the Derby.

It is difficult, furthermore, to understand the extreme sen-

sitiveness of certain moralists as to the alleged corrupting influence of the stage. They pay that institution, it seems to me, a very great compliment in ascribing to it such remarkable power over the public morals; or else, surely, they must conceive individual virtue to be exceedingly fragile. If a censor of the stage were to arraign it as a bore, I, for one, could appreciate his feelings and sympathize with his views. Many of the proceedings visible upon the stage are trivial and tedious to a degree not readily expressed. I have been in one theater or another almost every night of my life for more than twenty years, and while I have seen there much that was noble, beautiful, and impressive, I have also seen an aggregate of insipidity which cannot be reviewed without dismay. Stuffy scenery, ear-piercing music, execrable elocution, nasal vocalism, obvious ignorance, offensive conceit, pitiable vanity, the sad lack of reticence which so often permits a public disclosure of individualities that Nature plainly intended for sweet retirement and deep domestic seclusion,— all these blemishes upon the stage are appreciable. But where does the immoral influence appear? How does it strike? And in what manner does its victim conduct himself? Does the youth, upon seeing Iago, for example, presently rush forth and ham-string a fancied Cassio in a dark street? Is he driven to incontinence by the sight of a pretty woman playing Parthenia, or Pauline, or Desdemona, or Lady Teazle? What, then, must be thought of the virtue which melts like wax in the heat of such exceedingly mild fires as these? What becomes of such a person when he is led into society and obliged to stand the tremendous strain of an evening party? It is a great pity, surely, for certain philosophers, and for the weak vessels of the earth in general, that Nature has made women alluring and roses sweet. But there is one way of safety for all such imperiled creatures. If the stage is really thought to weaken character by undue enticement, you have only to present it as it really is, and that dreaded glamour will vanish like smoke. Divest it of nonsense in your thought. Quit describing it as a fascination of the devil. Cease telling ignorant people to keep away from the one particular room in Blue-Beard's palace. There is not among men a more exacting, laborious, stern profession than that of the stage. There is no place more strictly mechanical and prosaic than a theater. The stage is not a Paphian Bower; it is a machine-shop. You may as sensibly allege the immoral

influence of a cotton factory as the immoral influence of the stage, to a man who knows it.

The worst influence that I know of, as proceeding from the stage, is one that also proceeds from the pulpit, and perhaps from all artistic pursuits,—the possible weakening of character, from encouragement of the love of admiration in persons who are before the public, whether as actors, orators, writers, preachers, or personal exhibitors of any kind. It takes a long time for a man to learn the usual vagueness, the frequent ignorance, the heedless flippancy, and, therefore, the general worthlessness of the opinions and remarks of most other people about himself or his proceedings,—to learn that the only rational way to live is to make duty a rigid law of life and utterly to ignore what people say. Many men never learn this, and actors in particular, whose fortunes depend so immediately on popular liking, are sometimes pitiable in their restless, craving vanity. The same thing is seen in some clergymen. To my mind, at least two-thirds of all that occurs in the world, whether on the stage or elsewhere, is of no public importance at all, and ought never to be noticed in any way. We should see fewer cases of vanity, and hear less of nobodies and nothings, if society and the press had not such an inveterate disposition to "chronicle small beer."

The literature of the stage has not improved, and for simple and obvious reasons. After Shakespeare it could not improve; for that was the flood-tide. No such man has since appeared. Then, likewise, the stage has long been a costly institution, dependent on immediate gains, and obliged to aim at pleasing an immediate audience. For this reason, as well as by their nature, most of the writers for the stage have been followers and not leaders of the public sentiment. Great writers have their credentials from God; little ones are chartered by the life which surrounds them; and it is the little writers who have furnished most of the stage literature of the last two hundred and fifty years. Shakespeare produced his plays upon the stage; but he wrote them on a scale and with a scope that transcends all theatrical needs and limits, and made them for a stage as broad as the world and as permanent as the human race. Were there no stage at all, these works would still survive in all their imperial power and brilliant renown; but, without a stage, the works of most dramatists would vanish like the morning mist. Yet, with regard to modern stage literature, let us not forget that, although the nineteenth century has not, in this,

attained to the altitude of the Elizabethan age, it has fully equaled that of any later period. Knowles, Jerrold, Talfourd, Taylor, Marston, Bulwer, Gilbert, Robertson, Boucicault, Boker, Payne, Willis, and Epes Sargent are alone sufficient to prove this.

The principal fault of the stage of the present time, in America, is frivolity, and this comes from the frivolity of the public and the press. Acting is a learned profession. The stage should be devoted to good plays, well acted, and to nothing else. I do not think that the position of acting as a learned profession, or the utility of the stage as an intellectual force, is properly appreciated at this time. The public is far too easily pleased. Many silly things are accepted. Many commonplace persons are admired and commended. The newspapers, almost without exception, sedulously record, as matters of importance, the theatrical doings of individuals who, yesterday, were grocers' clerks or milliners' apprentices. Any person who can buy three-sheet posters and lithograph portraits can usually obtain prominent notice as an actor, in almost every newspaper in the United States; not by purchase, but as a matter of what is called "news." All this is out of proportion. Such a state of things tends to lower the value of critical recognition, cheapen the rewards of effort in dramatic art, and bring serious and splendid endeavor and high ambition into contempt.

The world does not advance in wisdom, virtue, and happiness by denial and destruction. All institutions should be bent to the good of all mankind. It was John Wesley, a clergyman, who said that the devil should not have all the good music. Men should not make their lives tributary to their pursuits, but their pursuits tributary to their lives—drawing from the stage, as from all things else, whatever is good and strong, whatever will help to build up and round out a noble character. Must we destroy the stage because a milksop may chance to be injured by it? Is all life to be squared to the tastes and needs of simpletons?

The thing to be desired is gravity and thoroughness in the American character, more scholarship, habits of study, the rare and noble habit of thinking, in which so few persons ever indulge. As the ideals of intellectual effort rise higher and higher in the community, the sincere workers upon the stage, as in every other department of art, will be encouraged and strengthened, and the stage itself will be ennobled.

WILLIAM WINTER.

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HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH VOLUME

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